Robinson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

RONALD ROBINSON,

Plaintiff, 9:23-cv-1388

(ECC/PJE)

v.

DETECTIVE BOIL, et al.,

Defendants.

Appearances:

Ronald Robinson, Pro Se Plaintiff

Paul Lyons, Esq., for Defendants

Hon. Elizabeth C. Coombe, United States District Judge:

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Ronald Robinson commenced this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

asserting claims for the violation of his constitutional rights arising between 2021 and 2023, while

he was a free citizen and during his confinement as a pretrial detainee at Jefferson County Jail.

Dkt. No. 1. On April 23, 2025, Defendants Officer Locy and Detective Vaughn filed a motion for

summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), seeking dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against

them. Dkt. No. 54. This matter was assigned to United States Magistrate Judge Paul J.

Evangelista, who issued a Report-Recommendation on February 10, 2026, recommending that

Officer Locy and Detective Vaughn’s motion be granted in part and denied in part. Dkt. No. 73.

Magistrate Judge Evangelista advised the parties that under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), they had

fourteen days within which to file written objections, and that the failure to object to the Report-

Recommendation within fourteen days would preclude appellate review. Id. at 33. Officer Locy

filed timely objections on March 7, 2026. Dkt. No. 77. For the reasons set forth below, the Court

rejects that portion of Magistrate Judge Evangelista’s Report-Recommendation denying summary

judgment to Officer Locy on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim. The Court otherwise adopts the

remainder of Magistrate Judge Evangelista’s Report-Recommendation granting Officer Locy and

Detective Vaughn’s motion for summary judgment.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews de novo those portions of the Magistrate Judge’s findings and

recommendations that have been properly preserved with a specific objection. Petersen v. Astrue,

2 F. Supp. 3d 223, 228–29 (N.D.N.Y. 2012); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). “A proper objection is

one that identifies the specific portions of the [report-recommendation] that the objector asserts

are erroneous and provides a basis for this assertion.” Kruger v. Virgin Atl. Airways, Ltd., 976 F.

Supp. 2d 290, 296 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Properly raised objections

must be “specific and clearly aimed at particular findings” in the report. Molefe v. KLM Royal

Dutch Airlines, 602 F. Supp. 2d 485, 487 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). “[E]ven a pro se party’s objections to

a Report and Recommendation must be specific and clearly aimed at particular findings in the

magistrate’s proposal . . . .” Machicote v. Ercole, No. 06-cv-13320, 2011 WL 3809920 at *2

(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2011) (citation omitted). Findings and recommendations as to which there

was no properly preserved objection are reviewed for clear error. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

Officer Locy objects to Magistrate Judge Evangelista’s determination that summary

judgment is not warranted on Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim against

him. Dkt. No. 77 at 3-5. Specifically, Officer Locy contends that Magistrate Judge Evangelista

failed to properly consider whether Plaintiff can maintain an excessive force claim viewing the

facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id.

To succeed in an excessive force claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, a pretrial

detainee must first show that the defendant used force “purposefully, knowingly, or (perhaps)

recklessly.” Edrei v. Maguire, 892 F.3d 525, 534 (2d Cir. 2018) (citing Kingsley v. Hendrickson,

576 U.S. 389, 395-96 (2015)). This is because “accidental or negligent acts are not subject to

Fourteenth Amendment liability.” Id.

A pretrial detainee must then show that “the force purposely or knowingly used against

him was objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397. “A court (judge or jury) cannot

apply this standard mechanically. Rather, objective reasonableness turns on the ‘facts and

circumstances of each particular case.’” Id. (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989))

(internal citation omitted). The determination whether given conduct was objectively reasonable

must be made by the court “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,” accounting

for the “legitimate interests that stem from [the government’s] need to manage the facility in which

the individual is detained . . . .” Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540 (1979)). The

Supreme Court has identified six non-exhaustive considerations that “may bear on the

reasonableness or unreasonableness of the force used: [(1)] the relationship between the need for

the use of force and the amount of force used; [(2)] the extent of the plaintiff’s injury; [(3)] any

effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; [(4)] the severity of the security

problem at issue; [(5)] the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; [(6)] and whether the plaintiff

was actively resisting.” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397.

Here, Officer Locy is entitled to summary judgment if Plaintiff’s contentions, fully

credited, fail to establish a constitutional violation. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable

to Plaintiff, Officer Locy was conducting “meal pass-out” on Plaintiff’s unit at Jefferson County

Jail on February 21, 2023. Dkt. No. 54-8 at 27. Plaintiff and another incarcerated individual,

Housery Rodriguez, were housed in adjacent, segregated cells on the unit. Id. at 27-28. Plaintiff

was in segregated custody because he suffered from rib pain due to a prior injury, and he was

afraid for his safety. Id. at 20-21. Rodriguez was in segregated custody due to safety issues and

had been placed in “cell moving restraints [after] being caught with a make[shift] jail shank.” Dkt.

No. 1 at 12. As Officer Locy moved down the unit to collect dinner trays, he passed over Plaintiff’s

cell and went to Rodriguez’s cell. Dkt. No. 54-8 at 27-28. Officer Locy opened Rodriguez’s cell

“with his key, left it unsecured, came over to [Plaintiff’s] cell, opened [Plaintiff’s] cell,” and asked

Plaintiff if he wanted extra juice. Id. Plaintiff replied no, and as he went to put his tray on the

meal cart, Plaintiff was attacked by Rodriguez. Id. Rodriguez “ran into [Plaintiff’s] segregated

unit area in a boxer stance and threw punches.” Id. at 30. Plaintiff still had the dinner tray in his

hands, and “shot the tray” at Rodriguez. Id. at 33. Officer Locy, who was “standing right there,”

did not “do anything to [Rodriguez,] who was out of place in somebody else’s segregation cell.”

Id. at 31. However, Officer Locy “back-arm elbow punched”1 Plaintiff in the upper chest area,

causing Plaintiff to hit a door or kiosk component. Id. at 31-32. Plaintiff “heard a snap” and

experienced “sharp pain” in his ribs. Id. at 32. Rodriguez walked back to his cell, “laughing and

smiling,” and after both Plaintiff and Rodriguez were secured in their cells other corrections

officers arrived to the incident. Id. at 32.

As an initial matter, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Evangelista’s finding that

Plaintiff has failed to substantiate his conclusory allegations that Officer Locy intentionally opened

Rodriguez’s cell door in a premeditated effort to incite an assault on Plaintiff. Dkt. No. 73 at 23-

1 In his Complaint, Plaintiff described the incident as “Officer Locy back handed me with his

elbow and arm in my chest and rib cage area violently into the wall.” Dkt. No. 1 at 13.

26. Thus, while the parties dispute how Rodriguez was ultimately able to get out of his cell, there

is nothing in the record beyond Plaintiff’s unsupported beliefs to suggest that it was the result of

Officer Locy’s intent to incite an inmate altercation. These conclusory beliefs, refuted by sworn

affidavits and documentary evidence, fail to establish a genuine dispute of material fact on this

issue.

Crediting Plaintiff’s version of the underlying incident, the inquiry is whether Officer Locy

purposefully used objectively unreasonable force to intercede in an inmate-on-inmate physical

altercation. With respect to the first prong, for purposes of this motion the Court finds that Officer

Locy used force purposefully to the extent he intended that his elbow/arm make contact with

Plaintiff.

Accordingly, the Court turns to the relevant factors to assess whether the force Officer

Locy used was objectively unreasonable. As far as the “the relationship between the need for the

use of force and the amount of force used,” Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397, it is undisputed that Officer

Locy acted in response to a fight between inmates. Corrections officers receive “wide-ranging

deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed

to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Whitley v. Albers,

475 U.S. 312, 321-22, (1986) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979)). This “deference

extends to a prison security measure taken in response to an actual confrontation,” and “requires

that neither judge nor jury freely substitute their judgment for that of officials who have made a

considered choice.” Id. at 322; see also Winters v. United States, No. 10 Civ. 7571, 2013 WL

1627950, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2013) (“As courts in this Circuit have held, corrections officers

responding to prison fights act with discretion based upon their judgment and experience.”);

Kalwasinski v. Artuz, No. 02-cv-2582, 2003 WL 22973420, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2003)

(“[P]rison administrators should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and

execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and

discipline and to maintain institutional security.” (quotation omitted)). “It is beyond dispute that

‘attempting to stop an inmate fight . . . is a legitimate governmental objective for a [Corrections]

Officer.’” Barnes v. Harling, 368 F. Supp. 3d 573, 593 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Vargas v. N.Y.C.

Dep’t of Corr., No. 17 Civ. 2544, 2018 WL 3392873, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2018)).

Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of finding that the force used by Officer Locy was

reasonable under the circumstances.

With respect to the extent of Plaintiff’s injuries, Plaintiff contends that the force of Officer

Locy’s contact caused Plaintiff to hit the door or wall, which resulted in Plaintiff’s ribs “cracking.”

The medical evidence of record includes a March 2023 radiology report observing that Plaintiff

had healing rib fractures. Dkt. No. 54-5 at 58. To be sure, such injuries, if proven, amount to

more than de minimis for purposes of an excessive force analysis. However, if the force causing

these injuries was “applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, it is unlikely to

be repugnant to the conscience of mankind, and will not amount to excessive force under Second

Circuit law.” Adilovic v. Cnty. of Westchester, No. 08-cv-10971, 2011 WL 2893101, at *6 n. 12

(S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2011) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Sims v. Artuz, 230 F.3d 14, 21 (2d

Cir. 2000)); accord Berry v. City of N.Y. Dept. of Corr., No. 12 Civ. 7819, 2014 WL 2158518, at

*1 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2014), aff’d sub nom. Berry v. New York City Dep’t of Correction, 622 F.

App’x 10 (2d Cir. 2015); see also Bongiorno v. Perilli, 537 F. Supp. 3d 367, 377 (N.D.N.Y. 2021)

(collecting cases in parallel Fourth Amendment excessive-force context finding officer’s conduct

in effecting arrest to be reasonable under those circumstances, notwithstanding the resulting

serious injuries to the plaintiffs).

Consideration of the remaining factors compels a finding that the amount of force used was

nonetheless proportional to the threat even if it resulted in Plaintiff’s alleged injury. Importantly,

Plaintiff concedes that he participated in the fight to the extent he (at a minimum) threw a dinner

tray at Rodriguez. Thus, the record according to Plaintiff reflects that Officer Locy was alone on

the unit, positioned between two inmates engaged in a physical altercation with each other. The

security problem at issue, a fight between two prison inmates, is undisputedly serious. Barnes,

368 F. Supp. 3d at 594 (“It is well established that an actual confrontation between prison inmates

is a serious security problem that corrections officers receive ‘wide-ranging deference’ to

address.”).

Finally, the facts according to Plaintiff establish that Officer Locy made an effort to limit

the amount of force used, to the extent that once Plaintiff was back in his cell, Officer Locy secured

Plaintiff’s’ cell door and the use of force ceased. Plaintiff does not directly dispute Officer Locy’s

contention that Plaintiff was actively resisting and still attempting to strike Rodriguez at this point.

Moreover, Plaintiff acknowledges that his injuries occurred because Officer Locy was attempting

to redirect Plaintiff back into his cell. Dkt. No. 54-8 at 31, 44.

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable trier of fact could

only find that no excessive force was used by Officer Locy in intervening in the fight between

Plaintiff and Rodriguez. Accordingly, summary judgment is warranted on this claim, and

Magistrate Judge Evangelista’s recommendation is rejected to this extent.

Defendant Locy further objects to Magistrate Judge Evangelista’s determination that he is

not entitled to qualified immunity. Dkt. No. 77 at 5-7. The Court agrees that, even if a reasonable

jury credited Plaintiff’s version of the facts to find that Officer Locy violated the Fourteenth

Amendment by using excessive force, he would still be entitled to summary judgment because he

did not violate a clearly established right.

Qualified immunity “shields government officials from civil damages liability unless the

official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the

challenged conduct.” Ross v. Willis, No. 16 Civ. 6704, 2021 WL 3500163, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.

9, 2021) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). “Its purpose is to ‘give

government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments’ and to protect

‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Id. at *10 (quoting City

& Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 611 (2015)).

“A constitutional right was clearly established if, at the time of the officer’s conduct, ‘the

law was sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would understand that what he is doing is

unlawful.’” Ross, 2021 WL 3500163, at *10 (quoting Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, 538 U.S. 48, 63

(2018)). The Supreme Court has “repeatedly stressed that courts must not define clearly

established law at a high level of generality, since doing so avoids the crucial question whether the

official acted reasonably in the particular circumstances that he or she faced.” Wesby, 538 U.S. at

63-64 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Although a ‘case directly on point’ is not

required, ‘existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond

debate.’” Ross, 2021 WL 3500163, at *10 (quoting Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 213 (2d

Cir. 2012)). “This demanding standard protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who

knowingly violate the law.” Id. (quotation omitted).

Summary judgment should be granted on the basis of qualified immunity only if “no

reasonable jury, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to, and drawing all inferences

most favorable to, the plaintiff, could conclude that it was objectively reasonable for the defendant

to believe that he was acting in a fashion that did not clearly violate an established federally

protected right.” Lennon v. Miller, 66 F.3d 416, 420 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Robison v. Via, 821

F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir. 1987)).

Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Officer Locy was the

sole corrections officer on a prison unit when he found himself in the middle of an inmate-on-

inmate physical altercation. At that point, in an undisputed effort to redirect Plaintiff – who was

actively participating in the fight – back into his cell, Officer Locy applied one “elbow-punch” to

Plaintiff’s chest, successfully placing him back into his cell. Officer Locy did not engage in any

additional use of force beyond the single “elbow-punch.” To be sure, the Second Circuit has stated

that “the use of entirely gratuitous force is unreasonable and therefore excessive[.]” Tracy, 623

F.3d at 99 n.5 (finding that “no reasonable officer could have believed that he was entitled to use

pepper spray gratuitously against a restrained and unresisting arrestee”); Ben-Reuben v.

Westchester County, No. 17 Civ. 9156, 2019 WL 1406868, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2019)

(declining to dismiss an excessive force claim based on an alleged slap where the court could not

determine the extent of the injuries from the complaint, and because the alleged use of force was

“entirely gratuitous”). However, the facts viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff establish

that Officer Locy’s use of force was not gratuitous, but a limited effort to restore order in a situation

that posed a safety risk to Officer Locy as well as other inmates, including Plaintiff. Plaintiff has

pointed to no authority suggesting that the application of such non-deadly force to regain control

of a violent situation in a prison constitutes unconstitutionally excessive force.

Because there is no version of the underlying events, including Plaintiff’s, in which Officer

Locy violated a clearly established right, he is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s

excessive force claim, and Magistrate Judge Evangelista’s recommendation is rejected as to this

extent.

The Court otherwise reviews the remainder of the Report-Recommendation for clear error

and, having found none, adopts the remainder of the Report-Recommendation in its entirety.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, it is hereby

ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Evangelista’s Report-Recommendation, Dkt. No. 73, is

ADOPTED in part and REJECTED in part; and it is further

ORDERED that Defendants Locy and Vaughn’s motion for summary judgment, Dkt. No.

54, is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's claims against these Defendants are DISMISSED with

prejudice; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision

and Order on the parties in accordance with the Local Rules.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 24, 2026

bien

Elizabeth C. Coombe

U.S. District Judge

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