Com. v. Pratt, K.

J-S09037-26

2026 PA Super 73

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

KYLEN PRATT :

:

Appellant : No. 3013 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 27, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP-51-CR-0005174-2022

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., LANE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 17, 2026

Appellant, Kylen Pratt, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on September 27, 2024.

After a careful review, we affirm.

On September 23, 2024, Appellant was tried by jury on the charges of

First-Degree Murder, Possession of an Instrument of Crime (PIC), Abuse of a

Corpse, and Tampering with Evidence. The relevant facts adduced at trial, as

summarized by the trial court, are as follows:

On February 17, 2022, Naasire Johnson, a 20-year-old

openly gay man, took a ride share from his home [in] West

Philadelphia to North Philadelphia, then walked to the 2900 block

of West Oxford Street, the block where Appellant lived.

Information from his mobile phone indicated that the device

remained there until the early morning of February 18, 2022.

When Mr. Johnson did not return home, his grandmother

repeatedly called his phone, but there was no answer. The

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

J-S09037-26

following day, February 19, 2022, she filed a missing person

report.

On February 20, 2022, two bystanders were walking down

a path near Brewerytown, of the Kelly Drive, where they saw a

burnt object with a recognizable foot. Mr. Johnson’s body was bunt

beyond recognition of any characteristics. In particular, his throat

(trachea and jaw) and genitals were burnt away. The Medical

Examiner opined that these areas would have been potential

repositories for DNA evidence of sexual activity. A bullet was also

recovered from Mr. Johnson’s neck. Homicide investigators

started culling missing persons reports and were able to narrow

their search to Mr. Johnson because the remains were found to

have braces, as did Mr. Johnson. The body was ultimately

identified as Naasire Johnson through DNA testing against

samples from his home.

Based upon an anonymous tip, police focused on Appellant

and obtained his mobile phone records. The location information

showed that Appellant’s phone and Mr. Johnson’s phone were

together in the vicinity of Appellant’s home. until about 3:00 A.M.

on February 18, 2022. Both phones then moved together to the

vicinity of where Mr. Johnson’s body was found on February 20th.

At that point, Mr. Johnson’s phone stopped sending information.

Appellant’s phone left that location, but returned the following

night to the same location where the body was found.

Police then executed a search warrant at Appellant’s home,

where they found bleach spots on the carpet in the back bedroom

as evidence of cleaning. The carpet and pad were lifted, and blood

stains were found on the floor below. Police also found other blood

spatter evidence. The blood was submitted for testing and was

found to be a DNA match for Naasire Johnson. Also found in

Appellant’s home was a 9mm handgun with ammunition, which

was consistent with the bullet found lodged 'in the cervical spine

of Mr. Johnson’s neck.

A search of Appellant’s phone also revealed deleted

searches of news stories regarding the recovery of Mr. Johnson’s

body, and deleted searches for male-on-male pornography, sex

with dead bodies and the traits of a psychopath. The phone also

had videos showing Appellant in his bedroom with what appeared

to be the same firearm recovered by police.

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Tr. Ct. Op. at 2-3.

Appellant was convicted on all counts and was sentenced on September

27, 2024, to life imprisonment on the murder conviction, and consecutive

sentences of two-and-a-half to five years’ incarceration on the PIC conviction,

one to two years’ incarceration for abuse of a corpse, and one to two years’

incarceration for tampering with evidence.

Appellant filed post-sentence motions on October 7, 2024. The trial

court denied the motions on October 21, 2024. Appellant filed a timely notice

of appeal on November 8, 2024, and a concise statement pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) on February 26, 2025. This appeal follows.

Appellant raises the following three issues in his brief:

I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR WHEN IT PERMITTED DETECTIVE

DALY TO CREATE AND PRESENT A CHART AND TESTIFY THAT THE

TIMING ADVANCE RECORDS CONTAINED IN APPELLANT’S CELL

PHONE RECORDS ESTABLISHED THAT THE DECEDENT AND

APPELLANT WERE TOGETHER AT THE TIME OF THE KILLING IN

VIOLATION OF PA.R.E. 1002 AND 1006 AND WITHOUT

PRODUCING A WITNESS TO TESTIFY THAT THE INFORMATION

CONTAINED IN THE RECORDS WAS AUTHENTIC AND UP TO

DATE?

II. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR WHEN IT DENIED APPELLANT’S

MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE THE COMMONWEALTH FROM

INTRODUCING EVIDENCE APPELLANT’S GOOGLE SEARCHES FOR

“MALE-ON-MALE PORNOGRAPHY”, “HAVING SEX WITH DEAD

BODIES,” AND “TRAITS OF A PSYCHOPATH?”

III. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN

SENTENCING APPELLANT TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT THE

POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE FOLLOWED BY A CONSECUTIVE

SENTENCE OF FOUR AND ONE-HALF TO NINE YEARS OF

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IMPRISONMENT IN LIGHT OF APPELLANT’S AGE, PERSONAL

CIRCUMSTANCES AND PROSPECTS FOR REHABILITATION?

Appellant’s Br. at 4.

Appellant’s first issue challenges the admission of a chart summarizing

certain cell phone data under Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence 1002 and 1006.

When considering the admission of evidence, our standard of review is very

narrow. Our review of a trial court’s evidentiary ruling is limited to determining

whether the trial court abused its discretion. See Commonwealth v.

Dengler, 890 A.2d 372, 379 (Pa. 2005). “An abuse of discretion may not be

found merely because an appellate court might have reached a different

conclusion, but requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality,

prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly

erroneous.” Id. (citation omitted). “To constitute reversible error, an

evidentiary ruling must not only be erroneous but also harmful or prejudicial

to the complaining party.” Commonwealth v. Lopez, 57 A.3d 74, 81 (Pa.

Super. 2012) (citation omitted).

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 1002, also known as the “best evidence

rule” provides, "[a]n original writing, recording, or photograph is required in

order to prove its content unless these rules, other rules prescribed by the

Supreme Court, or a statute provides otherwise.” Pa.R.E. 1002. A Rule that

“provides otherwise” is Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 1006, which states,

The proponent may use a summary, chart, or calculation to prove

the content of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs

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that cannot be conveniently examined in court. The proponent

must make the originals or duplicates available for examination or

copying, or both, by other parties at a reasonable time and place.

And the court may order the proponent to produce them in court.

Pa.R.E. 1006.

Here, the Commonwealth received cell phone data from the victim and

Appellant. Detective Robert Daly, an expert witness in the field of call detail

records analysis, was called to testify to the details of the cell phone data

including call records and “timing advance records.” N.T., 9/26/24, at 73.

Detective Daly created a report summarizing the phone records which the

Commonwealth introduced as exhibit C-80, and the Detective based his trial

testimony on this summary. Appellant’s issue is that the original “timing

advance records” from T-Mobile stated that information in the records “may

be subject to change” when Detective Daly’s report omitted this language.

Appellant’s Br. at 15. Accordingly, he argues, the admission of this evidence

violated Rule 1002 because the original records with this statement were not

shown to the jury and Rule 1006 because the report did not accurately

summarize the original records. Id. at 16.

In Keller v. Porta, 94 A.2d 140 (Pa. Super. 1953), the appellant owed

the appellee for repair expenses. At trial, the appellee called his bookkeeper

as a witness to testify to the charges for which the appellee was requesting

reimbursement. In that case, there were sixty-three invoices including 248

items of charge, so the bookkeeper created a list itemizing the charges. The

trial court admitted as an exhibit the bookkeeper’s list as opposed to the

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original invoices. Id. at 142. On appeal, the appellant argued that the list

summarizing the charges was inadmissible on the ground that the invoices as

original entries should have been admitted. This court affirmed, holding that

it would have overburdened the court and unduly confused the jury to have

required the appellee to introduce and prove each of the original invoices. We

stated the following:

The best evidence rule normally requires that the original records,

in this case the invoices, be submitted into evidence when the

purpose is to prove the contents thereof. Where, however, the

original evidence is voluminous and detailed so that an

examination thereof would be impracticable in the trial court, it is

within the discretion of the trial judge to admit as valid secondary

evidence a summary of the original evidence made by a

competent person familiar with the original records. . . . The best

evidence rule is not inflexible. Where, as here, the original records

are in court and available for examination by defendant and where

the witness testifying to the summary made therefrom is available

for detailed cross-examination, it rests within the sound discretion

of the trial judge as to the admissibility of a compact summary as

a substitute for the voluminous original records.

Id. at 142-43.

Here, Detective Daly was admitted as an expert in in the field of call

detail records analysis without objection. N.T., 9/26/24, at 95. He personally

compiled the summary report from which he testified. Call Data Records

Report, 2/7/24, C-80 at 1. Accordingly, he was a “competent person familiar

with the original records.” Keller, supra. Additionally, the records were

voluminous. The “timing advance records” provided by T-Mobile to the police

spanned two months including the dates January 23, 2022 to March 23, 2022.

See T-Mobile Metro Custodian of Records Certification, 4/4/22. This type of

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J-S09037-26

data updates every few minutes and sometimes several times per minute.

See C-80 Report at 18 (showing thirty-three entries in a forty-one-minute

period of time). The original records were included in discovery, and the

defense had viewed and was aware of the contents of the original documents.

The defense had the full opportunity to cross-examine and recross-examine

the detective. N.T., 9/25/24, at 115-146, 184-200. Despite arguing that the

detective was not qualified to testify to the “may be subject to change”

language in the original documents, Appellant’s Br. at 15, the defense could

have but failed to call a T-Mobile representative to testify. Finally, as the trial

court stated,

Appellant complains that the evidence should not have been

admitted because the T-Mobile records contained the

qualification: “Due to the complexities of telecommunications

networks, the information contained in timing advanced records

may be subject to change.” There was no evidence that the

information was ever changed.

Tr. Ct. Op. at 4.

We agree. The summary of the phone records was properly admitted

because the requirements of Rules 1002 and 1006 were met. Additionally, the

trial court concluded that the “timing advance records” were not unreliable

and that they were highly probative of Appellant’s involvement with the victim

based on their locations. Id. We discern no abuse of discretion.

Appellant’s second issue is that the trial court erred in denying his

motion in limine seeking to preclude evidence of his Google searches. When

reviewing the denial of a motion in limine, we apply an evidentiary abuse of

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discretion standard of review. Commonwealth v. Zugay, 745 A.2d 639 (Pa.

Super. 2000). Evidence is generally admissible if it is relevant and competent.

Commonwealth v. Hudson, 414 A.2d 1381 (Pa. 1980). Evidence is relevant

if it tends to establish a material fact in a criminal prosecution or tends to

make a fact at issue more or less possible. Commonwealth v. Brown, 414

A.2d 70 (Pa. 1980). Relevant evidence is admissible if its probative value

outweighs its prejudicial impact. Commonwealth v. Shain, 471 A.2d 1246,

1249 (Pa. 1984).

Appellant first argues that the trial court erred in allowing the

Commonwealth to admit evidence of his Google searches for “male-on-male

pornography.” Appellant argues that this evidence was highly prejudicial and

minimally relevant. Appellant’s Br. at 17. Appellant claims that the male-on-

male pornography searches were not relevant to any offense charged and was

introduced solely to inflame the passions of the jury. Id. at 18. Appellant was

not charged with any sexual offense and did not meet the victim through a

shared interest in pornography. Id. at 19.

Appellant cites Commonwealth v. Lang, 275 A.3d 1072 (Pa. Super.

2022) as analogous. In that case, the appellant was a priest charged with

various offenses for sexually abusing a minor altar server. The day after the

Attorney General released a grand jury report announcing the results of an

investigation into clergy abuse in Pennsylvania, the appellant conducted

internet searches for criminal attorneys in his area. On appeal, the appellant

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contested the admission of that search at trial. This Court found that because

the appellant had not been identified in the grand jury report and was unaware

if he was under investigation, his internet search was irrelevant to prove

consciousness of guilt. Id. at 1085.

We find Lang distinguishable from the instant case and find the

Commonwealth’s argument persuasive. The Commonwealth explained during

the motion hearing that the purpose for the inclusion of the pornographic

searches supported its theory that Appellant was a gay man interested in sex

and lured the openly-gay victim to his house to have sex. Appellee’s Br. at 13.

The Commonwealth posited that the two men spoke on an application

designed for gay men to meet and communicate anonymously. N.T., 9/18/24,

at 14. Further, the Commonwealth points out that significant burns to the

victim’s body were around his pelvis, genitalia, and mouth. Those are areas

that would be repositories for DNA following oral or anal sex. Thus, unlike in

Lang where there was no nexus between the evidence and the appellant’s

consciousness of guilt—the purpose for which the evidence was admitted—

here, Appellant’s interest in male-on-male sex “provided a bridge over the

gap” as to why the defendant would commit this crime on this victim and

target certain areas of the victim’s body more severely. Appellee’s Br. at 14.

Thus, there was a nexus between the evidence and the purpose for which it

was admitted.

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Appellant next challenges the admission of several of his Google

searches. Appellant challenges the admissibility of his searches for “having

sex with dead bodies” and “traits of a psychopath” because these searches

were conducted weeks after the murder took place and thus could not have

been relevant to his intent or state of mind at the time of the offense.

Appellant’s Br. at 21. Appellant was not charged with having sex with a dead

body and the Commonwealth did not allege that he had done so. Id. Appellant

argues that the nature of these searches is inherently inflammatory and far

more prejudicial than probative because it portrayed him as having deviant

sexual interests and psychological problems. Id. at 22-23. The

Commonwealth argues that these internet searches are relevant to Appellant’s

state of mind after the offense and tend to prove consciousness of guilt. The

trial court found after a hearing that Appellant’s searches for “tranny porn,”

“having sex with dead bodies,” “traits of a psychopath,” “murdering in cold

blood,” and “twenty warning signs you may be dealing with a psychopath” to

be relevant and not unduly prejudicial. N.T. 9/18/24, at 19.

A decision regarding the admissibility of evidence such as this is a matter

within the discretion of the trial judge, and only an abuse of that discretion

will constitute reversible error. Commonwealth v. Frederick, 475 A.2d 754

(Pa. Super. 1984). Evidence of consciousness of guilt is relevant and

admissible. Commonwealth v. Lark, 543 A.2d 491, 497 (Pa. 1988). There

is no requirement in the law that consciousness of guilt evidence needs to

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occur within a certain period of time surrounding an offense. See, e.g.

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 858 A.2d 1219, 1223 (Pa. Super. 2004)

(stating that actions of the accused occurring “before, during, and after” an

offense are admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt (emphasis in

original)); Commonwealth v. Hargrave, 745 A.2d 20, 21 (Pa. Super. 2000)

(vacated on other grounds) (finding evidence of “flight” for one year following

an offense to show consciousness of guilt for a crime that was not prosecuted

until nine years later).

Additionally, we note that to be considered unfairly prejudicial, evidence

must be so inflammatory that it would drive the jurors to make their decisions

based solely on their personal reactions to that specific piece of evidence, and

nothing else relevant to the case. Commonwealth v. Flamer, 53 A.3d 82,

88 (Pa. Super. 2012). Evidence is not unfairly prejudicial simply because it is

unfavorable to the defendant’s case, and courts are not required to exclude

all facts that are “unpleasant” in the eyes of the defendant, especially if they

are relevant to an issue in the case. Id. at 88.

Guided by the foregoing principles, this Court acknowledges that many

of these terms are inflammatory, but we find no abuse of discretion in the trial

court’s ruling that the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial. This Court agrees

that the searches are relevant to Appellant’s state of mind before, during, and

after the murder. The pornography searches were ongoing, occurring from

January on. N.T., 9/18/24, at 17. The search for “murdering in cold blood”

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also occurred in the month prior to the murder, while the others occurred in

the month after the murder. Id. at 10. Searches for news including the

victim’s name occurred throughout this time as well, indicating Appellant’s

ongoing thought process and consciousness of guilt. Id. at 10. The trial court’s

lack of unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, and ill-will is further

demonstrated by the fact that at the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court

agreed on the record that there should be voir dire questions reflecting

potential jurors’ views on gay sex to exclude anyone who may be intolerant

of that concept. Id. at 24. Accordingly, we find that the Google searches were

properly admitted.

Appellant’s third issue challenges the discretionary aspects of his

sentence. As we have observed, “[a]n appellant is not entitled to the review

of challenges to the discretionary aspects of a sentence as of right.”

Commonwealth v. McLaine, 150 A.3d 70, 76 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation

omitted). Instead, to invoke our jurisdiction involving a challenge to the

discretionary aspects of a sentence, an appellant must satisfy the following

four-part test:

(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see

Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved

at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see

Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect,

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question

that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the

Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Id.

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Here, Appellant filed a timely appeal. He presented a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f)

statement in his brief. See Appellant’s Br. at 24. Appellant preserved the issue

in his post-sentence motion. Accordingly, we must determine if he raised a

substantial question.

“A substantial question exists where an appellant sets forth a plausible

argument that the sentence violates a particular provision of the Sentencing

Code or is contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing

process.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 249 A.3d 1206, 1211 (Pa. Super.

2021). “The determination of whether a particular issue raises a substantial

question is to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v.

Crawford, 257 A.3d 75, 78 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted).

Appellant argues that he raised a substantial question because he claims

his sentence is manifestly excessive. He also argues that his sentences for the

three misdemeanor convictions fall outside the guideline range and constitute

an unreasonable sentence. Appellant’s Br. at 24. Appellant received a

mandatory life sentence for his first-degree murder conviction, over which he

acknowledges the court had no discretion. Id. at 26. For his three

misdemeanor offenses, he received consecutive sentences with an aggregate

of four and one-half to nine years’ incarceration. Appellant claims that the life

sentence as is would have sufficiently addressed his convictions. Id. at 27.

The trial court opined that imposing only a life sentence while declining to

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impose separate sentences for the three additional crimes would have

minimized Appellant’s conduct. Tr. Ct. Op. at 7.

We have previously stated that a challenge to the imposition of

consecutive rather than concurrent sentences does not present a substantial

question. See Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 878 A.2d 867, 873 (Pa. Super.

2005). However, our Court has recognized that a consecutive sentence can be

so excessive that it may create a substantial question. We have also found

that a claim that the sentence imposed was outside the guidelines and

unreasonable raised a substantial question. Commonwealth v. Guth, 735

A.2d 709, 711 (Pa. Super. 1999).

Accordingly, we will address the merits of Appellant’s sentencing claims,

mindful of our standard of review. This Court has repeatedly stated:

“[s]entencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing

judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse

of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 828 A.2d 1126, 1128 (Pa. Super.

2003). An abuse of discretion is more than a simple error of judgment.

Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 961 (Pa. 2007). An appellate court

will not lightly disturb the trial court’s sentencing judgment as the judge is in

the best position to “review the defendant’s character, defiance or indifference,

and the overall nature of the crime.” Commonwealth v. Conte, 198 A.3d

1169, 1177 (Pa. Super. 2018) (internal citation and quotations omitted).

Finally, our Supreme Court has repeatedly held that that the Sentencing

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Guidelines are purely advisory in nature. Commonwealth v. Yuhasz, 923

A.2d 1111, 1118 (Pa. 2007). “The guidelines are merely one factor among

many that the court must consider in imposing a sentence.” Id.

Here, the trial court imposed the mandatory life sentence for first-

degree murder and consecutive sentences of two and one-half to five years’

for possession of instrument of crime (PIC), one to two years’ for abuse of a

corpse, and one to two years’ for tampering with evidence. The trial court’s

reasoning was as follows:

Here, the court had no discretion in sentencing Appellant to life in

prison on the conviction for Murder of the First Degree; a

mandatory sentence from which a court may not depart. To the

extent that Appellant’s complaint concerns the aggregate

consecutive sentences of 4 ½ - 9 years incarceration on the PIC,

Abuse of Corpse and Tampering with Evidence Convictions, the

sentence was also proper. Appellant’s conduct in murdering

Naasire Johnson by shooting him in the neck, then burning and

discarding his corpse in an attempt to conceal evidence of his

identity was vile and cruel. Failing to impose separate sentences

for the crimes relating to that conduct would have minimized

those crimes and the outrageousness of Appellant’s conduct.

Accordingly, the court chose to impose consecutive sentences,

which was well within its discretion. As already noted “[there is no

abuse of discretion unless the sentence is manifestly excessive so

as to inflict too severe a punishment.” Commonwealth v.

Mouzon, supra. Here, the sentence[s] were not manifestly

excessive in light of the nature of the crimes and facts of

Appellant’s conduct as established by the evidence.

Tr. Ct. Op. at 7.

We find no abuse of discretion. Appellant’s crimes are especially

heinous. The court’s sentences did not exceed the statutory maximum.

Additionally, the court considered Appellant’s background and personal

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circumstances, Appellant’s prior record score, the offense gravity score, and

victim impact statements. N.T., 9/27/24, 53-61. Appellant is already facing a

mandatory life sentence, and we find that an additional four and a half to nine

years does not constitute too severe a punishment. Accordingly, we affirm.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 4/17/2026

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