Diez

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT March 27, 2026

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION

JAMES LOGAN DIEZ, §

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Plaintiff, §

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VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:24-CV-00295

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MR. SCHNEIDER, et al., §

§

Defendants. §

ORDER ADOPTING MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff James Logan Diez alleges he was deprived of his right to vote in the 2024

election when prison staff refused to provide him with the absentee ballot mailed to him

by election officials. Pending before the Court is Defendants Alan Schneider and Bobby

Lumpkin’s motion to dismiss (D.E. 28). On September 24, 2025, United States Magistrate

Judge Jason B. Libby issued his Memorandum and Recommendation (M&R),

recommending that the Court grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismiss all of

Plaintiff’s claims. D.E. 47.

Both parties were provided proper notice of, and opportunity to object to, the

Magistrate Judge’s M&R. FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Plaintiff timely

filed his objections, along with a supplement, on October 9 and 10, 2025.1 D.E. 50, 51.

1 Plaintiff’s objections were due by October 8, 2025. The prison mailbox rule—under which a pro se petitioner’s

notice of appeal is “deemed ‘filed’ at the moment it is delivered to prison authorities for forwarding to the district

court”—also applies to objections to an M&R. Causey v. Cain, 450 F.3d 601, 604 (5th Cir. 2006); see Thompson v.

Rasberry, 993 F.2d 513, 515 (5th Cir. 1993) (applying the prison mailbox rule to filing objections to an M&R). The

envelopes containing Plaintiff’s objections and supplement were postmarked on October 7 and 8, so the Court

considers both timely filed.

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Defendants did not file any objections. After review, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s

objections (D.E. 50, 51) and ADOPTS the M&R in its entirety (D.E. 47). Accordingly, the

Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss (D.E. 28) and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s

claims.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court must review de novo any portion of a magistrate judge’s proposed

findings and recommendations on dispositive matters to which the parties have filed

specific, written objections. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Objections must point out with sufficient

particularity any alleged error in the magistrate judge’s analysis; otherwise, they do not

constitute proper objections and will not be considered. Id.; see Battle v. U.S. Parole

Comm'n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987) (“[P]arties filing objections must specifically

identify those findings objected to.”); Edmonds v. Collins, 8 F.3d 290, 293 n.7 (5th Cir.

1993) (finding that right to de novo review not invoked when petitioner merely re-urges

arguments contained in original petition).

After considering proper objections, the district court may accept, reject, or modify,

in whole or in part, those portions of the proposed findings and recommendations. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72(b). As to any portion for which no objection is filed, a district court reviews for

clearly erroneous factual findings and conclusions of law. United States v. Wilson, 864

F.2d 1219, 1221 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).

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DISCUSSION

Plaintiff asserts five objections to the M&R.2 See D.E. 51. The Court addresses each

objection below.

1. Finality of Plaintiff’s Criminal Conviction

The Magistrate Judge concluded that “[i]n the absence of any pending appeal from

[Plaintiff’s] 2022 felony Burnet County convictions, . . . Plaintiff is ‘finally convicted’

and, therefore, not eligible to be a ‘qualified voter’ in Texas.” D.E. 47, p. 17. Because

Plaintiff is not an eligible voter, the case is moot and injunctive relief is unavailable. Id. at

pp. 12-18. Plaintiff objects that he is not finally convicted and provides proof that he filed

a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. D.E. 51, p. 1.

On January 12, 2026, the Supreme Court denied certiorari on Plaintiff’s appeal. See

Diez v. Texas, No. 25-5969, 2026 WL 79736 (U.S. Jan. 12, 2026). Therefore, Plaintiff no

longer has an appeal pending, and his conviction is final. He is no longer a “qualified voter”

so his case is moot regarding injunctive relief. Plaintiff’s first objection is OVERRULED.

2. Damages under the Voting Rights Act (VRA)

The Magistrate Judge concluded that “while equitable relief fulfills the purpose of

the VRA, a private individual like plaintiff is limited to damage actions under § 1983 in

seeking to protect his right to vote.” D.E. 47, p. 21. Plaintiff claims that he is entitled to

money damages under the VRA, and objects to the Magistrate Judge’s statement that

2 Although Plaintiff states six numbered objections, two of them are similar and are combined. See D.E. 51, pp. 2-3.

Additionally, the Court found no proper objection in Plaintiff’s “supplement” and considers it as additional argument

supporting the existing objections. See D.E. 50.

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Plaintiff failed to cite “any authority holding Plaintiff is entitled to monetary relief under

the VRA.” See D.E. 51, p. 1. He claims that Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58, 65 (1900),

supports his position. However, Wiley was decided 65 years before the passage of the VRA,

so it is not applicable here. The objection regarding money damages under the VRA is

OVERRULED.

3. Damages under § 1983

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) provides that “No Federal civil action may be brought

by a prisoner . . . , for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior

showing of physical injury . . . .” Plaintiff contends that the PLRA does not foreclose his

claim for money damages under § 1983 because he does not seek mental or emotional

damages but rather redress for the deprivation of his right to vote. D.E. 51, pp. 2-3. He

objects to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that because Plaintiff “alleges no physical

injury, he is barred from seeking compensatory, actual damages in this case.” Id.; see D.E.

47, p. 22.

Plaintiff’s argument seems to be that there is some form of compensatory damage

that is recoverable in this case, one that is not emotional, mental, physical, or economic.

See D.E. 51, pp. 2-3. He claims that “damages are presumed” from the deprivation of the

right to vote, and points to cases that discuss “presumed damages,” some in the context of

the denial of the right to vote. Id. (citing Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S.

299, 311 n.14 (1986)). Because Plaintiff’s claims are subject to dismissal for other reasons,

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the Court will not address this argument. For that reason, this objection is OVERRULED

AS MOOT.

4. Right to Vote, Generally

Plaintiff asserts that as a re-enfranchised felon,3 he has a constitutional right to vote.

D.E. 51, pp. 3-5. The Magistrate Judge concluded that Plaintiff “retained only a statutory

right to vote upon being re-enfranchised to vote” under the Texas Election Code, and did

not state a claim for a federal constitutional violation under the First Amendment. D.E. 47,

p. 31. Plaintiff objects, stating that the right to vote is “purely and strictly a U.S.

CONSTITUTION Right, with the U.S. Congress the Apex Constitutional Authority over

ALL Voting REGULATIONS/RULES pursuant to its constitutional authority ‘to alter’ the

Regulations adopted by States . . . .” D.E. 51, p. 4 (emphasis removed); see also D.E. 50.

He contends that the right to vote “NEVER STOPS BEING A CONSITUTIONAL

RIGHT . . . .” Id. at p. 5.

The constitutional right to vote is not guaranteed for those convicted of felonies. See

Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974) (“[T]he exclusion of felons from the vote

has an affirmative sanction in § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). The Magistrate Judge

correctly concluded that when felons are re-enfranchised, their resulting “right to vote” is

no longer conferred by the Constitution, but by operation of state statute. D.E. 47, pp. 28-

31. The State of Texas has chosen to re-enfranchise, by statute, felons who have fully

3 Because Plaintiff has now been finally convicted of a felony and his sentence has not been discharged, he is no

longer qualified to vote. See Tex. Const. art. VI, § 1(a)(3); Tex. Elec. Code § 11.002.

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discharged their sentences. See Tex. Elec. Code. § 11.002(a)(4). This objection is

OVERRULED.

5. Qualified Immunity

Plaintiff contends that Defendants are not entitled to immunity. D.E. 51, p. 5, citing

Fusilier v. Landry, 963 F.3d 447, 455 (5th Cir. 2020) (“[t]he VRA, which Congress passed

pursuant to its Fifteenth Amendment enforcement power, validly abrogated state sovereign

immunity.”) (quoting OCA-Greater Hous. v. Texas, 867 F.3d 604, 614 (5th Cir. 2017)).

The Magistrate Judge concluded that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as to

the “right to vote” and the “right to receive mail” claims. D.E. 47, pp. 31, 36.

Plaintiff’s objection fails because Plaintiff’s claims under the VRA were dismissed

because money damages are unavailable and the case is moot; they were not dismissed on

the basis of immunity. The Magistrate Judge’s conclusions regarding qualified immunity

applied only to the § 1983 claims. D.E. 47, pp. 23-38. This objection is OVERRULED.

CONCLUSION

Having reviewed the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations set

forth in the Magistrate Judge’s Memorandum and Recommendation, as well as Plaintiff’s

objections and all other relevant documents in the record, and having made a de novo

disposition of the portions of the Magistrate Judge’s Memorandum and Recommendation

to which objections were specifically directed, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s

objections and ADOPTS as its own findings and conclusions of the Magistrate Judge (D.E.

47).

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Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss (D.E. 28), and

Plaintiff's claims are hereby DISMISSED as follows:

e Plaintiff’s claims for money damages under § 1983 against Defendants and the

unknown DRC members in their official capacities are DISMISSED without

prejudice;

e Plaintiff’s claims seeking injunctive relief against Defendants and the unknown

DRC members are DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction on mootness grounds;

e Plaintiff’s claims for money damages under the VRA against Defendants and the

unknown DRC members are DISMISSED with prejudice;

e Plaintiff's claims for compensatory damages for his § 1983 First Amendment

claims against Defendants and the unknown DRC members are DISMISSED

with prejudice; and

e Plaintiff's First Amendment right-to-vote and right-to-receive mail claims

against Defendants and the unknown DRC members in their individual

capacities are DISMISSED with prejudice as they are entitled to qualified

immunity.

This action is DISMISSED in its entirety.

ORDERED on March 27, 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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