Thomas

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

LAKE CHARLES DIVISION

CALVIN THOMAS #532630 CASES NO. 2:23-CV-00592 SEC P

VERSUS JUDGE JAMES D. CAIN, JR.

KEITH COOLEY ET AL MAGISTRATE JUDGE LEBLANC

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed on June 13, 2025, pursuant to

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by defendants Warden Keith Cooley, Krystle

Simon, Ricky Kennon, and Lt. Myranda Seal (collectively referred to as “the Defendants”). This

motion was filed in response to the original complaint (doc. 1) filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

by plaintiff Calvin Thomas (“Thomas”). Doc. 44. Thomas filed an Opposition to the motion.

Doc. 47. The Defendants filed a Reply to Thomas’s Opposition. Doc. 48.

This motion has been referred to the undersigned for review, report, and recommendation

in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636. For the following reasons, IT IS

RECOMMENDED that the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 44) be

GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Thomas filed the instant suit on May 3, 2023. Doc. 1. At all times pertinent to this case,

Thomas was confined to the custody of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections

and housed at Allen Correctional Center (“ACC”) in Kinder, Louisiana. Thomas claims to be a

practitioner of the Rastafari religion, and he summarizes his complaints against the Defendants

this way:

I filed said ARP due to the harassment and religious profiling of

rastafarians, by Head Warden Cooley, Chaplain Kennon, and asst Warden Simon

using color of the law to enforce two non-neutral policies without a legitimate

penological objective strategically attacking hair exemption status to deter

Rastafarians from growing hair while practicing their faith via (diet, forced church).

Doc. 1, p. 4. Specifically, his Complaint alleges that, in a meeting on or about September 28,

2022, at which Warden Cooley was present, all Rastafarians at ACC were “called upon and

informed they were to immediately adhere to new diet (non-meat) regardless, and violators would

lose exemption status and forced to cut hair.” Id. Further, Thomas complains that, on October 12,

2022, all Rastafarians received a memo from Chaplin Kennon stating that it was mandatory that

they attend church service at least 50% of the time or risk losing hair exemption status and, again,

be forced to cut their hair. Id.

Thomas’s hair was never cut while at ACC. See doc. 44-9, p. 3, Calvin Thomas

Admissions and Responses to Interrogatories at Request for Admission No. 1. Thomas admits that

he stopped attending Rastafarian services in December 2023. Id., at Request for Admission No.

2.

No ACC corrections staff, including Chaplain Ricky Kennon, Warden Keith Cooley,

Assistant Warden Krystle Simon, and Lieutenant Myranda Seal, has enforced any of the

challenged policies against Thomas. Id. at Nos. 1, 2, 3.

No ACC corrections staff, including Chaplain Ricky Kennon, Warden Keith Cooley,

Assistant Warden Krystle Simon, and Lieutenant Myranda Seal, has forcibly subjected Thomas to

a haircut. Id. at No. 1.

No ACC corrections staff, including Chaplain Ricky Kennon, Warden Keith Cooley,

Assistant Warden Krystle Simon, and Lieutenant Myranda Seal, has forced Thomas to attend

Religious Services/Church Services. Thomas admits he stopped attending Rastafarian services in

December 2023. Id. at No. 3.

Thomas’s first step Administrative Remedy Procedure (“ARP”) submission was reviewed

by Warden Simon, who denied his request for remedy. See doc. 1, att. 2, p. 1. The response was

prepared and signed by Lieutenant Seal. Id. Thomas sought review of the First Step Response

(doc. 1, att. 2, p. 1) and received a Second Step Response that addressed meal options for

Rastafarians but did not speak to Thomas’s claims of harassment based on the church attendance

policy (doc. 1, att. 2, p. 2).

Thomas alleges that the church attendance policy being instituted at ACC is arbitrary and

capricious and is implemented to target and deter Rastafarians from growing their hair while

practicing their faith. He alleges that the rule violates the First Amendment, because it does not

demonstrate a neutral policy, there is no legitimate penological objective, and it does not “effect

[sic] prison resources or impact accommodation of asserted rights on prison or inmates.” Doc. 1,

att. 2, p. 4. Thomas requests the following relief: “[a]n independent external reviewer and federal

transparency for objectivity to eliminate defendants impunity,” for “said officials [to be] held

accountable,” to be “[p]rovided DOC policy regarding hair exemption criteria, eligibility and

forfeiture,” and monetary relief for compensatory, nominal and punitive damages. Doc. 1, p. 4,

¶V. Finally, Thomas is seeking to be permanently remanded to federal custody to avoid the risk

of retaliatory actions for his complaints. Doc. 1, att. 2, p. 6.

On August 1, 2023, Magistrate Judge Kathleen Kay recommended that all claims against

DPSC Secretary James LeBlanc be dismissed. Doc. 4. The Court adopted that recommendation

on September 12, 2023. Doc. 7.

On November 22, 2023, the remaining Defendants moved to dismiss the remainder of

Plaintiff’s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. Doc. 18.

Specifically, the Defendants argued they were entitled to sovereign immunity for (1) the claims

for monetary relief under § 1983 against the Defendants in their official capacity and (2) all claims

for monetary relief under RLUIPA. Id.; doc. 18-1. The Defendants also argued that Thomas failed

to state a cause of action under § 1983 because Thomas’s rights were not violated and so the

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. They also argued Thomas failed to plead a physical

injury so, under the PLRA, he is not entitled to compensatory damages. Id.

On September 27, 2024, the undersigned recommended that the Motion to Dismiss be

granted in part and denied in part. Doc. 28. The Court adopted the Report and Recommendation

in its Judgment dated October 21, 2024. Doc. 30. Ultimately, all claims were dismissed except

the following claims, which are the subject of this motion:

1. Thomas’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for monetary relief against the Defendants, in their

individual capacity;

2. Thomas’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for injunctive relief against the Defendants in their

official capacities; and

3. Thomas’s RLUIPA claim for injunctive relief.

II. POLICIES AT ISSUE

In December 2020, Allen Correctional Center had in place ACC policy No. 02-08-004. See

doc. 44-2, ACC Policy for Religious Services, attached as Exhibit A to Defendants’ Motion for

Summary Judgment. ACC Policy No. 02-08-00424 was revised in December 2022 (doc. 44-3)

and in September 2023 (doc. 44-3). ACC policy No. 02-08-004 was adopted pursuant to the State

of Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections Department Regulation No. PS-E-1.

See doc. 44-5, DPSC Regulation for Religious Services, attached as Exhibit B to Defendants’

Motion for Summary Judgment.

State of Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections Department Regulation

No. PS-E-127 became effective on December 12, 2018. DPSC Regulation No. PS-E-1 provides

for Religious Faith-Based Programs and Services in subsection 7.G.(1) which provides that each

Warden shall ensure that Offenders have the opportunity to participate in practices of their

religious faith that are deemed essential by the faith’s governing judicatory, limited only by

documentation showing threat to the safety of persons involved in the practice of the faith or that

the practice itself disrupts order in the institution. Id. DPSC Regulation No. PS-E-1 subsection

7.G.(2) provides that in determining what constitutes legitimate religious practices, the Warden or

his designee shall consider whether there is a body of literature stating religious practices that

support the practices and whether the practices are recognized by a group of persons who share

common ethical, moral, or intellectual views. Id.

ACC Policy Offender Posted Policy #11 (doc. 44-6, ACC Grooming Policy, attached as

Exhibit C to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment) became effective on June 3, 2015.

DPSC Regulation Offender Posted Policy #11 (doc. 44-7, DPSC Grooming Policy, attached as

Exhibit D to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment) became effective on August 25, 2021.

The DPSC Grooming Policy, with respect to an offender’s grooming of their head hair, provides,

“an offender’s appearance and hair style or length must not conflict with institutional requirements

for security, safety, identification, hygiene, and all valid penological goals. Controls are necessary

to prevent incidents such as the introduction, concealment, and trafficking of contraband; the

ability to easily change one’s appearance both in prison and in the event of an escape; and the

ability to have a gang or group identity, which is destabilizing in a prison environment.” Id. The

DPSC Grooming Policy also provides that, “C. An offender’s hair shall be groomed in a manner

as to prevent the concealment of contraband and to limit the offender’s ability to change his

appearance both in prison and in the event of an escape. An offender’s hairstyle may not interfere,

delay, or create difficulty in conducting search procedures. D. Hair, facial hair, and sideburns of a

length and style which can be used to conceal contraband and which are not easily inspected are

prohibited….” Id. An offender at ACC who wishes to avoid compliance with the DPSC and/or

ACC Grooming Policies may request a “Religious Exemption” by completing Form PS-E-1-a

(doc. 44-8, Religious Exemption, attached as Exhibit E to Defendants’ Motion for Summary

Judgment).

The Religious Exemption provides at subsection 3, “I understand that if I am granted this

exception: a. I agree to abide by the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections

regulations, policies, and procedures in order to protect Departmental staff and other offenders; b.

I agree to remain actively engaged in my religion at least 50 percent of the time on a monthly basis

or else forfeit my right to a religious exemption; and c. The Head Warden of my institution may

withdraw the religious exemption if I abuse it in a manner that undermines the prison’s compelling

interests.” Id.

III. LAW & ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment Standard

A court should grant a motion for summary judgment when the pleadings, including the

opposing party’s affidavits, “show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see also Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment is initially

responsible for demonstrating the reasons justifying the motion for summary judgment by

identifying portions of pleadings and discovery that show the lack of a genuine issue of material

fact for trial. Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V Risan, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995). The court must deny

the moving party’s motion for summary judgment if the movant fails to meet this burden. Id.

Ordinarily, summary judgment may not be granted merely because no opposition has been filed.

See Luera v. Kleberg Cnty., Tex., 460 Fed. App’x 447, 449 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).

Once the movant makes this showing, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to set

forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). The burden requires more than mere allegations or denials of the

adverse party’s pleadings. The non-moving party must demonstrate by way of affidavit or other

admissible evidence that there are genuine issues of material fact or law. Celotex Corp., 106 S.Ct.

at 2553. There is no genuine issue of material fact if, viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party, no reasonable trier of fact could find for the non-moving party.

Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014). Furthermore, a court may not make credibility

determinations or weigh the evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Reeves v.

Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2110 (2000). However, the nonmovant must

submit “significant probative evidence” in support of his claim. State Farm Life Ins. Co. v.

Gutterman, 896 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1990). If the evidence is merely colorable or is not

significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 106 S.Ct. at 2511.

B. The Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s § 1983

claims for monetary damages.

“The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their

conduct ‘does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.’” DeMarco v. Bynum, 50 F.4th 479, 483 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting

Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11, 136 S.Ct. 305, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015)) (additional citation

omitted). The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that the immunity issue must

be resolved at the earliest possible stage of the litigation since it entails not merely a defense to

liability but is instead immunity from suit and an entitlement not to stand trial or face the burdens

of litigation. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009); Saucier v. Katz, 553 U.S. 194, 202

(2001). The Plaintiff bears the burden to “negate qualified immunity.” Estevis v. Cantu, 134 F.4th

793, 798 (5th Cir. 2025) (citing King v. Handorf, 821 F.3d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 2016) (when qualified

immunity is asserted, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to “show that the defense is not available”)).

To overcome the immunity defense, Thomas “must show both (1) that the officials violated [his]

statutory or constitutional right and (2) that right was clearly established at the time of the

challenged conduct.” Williams v. City of Yazoo, Mississippi, 41 F.4th 416, 422 (5th Cir. 2022)

(citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011)).

1. Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were not violated.

The Court found that Thomas pled a plausible violation of his First Amendment rights via

“defendants’ ongoing application of the religious service attendance policy.” Doc. 28, p. 9, 12.

However, Thomas cannot merely rest on his pleadings to overcome the qualified immunity defense

raised in the instant motion for summary judgment. Johnson v. Bd. of Supervisors of Louisiana

State Univ. & Agric. & Mech. Coll., 90 F.4th 449, 455 (5th Cir. 2024) (“In opposing summary

judgment, a party ‘may not rest on mere conclusory allegations or denials in its pleadings.’”)

(quoting Smith v. Regional Transit Auth., 827 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2016)). He must offer

evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact for trial.

Thomas requests nominal damages for the past violation of his First Amendment rights

when the religious service attendance policy was supposedly enforced against him. Doc. 28, p. 9,

12. According to Thomas, that policy required attendance at 50% of available Rastafari religious

services to avoid losing the religious exemption and risk being forced to cut his hair. See doc. 44-

9, Calvin Thomas Admissions and Responses to Interrogatories at Interrogatory No. 3; see also

Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendants’ Summary Judgment, doc. 47, p. 1 (“Plaintiff Calvin Thomas

opposes Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and ascertains his first amendment rights

were violated by the implementation of unconstitutional policy [mandatory 50% church attendance

to avoid haircut].”)

Thomas was granted a religious exemption in 2021, while at the David Wade Correctional

Center. Doc. 44-9. The Defendants represent that this exemption was never taken away, and

Thomas puts forth no evidence to refute this contention. Further, Thomas admitted that “[his] hair

wasn’t cut period.” Doc. 44-9, p. 3. And he “stopped attending Rastafarian church services [in]

Dec[ember] 2023.” Id.

While Thomas argues in his Opposition to the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

that his constitutional rights were violated because the policies at issue are not reasonably related

to a legitimate penological interest (doc. 47, pp. 3-4), he puts forth no evidence to dispute the

Defendants’ argument that the policy was never enforced against the Plaintiff.

Furthermore, in their Reply to Plaintiff’s Opposition, the Defendants introduce the

testimony of Defendant Chaplain Ricky Kennon. Doc. 48-1. In his affidavit, Chaplain Kennon

states that no ACC Corrections Staff, and specifically including the individual Defendants herein,

have ever enforced the policies at issue against this Plaintiff. Id.

Therefore, without any evidence of the enforcement of the policies (i.e., his hair being cut

and/or forcible attendance of religious services) by the individual Defendants, his claim that the

Defendants should not be entitled to qualified immunity is defeated. See Estrada v. Nehls, 524

F.Supp.3d 578, 590 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 9, 2021) (assuming an unconstitutional policy existed, the

plaintiff’s claims still failed because he did not show the policy caused a violation of his

constitutional rights); see also Pappillion v. La. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr., 2022 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 55505 (M.D. La. March 28, 2022) (“Though unconstitutional practices existed, to succeed

herein, Pappillion must be able to demonstrate that the unconstitutional practices caused a

constitutional violation in his particular case, i.e., Pappillion must demonstrate that an actual

constitutional violation, here, deliberate indifference, resulted from the practices. Because the

summary judgment evidence demonstrates that deliberate indifference did not exist in Pappillion’s

particular case, much less result from unconstitutional practices, his claims must fail.”)

2. Defendants’ conduct was not unlawful under clearly established law.

“The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is

whether it would be clear to a reasonable [official] that his conduct was unlawful in the situation

he confronted.” Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 445 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533

U.S. at 202). “The Supreme Court has ‘repeatedly told courts ... not to define clearly established

law at a high level of generality.’ Instead, ‘the clearly established law must be ‘particularized’ to

the facts of the case.’” Wetherbe v. Texas Tech Univ. Sys., 138 F.4th 296, 301 (5th Cir. 2025)

(cleaned up) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015); White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79

(2017)). To overcome this element of the qualified immunity defense, it is not enough for the

plaintiff to show that his constitutional rights were violated; he must prove that each defendant’s

conduct violated clearly established law. Each defendant’s actions must be examined

independently to determine his entitlement to qualified immunity. Solis v. Serrett, 31 F.4th 975,

981 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Meadours v. Ermel, 483 F.3d 417, 421–22 (5th Cir. 2007)); see also

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens

and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the

official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”)

In his Opposition, Thomas argues that the Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity

because their conduct was unlawful under clearly established laws. Doc. 47, p. 4. In support of

this argument, Thomas states that the actions of Defendant Warden Cooley1, Defendant Chaplain

Kennon2 and Defendant Simon3 are not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. (He

makes no mention of any conduct by Defendant Lieutenant Seal.) However, Thomas failed to

produce any evidence, whatsoever, showing that each individual Defendant engaged in conduct

that violated clearly established law

Again, “[Thomas’s] hair wasn’t cut period” (see doc. 44-9, p. 3) and he has provided no

evidence that he was forced to attend any unwanted religious services. Absent the underlying

constitutional violation, Thomas cannot meet his burden of showing that each Defendant’s actions

violated clearly established constitutional law.

C. Plaintiff lacks standing to pursue claims for injunctive relief against the

Defendants in their official capacities and his claims for injunctive relief are

otherwise barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

As set forth above, Thomas admitted that “[his] hair wasn’t cut period” and he “stopped

attending Rastafarian church services [in] Dec[ember] 2023.” Doc. 44-9, p. 3. There is no

evidence that the challenged policy was ever enforced against him. Thomas therefore lacks Article

III standing to pursue a claim for injunctive relief against the Defendants.

Article III of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to actual

cases or controversies. U.S. Const. Art. III. “‘No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s

1 Doc 47 at p. 4, para 2 (“Defendant Warden Cooley plead he instructs all staff at ACC to adhere to DPSC regulations,

however, forced church policy isn’t a DPSC regulation.”).

2 Id. ((“[D]efendant Kennon sent email championing illegal policy.”)

3 Id. (“[D]efendant Simon screened and responded to first step ARP but neglected her duties to intervene as required.”)

proper role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court

jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.’” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 337 (2016)

(quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997)). “A proper case or controversy exists only

when at least one plaintiff ‘establish[es] that he ha[s] standing to sue.’” Murthy v. Missouri, 603

U.S. 43, 57 (2024) (quoting Raines, 521 U.S. at 818; Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 588 U.S. 752,

766 (2019)). “The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing standing as of the time he brought the

lawsuit and maintaining it thereafter.” Id. (cleaned up). Furthermore, “standing is not dispensed

in gross.” Id. at 61 (quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 431 (2021)). That is,

“plaintiffs must demonstrate standing for each claim that they press” against each defendant, “and

for each form of relief that they seek.” Id.

Standing is “an indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case” so he must prove each element

“in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with

the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Lujan v.

Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (citation omitted). “Where, as here, the parties have

taken discovery, the plaintiff cannot rest on ‘mere allegations,’ but must instead point to factual

evidence.” Murthy, 603 U.S. at 58 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561).

Jurisprudence has established that the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing

consists of three elements. The plaintiff must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly

traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a

favorable judicial decision. Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 337 (internal citations omitted).

The State’s sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

further limit federal jurisdiction. This Court previously held that the Eleventh Amendment

provides non-consenting states with immunity “from any lawsuit seeking monetary damages or

equitable relief brought in federal courts . . .” Doc. 28, p. 6 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.

651 (1974)). In Ex parte Young, the Supreme Court recognized an exception to the State’s

sovereign immunity. 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441, 52 L. Ed. 714 (1908). The Supreme Court held

that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit if it is brought (1) to correct an ongoing violation

of the Constitution or a federal right, (2) is against individual persons in their official capacities as

agents of the state, and (3) the relief sought [is] declaratory or injunctive in nature and prospective

in effect. Doc. 28, p. 6. (quoting Aguilar v. Texas Dep’t of Crim. Just, 160 F.3d 1052, 1054 (5th

Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted)).

“[C]ourts recognize the significant overlap between Article III jurisdiction, Ex parte

Young, and equitable relief.” Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Texas, Dep’t of Ins., Div. of Workers' Comp.,

851 F.3d 507, 520 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing NiGen Biotech, L.L.C. v. Paxton, 804 F.3d 389, 394 n.5

(5th Cir. 2015) (equating and distinguishing Ex parte Young’s requirements with the “Article III

minimum for standing to request an injunction”)).

Thomas’s constitutional rights were not and are not being violated so he fails the injury-

in-fact element of standing and the ongoing-violation element of Ex parte Young. “Whether

Plaintiffs have alleged ongoing constitutional violations is a central question of both the Article III

standing analysis and the Ex parte Young analysis in this case.” James v. Hegar, 86 F.4th 1076,

1081 (5th Cir. 2023). Article III jurisprudence will therefore inform the Court’s analysis of the

ongoing-violation element of Young. Id. “An injury-in-fact constitutes ‘an invasion of a legally

protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not

conjectural or hypothetical.’” Wendt v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc., 821 F.3d 547, 550 (5th Cir.

2016) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).

In the matter before this Court, Thomas candidly admits that the policy has never been

enforced against him. His hair “wasn’t cut period” and he has not attended religious services since

December 2023. Doc. 44-9, p. 3. Considering those admissions, Thomas cannot meet his burden

of proving the injury-in-fact element of the standing inquiry or the ongoing-violation element of

Ex parte Young. Furthermore, the Defendants represent that the challenged policy has not been

enforced at ACC as to any Rastafarian offender. Rastafarian offenders are neither forced to attend

religious services nor forcibly subjected to a haircut for a failure to attend a certain percentage of

services. To have standing to request prospective injunctive relief, the Plaintiff must demonstrate

“continuing harm or a real and immediate threat of repeated injury in the future.” James, 86 F.4th

at 1081 (quoting Soc’y of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman, 959 F.2d 1283, 1285 (5th Cir. 1992)).

“The threat of future injury must be ‘certainly impending’; mere allegations of possible future

injury will not suffice.” Id. (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409, 133 S.Ct.

1138, 185 L.Ed.2d 264 (2013)). And where, as here, the plaintiff brings a pre-enforcement

challenge to a policy or rule, the plaintiff must show that “the threat of future enforcement of the

challenged policies is substantial.” Nat’l Press Photographers Ass’n v. McCraw, 90 F.4th 770,

781 (5th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up) (quoting Speech First, Inc. v. Fenves, 979 F.3d 319, 330 (5th Cir.

2020)). Considering the policy has not been enforced as to Thomas or any other Rastafarian

offender at ACC, the Defendants argue, and the Court agrees, that Thomas cannot prove an actual

or imminent injury-in-fact as required to establish Article III standing or the Ex parte Young

exception to sovereign immunity.

The traceability element of standing correlates to the requirement of Ex parte Young that

the named defendants have some connection with enforcement of the challenged policy. Supreme

Court precedents explain that traceability requires “a causal connection between the injury and the

conduct complained of. In other words, the injury has to be ‘fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged

action of the defendant.’” California v. Texas, 593 U.S. 659, 692–93 (2021) (cleaned up) (quoting

Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). For purposes of Ex parte Young, Thomas must show that the named state

officials have some causal connection with enforcement of the challenged provision. Okpalobi v.

Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 411–12 (5th Cir. 2001).

In his Statement of Issues, Thomas alleges that Warden Cooley “instructs all staff at Allen

Correctional Center to adhere to DPSC regulations.” Doc. 42, p. 2. He alleges Warden Simon

should know of these policies in light of her job duties but she also failed to properly respond to

his ARP. Id. He also alleges Chaplain Kennan notified the offenders of the policy (which was

never thereafter enforced). Id. at p. 1. As set forth above, because the policy was never actually

enforced, Thomas is unable to allege, or provide any evidence to establish, that any Defendant is

connected to enforcement of the policy. Therefore, Thomas fails the traceability element, because

he has not causally connected any action of any Defendant to his alleged harm.

Finally, the Court finds that a decision favorable to Thomas will not “relieve a discrete

injury” to him. Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Texas, Dep’t of Ins., Div. of Workers’ Comp., 851 F.3d 507,

514 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 243 n.15 (1982)). As established

by the evidence submitted by the Defendants in support of this motion, Thomas has been given

accommodations based on his religious beliefs and practices. Specifically, he has an exemption

from haircuts and has been given a special diet. An injunction to stop enforcement of the policy,

which is not being enforced, will not affect Thomas.

In conclusion, the undersigned finds that Thomas lacks standing to pursue injunctive relief

under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and RLUIPA. Nonspecific, vague, conclusory, and unsupported

statements that the Defendants are “continuing to engage in unlawful conduct” do not support

federal jurisdiction. James, 86 F.4th 1076 (citations omitted). Thomas has not been injured, and

the evidence indicates he will not be injured in the future. He therefore lacks standing and fails to

show the elements of Ex parte Young. The claims for injunctive relief should therefore be

dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS RECOMMENDED that the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 44)

be GRANTED and that the action be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of this Report and Recommendation to

file written objections with the Clerk of Court. Failure to file written objections to the proposed

factual findings and/or the proposed legal conclusions reflected in this Report and

Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of receipt shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking

either the factual findings or the legal conclusions accepted by the District Court, except upon

grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429-

30 (Sth Cir. 1996).

THUS DONE AND SIGNED in chambers this 3rd day of March, 2026.

UNITED S®¥TES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

-16-