State of Tennessee v. Jansen L. Smith

04/17/2026

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

March 10, 2026 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JANSEN L. SMITH

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Sequatchie County

No. 2024-CR-22 Bradley Sherman, Judge

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No. M2025-00357-CCA-R3-CD

___________________________________

Following the denial of his motion to suppress, the Defendant was convicted by a

Sequatchie County Jury of driving under the influence (DUI), first offense, a Class A

misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code. Ann. § 55-10-401. He received a sentence of eleven

months and twenty-nine days of supervised probation after service of twenty days in jail

on weekends. In this appeal, the Defendant argues the trial court erred in overruling his

motion to suppress and admitting evidence obtained from an unlawful detention. The

Defendant contends his arrest was without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and

unsupported by probable cause in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to

the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution.

Because the subsequent detention of the Defendant exceeded the duration of a Terry-type

investigatory stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment, we conclude that any evidence

seized as a result should have been suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Wong Sun

v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial

court, vacate the Defendant’s conviction, and dismiss the charge in this case.

Tenn R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed,

Vacated, and Case Dismissed.

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W.

WEDEMEYER, P.J., and MATTHEW J. WILSON, J., joined.

Theodore A. Engel III, District Public Defender, for the appellant, Jansen L. Smith.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Lavy E. Wilber, Senior Assistant

Attorney General; Courtney C. Lynch, District Attorney General; and Randy Clark,

Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

On November 27, 2024, the trial court conducted a hearing on the Defendant’s

motion to suppress. Deputy Joshua Roberts testified that in December 2022 he was

employed with the Sequatchie County Sheriff’s Office. A hospital volunteer working in

the emergency room called Deputy Roberts and advised him that while on a brief break out

in his car in the parking lot, he heard “a male screaming and yelling and hitting his vehicle.”

In response, Deputy Roberts “went ahead and got on [his] radio and hollered for a city

unit.” Deputy Roberts explained that he did so because, “[i]f a male was being that

aggressive[,] I would rather have somebody en route just in case.” Deputy Roberts went

to the parking lot and interacted with the Defendant “[f]or a brief few moments.” Deputy

Roberts described the interaction as, “semi okay. [The Defendant] seemed to be extremely

nervous and sketchy[.]” Deputy Roberts also described the Defendant as “[r]eady to go.”

Deputy Roberts said the Defendant left the parking lot; however, Deputy Roberts “had

already put out a BOLO [be on the look out] on the vehicle.” Deputy Roberts said there

was a female in the passenger seat of the Defendant’s vehicle, which is why he “continued

the BOLO.” He said he was concerned about the safety of the female passenger based on

the Defendant’s actions. Deputy Roberts provided this information to Officer Jacob

Kilgore upon his arrival at the hospital parking lot.

On cross-examination, Deputy Roberts confirmed that he was working in central

security at the emergency room when he encountered the Defendant. He also confirmed

that the hospital volunteer who reported the situation to him was watching it from his car

as it unfolded. Deputy Roberts did not personally observe the reported conduct. The

Defendant was seated in his vehicle when Deputy Roberts walked outside and approached

him. During his interaction with the Defendant, the Defendant talked to Deputy Roberts,

was not aggressive, and appeared nervous. Deputy Roberts understood the Defendant had

been in “some sort of disagreement[.]” Deputy Roberts said the female in the vehicle did

not ask for help, but he explained that it was “two o’clock in the morning and she could

have been afraid.” Deputy Roberts agreed that there were streetlights in the parking lot of

the hospital and that he was wearing a uniform with a badge, a full duty belt, and a gun.

He agreed that the female did not express to him in any way that she was afraid, and she

did not ask him for help. He emphasized that he continued the BOLO out of concern for

the safety of the female passenger. After his brief interaction with the Defendant, the

Defendant drove away from the parking lot. At no point did Deputy Roberts tell the

Defendant that he had to stay in the parking lot or that he was not free to leave.

On redirect examination, Deputy Roberts said his conversation with the Defendant

lasted between one to three minutes. During that time, Deputy Roberts did not have an

opportunity to speak with the female passenger. Upon further questioning from the trial

court, Deputy Roberts affirmed that the hospital volunteer reported to him that the

Defendant was “beating on his own car, hooting, [and] hollering[.]” Upon interacting with

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the Defendant, “the Defendant was respectful and when [Deputy Roberts] asked [the

Defendant] what was going on [the Defendant] told [Deputy Roberts] nothing and then [the

Defendant] pretty much drove off after that.” Asked if he noticed any signs of impairment

at that time, Deputy Roberts said, “No, sir.” Asked again about the female in the vehicle

with the Defendant, Deputy Roberts said that he did not see the female in the vehicle

because it was too dark, that she did not ask for help or call out to him, and that he did not

see any indicator that she herself was in distress. On recross-examination, Deputy Roberts

confirmed that the window was rolled down when he interacted with the Defendant and

that if the female had spoken to him, he would have heard it. Deputy Roberts also

confirmed that there was no report that the Defendant was hitting the female passenger,

and he did not observe any injury to the female passenger. On redirect examination,

Deputy Roberts said that the hospital volunteer reported that the Defendant was punching

at his vehicle and slamming the door. The Defendant was already in his vehicle when

Deputy Roberts approached him. Deputy Roberts agreed that in his one-to-three-minute

interaction with the Defendant, he did not have enough time to investigate the information

he received from the volunteer report. On recross-examination, Deputy Roberts confirmed

there was no report that the Defendant was hitting the female in his vehicle and that Deputy

Roberts did not observe any injury to the female in the vehicle.

Jacob Kilgore of the Dunlap Police Department testified that sometime between one

and two o’clock in the morning on December 3, 2022, he responded to Deputy Roberts’

call at the emergency room. He said Deputy Roberts advised him of a disturbance and

provided him with a description of the Defendant’s vehicle. Asked the nature of the

disturbance, Officer Kilgore said, “[t]here was some kind of possible domestic in the

parking lot of the individual hitting his car and screaming and shouting.” Officer Kilgore

said he issued a BOLO for the vehicle, and Detective Layne stopped the vehicle “a short

time later.” Officer Kilgore arrived at the traffic stop “a short period later” and took over

the investigation.

Officer Kilgore approached the Defendant’s vehicle and spoke with him. He said

the Defendant appeared “calm and kind of lethargic. He wasn’t too hyped up or anything.”

He eventually asked the Defendant to exit the vehicle. Asked whether he asked the

Defendant where he came from or anything of that nature, Officer Kilgore said, “I asked

him what happened at the [emergency room] and he said nothing.” Officer Kilgore

continued to ask the Defendant questions about the emergency room; however, he was

unable “to get a clear answer so [he] quit that investigation and started the DUI

investigation.” Asked what led him to believe the Defendant could be under the influence,

Officer Kilgore said, “[w]hen I arrived at the [emergency room] they said he may have

been under the influence.” Asked what “clues” he had upon contact with the Defendant at

the vehicle, Officer Kilgore said, “lethargic and just odd behavior[.]”

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Officer Kilgore said the Defendant told him that he had taken pain medication.

Officer Kilgore conducted an HGN test, and his notes reflected the Defendant’s pupil size,

equal tracking, lack of smooth pursuit, distinct and sustained nystagmus were at maximum

deviation with an onset of nystagmus prior to 45 degrees. In other words, Officer Kilgore

said the Defendant had involuntary jerking of the eye and dilated pupils, both of which

were indicators that someone could be under the influence. His notes were exhibited to the

hearing. Officer Kilgore did not conduct any other field sobriety tests because the

Defendant was physically unable to due to medical issues.

On cross-examination, Officer Kilgore provided his background, training, and

experience with DUI investigations. He estimated that he had six or seven DUI arrests

with a typical year. He confirmed that he responded to the emergency room and that all of

the information he received pertaining to that encounter came from Deputy Roberts. He

confirmed that Detective Layne never got out of the car, that Detective Layne detained the

Defendant until Officer Kilgore arrived, and that the traffic stop conducted by Detective

Layne was already in progress when he arrived. Officer Kilgore spoke with the Defendant

for approximately a minute or two before he transitioned into the DUI investigation. He

agreed that this was “right off the bat.” He clarified that the Defendant told him that he

had taken pain medication at the hospital. He confirmed that he did not observe the

Defendant driving. He agreed that he had no reason to suspect alcohol impairment and his

only concern was the medication.

At the conclusion of the proof, the trial court expressed concern with why Deputy

Roberts allowed the Defendant to leave the parking lot. The court asked Officer Kilgore

if he knew when the BOLO was made, and Officer Kilgore said, “I believe [the Defendant]

left and then he gave the BOLO if I remember right.” Asked upon further redirect

examination by the State how long the entire event was, including the BOLO, speaking

with Deputy Roberts at the emergency room, and the stop, Officer Kilgore said, “two to

three minutes possibly.” Officer Kilgore agreed that the events occurred “almost

simultaneous[ly].” On recross-examination, Officer Kilgore confirmed that he spent two

minutes with the deputy at the hospital.

In denying the motion to suppress, the trial court made the following findings of

fact:

The Court heard testimony from Deputy Joshua Roberts at the

Sequatchie County Sheriff's Office and Patrolman Officer Jacob Kilgore

from the Dunlap Police Department here. Officer Roberts testified

explaining that he was on duty on the day in question, December the 3rd, the

evening in question rather, early morning in question, December the 3rd,

2022. He was providing security for the emergency room at the hospital in

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his capacity as a deputy with the Sequatchie County Sheriff’s Department.

There was uncontroverted testimony. There was no hearsay objection or

anything like that to the initial sort of foundational and setup remarks

regarding what Deputy Roberts heard from this young man that was working

there at the [emergency room], evidently, and I, of course, make a finding of

fact that some individual was working in the emergency room, working there

at the hospital as a volunteer in the specific effort to get hours or some sort

of educational credit for the purpose of becoming a paramedic, ambulance

driver, something along those lines. That was essentially what Deputy

Roberts testified to, that that individual had taken a break and outside

apparently noticed the [Defendant], having what I think would be most

sensibly characterized as some sort of a fit and taking it out on his own

vehicle in the parking lot.

So he immediately let the deputy know what was going on. That all

makes sense so far, because the deputy is there specifically to provide

security. The deputy took that information that there was folks in the parking

lot and that there’s a gentleman outside the car beating on his own car and

kind of hooting and hollering and having a fit, or acting erratically. Then

called for backup, because as Patrolman Kilgore said, he’s not -- the deputy

is not POST certified and wasn’t necessarily fully prepared to deal with all

of those -- with the interaction that might ensue when he approached [the

Defendant], so he did what a sensible officer would do, he called for backup,

and evidently, based upon the timeline that’s been established here this

afternoon, backup was on [its] way, they responded very quickly. In the

meantime, Deputy Roberts goes out and talks to [the Defendant]. It’s

concerning for the Court that [the Defendant] didn’t apparently, you know,

give the deputy any pause or any reason to further detain him, ask him to step

out of the vehicle, question him about the potential disorderly conduct that

he may have been engaging in and that the deputy learned about from the

volunteer. Didn’t ask, you know, didn’t really get into the issue of what was

going on with the female passenger and whether there was a domestic

altercation.

Now, all these things, apparently, were relayed to, you know, dispatch

and the city officer responds. So we’ve got Deputy Roberts responding to

some statements made by a volunteer who happened to witness [the

Defendant’s] behavior, and he did what he was suppose to do, he went out

there and checked it out, and in doing so contacted back, contacted dispatch,

called for backup, all the sorts of things that law enforcement officers do.

Everything is above board. Everything is good at this point.

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Now, it helps the Court to understand fully the timeline involved,

because if Deputy Roberts chose not to further detain or question at length

[the Defendant], and then [the Defendant] was pulled over sometime and

some ways down the road, I’m talking 10, 15, 20, 30 minutes, 5, 10, 15 miles

down the road, I would probably agree with [defense counsel’s] reasonable

suspicion argument that the reasonable suspicion probably should have

ended there the moment that the deputy released this gentleman, but knowing

that all this matters unfolded in the course of a few minutes in close proximity

to each other, I agree with the State’s position with regard to the community

caretaking function. I mean, they’ve got reason to think that something is

happening to or between these folks. The call had already went out. There’s

nothing inappropriate or unconstitutional about calling for backup. The

BOLO was sort of in place.

Patrolman Kilgore pulls up there to the hospital, speaks very briefly

with Deputy Roberts, who I’m taking from his testimony, can’t leave the

hospital and just go on some sort of chase of his own. [The Defendant] is

acting in a way that doesn’t comport with what Deputy Roberts just heard

from the witness and that probably raised some reasonable suspicion that

maybe he was trying to hide something or cover up something there or at

least get the police to just leave him alone, disengage so he could go on about

his night. I can’t find that Patrolman Kilgore did anything wrong in

responding to the call and immediately noticing the vehicle just a few

moments after Deputy Roberts had interacted with [the Defendant], and

apparently when talking to [the Defendant], [the Defendant] had some

medical issues that made him unable to conduct most of the field sobriety

tests, that gets into the HGN issue. That is technical and that is complicated,

but it’s also uncontroverted that [the Defendant] at least admitted to using

some sort of pain medication here. So in terms of these bare issues of

reasonable suspicion to look into [the Defendant] and then probable cause to

arrest him, I’m going to come down on the side of the State here and

respectfully deny the motion to suppress the evidence[.]

....

It’s an interesting case and it might be one that [defense counsel] ends up

pursuing all the way if [the Defendant] is convicted, but it seems to me like

considering the relative proximity to one another, that all these events took

place both temporarily and spatially, I don’t think I’m stepping on [the

Defendant’s] constitutional rights in denying the motion. Seems like the law

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was doing their job the whole way. I would think differently and feel

different about it if [the Defendant] left the parking lot, Deputy Roberts

didn’t stop him, didn’t think anything was wrong, didn’t bother to detain him,

or investigate further and then he was pulled over 20 minutes down the road

and there was no evidence of him driving badly or like I say, swerving,

running a stop sign, anything like that, but because of the way in which all

of these events took place so close together both in time and like I say,

geographically, I think that there was reasonable suspicion and then probable

cause to go ahead and affect the arrest of [the Defendant], so the motion is

denied.

Asked to clarify the basis for its ruling, the trial court stated there was reasonable

suspicion to support the traffic stop and that the traffic stop was also justified by the

community caretaking doctrine.1 At the close of the motion to suppress, the parties noted

their agreement that the HGN would not be used at trial.

The Defendant had a one-day jury trial on December 5, 2024, during which Deputy

Roberts testified, in large part, consistently with his motion to suppress testimony.

Significantly, however, Deputy Roberts stated that the hospital volunteer reported to him

that the Defendant “was yelling or screaming at a female that was with him and hitting his

own vehicle.” Deputy Roberts immediately went to the parking lot, observed the

Defendant in his vehicle, and simultaneously issued a BOLO and requested backup from a

city officer. Deputy Roberts approached the Defendant as the Defendant was leaving the

parking lot. He testified that he got the Defendant to stop his vehicle, and the Defendant

rolled down his window. Deputy Roberts asked the Defendant “if what the volunteer said

was true[?]” The Defendant replied, “[N]o, nothing happened.” Asked what Deputy

Roberts did next, Deputy Roberts said, “I was kind of left in my worries trying to think of

what to do next.” Deputy Roberts then agreed that the Defendant “ended up leaving

afterwards.” Deputy Roberts said his encounter with the Defendant lasted “[m]aybe 30 to

45 seconds.” Deputy Roberts advised Officer Kilgore of this information, another BOLO

was placed, and Detective Lane subsequently stopped the Defendant’s vehicle.

On cross-examination, Deputy Roberts confirmed that he did not personally observe

any of the behavior as reported by the volunteer in the parking lot. He agreed that at the

time he yelled for the Defendant to stop his vehicle, the Defendant’s window was partially

1

The record on appeal does not include the entry of an order from the trial court denying the motion

to suppress; however, neither party contests the ruling of the trial court or whether this issue has been

properly preserved for meaningful appellate review. See e.g., State v. Summers, No. W2024-00830-CCA-

R3-CD, 2025 WL 832117, at *14 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 17, 2025), perm. appeal denied (Aug. 8, 2025);

State v. Davis, No. W2008-00226-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 160927, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 23, 2009).

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down. He agreed that when the Defendant stopped his vehicle, the Defendant rolled his

window completely down and spoke with the deputy. At this point, the Defendant

appeared calm and “seemed like he was in a little bit of pain[.]” He agreed the Defendant

was not yelling and screaming. He agreed that he let the Defendant leave the parking lot.

Detective David Layne with the Sequatchie County Sheriff’s Office, a patrolman at

the time of the offense, testified that on December 3, 2022, he responded to a BOLO and

initiated a traffic stop of the Defendant’s vehicle. He obtained the identification from the

driver and the passenger, ran their information, and waited for Officer Kilgore to arrive.

He said Officer Kilgore arrived “a very short time” after the initial stop. On cross-

examination, Detective Layne confirmed that the traffic stop was initiated based solely on

the BOLO.

Officer Jacob Kilgore of the Dunlap Police Department testified consistently with

his testimony from the motion to suppress. He was dispatched to the emergency room in

Sequatchie County and spoke with Deputy Roberts, who advised him of “some kind of

disturbance at the [emergency room], a possible domestic.” Deputy Roberts also advised

him there was a female passenger in the vehicle. He said Deputy Roberts was led to believe

that it was a possible domestic based on the “erratic” behavior of the driver in hitting the

vehicle. Based on Deputy Roberts report, Officer Kilgore also became suspicious and was

concerned for the female passenger in the vehicle. He could not recall whether a BOLO

had been issued at the time he arrived at the hospital. He put out a BOLO for the vehicle,

and another officer subsequently located and stopped the vehicle. Based on Officer

Kilgore’s timeline of events, he responded to the hospital a minute after the call from

dispatch and spoke with Deputy Roberts at the hospital for “probably a minute.”

Upon his arrival at the traffic stop, Officer Kilgore gathered the identification of the

Defendant and the passenger and then spoke with the driver about the reported disturbance

at the hospital. The Defendant told Officer Kilgore that nothing happened at the hospital.

As he did so, Officer Kilgore observed the Defendant to be lethargic in his actions and

speech. Officer Kilgore asked the Defendant if he had taken anything, and the Defendant

told him he had taken some medicine for pain in the emergency room. Officer Kilgore

then asked the Defendant to exit the vehicle to perform field sobriety tests. Officer Kilgore

was concerned the Defendant was unable to safely operate the vehicle. Officer Kilgore did

not conduct any field sobriety tests due to the Defendant’s medical issues. He confirmed

that the Defendant told him that he was dying of cancer. He took the Defendant into

custody and arrested him for DUI. The Defendant was asked to submit to chemical analysis

of his blood and read his implied consent form, which he signed at the jail. Officer Kilgore

obtained a blood sample from the Defendant and later examination by the Tennessee

Bureau of Investigation revealed that the Defendant’s blood contained 11 nanograms per

milliliter of hydrocodone (opioid), 0.19 micrograms per milliliter of methamphetamine

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(central nervous system stimulant), and 0.06 micrograms per milliliter of cyclobenzaprine

(prescribed as a muscle relaxant).

On cross-examination, Officer Kilgore agreed that he did not observe the Defendant

driving his vehicle. Based on the implied consent form, the Defendant was arrested by

1:50 that morning. Officer Kilgore agreed that the entire encounter, from responding to

the dispatch call to taking the Defendant to the jail, occurred over the course of twenty-

eight minutes. Based on this evidence, the jury convicted the Defendant as charged. The

trial court subsequently ordered the Defendant to be placed on supervised probation for

eleven months and twenty-nine days after service of twenty days in jail on the weekends.

The Defendant filed a motion for new trial relying, in part, on the arguments

previously made at the motion to suppress hearing. In denying the motion for new trial,

the trial court stated, in relevant part,

Rather than try to recall of the top of my head the testimony of Deputy

Roberts and Officer Kilgore, when they originally gave it in the suppression

hearing which was held by agreement up the road in Bledsoe County to

accommodate everyone’s schedules, I think I’m just going to stand on that

transcript. There’s a full transcript of that hearing, all the arguments that

were made, or there can be a full transcript of that hearing, all the arguments,

the testimony of the witnesses, and the Court’s ultimate ruling and findings.

The way that this unfolded, as I recall, and I hesitate to do too much

of this, because we have already kind of heard it afresh once from the actual

law enforcement individuals involved, but the way this unfolded is,

essentially, some candy striper told Deputy Roberts, who happened to be

working security at the [emergency room] at the hospital, that there appeared

to be some sort of altercation or erratic behavior in the parking lot that

involved [the Defendant] kind of hitting and kicking his own vehicle and

raising his voice. I don’t want to speculate on what Deputy Roberts was

thinking here today on March the 6th, because I believe he testified to that at

length already, but essentially there was some concern that there might have

been a domestic situation unfolding in the vehicle. Now if not in the vehicle,

in the parking lot by the vehicle, so the deputy goes out there and has an

interaction with [the Defendant]. But as I recall the testimony and the record

may prove me wrong here, but as I recall the totality of the testimony, he had

called for back up because he was not able in that particular post, that

particular assignment of guarding the [emergency room] in the hospital

providing security, he wasn’t able to leave the premises.

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So when [the Defendant] drove off, the backup for which Deputy

Roberts had called already, standard operating procedure in a domestic,

because of the inherit danger of domestic assault situations, I think something

like 80 percent of all injuries to law enforcement officers happen in the

context of domestic assault calls and don’t quote me on that, that’s not a stand

alone basis for my rulings in this case, but I’ve heard that anecdotally at least,

he had already made the call to get someone else on the scene, because it was

a possible domestic and because he couldn’t leave, and that officer, Officer

Kilgore was already en route when [the Defendant] was allowed to leave,

and I remember at the time we discussed, maybe I discussed mostly, my

understanding of the time frame and the timeline along which all these event

unfolded, and I understood everything to have happened in pretty rapid

succession, because I remember specifically thinking and I believe

articulating on the record that if the proof were such that there was large sort

of gaps of time in the course of this early morning interactions with law

enforcement, that I may have ruled differently, but because of the proximity

of one aspect of these events to the other, how it all unfolded pretty quickly

there, like I understood Deputy Roberts to be saying like as he’s heading in

and [the Defendant] is pulling off one corner of the parking lot, Officer

Kilgore is pulling in the other. Like which way did he go sort of thing. So I

say all of that to say that as well drawn as [defense counsel’s] motion is and

they always are, I’m going to deny it with regard to the paragraphs and

arguments (1), (2) and (3) -- or (1) and (2) in particular, because I’ve already

made those rulings.

The Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, and this case is now properly before

this court for review.

ANALYSIS

The Defendant contends (1) that the traffic stop by Detective Layne was

unsupported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; (2) that the seizure by Detective

Layne was not a valid community caretaking function; and (3) that the subsequent arrest

was not supported by probable cause. In response, the State contends the traffic stop was

supported by reasonable suspicion based on the following: (1) the trial court accredited

Deputy Roberts’ testimony that the Defendant was beating on his own vehicle and

shouting; (2) Deputy Roberts’ trial testimony that the hospital volunteer reported the

Defendant was screaming at his female passenger; and (3) Deputy Roberts’ trial testimony

that the Defendant was extremely nervous and sketchy and Deputy Roberts was worried

about the female passenger. The State asserts that it was reasonable for Deputy Roberts to

believe that a domestic assault was ongoing and that Deputy Roberts “did not have time”

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to ask the Defendant follow-up questions before the Defendant drove away from the

hospital. The State also counters that the stop was reasonable pursuant to the community

caretaking doctrine because it was reasonable to believe that “something [was] happening

to or between these folks” in the vehicle. Finally, the State asserts Officer Kilgore had

probable cause to arrest the Defendant for DUI because he appeared “lethargic” and “odd”;

he had been beating on his vehicle minutes earlier; and he admitted taking pain mediation

at the emergency room.

On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, we uphold the trial court’s

findings of fact “unless the evidence preponderates otherwise.” State v. Washington, No.

W2022-01201-SC-R11-CD, 2025 WL 2847585, at *3 (Tenn. Oct. 8, 2025) (citing State v.

Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996)). The credibility of witnesses, the weight and

value of evidence, and the resolution of conflicting evidence “are matters entrusted to the

trial judge as the trier of fact.” Id. Appellate courts may consider evidence offered at both

the suppression hearing and trial when reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a motion to

suppress. Id. (citing State v. Henning, 975 S.W.2d 290, 299 (Tenn. 1998). Because the

State prevailed in the trial court, it is entitled to the “strongest legitimate view of the

evidence . . . as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn from

that evidence.” Id. (citing Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23). The trial court’s application of the

law to the facts, on the other hand, is reviewed de novo with no presumption of correctness.

Id. (citing State v. Tuttle, 515 S.W.3d 282, 299 (Tenn. 2017) and State v. Walton, 41

S.W.3d 75, 81 (Tenn. 2001)). The defendant bears the burden of showing that the evidence

preponderates against the trial court’s findings.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the government

from conducting “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Article I,

§ 7 of the Tennessee Constitution similarly prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures

and is identical in intent and purpose with the Fourth Amendment. State v. Troxell, 78

S.W.3d 866, 870 (Tenn. 2002) (internal citation omitted). “No right is held more sacred,

or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the

possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others,

unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.” Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141

U.S. 250, 251, 11 S. Ct. 1000, 1001 (1891). The requirement for reasonableness protects

individuals from “arbitrary invasions” of their privacy and security by government actors.

State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d 626 (Tenn. 1997) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.

648, 653-54, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979)). “[T]he general rule is that a warrantless search or

seizure is presumed unreasonable and any evidence discovered subject to suppression.”

State v. Talley, 307 S.W.3d 723, 729 (Tenn. 2010). The burden is on the State to

demonstrate that the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to one of the narrowly

defined exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tenn.

2000); Yeargan, 958 S.W.2d at 629. Terry created a limited exception to the general rule,

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and certain seizures are justifiable under the Fourth Amendment if there is articulable

suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392

U.S. 1, 31, 32-33, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1885-1886 (1968); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498,

103 S. Ct. 1319, 1324 (1983).

The stop of a vehicle and the detention of individuals during the stop amounts to a

seizure for purposes of both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and

Article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution and is thus subject to the reasonableness

requirement. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996); State v. Brotherton,

323 S.W.3d 866, 870 (Tenn. 2010). “[I]n determining whether the seizure and search were

‘unreasonable’ our inquiry is a dual one -- (1) whether the officer’s action was justified at

its inception, and (2) whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which

justified the interference in the first place.” See State v. Montgomery, 462 S.W.3d 482,

487 (Tenn. 2015) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879); see also United States v.

Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881, 95 S. Ct. 2574, 2580 (1975) (noting that a police

officer who lacks probable cause but whose “observations lead him reasonably to suspect”

that a particular person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime, may

detain that person briefly in order to “investigate the circumstances that provoke

suspicion”).

There are three categories of police intervention with private citizens: (1) a full-

scale arrest, which requires probable cause; (2) a brief investigatory detention, requiring

reasonable suspicion of wrong-doing; and (3) a brief police-citizen encounter, requiring no

objective justification. State v. Daniel, 12 S.W.3d 420, 424 (Tenn. 2000). While arrests

and investigatory stops are seizures implicating constitutional protections, consensual

encounters are not. State v. Nicholson, 188 S.W.3d 649, 656 (Tenn. 2006). Neither party

in this case argues that the first encounter between the Defendant and Deputy Roberts was

a full-scale arrest, a brief police-citizen encounter, or consensual. Accordingly, we must

first determine whether Deputy Roberts had reasonable suspicion to believe that the

Defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime to justify stopping the Defendant

in the emergency room parking lot.

An officer conducting an investigatory stop based on reasonable suspicion of

criminal wrongdoing “must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken

together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.”

Nicholson, 188 S.W.3d at 659 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880). “Reasonable

suspicion” for a detention is “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the subject

of a stop of criminal activity.” Binette, 33 S.W.3d at 218 (citing Ornelas v. United States,

517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)). Whether reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop exists

must be evaluated under the totality of the circumstances known to the police at the time

of the stop. Id. (citing Binette, 33 S.W.3d at 218). A mere “inchoate and unparticularized

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suspicion or ‘hunch’” is not enough to generate reasonable suspicion. Terry, 392 U.S. at

27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883. Reasonable suspicion is an objective standard evaluated in light of

the totality of the circumstances surrounding the seizure, which may include an officer’s

observations, information from other law-enforcement personnel or agencies, information

from citizens, known patterns of criminal offenders, deductions based upon experience,

and the nature of the suspected crime. Montgomery, 462 S.W.3d at 487 (citing State v.

Williamson, 368 S.W.3d 468, 474-75 (Tenn. 2012)).

In assessing the reasonableness of the duration and scope of a detention, the officer’s

actions must be reasonably related to the circumstances that justified the interference in the

first place, and the detention must be temporary and last no longer than necessary to

effectuate the purpose of the stop. State v. Cox, 171 S.W.3d 174, 179-80 (Tenn. 2005)

(adopting the rationale in Royer and concluding that the duration of a stop must be

“temporary and last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop); Troxell,

78 S.W.3d at 871. “[T]he proper inquiry is whether during the detention the police

diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their

suspicions quickly.” Troxell, 78 S.W.3d at 871; State v. Simpson, 968 S.W.2d 776, 783

(Tenn. 1998); see also United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84

L.Ed.2d 605 (1985). Otherwise, a detention that is reasonable at the outset can become

unreasonable and constitutionally invalid if the time, manner, or scope of the investigation

exceeds the proper parameters. Montgomery, 462 S.W.3d at 487; Troxell, 78 S.W.3d at

871 (quoting United States v. Childs, 256 F.3d 559, 564 (7th Cir. 2001)). Significantly,

“[a]n investigatory traffic stop under Terry ‘is a far more minimal intrusion [than an arrest

pursuant to probable cause], simply allowing the officer to briefly investigate further. If

the officer does not learn facts rising to the level of probable cause, the individual must be

allowed to go on his way.’” Brotherton, 323 S.W.3d at 870 (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow,

528 U.S. 119, 126 (2000)). “It is the State’s burden to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks

to justify on the basis of a reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and

duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure.” Royer, 460 U.S. at 500.

Justification for Stop. Evaluating the totality of the circumstances of this case in

light of the well-settled principles of law set forth above, we conclude that Deputy Roberts’

action in stopping the Defendant was justified at its inception. In reaching this conclusion,

the first question we ask is whether Deputy Roberts held a belief that the Defendant had

committed or was about to commit a crime. If so, the question becomes whether that belief

was objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Here, in denying the

motion to suppress, the trial court provided general findings of fact and merged its analysis

of what justified the initial stop with its analysis of whether the duration of the stop was

reasonable. Nevertheless, a fair reading of the court’s reasoning can be understood to have

found that Deputy Roberts believed the Defendant had committed or was about to commit

the offense of disorderly conduct. The court also noted that the officers had “reason to

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think that something is happening to or between these folks,” but the court did not state

that Deputy Roberts believed that the Defendant was engaged in domestic assault. Even

had the court done so, we conclude that any such belief would have been unreasonable

under the totality of the circumstances.

To be a valid investigatory stop, Deputy Roberts was required to point to specific

and articulable facts that are sufficient to give rise to an inference that the Defendant was

engaged in a crime. Before the stop, Deputy Roberts received a report from a volunteer at

the hospital that an individual was outside in the parking lot of the emergency room, yelling

and hitting his own vehicle. We recognize a marked inconsistency between Deputy

Roberts’ suppression hearing testimony and at trial, in that his trial testimony included the

hospital volunteer reported that the Defendant was yelling at a female who was with him.

See State v. Greer, 749 S.W.2d 484, 486 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988) (finding officer’s

testimony between motion to suppress hearing and trial to be a variance in form rather than

material matter and affirming conviction because such variance in officer’s testimony

would not have changed the ruling of the trial court). Nevertheless, Deputy Roberts

simultaneously issued a BOLO and called for assistance from another officer in the event

the Defendant became aggressive with him. Based on the report from the hospital

volunteer, Deputy Roberts had reasonable and articulable suspicion to believe that the

Defendant had been or was about to be involved in criminal conduct. At a minimum, it

was objectively reasonable for Deputy Roberts to infer from the volunteer report that the

Defendant was engaged in disorderly conduct. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-305(a)(1)

(“[a] person commits [the] offense [of disorderly conduct] who, in a public place and with

intent to cause public annoyance or alarm . . . [e]ngages in fighting or in violent or

threatening behavior[.]”).

The same hospital volunteer report did not establish reasonable and articulable

suspicion from which to infer that the Defendant was involved in or about to be involved

in domestic assault. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-101 (a)(1)-(3) (“[a] person commits

assault who:(1) [i]ntentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; (2)

[i]ntentionally or knowingly causes another to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury; or

(3) [i]ntentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with another and a reasonable

person would regard the contact as extremely offensive or provocative.”); Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 39-13-111(a)(2), (3), (b) (defining domestic assault as an assault against a “domestic

abuse victim,” which includes adults “who have lived together” or “who have dated” or

“who had a sexual relationship”). We acknowledge Deputy Roberts’ vigilance and

responsiveness in attempting to recognize signs of potential domestic violence, and his

dedication to public safety and the welfare of vulnerable individuals. His approach here,

as noted by the trial court at the motion for new trial, reflects a broader commitment to

addressing domestic violence, which remains a critical societal issue. However, the

hospital volunteer did not report that the Defendant hit the female or that she was in any

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danger. Deputy Roberts had no information that the female had been threatened or injured.

At most, the Defendant was involved in a verbal dispute, which is not a crime.

Accordingly, there were no articulable facts supporting a belief that a crime involving

domestic assault was afoot before Deputy Roberts stopped the Defendant. While these

facts alone do not provide specific and articulable suspicion of domestic assault, the initial

stop of the Defendant was justified at its inception based on Deputy Roberts’ objective

belief that the Defendant was engaged in the offense of disorderly conduct.

Scope and Duration of Detention. Next, we must assess whether the

investigatory detention was reasonable in duration and scope. Because Deputy Roberts

permitted the Defendant to leave the parking lot, the Defendant maintains that it was no

longer reasonable to suspect that a domestic assault had occurred or was in progress. In

support, the Defendant cites the findings of the trial court that “[the Defendant] didn’t

apparently . . . give the deputy any pause or any reason to further detain him[.]” The

Defendant insists that all of the facts known to Deputy Roberts that produced his hunch of

domestic disturbance were known to Deputy Roberts the moment he concluded his

conversation and watched the Defendant drive away from the hospital. The Defendant

argues those facts adduced from the initial stop and detention at the hospital cannot support

the second traffic stop “some distance down the road” by Officer Kilgore.

In response, the State argues that Deputy Roberts “did not have time to ask the

Defendant follow-up question before the Defendant drove away.” The State attaches no

legal significance to the fact that the Defendant was stopped twice and contends the

circumstances which justified Deputy Roberts’ interference, i.e. a report of someone

yelling at a female in the parking lot, still existed at the time Officer Kilgore began his

investigation during the second stop of the Defendant.

The facts of this case are unique and require this court to evaluate not one, but two

stops of the Defendant by law enforcement officers in succession on the same day.

Tennessee courts have not had the opportunity to consider the constitutional implications

of successive investigatory stops. Accordingly, some discussion of how other jurisdictions

have dealt with this issue is helpful to our resolution of this case.

In United States v. Ilazi, 730 F.2d 1120, 1125 (8th Cir. 1984), officers observed two

suspicious men while conducting routine surveillance to intercept drug traffickers at a

Minneapolis airport. Both of the men were staggering as they walked, the officers noticed

the men sniffing and inhaling deeply after placing their fingers near their noses, and one of

the men was walking with some difficulty, continually stomping both feet as he went. The

officers approached the men near an airport bar, inquired about their travel plans, and then

thanked the men for their cooperation and left. Id. at 1121-22. After leaving the bar, the

officers explained the situation to two DEA agents who were also on duty at the airport.

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The DEA agents watched the two men as they left the bar and, like the officers, they noticed

that one of the men walked with a strange gait—like “a two-year-old child with a dirty

diaper.” Id. at 1123. Based on this observation and their conversation with the officers,

the DEA agents approached the men, asked to see their travel papers, and inquired about

their trip. During this second round of questioning, the agents noticed a bulge in the right

boot of one of the men, and a subsequent search revealed it was heroin. In considering

whether the investigatory stops were properly limited in scope and duration, the court

observed that to consider the reasonableness of each investigatory stop individually would

allow for police-officer “gamesmanship.” In other words, officers could conduct

successive, limited stops based on the same reasonable suspicion in order to circumvent

constitutional limitations on duration.

However, the court rejected the defendant’s contention that the second stop,

occurring so close in time to the initial stop, exceeded the bounds of an investigatory stop,

and therefore constituted an arrest without probable cause. Where there is not one stop,

but two, the court observed,

[B]oth must be limited in scope and duration. To end our inquiry here . . .

would allow law enforcement officials to circumvent [constitutional]

requirements by subjecting an individual to successive stops, each

sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an

investigatory seizure, but collectively so intrusive as to be tantamount to an

arrest.

Ilazi, 730 F.2d at 1125. While the court acknowledged the coercion inherent in the

successive stop situation and that successive stops of an individual based on the same

information strongly indicate a finding that an arrest has taken place, see United States v.

Morin, 665 F.2d 765, 769 (5th Cir. 1982), this observation does not compel a finding that

an arrest occurs in every case involving successive stops. Ilazi, 730 F.2d at 1125. Rather,

the presence of successive stops is to be added to the list of factors to be considered in

determining when an interrogation rises to the level of arrest. Id. at 1126.

In United States v. Peters, another successive stop case, an officer initially stopped

Peters for weaving and noticed that the driver, in responding to the officer’s questions,

seemed nervous. 10 F.3d 1517, 1522 (10th Cir.1993). The officer requested a drug sniff

dog, but no dogs were available. The officer released Peters because he lacked probable

cause to detain him. The officer then informed his superior that he “‘didn’t feel good’

about the stop[,]” and his superior relayed the information to a DEA agent, who then

referred the information to a border patrol agent. Based on the information received from

the other law enforcement officers, the border patrol agent later stopped Peters because he

looked nervously at the agent and abruptly changed lanes. Id. at 1519-20. During the

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second stop, a counterfeit social security card and other false identification documents were

found hidden in a suitcase. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit rejected the defendant’s nervous

behavior as reasonable and articulable grounds to support the second stop and observed,

[W]hen reasonable suspicion has been dispelled or probable cause has not

developed, the conduct upon which the officer originally based his suspicions

has proved to be an illusory ground for suspicion under the particular

circumstances, and thus, has been exhausted. Being illusory, the ground no

longer reasonably supports a continuation of the search. Absent a new and

independent basis for suspicion, the officer must halt his investigation in

accordance with [Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884] and [United States

v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 717, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 2649, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983)].

Of course, a second officer who is unaware of the fruitless search

conducted earlier may initiate his own investigation based on the same

“suspicious” behavior that was exhausted by the first officer’s failed

investigation. The officer who performed the original investigation,

however, may not release the suspect as required by Terry and Place, wait

until he has travelled down the road a few miles, and then make a second

Terry stop based solely on the conduct that has already proved to be illusory.

Similarly, the officer cannot circumvent Terry and Place by calling upon a

different officer to make the second intrusion in his stead.

Id. at 1522; see also United States v. Padilla-Esparza, 798 F.3d 993, 1000-1001 (10th Cir.

2015) (distinguishing Peters where agents quickly aborted first stop based on erroneous

belief that they had pulled over wrong truck and reasoning that the border agents’ initial

stop of the defendant did not dispel reasonable suspicion); United States v. Foreste, 780

F.3d 518, 525 (2d Cir. 2015) (concluding that “where the same suspicion justifies

successive investigation, and the officer conducting the subsequent investigation is aware

of the prior investigation and the suspicion that supported it, the investigations’ duration

and scope must be both individually and collectively reasonable under the Fourth

Amendment”).

The above cases are persuasive and convince us that there is no per se rule

prohibiting a successive stop of a defendant and that a successive stop of a defendant is but

one of the factors on the list of factors to be considered when determining the

reasonableness of the scope and duration of an investigatory stop. In addition, the

reasonableness of the scope and duration of a successive stop depends, in large part, on

whether the investigatory detentions were based on the same or independent reasonable

suspicion. Foreste, 780 F.3d at 525.

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Evaluating the totality of the circumstances of this case with the above law in mind,

we conclude (1) that reasonable suspicion had been dispelled during the first stop when

Deputy Roberts released the Defendant from the parking lot; and (2) that the second stop

of the Defendant’s vehicle involving Officer Kilgore was based entirely on information he

received from Deputy Roberts and not independent reasonable suspicion. In analyzing the

information gained by Deputy Roberts during the initial stop, the trial court found that the

Defendant was “acting in a way that [did not] comport with what Deputy Roberts just heard

from the witness and that probably raised some reasonable suspicion that maybe he was

trying to hide something or cover up something there or at least get the police to just leave

him alone, disengage so he could go on about his night.” Nothing in the record supports

the court’s finding that the Defendant was trying to hide or cover up something, and one

cannot infer illegality from the Defendant’s desire to leave the parking lot free from

government intrusion. Indeed, the court’s comment lends credence to the conclusion that

the disturbance was no longer ongoing when Deputy Roberts stopped and questioned the

Defendant. When Deputy Roberts approached the Defendant, Deputy Roberts was in

uniform, carrying a gun, and wearing a utility belt. Deputy Roberts spoke with the

Defendant, and the Defendant stopped his vehicle and rolled down the driver’s side

window. Although it was dark, Deputy Roberts observed a female in the passenger seat of

the Defendant’s vehicle. Deputy Roberts asked the Defendant what was going on, and the

Defendant told him nothing. Although the Defendant was nervous and seemed sketchy, he

answered Deputy Roberts’ question; he was not aggressive, and he was respectful. Deputy

Roberts permitted the Defendant to leave the premises. The entirety of Deputy Roberts’

investigatory stop of the Defendant was one to three minutes.

Clearly, the circumstances described by the hospital volunteer report were no longer

present when Deputy Roberts approached the Defendant’s vehicle. Deputy Roberts

described the Defendant as calm and respectful. He was no longer hitting his vehicle or

yelling at or in the presence of the female. Deputy Roberts conceded as much by stating

at the motion to suppress that the only reason he kept the BOLO in place after talking with

the Defendant was his concern for the female’s safety. Any reasonable suspicion that the

Defendant was committing or about to commit disorderly conduct had been dispelled.

As previously noted, there were no articulable facts supporting a belief that a crime

involving domestic assault was afoot before Deputy Roberts stopped the Defendant. In

terms of evaluating the reasonableness of the duration of the stop, we observe at the top of

the analysis that the record does not contain any evidence demonstrating whether Deputy

Roberts had specialized knowledge or training in identifying signs of domestic violence.

In continuing the BOLO after his interaction with the Defendant, Deputy Roberts did not

identify any articulable facts beyond the presence of the female, the early morning hour,

and the Defendant’s nervous behavior to support further detention of the Defendant.

Deputy Roberts explained that he was unable to finish his investigation because he did not

- 18 -

have enough time and it was dark. However, it was Deputy Roberts who inexplicably

chose to release the Defendant prior to the arrival of Officer Kilgore. At trial, Deputy

Roberts was asked what he did after the Defendant told him nothing had happened, and

Deputy Roberts said, “I was kind of left in my worries trying to think of what to do next.”

Deputy Roberts then agreed that the Defendant “ended up leaving afterwards.” We

acknowledge the trial court’s comment from the hearings on motion to suppress and motion

for new trial that Deputy Rogers could not leave the parking lot. However, the record does

not contain any information supporting this finding, and therefore, preponderates against

the determination of the trial court. We emphasize that there was nothing in the record to

explain why the Defendant was released by Deputy Roberts.

There was also lighting in the hospital parking lot, and Deputy Roberts was dressed

in uniform and armed with a gun. Deputy Roberts interacted with the Defendant for

approximately one to three minutes. During this time, the female passenger did not ask for

help, appear to be afraid, or exhibit any signs of distress. Under these circumstances,

Deputy Roberts lacked an objectively reasonable basis to believe that the Defendant was

committing or about to commit domestic assault. To hold otherwise, on this record, would

prolong the detention in this case based on general assumptions about domestic violence.

While we agree with the trial court’s concerns regarding domestic violence, the Fourth

Amendment strictures demand government intrusions to be based on particularized facts.

Because Deputy Roberts did not observe any signs of domestic assault during his

interaction with the Defendant, the Defendant was required to be released.

Here, in terms of timeframe, the trial court found only generally that “all th[ese]

matters unfolded in the course of a few minutes in close proximity to each other” and

occurred in “pretty rapid succession.” Based on the record, the Defendant’s initial

encounter lasted one to three minutes, which, in isolation, was reasonable in scope and

duration given the report of disorderly conduct. However, Officer Kilgore responded to

the emergency room after the Defendant was released and spoke with Deputy Roberts for

approximately two minutes. At some point after their discussion, the Defendant was

stopped a second time and detained by Detective Layne based on a BOLO issued by Officer

Kilgore. The Defendant had left the hospital parking lot; however, it is unclear how far

away from the hospital he was when the second stop occurred. Detective Layne detained

the Defendant long enough to obtain identification from the Defendant and the female

passenger and to run a check on their information. Officer Kilgore arrived at the second

stop “a very short time” later, and he did not observe the Defendant driving. Officer

Kilgore began his investigation by asking the Defendant, yet again, what happened at the

emergency room, and the Defendant again said nothing. Officer Kilgore repeatedly asked

the Defendant questions about the emergency room; and when he did not get a clear answer,

Officer Kilgore started the DUI investigation.

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The second investigatory stop and detention of the Defendant was therefore based

solely on information obtained from the first stop by Deputy Roberts. As such, the second

stop was an unreasonable extension of the first stop unless it was supported by independent

reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. There was no evidence introduced by the State,

apart from what Officer Kilgore learned from Deputy Roberts, to support reasonable

suspicion anew for the second stop of the Defendant. We acknowledge that Officer Kilgore

said that he was led to believe, based on information from the emergency room, that the

Defendant could be under the influence. However, Deputy Roberts clearly testified that he

did not observe any signs of impairment during the first stop. Accordingly, the duration

and scope of the detention violated the Fourth Amendment’s general proscription against

unreasonable searches and seizures, and any evidence seized as a result must be suppressed.

II. We address the remaining issues so as not to pretermit in the event of further

appellate review. The State seeks to justify the second warrantless stop of the Defendant

under the community caretaking exception. In denying the motion to suppress, the trial

court “agree[d] with the State’s position with regard to the community caretaking function.

I mean, they’ve got reason to think that something is happening to or between these folks.”

The record, however, shows that, prior to the second stop, Deputy Roberts had already

investigated the situation, found no evidence of criminal activity, observed no signs of

distress or danger, and allowed the Defendant to leave the hospital parking lot. The second

officer’s stop—based solely on Deputy Roberts generalized concern for the female

passenger—occurred after the situation had been resolved and without any new facts

suggesting a need for assistance or a threat to public safety. Under State v. McCormick,

494 S.W.3d 673 (Tenn. 2016), we conclude the community caretaking exception does not

apply.

In holding that the act of community caretaking by law enforcement was also an

exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, the Tennessee Supreme Court

sought to strike a proper balance between the public’s interest in having police officers

assist citizens in need and the individual’s interest in being free from unreasonable

governmental intrusion. McCormick, 494 S.W.3d at 686. “[W]hen the community

caretaking exception is invoked to validate a search or seizure, courts must meticulously

consider the facts and carefully apply the exception in a manner that mitigates the risk of

abuse.” Id. The community caretaking exception will justify a warrantless seizure so long

as the State establishes

that (1) the officer possessed specific and articulable facts which, viewed

objectively and in the totality of the circumstances, reasonably warranted a

conclusion that a community caretaking action was needed, such as the

possibility of a person in need of assistance or the existence of a potential

threat to public safety; and (2) the officer’s behavior and the scope of the

- 20 -

intrusion were reasonably restrained and tailored to the community

caretaking need.

Id. “Determining whether police action is objectively reasonable in light of the

circumstances requires careful consideration of the facts of each case[,]” including “the

nature and level of distress exhibited by the citizen, the location, the time of day, the

accessibility and availability of assistance other than the officer, and the risk of danger if

the officer provides no assistance.” Id. (internal citations omitted).

As previously discussed, Deputy Roberts’ observations during the first stop

eliminated any reasonable basis for community caretaking. Deputy Roberts approached

the Defendant in the hospital parking lot, asked what was going on, received the response

“nothing,” observed a female passenger in the vehicle, saw no injuries, no signs of distress,

received no request for help, and ultimately let the Defendant go. These facts affirmatively

dispel any notion that the Defendant or the female passenger required assistance. Under

McCormick, the community caretaking exception requires specific and articulable facts

indicating a need for aid. Here, Deputy Roberts’ own observations generated the opposite

conclusion: there was no emergency, no medical issue, no threat, and no reason to intervene

further. Once he allowed the Defendant to leave, the situation was resolved. Any

caretaking concern had dissipated.

Deputy Roberts’ statement that he “did not have time” to investigate whether the

female passenger was safe did not elevate the encounter to an emergency. To the contrary,

his statement confirms that during his encounter with the Defendant, he did not observe

any facts suggesting an emergency. Had he seen anything objectively alarming, he would

have been obligated to act immediately. His decision to let the Defendant go, combined

with his statement that he lacked time to investigate further, demonstrates that he perceived

no immediate threat requiring intervention. His statement also shows that any concern he

may have held was speculative, not based on specific and articulable facts. Under

McCormick, the community caretaking exception cannot rest on a vague sense that

“something might be wrong” or that the female passenger “could have been afraid.”

Deputy Roberts’ statement reveals that he did not identify any concrete facts suggesting

danger. A hypothetical or uninvestigated concern is not enough to justify a later seizure.

The second stop involving Officer Kilgore stemmed from the first, and therefore,

also based on a generalized concern, not specific and articulable facts. Officer Kilgore

ordered the second stop of the Defendant based solely on Deputy Roberts generalized

concern for the female passenger’s safety. But McCormick requires specific, articulable

facts, not vague unease or speculative fears. 494 S.W.3d at 686. Officer Kilgore did not

observe the initial encounter, did not witness any distress, did not see any injury, did not

receive a report of a continuing emergency, and had no independent basis to believe

- 21 -

assistance was needed. A generalized concern is insufficient under McCormick. The

exception to the warrant requirement cannot rest on a hunch or intuition. It requires

objective facts demonstrating a real need for assistance. Here, there were none.

Finally, under McCormick, courts must consider the risk of danger if the officer

provides no assistance. 494 S.W.3d at 688. Here, the risk was low to almost nonexistent.

The Defendant was coherent and responsive, the passenger showed no signs of distress, no

one requested help, the vehicle was safely operated, and the Defendant had already left the

hospital without incident. These facts foreclose any claim that immediate intervention was

necessary. Even if the State could satisfy the first prong—which it cannot—the second

prong independently fails. The second stop was not “reasonably restrained and tailored”

to a caretaking need. Under McCormick, the community caretaking exception cannot

justify a seizure that is untethered to an immediate need, duplicative of an already

completed inquiry, or based on speculation rather than observable facts. Id. Because the

second stop was unsupported by the community caretaking exception, it was

unconstitutional, and all evidence obtained as a result must be suppressed.

III. Even if the traffic stop had been lawful, the Defendant argues his arrest was

without probable cause. The Defendant insists the facts available to Officer Kilgore to

signal intoxication, including, “lethargic” behavior, “odd” demeanor, admitting to taking

pain medication, and failure on the HGN test, were insufficient to establish probable cause

to arrest him for DUI. In response, the State contends, and we agree, that Officer Kilgore

had probable cause to arrest the Defendant based on the same facts.

Another exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement occurs when an

arrest is supported by probable cause. State v. Bell, 429 S.W.3d 524, 529 (Tenn. 2014);

State v. Echols, 382 S.W.3d 266, 277 (Tenn. 2012) (citing State v. Hanning, 296 S.W.3d

44, 48 (Tenn. 2009) and Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 170 L.Ed.2d

559 (2008)). Thus, Tennessee law provides that an officer may make a warrantless arrest

for DUI—as “a public offense committed or a breach of the peace threatened in the

officer’s presence”—so long as probable cause exists. Id. at 530 (internal citations

omitted).

The Tennessee Supreme Court has recognized that it is impossible to precisely

articulate what probable cause means. State v. Smith, 484 S.W.3d 393, 400 (Tenn. 2016).

Instead, probable cause is a “‘practical, nontechnical concept[,]’” id. (quoting State v.

Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 432 (Tenn. 1989)), and “[t]he substance of all the definitions of

probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.” Bell, 429 S.W.3d at 530 (citing

Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949)).

“‘[T]he strength of the evidence necessary to establish probable cause . . . is significantly

less than the strength of evidence necessary to find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

- 22 -

doubt.’” State v. Davis, 484 S.W.3d 138, 143-44 (Tenn. 2016) (quoting State v. Bishop,

431 S.W.3d 22, 41 (Tenn. 2014)). “‘[T]he constitutional validity of the [seizure] does not

depend on whether the suspect actually committed any crime,’ and ‘it is irrelevant to the

probable cause analysis what crime a suspect is eventually charged with or whether a

person is later acquitted of the crime for which she or he was arrested.’” Id. at 144

(alteration in original) (quoting Wright v. City of Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 602 (3d Cir.

2005) (citations omitted)). “[P]robable cause exists when ‘at the time of the [seizure], the

facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the officers, and of which they had

reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing

that the defendant had committed or was committing an offense.’” State v. Dotson, 450

S.W.3d 1, 50 (Tenn. 2014) (quoting State v. Echols, 382 S.W.3d 266, 277-78 (Tenn.

2012)); see Smith, 484 S.W.3d at 400.

Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-401 describes a DUI offense and states

that it is unlawful for a person to drive while:

[u]nder the influence of an intoxicant . . . that impairs the driver’s ability to

safely operate a motor vehicle by depriving the driver of the clearness of

mind and control of oneself that the driver would otherwise possess.

At the time of the Defendant’s arrest, Officer Kilgore knew the following facts: the

Defendant had been involved in a disturbance at the hospital and hit his vehicle and yelled

and screamed in the presence of or at a female, he was lethargic, his actions and speech

were slow, and he admitted to having taken pain medication at the hospital. The Defendant

also failed the HGN test, which showed five signs of intoxication including involuntary

jerking of the eye and dilated pupils. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we

conclude that these facts were sufficient to enable a prudent person to believe that the

Defendant had committed or was about to commit the offense of DUI. In reaching this

result, we are mindful that a suspect need not exhibit every known sign of intoxication in

order to support a determination of probable cause, Bell, 429 S.W.3d at 532, and in

assessing probable cause, we deal with probabilities, not hard certainties. State v.

Reynolds, 504 S.W.3d 283, 301 (Tenn. 2016). Accordingly, Officer Kilgore had probable

cause to arrest the Defendant without a warrant for operating a motor vehicle while under

the influence of an intoxicant.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing reasoning and analysis, we conclude that the second stop of

the Defendant was an unreasonable extension of the first; and therefore, the duration of the

Defendant’s detention was unconstitutional. Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying

the Defendant’s motion to suppress the seizure of the Defendant’s blood during the second

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stop. We reverse the order of the trial court, vacate the judgment of conviction, and dismiss

the charge against the Defendant.

S/ Camille R. McMullen____________

CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, JUDGE

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