Jackman-Bey

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

CHARLOTTE DIVISION

CIVIL CASE NO. 3:26-cv-00002-MR

JEREMY RAPHAEL JACKMAN-BEY, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

MICHELLE JACKMAN-BEY, )

)

As Next Friend, ) MEMORANDUM OF

) DECISION AND ORDER

vs. )

)

JAMIE BULLARD, Warden, )

Tabor Correctional Institution, )

)

Respondent. )

________________________________ )

THIS MATTER is before the Court on initial review of the Petition for

Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, on behalf of

Jeremy Raphael Jackman-Bey (herein “Petitioner”), by Michelle Jackman-

Bey, as his “next friend” (herein “Ms. Jackman-Bey”). [Doc. 1].

I. BACKGROUND

According to the North Carolina Department of Adult Correction

Database,1 the Petitioner is a prisoner of the State of North Carolina pursuant

1 See https://webapps.doc.state.nc.us/opi/viewoffender.do?method=view&offenderID=

1082643&searchOffenderId=1082643&searchDOBRange=0&listurl=pagelistoffendersea

rchresults&listpage=1 (herein “NCDAC Database”); Fed. R. Evid. 201.

to a state court judgment. The Petitioner was convicted in the Mecklenburg

County Superior Court, file number 11CR23384, of Second-Degree Murder

on April 26, 2012. [NCDAC Database]. The state trial court imposed on the

Petitioner an active sentence of 200 to 249 months imprisonment. [Id.]. The

Petitioner’s conviction and sentence imposed in this judgment is projected to

expire November 12, 2029. [Id.].

Ms. Jackman-Bey has filed the petition herein purportedly on behalf of

the Petitioner asserting that she is the “Attorney-in-Fact and Authorized Next

Friend” of the Petitioner. [Doc. 1]. Ms. Jackman-Bey is not an attorney

licensed by the North Carolina State Bar2 to practice law. Further, Ms.

Jackman-Bey neither alleges any facts to show why the Petitioner is

incapable of filing his own petition through licensed counsel or pro se, nor

why this Court should grant her “next friend” status.

II. DISCUSSION

Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is available to a person who is “in

custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that he

is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United

States.” While Ms. Jackman-Bey broadly asserts that the Petitioner is being

2 A search of the North Carolina State Bar membership directory using the surname

“Jackman” or “Jackman-Bey” located no licensed attorney with the full name “Michelle

Jackman-Bey.” https://portal.ncbar.gov/Verification/results.aspx. Fed.R.Evid. 201.

held by the state in violation of the Constitution, her very capacity to assert

these claims for and on behalf of the Petitioner is governed by a separate

part of the Constitution. Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution limits the

power of federal courts to actual cases and controversies. Though “several

doctrines ... have grown up to elaborate that requirement,” the one “that

requires a litigant to have ‘standing’ to invoke the power of a federal court is

perhaps the most important.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). A

person who does not satisfy Article III's standing requirements may still

proceed in federal court if she meets the criteria to serve as “next friend” of

someone who does.

In Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 162 (1990), the Supreme

Court noted that next friend standing “has long been an accepted basis for

jurisdiction in certain circumstances,” expressly permitted in habeas actions,3

and has most often been invoked “on behalf of detained prisoners who are

unable, usually because of mental incompetence or inaccessibility, to seek

relief themselves.” The Court clarified that “[a] ‘next friend’ does not himself

become a party to the habeas corpus action in which he participates, but

3 “Application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be in writing signed and verified by the

person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf.” 28 U.S. Code

§ 2242 (emphasis added).

simply pursues the cause on behalf of the detained person, who remains the

real party in interest.” Id. at 163.

The availability of next friend standing in federal court is not a right and

is strictly limited:

Most important for present purposes, “next friend” standing is by

no means granted automatically to whomever seeks to pursue

an action on behalf of another. Decisions applying the habeas

corpus statute have adhered to at least two firmly rooted

prerequisites for “next friend” standing. First, a “next friend” must

provide an adequate explanation – such as inaccessibility,

mental incompetence, or other disability – why the real party in

interest cannot appear on his own behalf to prosecute the action.

Second, the “next friend” must be truly dedicated to the best

interests of the person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate, and

it has been further suggested that a “next friend” must have some

significant relationship with the real party in interest. The burden

is on the “next friend” clearly to establish the propriety of his

status and thereby justify the jurisdiction of the court.

Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163-64 (internal citations omitted). As the Court

emphasized, “[t]hese limitations on the ‘next friend’ doctrine are driven by the

recognition that it was not intended that the writ of habeas corpus should be

availed of, as matter of course, by intruders or uninvited meddlers, styling

themselves next friends.” Id. at 164.

This Court now turns to the issue of whether Ms. Jackman-Bey

qualifies for next friend status. First, the Court finds that Ms. Jackman-Bey

has no significant relationship with the real party in interest, the Petitioner, or

that she appears truly dedicated to his best interests. This is so simply

because Ms. Jackman-Bey has alleged no such facts leading to either

conclusion. Second, the Court likewise cannot find that the real party in

interest, the Petitioner, is incapable of appearing on his own behalf to

prosecute the action. Ms. Jackman-Bey has alleged no facts setting forth any

basis as to why the Petitioner cannot complete a standard habeas form

himself and sign it under penalty of perjury.

The Court has before it the all-too-common scenario of a concerned

individual, possibly a spouse or family member, wanting only the best for the

named Petitioner who is in state custody. In the absence of any factual

showing of mental incompetence or other disability plaguing the Petitioner,

as well as the absence of any facts showing her significant relationship with

the Petitioner, Ms. Jackman-Bey’s claim to next friend status is unfounded.

As noted by the Fifth Circuit,

[I]ndividuals not licensed to practice law by the state may not use

the “next friend” device as an artifice for the unauthorized

practice of law. The “next friend” expedient, which on occasion

may be essential to the efficacy of the “Great Writ,” may not be

so abused as to unleash on the courts a quasi-professional group

of lay writ writers who would seek to right all wrongs, both real

and imagined.

Weber v. Garza, 570 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir. 1978). As mandated by the

Supreme Court, “[t]he burden is on the ‘next friend’ clearly to establish the

propriety of [her] status and thereby justify the jurisdiction of the court.”

Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 164. Ms. Jackman-Bey has not carried this burden.

Accordingly, Ms. Jackman-Bey fails to qualify for the status of next friend

and, therefore, this Court is without jurisdiction to proceed.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that Ms. Jackman-Bey’s next friend

status is DENIED and this action is DISMISSED for want of subject matter

jurisdiction.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases, the Court DECLINES to issue a certificate

of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322,

338 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Signed: April 20, 2026

Martifi Reidinger ee

Chief United States District Judge AS