The opinion
Case: 25-30213 Document: 53-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/20/2026
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
April 20, 2026
No. 25-30213 Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
Amanda Carter, Individually and real party in interest G.C.;
Michael Carter,
Plaintiffs—Appellees,
versus
Chad Dupuy, Individually; Jason Ard, Sheriff, in his official capacity
as the public entity responsible for LPSO,
Defendants—Appellants.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
USDC No. 3:23-CV-69
______________________________
Before Clement, Graves, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
James C. Ho, Circuit Judge:
“[A] constitutional violation does not occur every time an officer
touches someone.” Ikerd v. Blair, 101 F.3d 430, 434 (5th Cir. 1996). “Not
every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a
judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment.” Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (cleaned up). “In just about every conceivable situation,
some amount of force or contact would be too nominal to constitute a
constitutional violation.” Ikerd, 101 F.3d at 434. “When the force used is
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insufficient to satisfy the legal standard necessary for recovery, the amount
of force is de minimis for constitutional purposes.” Id.
And that’s precisely what we find in this case. The use of force used
here was de minimis. We accordingly reverse.
I.
Plaintiff Amanda Carter’s minor daughter attends Live Oak High
School. In February 2022, an agent of the Louisiana Department of Children
and Family Services visited Carter and her husband Michael at their home to
investigate a report of child abuse. After this visit, the Carters immediately
drove to Live Oak to pick up their daughter.
Around this time, the agent contacted the high school and ordered the
school not to release the girl to the Carters’ custody. The school then began
locking all exterior school doors to prevent the Carters’ entry. The school
also contacted Chad Dupuy, a deputy from the Livingston Parish Sheriff’s
Office assigned to the school as the school resource officer, and asked him to
report to the school’s front office. The school informed Dupuy that it had
been instructed not to release the girl to the Carters, and that an agent of the
Department was on his way to the school.
When they arrived at Live Oak, Amanda Carter entered the front
office, while her husband remained outside with Dupuy. School officials
informed Carter that they had been instructed not to release the girl. Carter
became angry and used profanity. The school secretary warned Carter that
she would have to leave the office if she continued to use profanity.
Shortly afterward, Carter stepped partially outside the office to talk to
her husband. She then re-entered the office. Following Carter’s exchange
with her husband, Dupuy asked Carter to step outside the office. But Carter
refused to leave without her daughter. Surveillance footage depicts her
gesturing angrily while speaking to Dupuy.
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Dupuy grasped Carter’s arm and pulled her toward the door. When
Carter refused to move, Dupuy pushed her a few inches through the office
doorway.
Carter sued Dupuy, along with Sheriff Jason Ard. She alleged that
Dupuy’s use of force violated her Fourth Amendment rights. She also
brought Louisiana state law claims against Dupuy for negligence, assault, and
battery, and against Sheriff Ard under a respondeat superior theory.
Dupuy and Sheriff Ard moved for summary judgment, asserting
qualified immunity. The district court denied their motion.
On appeal, Dupuy contends that the district court erred in denying
him summary judgment as to qualified immunity, and that Carter’s state law
claims should be dismissed because he did not use excessive force.
We agree and accordingly reverse.
II.
We review a denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity
“to the extent it turns on an issue of law.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511,
530 (1985). “Where that denial was because of genuine issues of material
fact, we do not have jurisdiction to review the genuineness of any factual
disputes but can decide whether the factual disputes were material.” Spikes
v. Wheat, 141 F.4th 662, 667 (5th Cir. 2025) (cleaned up). We “consider only
whether the district court correctly assessed the legal significance of the facts
it deemed sufficiently supported for purposes of summary judgment.” Id.
(cleaned up).
Ordinarily, we review the summary judgment facts in the light most
favorable for the plaintiff, drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor. See
Griggs v. Brewer, 841 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 2016). In so doing, “we must
view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff and ask whether the defendant would be entitled to qualified
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immunity on those facts.” Cole v. Carson, 935 F.3d 444, 452 (5th Cir. 2019).
As to that question, our review is de novo. Id.
But “when there is video evidence available in the record, the court is
not bound to adopt the non-moving party’s version of the facts if it is
contradicted by the record, but rather should view the facts in the light
depicted by the videotape.” Scott v. City of Mandeville, 69 F.4th 249, 254 (5th
Cir. 2023) (cleaned up).
III.
To overcome qualified immunity, Carter must show “(1) that the
official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was
clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-
Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (cleaned up). Courts have discretion to
address these two prongs in any order. See id. Because the first prong is
dispositive here, we need not address the second.
To prevail on an excessive force claim, Carter must show “(1) an
injury, (2) which resulted directly and only from the use of force that was
clearly excessive, and (3) the excessiveness of which was clearly
unreasonable.” Manis v. Lawson, 585 F.3d 839, 843 (5th Cir. 2009). This
inquiry is guided by the following factors: “the severity of the crime at issue,
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or
others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade
arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. In evaluating these factors, courts
consider the “totality of the circumstances.” Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73, 80
(2025) (citation omitted).
The force at issue here consists of Dupuy grasping Carter’s arm,
attempting to drag her a few inches through the office doorway, and briefly
pushing her through the doorway. Dupuy used force for, at most, four
seconds. As soon as Carter was outside, Dupuy removed his hands from her
back.
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Under the circumstances, we cannot say that such de minimis force
was “clearly” excessive and unreasonable. Manis, 585 F.3d at 843. Dupuy
knew that the Department was investigating potential child abuse and that it
had instructed the school not to release the girl to the Carters’ custody.
Carter was visibly upset, demanded custody of her child, and refused to
comply with Dupuy’s instructions. For the safety of everyone involved,
Dupuy removed Carter from the office. Once Carter was outside, Dupuy
ceased all force. We hold that the force used by Dupuy was de minimis, and
that Carter suffered no violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district
court thus erred in denying qualified immunity.
IV.
We turn next to Carter’s state law claims. Carter brought Louisiana
state law claims against Dupuy for negligence, assault, and battery, and
against Sheriff Ard under a respondeat superior theory. The district court
denied summary judgment to Dupuy and Sheriff Ard as to these claims
“largely for the same reasons given for the federal excessive force claim.”
Although this is an interlocutory appeal of the district court’s denial
of qualified immunity, we may “exercise [our] discretion to consider under
pendant appellate jurisdiction claims that are closely related to the issue
properly before us,” in the interest of judicial economy. Morin v. Caire, 77
F.3d 116, 119 (5th Cir. 1996). And “[a]lthough we generally exercise this
power with caution, it is appropriate for us to do so in this situation, for if we
were to refuse to exercise jurisdiction over the state law claims, our refusal
would defeat the principal purpose of allowing an appeal of immunity issues
before a government employee is forced to go to trial.” Id. at 119–20 (cleaned
up).
Under Louisiana law, excessive force can constitute negligence. See
Harvey v. City of Eunice Police Dep’t, 2010-1228 (La. App. 3 Cir. 4/6/11), 62
So. 3d 290, 293. “Excessive force transforms ordinarily protected use of
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force into an actionable battery, rendering the defendant officer and his
employer liable for damages.” Patton v. Self, 2006-1029 (La. App. 3 Cir.
3/7/07), 952 So. 2d 874, 878 (citation omitted).
But Dupuy’s use of force was de minimis, not “clearly excessive.”
Manis, 585 F.3d at 843. Carter’s state law claims thus fail, and the district
court erred in denying summary judgment.
* * *
Dupuy’s de minimis use of force did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. Accordingly, Dupuy and Sheriff Ard are entitled to qualified
immunity on Carter’s Fourth Amendment claim. Carter’s state law claims
likewise fail, because Dupuy did not use excessive force. We accordingly
reverse the denial of summary judgment.
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