M.

1

2

3

4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6

7 S. M., Case No. 25-cv-09255-TSH

8 Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

9 v. DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO

10 SEQUOIA UNION HIGH SCHOOL RULE 12(b)(6)

DISTRICT, et al.,

11

Defendants. Re: Dkt. No. 14

12

13 I. INTRODUCTION

14 Plaintiff S.M., a minor, brings this action against Defendants Sequoia Union High School

15 District and Jarrett Dooley (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging that Defendants were deliberately

16 indifferent to sex-based harassment of S.M. and discriminated against S.M. in their failure to

17 investigate such harassment. ECF No. 1. Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to

18 Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). ECF No. 14 (“Mot.”). The Court finds this matter suitable for

19 disposition without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b) and VACATES the January

20 22, 2026, hearing. For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN

21 PART the motion.1

22 II. BACKGROUND

23 A. Factual Background

24 S.M., a minor, brings this action by and through his parents and guardians, H.M. and A.M.

25 Compl. ¶ 5 (ECF No. 1); ECF No. 11 (Order Appointing GAL). Defendant Sequoia Union High

26 School District (“Sequoia”) is a public school district that receives federal financial assistance.

27

1 Compl. ¶ 6. S.M. was enrolled as a student at Sequoia at all times relevant to this action. Id. ¶ 16.

2 Defendant Jarrett Dooley (“Dooley”) is the Director of Student Services for Sequoia. Id. ¶ 7.

3 Overall, S.M. alleges that (1) Defendants were deliberately indifferent when S.M.

4 experienced sex-based harassment when his “email account was hacked and used to send a

5 sexually explicit and humiliating email” to members within the school district; (2) Defendants

6 engaged in sex-based discrimination when they “treat[ed] male harassment victims less seriously

7 than female victims would be treated”; and (3) Sequoia failed “to train employees on mandatory

8 Title IX procedures.” Id. ¶ 1.

9 1. Incidents Of Harassment

10 On April 1, 2024, S.M.’s email account was hacked and used to send a “discriminatory

11 email.” Id. ¶ 17. “The email contained a picture of S.M. bare-chested, in a flex pose, but altered

12 to make him look skinnier than he is, or deformed, in a bathing suit.” Id. ¶ 19. “The email stated:

13 ‘THE PEDIFILE IS BACK!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!’” Id. ¶

14 20. “Pedifile” is a misspelling of the word “pedophile.” Id. ¶ 21. “The altered body photograph

15 constitutes body-shaming and sexual humiliation. The text falsely brands [S.M.] as a sexual

16 predator.” Id.

17 “The email was directed to an extensive listserv of school-associated email accounts,

18 including: S.M.’s parents’ personal emails; Teachers; School bus drivers; Long-term substitute

19 teachers; Family accounts; The Director of Maintenance and Operations; ‘All Carlmont Students’;

20 ‘All Menlo-Atherton Students’; ‘All Middle College Students’; ‘All Redwood Students’; ‘All

21 Woodside Students’; and Others throughout the District community.” Id. ¶ 18. Through this

22 distribution, the email “was sent to virtually the entire [Sequoia] community[.]” Id. ¶ 22.

23 “As a result of [Sequoia’s] failure to investigate and provide supportive measures, [S.M.]

24 was subjected to increased ridicule and was effectively excluded from the programs and activities

25 of [Sequoia].” Id. ¶ 36. In November 2024, S.M. was bullied by another student at a residential

26 facility “related to the April 1, 2024 email incident.” Id. ¶ 37.

27 Because S.M. does not know who sent the email, he “remains vulnerable to ongoing

1 school, incurring substantial out-of-pocket expenses.” Id. ¶ 40. S.M.

2 has suffered and continues to suffer severe emotional distress,

anxiety, and mental anguish; humiliation and embarrassment from the

3 districtwide harassment; fear and vulnerability to ongoing

harassment; loss of equal access to educational opportunities and

4 benefits; loss of social connections, extracurricular participation, and

normal school experiences; economic damages from attending

5 alternative educational settings; ongoing psychological harm from the

institutional betrayal of having his complaint rejected on false

6 grounds.

7 Id. ¶ 41.

8 2. Activities Regarding The Incidents

9 Sequoia has “adopted Administrative Regulation 5145.71 (‘AR 5145.71’), which sets forth

10 [Sequoia’s] Title IX Policy and procedures for responding to sexual harassment.” Id. ¶ 9.

11 Pursuant to AR 5145.71, when Sequoia receives a report of sexual harassment, Sequoia must

12 discuss supportive measures with the complainant and “follow certain protocols in investigating

13 complaints.” Id. ¶¶ 10–15.

14 S.M. alleges that the following events occurred. On April 22, 2024, S.M.’s parents

15 notified Sequoia about the email distributed on April 1, 2024, by filing a “Uniform Complaint.”

16 Id. ¶ 24. On May 9, 2024, Dooley “sent a letter to [S.M.’s] parents acknowledging receipt of the

17 Uniform Complaint”; Dooley stated that “the email was ‘sexually explicit and offensive’ and that

18 it ‘manipulated a photograph of Complainant.’” Id. ¶¶ 26–27. In the letter, Dooley “rejected the

19 Uniform Complaint” and stated:

20 As Complainant is no longer enrolled with the District, and was not a

part of the District’s program or activities at the time the email was

21 sent, the Complaint falls outside the District’s Uniform Complaint

Procedure.

22

23 Id. ¶ 28. This statement was false because S.M. “has always remained a student enrolled at

24 [Sequoia].” Id. ¶ 29. Sequoia “knew or should have known this fact, as enrollment status is

25 readily verifiable through [Sequoia’s] records.” Id. Sequoia acknowledged “that it would

26 investigate due to ‘the serious nature of the complaint,’” but it refused to investigate S.M.’s

27 complaint Id. ¶ 30. Sequoia failed to comply with multiple requirements under AR 5145.71 and

1 “On September 13, 2024, [S.M.] filed a government tort claim with [Sequoia] advising that

2 no Title IX investigation had been initiated and that [S.M.] remained a student in [Sequoia].” Id. ¶

3 32.

4 “In November of 2024, [Sequoia] placed another student at the residential facility at which

5 [S.M] was placed. That student proceeded to bully [S.M.] related to the April 1, 2024 email

6 incident.” Id. ¶ 37.

7 “On February 10, 2025, [S.M.’s] counsel communicated with counsel for [Sequoia] again

8 reiterating that no Title IX investigation had occurred and that [S.M.] remained a student in

9 [Sequoia].” Id. ¶ 34. As of the time this action was filed, Sequoia “has still not initiated a Title IX

10 investigation, has not followed AR 5145.71 regulations, and has not provided supportive

11 measures.” Id. ¶ 35. “As a result of [Sequoia’s] failure to investigate and provide supportive

12 measures,” S.M. suffered harm. Id. ¶ 36.

13 3. Sex-Based Discrimination By Defendants

14 S.M. alleges that Defendants engaged in sex-based discrimination when they “treat[ed]

15 male harassment victims less seriously than female victims would be treated.” Id. ¶ 1. S.M.

16 lacks sufficient information at this time to form a belief as to how

[Sequoia] has responded to complaints filed by or on behalf of female

17 students but specifically identifies that this allegation is likely to have

evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for discovery of

18 [Sequoia’s] Title IX complaint files, response times, investigation

records, and comparative treatment data.

19

20 Id. ¶ 42.

21 “[Sequoia’s] false assertion that [S.M.] was not enrolled constitutes pretextual reasoning

22 masking sex-based discriminatory animus.” Id. ¶ 43. If Sequoia was not acting with a

23 discriminatory motive, it would have verified S.M.’s enrollment status before refusing to

24 investigate, provided supportive measures to S.M., and followed all internal procedures. Id. ¶ 42.

25 S.M.

26 currently lacks sufficient information to establish a pattern of

differential treatment but specifically identifies that this allegation is

27 likely to have evidentiary support after discovery of [Sequoia’s] Title

1 Id. ¶ 45. If Sequoia did not have “a pattern and practice of taking complaints more seriously and

2 responding more promptly when filed by or on behalf of female students than male students,” it

3 would have acted on S.M.’s complaint. Id.

4 B. Procedural Background

5 On October 28, 2025, S.M. filed his complaint against Defendants Sequoia, Dooley (in his

6 individual capacity), and Does 1–10, alleging four causes of action: (1) Violation of Title IX of

7 the Education Amendments Act of 1972 (20 U.S.C. § 1681); (2) Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

8 (Title IX) (against Dooley); (3) Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Equal Protection Clause) (against

9 Dooley); and (4) Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Failure to Train) (against Sequoia). Compl. ¶¶

10 53–112 (ECF No. 1). S.M. seeks, inter alia, “an order enjoining Defendant to conduct an

11 investigation under Title IX” and damages. Id. at 26–27.

12 On December 18, 2025, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule

13 12(b)(6). ECF No. 14 (“Mot.”). On January 2, 2026, S.M. filed an Opposition. ECF No. 20

14 (“Opp.”). On January 9, 2026, Defendants filed a Reply. ECF No. 21 (“Reply”).

15 III. LEGAL STANDARD

16 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) “tests the legal

17 sufficiency of a claim. A claim may be dismissed only if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff

18 can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Cook v.

19 Brewer, 637 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up). Rule 8 provides that a complaint must

20 contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

21 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that

22 is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Plausibility does

23 not mean probability, but it requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

24 unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint must therefore provide a

25 defendant with “fair notice” of the claims against it and the grounds for relief. Twombly, 550 U.S.

26 at 555 (citation omitted).

27 In considering a motion to dismiss, the court accepts factual allegations in the complaint as

1 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008); accord Erickson v. Pardus,

2 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the

3 allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of

4 the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”

5 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

6 If a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is granted, the “court should grant leave to amend even if no

7 request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly

8 be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en

9 banc) (cleaned up). A court “may exercise its discretion to deny leave to amend due to ‘undue

10 delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by

11 amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party . . ., [and] futility of

12 amendment.’” Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 629 F.3d 876, 892–93 (9th Cir. 2010)

13 (alterations in original) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). Courts have broader

14 discretion in denying motions for leave to amend after leave to amend has already been granted.

15 See Rich v. Shrader, 823 F.3d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[W]hen the district court has already

16 afforded a plaintiff an opportunity to amend the complaint, it has wide discretion in granting or

17 refusing leave to amend after the first amendment, and only upon gross abuse will its rulings be

18 disturbed.”) (cleaned up); Chodos v. W. Publ’g Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen

19 a district court has already granted a plaintiff leave to amend, its discretion in deciding subsequent

20 motions to amend is particularly broad.”) (cleaned up).

21 IV. DISCUSSION

22 Defendants move to dismiss all S.M.’s claims for failing to state a cognizable claim. Mot.

23 at 1. In sum, the Court concludes that S.M. alleges cognizable claims for violation of Title IX and

24 Section 1983 equal protection. Therefore, dismissal of Claims 1 and 3 is not warranted.

25 However, the Court concludes that S.M. fails to allege cognizable claims for Section 1983 Title IX

26 and failure to train. Therefore, dismissal of Claims 2 and 4 is warranted.

27 A. Title IX Claim (Claim 1)

1 and its failure “caused [S.M.] to suffer further harassment and to be vulnerable to harassment

2 thereafter, continuing to this date.” Compl. ¶¶ 32–41, 53–63. Defendants argue that the Court

3 should dismiss S.M.’s Title IX claim (Claim 1) because the claim (1) cannot be brought against

4 Dooley; and (2) fails to sufficiently state a claim against Sequoia. Mot. at 2. S.M. clarifies that

5 his Title IX claim lies against Sequoia only and not against Dooley. Opp. at 6:3–6. The Court

6 therefore construes the Title IX claim as against Sequoia only. See Reply at 2:13–18.

7 With certain exceptions not relevant here, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972

8 (“Title IX”) provides that

9 [n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded

from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to

10 discrimination under any education program or activity receiving

Federal financial assistance[.]

11

12 Title IX, Section 901(a) (20 U.S.C. § 1681).

13 Title IX provides for a private right of action against federal funding recipients, who are

14 liable for damages for their own misconduct. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629,

15 639–41 (1999). “[S]exual harassment is a form of discrimination for Title IX purposes.” Id. at

16 649–50. “[F]unding recipients are properly held liable in damages only where they are

17 deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment, of which they have actual knowledge, that is so

18 severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to

19 the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.” Id. at 650. A school district is

20 liable for harassment by a third-party when (1) it exercises “substantial control” over the offender

21 and (2) the harassment takes place “in a context subject to the school district’s control.” Id. at

22 644–45.

23 Here, Defendants argue that S.M.’s Title IX claim fails because the Complaint fails to

24 plausibly allege the elements of control, severity, and deliberate indifference. Mot. at 6:11–8:19.

25 The Court addresses each element in turn below and concludes that S.M. alleges a cognizable Title

26 IX claim against Sequoia.

27 1. Control

1 requirement that Sequoia “had ‘substantial control.’” Mot. at 7:1–6.

2 In a Title IX case predicated on harassment, the defendant is only liable if it “had

3 substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which the harassment occurred.”

4 Brown v. Arizona, 82 F.4th 863, 874–75 (9th Cir. 2023) (en banc) (cleaned up). If these two

5 prongs are met, a school can be liable for failing to respond to a student’s complaint about the

6 conduct of a harasser. Id. at 875.

7 “[W]hile the physical location of the harassment can be an important indicator of the

8 school’s control over the ‘context’ of the alleged harassment, a key consideration is whether the

9 school has some form of disciplinary authority over the harasser in the setting in which the

10 harassment takes place.” Id. Thus, in a “context” over which the institution has substantial

11 control, “the institution may be held liable for deliberate indifference under Title IX even though

12 the harassment takes place off the physical property of the institution.” Id.

13 Here, the Court finds that S.M. pleads sufficient facts to plausibly allege that Sequoia had

14 substantial control over the harasser. S.M. alleges that the explicit email was sent to numerous

15 Sequoia listservs, contained a misspelling, and contained a photograph that altered his body to

16 make him look deformed. Compl. ¶¶ 17–22. Defendants quarrel with S.M.’s allegation that the

17 “hacker is unknown” because in their view, it confirms the Complaint cannot show that Sequoia

18 “had any means of disciplinary authority over the harasser.” Reply at 4:19–5:5. But the Court

19 must draw all reasonable inferences in S.M.’s favor. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Court agrees

20 with S.M. that because the hacker had access to more than eleven of Sequoia’s listservs, there

21 exists a reasonable inference that “the harasser was either a student or staff member who had

22 access to virtually all school email addresses.” Opp. at 7:7–17. And because the harasser

23 misspelled words and altered an image in a humiliating way, there exists a reasonable inference

24 that the harasser is likely a student. In fact, Defendants seemingly make the same inference by

25 repeatedly citing to caselaw applicable to “peer-on-peer harassment.” See Mot. at 6–8; Reply at 2.

26 The identity of the harasser is “a key consideration” because it indicates whether Sequoia had

27 disciplinary authority over the harasser. Brown, 82 F.4th at 875. As such, because Sequoia would

1 “context” prong in this light.

2 The Court finds that S.M. pleads sufficient facts to plausibly allege that Sequoia had

3 substantial control over the context in which the harassment occurred. Defendants argue that the

4 facts alleged regarding “harassment firmly put any incident outside of [Sequoia’s] control as they

5 did not happen on school grounds or under the supervision of a school employee.” Mot. at 7:1–

6 17. But that is not dispositive—while these are examples illustrating control, “location is only one

7 factor in determining the control over context.” Brown, 82 F.4th at 878. The question is whether

8 the overall context surrounding the harassment, considering the plausible identity of the harasser,

9 was within Sequoia’s control. Id. at 875.

10 S.M. contends that Sequoia has substantial control over harassment that occurs through its

11 own email system. Opp. at 6:11–17. Defendants complain that S.M. “fails to cite any authority

12 holding that a school district has substantial control over their electronic communications

13 systems.” Reply at 3:14–24. That is unsurprising given the lack of caselaw. However, California

14 law and analogous caselaw shed light on the issue. As discussed, the “discipline-related factor” is

15 critical in assessing a school’s control over context. Brown, 82 F.4th at 875, 878. S.M. points out

16 that California state law provides school districts with “authority to discipline students for

17 harassing communications directed at another student even if those communications occurred off-

18 ‘schoolsite.’” Opp. at 7:13–17 (citing Cal. Educ. Code § 48900(r)(1), (2)(A)). Thus, Sequoia has

19 disciplinary authority over students who send harassing emails.

20 But Sequoia’s control goes even further. Recall that the offending email “was directed to

21 an extensive listserv of school-associated email accounts.” Compl. ¶ 18. A listserv

22 is an automatic mailing list service that amounts to an e-mail

discussion group. Subscribers receive and send messages that are

23 distributed to all others on the listserv. Messages may be

automatically posted to the listserv or filtered through the list owner

24 (who may elect not to post messages that are off topic or

inappropriate). A listserv, unlike a newsgroup, involves one-to-many

25 messaging, rather than the use of distributed message databases.

26 Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1021 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Ian C. Ballon, E–Commerce and

27 Internet Law: Treatise with Forms, Glossary of Terms, at 30 (2001)) (cleaned up), overruled on

1 definition, there exists a reasonable inference that Sequoia would have significant control over its

2 own listservs, including the ability to filter offensive messages. The Fourth Circuit’s opinion in

3 Feminist Majority Found. v. Hurley, cited to by the Ninth Circuit with approval, is helpful on this

4 point. See Brown, 82 F.4th at 876–77 (citing Feminist Majority, 911 F.3d 674 (4th Cir. 2018));

5 Opp. at 7:1–6. In Feminist Majority, the harassment occurred via anonymous posts on a social

6 media platform that permitted communication within a 1.5-mile radius of the school. Brown, 82

7 F.4th at 876. As the Ninth Circuit explained, “the Feminist Majority court held that a university

8 has substantial control over an off-campus context when it has the ability to take actions that

9 would likely prevent harassment in the immediate vicinity of the campus.” Id. at 877. The court

10 highlighted that “the disciplinary and remedial tools” available to the school in Feminist Majority

11 illustrated the control the school had over the social media platform. Id. at 877–78. For example,

12 the school could have disabled access to the social media platform, “communicated to the student

13 body that the [school] would not tolerate sexually harassing behavior,” or “conducted mandatory

14 assemblies to explain and discourage cyber bullying and sex discrimination.” Id. at 877 (citation

15 omitted). So too here. When an offensive email is disbursed using Sequoia’s listservs, the

16 reasonable inference is that Sequoia can manipulate or shut down the listservs, communicate to

17 students that the email content is not acceptable, and provide training to all members of its

18 community regarding digital sexual harassment. This shows that Sequoia has control over the

19 context of harassment via its email listservs. Defendants’ argument that it lacks control over the

20 context surrounding the email incident because the email did not originate from a school account

21 or on campus is unavailing. Reply at 4:1–28. S.M. alleges harm from the distribution of the

22 email. Compl. ¶¶ 17–22. Thus, as in Brown (discussed more fully below), Sequoia has control

23 over the “home” where the harassment took place: Sequoia’s listservs and associated email

24 accounts. Brown, 82 F.4th at 878.

25 S.M. further contends that Sequoia has substantial control over harassment occurring at a

26 residential facility that involves another Sequoia student placed in the facility by Sequoia. Opp. at

27 7:18–22. Defendants respond that even where it places students at a residential facility, it lacks

1 Defendants incorrectly assert that “the Complaint does not contain any allegations that [Sequoia]

2 facilitated [S.M.’s] placement at the residential facility.” Id. at 7:16–8:3 (emphasis in original).

3 S.M. alleges Sequoia “placed another student at the residential facility at which [S.M.] was

4 placed.” Compl. ¶ 37 (emphasis added). This creates a reasonable inference that Sequoia

5 “placed” both S.M. and the harasser at the residential facility. As such, this case is squarely on

6 point with Brown, where the Ninth Circuit held that a university had substantial control over a

7 student’s assaults against his girlfriend in his off-campus residence because the university was

8 required to give permission to the student to reside off-campus and could revoke that permission.

9 Brown, 82 F.4th at 878. Given this, the Ninth Circuit held that the university “had control over

10 the off-campus housing in which [the student] was living.” Id. As in Brown, S.M. alleges that

11 Sequoia determines placement at the residential facility. Compl. ¶ 37. And because Sequoia had

12 the power to place students at the residential facility, a reasonable inference exists that Sequoia

13 could remove students from the facility. Therefore, S.M.’s Title IX claim meets the control

14 element at the pleadings stage.

15 2. Severity, Pervasiveness, And Impact On Education

16 Defendants argue that the Complaint “fails to allege harassment so severe, pervasive, and

17 objectively offensive that it denies [S.M.] the equal access to education that Title IX is designed to

18 protect.” Mot. at 7:18–8:5. Specifically, Defendants assert that S.M.’s alleged harassment is not

19 “severe” or “pervasive,” and that it did not impact “his educational opportunities while at

20 [Sequoia].” Id.; Reply at 5:19–7:9.

21 Under Title IX, “a plaintiff must show harassment that is so severe, pervasive, and

22 objectively offensive, and that so undermines and detracts from the victims’ educational

23 experience, that the victims are effectively denied equal access to an institution’s resources and

24 opportunities.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 631. “Whether gender-oriented conduct rises to the level of

25 actionable ‘harassment’ thus depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances,

26 expectations, and relationships, including, but not limited to, the ages of the harasser and the

27 victim and the number of individuals involved.” Id. at 651 (cleaned up). “Damages are not

1 a cognizable claim, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting a potential link between his education

2 and the alleged misconduct. Id.

3 Here, the Court finds that S.M. pleads sufficient facts to plausibly allege that the email

4 incident satisfies the severity and pervasiveness requirements. Defendants argue that “the singular

5 email sent by an unknown party and the allegation that [S.M.] was bullied as a result” do not meet

6 these elements. Mot. at 7:18–8:5. S.M. contends that a single incident can satisfy the elements.

7 Opp. at 8:4–9:3. Defendants respond that S.M. “does not provide relevant legal authority as to

8 when a court should make such a determination that a single incident is so severe as to be

9 considered pervasive.” Reply at 5:22–6:7 (emphasis in original). The Court takes Defendants’

10 argument in two parts.

11 First, legal authority—including Supreme Court precedent—support S.M.’s proposition

12 that a single incident can give rise to Title IX liability. Opp. at 8:4–9:3. In Davis, the Supreme

13 Court explained that “in theory, a single instance of sufficiently severe one-on-one peer

14 harassment could be said to have” the “systemic effect of denying the victim equal access to an

15 educational program or activity.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 652–53. To be sure, the Supreme Court

16 noted that a single incident was “unlikely” to be sufficient. Id. at 653. But Davis was twenty-five

17 years ago and dealt with in-person harassment—it did not occur in an era where a single click of a

18 button could disseminate a humiliating photo to an entire district. And Davis acknowledged that

19 harassment on a “widespread level” could be actionable. Id. Applying this guidance, federal

20 district and appellate courts have held that a single instance of sexual assault or sexual harassment

21 may be actionable under Title IX. See Doe v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 1 F.4th 257, 274 (4th Cir.

22 2021); Williams v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 477 F.3d 1282, 1297–99 (11th Cir.

23 2007); Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504 F.3d 165, 172–73 (1st Cir. 2007), rev’d on other

24 grounds by 555 U.S. 246 (2009); Vance v. Spencer Cnty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 259 (6th

25 Cir. 2000); T.Z. v. City of New York, 634 F. Supp. 2d 263, 270 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). Therefore, the

26 Court is not aware of any authority foreclosing the possibility that a single incident of sexual

27 harassment satisfies the Davis standard.

1 satisfy the severity and pervasiveness elements. Opp. at 9:4–10:6. Defendants attempt to classify

2 the email incident as mere “teasing” or “name calling” that falls outside Title IX’s ambit. Mot. at

3 7:28–8:5 (citing Davis, 526 U.S. at 652). It strains credulity that an explicit image of a minor,

4 containing language indicating that the minor is a sexual predator, that is distributed to all

5 students, faculty, and parents within a school district, is tantamount to simple teasing. See Opp. at

6 9:6–12. Indeed, S.M. alleges that Sequoia’s own agent conceded the incident’s offensiveness. Id.

7 at 9:9–12 (citing Compl. ¶ 27). Beyond this allegation, analogous caselaw and statutory schemes,

8 along with agency guidance, compel the conclusion that S.M.’s allegations are sufficient on a

9 motion to dismiss.

10 While there is a dearth of caselaw addressing digital sexual harassment, some cases are

11 illuminating. Davis instructs courts to “bear in mind that schools are unlike the adult workplace

12 and that children may regularly interact in a manner that would be unacceptable for adults.” Reese

13 v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 739 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). Common

14 sense dictates that distributing humiliating photos is inappropriate, even for schoolchildren. In

15 fact, courts have held that this behavior—even on a single occasion—can give rise to severe or

16 pervasive harassment when experienced by adults. In Carranza v. City of Los Angeles, a

17 California appellate court analyzed whether the distribution of a sexualized humiliating picture

18 constitutes severe and pervasive conduct under FEHA,2 a state statute that employs the same

19 severity standard as that in Title IX. 111 Cal. App. 5th at 403–06. In Carranza, employees at the

20 plaintiff’s workplace circulated a “nude look-alike photo” of the plaintiff meant to “harass,

21 intimidate, and slander” the plaintiff; the offending photo was “widely shared” around the

22 plaintiff’s workplace. Id. at 393, 403–04. The Carranza court held that the plaintiff’s “knowledge

23 of the widespread circulation of a sexualized nude image purporting to depict her, along with

24 crude, objectifying commentary” was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work

25 environment. Id. at 403–405. In other words, a widely circulated intimate image resembling an

26

27

2 FEHA refers to California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act, which prohibits sexual

1 adult is sufficient to “disrupt [the adult’s] emotional tranquility in the workplace.” Id. at 405. A

2 fortiori, a widely circulated intimate image displaying a child’s actual face surely can constitute

3 severe and pervasive harassment. See Compl. ¶¶ 5, 17–22; Davis, 526 U.S. at 651 (directing

4 courts to consider the age of the victim and the number of individuals involved).

5 Moreover, as S.M. points out, Title VII is instructive. Opp. at 8:4–15; see Grabowski v.

6 Arizona Bd. of Regents, 69 F.4th 1110, 1116 (9th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted) (“The Supreme

7 Court has often looked to its Title VII interpretations of discrimination in illuminating Title IX.”).

8 Under Title VII’s similar severity element, courts analyze the totality of the circumstances,

9 including “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically

10 threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; whether it unreasonably interferes with

11 an employee’s work performance” and the “effect on the employee’s psychological well-being” to

12 determine whether the element is satisfied. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).

13 The Court has little doubt that in applying the Title VII standard, S.M. plausibly alleges severe and

14 persistent harassment through the dissemination of a humiliating, intimate photo and accusation of

15 being a sexual predator, and S.M.’s resulting psychological harm and complete withdrawal from

16 Sequoia. See Compl. ¶¶ 17–22, 36–41.

17 Further, the Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”) issued guidance explaining that actionable

18 online harassment can include “[n]onconsensual texting, posting, or otherwise sharing naked or

19 intimate images of a person—whether real, altered, or created through artificial intelligence (AI)

20 technologies.” Online or Digital Sexual Harassment under the 2020 Title IX Regulations: A

21 Resource for Students, Families, and Educators, U.S. Dep’t Educ., OCR (Jan. 2025)3; see

22 Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal

23 Financial Assistance, 89 FR 33474-01, 2024 WL 1833438, at 33515 (U.S. Dep’t Educ. 2024)

24 (same). Such is the case here where S.M. alleges that his email was hacked and used to distribute

25 an intimate altered image of himself without his consent. Compl. ¶¶ 17–21.

26

27

3 Available at https://www.ed.gov/media/document/digital-sexual-harassment-under-2020-title-ix-

1 Defendants take issue with S.M.’s assertion that “pervasive” harassment need not occur

2 throughout time. Reply at 6:8–7:9; see Opp. at 8:21–9:3. However, S.M.’s assertion that

3 “pervasive” can refer to an incident of harassment that is “widespread in scope” is supported by

4 the word’s plain meaning. Opp. at 8:21–9:3; see Pervasive, Merriam-Webster Dictionary

5 (“existing in or spreading through every part of something”)4; Pervasive, Oxford English

6 Dictionary (last rev. 2005) (“Having the quality or power of pervading; penetrative, permeative;

7 ubiquitous.”).5 And as discussed, federal courts have held that a single incident in time can be

8 “pervasive.” See, e.g., T.Z., 634 F. Supp. 2d at 270 (holding that under Title IX, “a one-time

9 assault may be pervasive”). Therefore, the Court agrees with S.M. that he sufficiently alleges

10 pervasive harassment “through breadth of distribution” of the explicit email. Opp. at 9:13–18.

11 Finally, the Court finds that S.M. pleads sufficient facts to plausibly allege that the

12 harassment he endured satisfies the requirement that it deprived him of educational opportunities.

13 Defendants’ assertion that “[S.M.’s] Complaint does not contain any allegations supporting that

14 the single instance of alleged harassment . . . impacted his educational opportunities while at

15 [Sequoia]” is disingenuous. Reply at 6:15–24. S.M. alleges that he was bullied about the email

16 incident and was subjected to increased ridicule. Opp. at 9:21–10:6, 12:3–8 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 36–

17 37). Defendants’ assertion that the Complaint does not allege “bullying or further verbal

18 harassment while at school” is thus not only incorrect, but its focus is too narrow. Reply at 6:16–

19 19. The Court agrees with other courts that “[e]ven a single incident of sexual harassment, if

20 sufficiently severe, can inflict serious lasting harms on the victim—physical, psychological,

21 emotional, and social.” Fairfax, 1 F.4th at 274. Like the plaintiff in Ray v. Antioch Unified Sch.

22 Dist., S.M. alleges that his emotional state negatively affects his ability to receive an education.

23 See Compl. ¶ 41 (alleging S.M. suffers “severe emotional distress, anxiety, and mental anguish,”

24 and “ongoing psychological harm”); cf. Ray, 107 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2000)

25 (“Accepting the allegations regarding Plaintiff’s emotional state as true, the Court finds it possible

26

27

4 Available at https://www.merriam-webster. .com/dictionary/pervasive.

1 that Plaintiff has suffered, and possibly continues to suffer, concrete, negative effects on his ability

2 to receive an education.”). And unlike the plaintiff in Grabowski, S.M. alleges that he was forced

3 to attend another school as a result of the harassment. See Compl. ¶ 40; contra Grabowski, 69

4 F.4th at 1120 (finding plaintiff failed “to provide a potential link between the quality of Plaintiff’s

5 education and the alleged harassment” where, inter alia, the plaintiff did not “allege that he

6 stopped attending team practices or team-sponsored events because of the bullying”) (cleaned up).

7 Collectively, S.M.’s allegations meet his burden at the pleadings stage.

8 In sum, the email incident, if proved, could amount to severe and pervasive conduct that

9 was objectively offensive under Title IX and that deprived S.M. of educational opportunities.

10 Therefore, S.M.’s Title IX claim meets the severity and pervasiveness elements at the pleadings

11 stage.

12 3. Deliberate Indifference

13 Defendants argue that the facts in the Complaint “do not rise to the level of deliberate

14 indifference required on the part of [Sequoia] to establish Title IX liability.” Mot. at 8:6–19. S.M.

15 contends that he establishes deliberate indifference because, inter alia, “[r]efusing to investigate

16 sexual harassment based on a false premise is per se unreasonable.” Opp. at 10:7–12:2.

17 “Deliberate indifference” occurs “where the recipient’s response to the harassment or lack

18 thereof is clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 648.

19 “[D]eliberate indifference must, at a minimum, cause students to undergo harassment or make

20 them liable or vulnerable to it.” Id. at 645 (cleaned up). “[A] Title IX plaintiff can establish

21 school district liability by showing that a single school administrator with authority to take

22 corrective action responded to harassment with deliberate indifference.” Fitzgerald v. Barnstable

23 Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 257 (2009). On a motion to dismiss, courts are permitted to “identify a

24 response as not ‘clearly unreasonable’ as a matter of law.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 649. But

25 “[d]eliberate indifference will often be a fact-laden question, for which bright lines are ill-suited.”

26 Roe v. Gustine Unified Sch. Dist., 678 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1035 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (cleaned up).

27 Here, the Court finds that S.M. pleads sufficient facts to plausibly allege that Dooley’s lack

1 of the email incident, Dooley refused to investigate, even though Dooley stated that the email was

2 “sexually explicit and offensive,” because Dooley falsely asserted that S.M. was not a Sequoia

3 student. Compl. ¶¶ 24–29. The Court cannot say that Dooley’s response was not clearly

4 unreasonable as a matter of law. Indeed, “an official decision by the [federal funding] recipient

5 not to remedy the violation,” through the action of “an official who is advised of a Title IX

6 violation” yet “refuses to take action to bring the recipient into compliance,” constitutes deliberate

7 indifference. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998); see also

8 Grabowski, 69 F.4th at 1120–21 (finding deliberate indifference met where plaintiff “alleged that

9 Defendants took no meaningful action in response to his complaints of anti-gay bullying”). And

10 because Dooley had authority to initiate a Title IX investigation but did not, Sequoia can be held

11 liable for Dooley’s failure. See Compl. ¶ 7; Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 257. Moreover, S.M.’s

12 allegations that he was “subjected to increased ridicule” and bullied by another Sequoia student

13 about the email incident satisfy the causation element of deliberate indifference. Opp. at 12:3–8

14 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 36–40); see Myles v. W. Contra Costa Unified Sch. Dist., No. 23-cv-01369-

15 AGT, 2024 WL 1354440, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2024) (describing liability “when the school

16 exhibits deliberate indifference after the attack which causes the student to endure additional

17 harassment”) (citation omitted). Therefore, S.M.’s Title IX claim meets the deliberate indifference

18 element at the pleadings stage.

19 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss S.M.’s Title IX claim

20 against Sequoia (Claim 1).

21 B. Section 1983 Claims

22 S.M. brings three claims under Section 1983 (Claims 2–4). See Compl. ¶¶ 64–112.

23 Defendants move to dismiss all claims. Mot. at 2.

24 In relevant part, the Civil Rights Act provides:

25 Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation

26 of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution

. . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

27 or other proper proceeding for redress.

1 method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,

2 393–94 (1989) (cleaned up). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential

3 elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated,

4 and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of State law.”

5 Long v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006).

6 1. Violation Of Title IX (Claim 2)

7 Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss S.M.’s Section 1983 claim for violating

8 Title IX (Claim 2) because the claim cannot be brought against Dooley. Mot. at 2.

9 “Title IX reaches institutions and programs that receive federal funds, which may include

10 nonpublic institutions, but it has consistently been interpreted as not authorizing suit against

11 school officials, teachers, and other individuals.” Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 257 (cleaned up).

12 Whether an individual may be held liable under Section 1983 for violating Title IX is an open

13 question in the Ninth Circuit. See Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 54 F.3d 1447, 1449 (9th Cir.

14 1995) (declining to reach issue of whether the individual defendant “can be sued for a Title IX

15 violation using section 1983”).

16 Here, S.M. “concedes that dismissal of the second cause of action is appropriate given the

17 third cause of action raises the issue of constitutional deprivation.” Opp. at 13:3–8. Further, S.M.

18 “concedes that Title IX does not permit individual liability.” Id. at 6:3. The Court agrees with

19 Defendants that dismissal is appropriate. See Reply at 9:20–26.

20 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss S.M.’s Section 1983

21 claim for violation of Title IX against Dooley (Claim 2). As S.M. concedes that dismissal is

22 warranted, the Court DENIES S.M. leave to amend this claim.

23 2. Violation Of Equal Protection Clause (Claim 3)

24 Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss S.M.’s Section 1983 claim for violating the

25 Equal Protection Clause (Claim 3) because (1) the claim cannot be brought against Dooley; and

26 (2) alternatively, the claim fails to sufficiently state a claim against Dooley. Mot. at 2.

27 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

1 protection of the laws.” U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1. This “is essentially a direction that all

2 persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,

3 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).

4 “The Equal Protection Clause reaches only state actors, but § 1983 equal protection claims

5 may be brought against individuals as well as municipalities and certain other state entities.”

6 Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 257.

7 a. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

8 Defendants argue that Dooley is not a proper defendant because he “is immune from

9 liability under the Eleventh Amendment.” Mot. at 14:11–16:15. S.M. contends that “Dooley is

10 not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity for individual-capacity claims based on his own

11 wrongful conduct—making a false statement about enrollment to avoid Title IX obligations.”

12 Opp. at 2:15–17.

13 The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution states:

14 The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to

extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against

15 one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens

or Subjects of any Foreign State.

16

17 U.S. Const., amend. XI. Broadly, the Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional bar to “federal

18 jurisdiction over suits against unconsenting States.” Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44,

19 54 (1996). This bar extends to state officials sued in their official capacity for damages; thus, a

20 Section 1983 damages suit cannot be maintained against a state official sued in their official

21 capacity. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985) (explaining individuals in official-

22 capacity action may claim Eleventh Amendment immunity); Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State

23 Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (holding state officials sued in their official capacities are not

24 “persons” under § 1983 damages suits). However, the jurisdictional bar does not extend to state

25 officials sued in their official capacity for injunctive relief. Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10. Nor does it

26 preclude suit against a state official in their personal capacity. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31

27 (1991) (“The Eleventh Amendment does not bar such suits [against ‘state officials, sued in their

1 damages against a state official who is not sued in their official capacity. See id. at 30–31 (“[T]he

2 Eleventh Amendment does not erect a barrier against suits to impose ‘individual and personal

3 liability’ on state officials under § 1983.”).

4 Here, because S.M. brings his Section 1983 equal protection claim against Dooley for

5 damages, the dispositive issue is whether Dooley is sued in his official or personal capacity.

6 Defendants argue that although S.M. claims “that Dooley is being sued in his individual capacity,”

7 the “facts alleged in the Complaint reflect otherwise.” Mot. at 14:1–15:11. S.M. contends that

8 “the Complaint clearly alleges Dooley is ‘sued in his individual capacity’ (Compl. ¶ 7) and seeks

9 to hold him personally liable for his own wrongful conduct.” Opp. at 18:6–19:18. S.M. has the

10 better argument.

11 First, Defendants’ assertion that a state official cannot be sued personally for “acting

12 within the course and scope of his employment” misapplies the law. Mot. at 15:12–28. “[T]he

13 phrase ‘acting in their official capacities’ is best understood as a reference to the capacity in which

14 the state officer is sued, not the capacity in which the officer inflicts the alleged injury.” Hafer,

15 502 U.S. at 26. Simply put, state officers are not “absolutely immune from personal liability

16 under § 1983 solely by virtue of the ‘official’ nature of their acts.” Id. at 31. Therefore, the “fact

17 that Dooley was acting within the scope of his employment does not convert an individual-

18 capacity suit into an official-capacity suit.” Opp. at 19:15–18. Moreover, Defendants’ reliance on

19 Will for the proposition that S.M. cannot “circumvent congressional intent by a mere pleading

20 device” is misplaced. Mot. at 11:28–15:11 (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 71). Will analyzed whether a

21 state official could be sued in their official capacity for damages—the Supreme Court held that a

22 plaintiff cannot use a “mere pleading device” to obtain damages from the state by suing a state

23 officer in their official capacity. Will, 491 U.S. at 70–71, n.10. In other words, official-capacity

24 suits “generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an

25 officer is an agent.” Graham, 473 U.S. at 165 (citation omitted). But here, there is no problem

26 because S.M. seeks damages against Dooley in his individual capacity, not in his official capacity.

27 Second, contrary to Defendants’ assertion, S.M.’s claim against Dooley satisfies the

1 personal liability in a § 1983 action, it is enough to show that the official, acting under color of

2 state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right.” Graham, 473 U.S. at 166 (emphasis in

3 original). S.M. alleges that Dooley, while acting as Sequoia’s Director of Student Services,

4 deprived S.M. of his right to equal protection under the law by falsely asserting that S.M. was not

5 a student at Sequoia and using this falsity to justify refusing to investigate S.M.’s complaint of

6 sexual harassment. Compl. ¶¶ 24–31; see Opp. at 19:3–18. S.M. needs “to allege nothing more to

7 avoid the Eleventh Amendment’s shield.” Romano v. Bible, 169 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1999).

8 Finally, the nature of the proceedings is a salient factor in determining the capacity in

9 which a defendant is sued. Graham, 473 U.S. at 167 n.14. The Ninth Circuit presumes “that

10 officials necessarily are sued in their personal capacities where those officials are named in a

11 complaint” and the plaintiff seeks damages against the official. Romano, 169 F.3d at 1185–86.

12 Such is the case here where S.M. not only names Dooley in his individual capacity but also seeks

13 only damages, and not injunctive relief, for his Equal Protection claim. Compl. at 27. The Court

14 thus presumes that Dooley is sued in his personal capacity. Defendants’ reliance on McAllister v.

15 Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. does not compel a different conclusion. Mot. at 15:2– 15 (citing

16 216 Cal. App. 4th 1198 (2013)). In McAllister, “the caption of the complaint g[ave] no indication

17 that [the defendant] was being sued as an individual,” nor did the complaint’s body indicate that

18 the defendant was sued as an individual. 216 Cal. App. 4th at 1208–10. In contrast—as

19 acknowledged by Defendants—here “the Complaint caption identifies Dooley as ‘an individual’

20 and identifies that Dooley is being ‘sued in his individual capacity.’” Mot. at 15:21–23 (citing

21 Compl. ¶ 7). As such, McAllister is inapposite. Therefore, S.M. plausibly alleges an individual-

22 capacity claim against Dooley at the pleadings stage.

23 Accordingly, because S.M. brings his claim against Dooley in Dooley’s personal capacity,

24 the Eleventh Amendment does not bar S.M.’s claim against Dooley.

25 b. Sufficiency Of Claim

26 S.M. alleges that his rights were violated under the Equal Protection clause when Dooley

27 discriminated against him “on the basis of his sex in responding to sexual harassment directed at

1 nonconclusory facts supporting discrimination of [S.M.] on the basis of sex.” Mot. at 9:19–11:2.

2 Section 1983 suits based on the Equal Protection Clause are “available to plaintiffs

3 alleging unconstitutional gender discrimination in schools.” Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 258. Thus,

4 Title IX allows “for parallel and concurrent § 1983 claims.” Id. at 259. To establish a § 1983

5 equal protection violation, a plaintiff must show that the defendant, acting under color of state law,

6 discriminated against the plaintiff as a member of an identifiable class and that the discrimination

7 was intentional. Flores v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2003).

8 Sex is a protected class under the Equal Protection Clause. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197

9 (1976).

10 Here, the Court concludes that S.M. alleges a cognizable Section 1983 equal protection

11 claim against Dooley. Defendants argue that S.M. fails to plausibly allege that he experienced

12 discrimination because he was a male who filed a sexual harassment complaint. Mot. at 10:12–

13 11:2; Reply at 10:1–12:11. Not so. To establish an unconstitutional motive, a plaintiff “must

14 show either that the defendants intentionally discriminated or acted with deliberate indifference.”

15 Flores, 324 F.3d at 1135; see also Doe 1 v. Manhattan Beach Unified Sch. Dist., No. 23-55233,

16 2024 WL 719049, at *2 (9th Cir. Feb. 22, 2024) (“ [Plaintiff] can show an unconstitutional motive

17 by showing [defendant] intentionally discriminated or acted with deliberate indifference.”)

18 (cleaned up). As discussed, S.M. plausibly alleges that Dooley acted with deliberate indifference

19 in refusing to investigate the email incident. This is sufficient to raise an inference that Dooley

20 acted with an unconstitutional motive. Cf. Flores, 324 F.3d at 1136 (holding improper motive

21 established where defendant’s “failure to take any steps to investigate and stop the harassment

22 would support a finding of deliberate indifference”).

23 Defendants’ argument that the claim fails because the Complaint alleges only “conclusory

24 facts indicating that Dooley treated [S.M.’s] complaint of harassment differently than harassment

25 of any other kind” is unpersuasive. Mot. at 10:3–11. The Court agrees with S.M. that the

26 “Complaint alleges sufficient facts to support a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal

27 evidence of discriminatory treatment.” Opp. at 14:12–15:8. First, Defendants cite no authority for

1 complaints. See Reply at 12:8–11 (“[T]he Complaint admits on multiple occasions that [S.M.]

2 lacks any information about [Sequoia’s] handling of complaints other than [S.M.’s].”). S.M.

3 alleges that there is a “reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of discriminatory

4 treatment.” Opp. at 14:12–15:8 (citing Compl. ¶ 42). Along with S.M.’s allegations of pretext,

5 this is sufficient at the pleadings stage, especially where the records “showing how [Sequoia]

6 treated female complainants” are “in [Sequoia’s] exclusive possession.” Id. at 14:12–16; see

7 Scheibe v. ProSupps USA, LLC, 141 F.4th 1094, 1100 (9th Cir. 2025) (“And the fact that

8 defendants may have exclusive control and possession of critical facts—like their own product

9 inventory—cannot categorically prevent plaintiffs from stating a plausible claim.”). Second, S.M.

10 alleges that Dooley relied on a false assertion to justify his refusal to investigate S.M.’s complaint,

11 continued to refuse to investigate even after being corrected on two occasions, and failed to follow

12 Sequoia’s internal procedures for handling complaints of sexual harassment. Compl. ¶¶ 28–35,

13 87–90; see Opp. at 14:4–11, 15:5–8. As in Flores, S.M. alleges that Sequoia failed to enforce its

14 own anti-harassment policies to prevent harm to S.M., despite Sequoia’s knowledge that S.M.

15 experienced sexual harassment. Cf. Flores, 324 F.3d at 1135. Therefore, S.M. plausibly alleges

16 facts sufficient to raise an inference at the pleadings stage that he was treated differently because

17 of his sex.

18 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss S.M.’s Section 1983

19 claim for violating the Equal Protection Clause against Dooley (Claim 3).

20 3. Failure To Train (Claim 4)

21 Defendants argue that the Court should dismiss S.M.’s Section 1983 claim for Failure to

22 Train (Claim 4) because (1) the claim cannot be brought against Sequoia; and (2) alternatively, the

23 claim fails to sufficiently state a claim against Sequoia. Mot. at 2. S.M. contends that (1) the

24 claim is properly brought against Sequoia for prospective relief; and (2) the Complaint adequately

25 alleges a training failure. Opp. at 16:1–18:5.

26 Eleventh Amendment immunity “extends not just to suits in which the state itself is a

27 named party but also to those against an ‘arm of the state.’” Kohn v. State Bar of California, 87

1 considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of

2 City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.54 (1978). Accordingly, only local government units, not

3 state entities, are “persons” for purposes of Section 1983. Will, 491 U.S. at 62–64; see Howlett By

4 & Through Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365 (1990) (explaining that a state “entity with

5 Eleventh Amendment immunity is not a ‘person’ within the meaning of § 1983”).

6 Here, Defendants argue that the claim against Sequoia fails entirely because Sequoia is not

7 a “person” within Section 1983 given its Eleventh Amendment immunity. Mot. at 11:3–26.

8 Defendants are correct. To be sure, a school district may be considered a “person” within Section

9 1983. Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2004). However, California school districts are

10 not—they are considered state agencies protected by the Eleventh Amendment. Belanger v.

11 Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 248, 251 (9th Cir. 1992); see L.T. v. Eleanor Murray Fallon

12 Middle Sch., No. 24-cv-00110-TSH, 2024 WL 3678014, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2024) (“[I]t is

13 well settled that school districts in California are ‘arms of the State’ for Eleventh Amendment

14 purposes and are therefore not ‘persons’ within the meaning of § 1983.”). Indeed, the parties

15 agree that school districts are considered arms of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes.

16 Mot. at 11:19–22; Opp. at 16:6–8. Therefore, the Eleventh Amendment shields Sequoia from

17 Section 1983 liability.

18 S.M. contends that “[e]ven if damages against [Sequoia] are unavailable under Section

19 1983, the claim should proceed for injunctive relief.” Opp. at 16:1–18 (citing Ex parte Young, 209

20 U.S. 123 (1908)). True, under the Ex parte Young doctrine, a federal court may enjoin a state

21 official from violating federal law. 209 U.S. at 155. Thus, unlike suit against a state itself, the

22 Eleventh Amendment does not bar suit against a state officer where the “complaint alleges an

23 ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” Verizon

24 Maryland, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Maryland, 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002). But here, S.M.

25 names only Sequoia in his Failure to Train claim, not an individual in their official capacity. See

26 Compl. ¶¶ 97–112. S.M. cannot maintain suit directly against Sequoia, even one that only seeks

27 injunctive relief. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 167 n.14 (“Unless a State has waived its Eleventh

1 its own name regardless of the relief sought.”). Therefore, to the extent S.M. seeks to allege a

2 || claim for injunctive relief against individual Sequoia employees in their official capacities, such a

3 claim would not be subject to dismissal on the ground that they are not “persons” under § 1983.

4 Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10.

5 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss $.M.’s Section 1983

6 || claim for Failure to Train against Sequoia (Claim 4) WITH LEAVE TO AMEND to the extent

7 S.M. seeks to bring this claim against individual defendants in their official capacity.

8 Vv. CONCLUSION

9 For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART

10 || Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. S.M. may file an amended complaint by February 19, 2026.

11 IT IS SO ORDERED.

12

13 || Dated: January 20, 2026

□

LAA. |} □ —

THOMAS S. HIXSON

IS United States Magistrate Judge

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