DAVIS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PANAMA CITY DIVISION

MICHAEL J. DAVIS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 5:25-cv-281-MW-MJF

T. RATLIFF, et al.,

Defendants.

/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, filed an amended civil rights

complaint in which he asserts that three employees of the Florida

Department of Corrections violated the Eighth and Fourteenth

Amendments. Doc. 12. Because Plaintiff fails to state a claim on which

relief can be granted, the District Court should dismiss this civil action.

BACKGROUND

A. Plaintiff’s Initial Complaint

On September 24, 2025, Plaintiff commenced this civil action

against three employees of the Florida Department of Corrections:

Captain T. Ratliff, Officer T. Haire, and Officer W. Brown. Doc. 1. The

undesigned conducted the requisite screening of Plaintiff’s complaint.

Because Plaintiff failed to state a claim, the undersigned afforded

Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint. Doc. 11.

B. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

On March 9, 2026, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. Doc. 12.

Plaintiff’s amended complaint consists of two factual allegations:

• “[o]n May 30, 2025, at 8:30 am Michael Davis was

put on property restriction (“property”), no blue

uniforms, no socks. Only boxer in a 60 degrees AC

unit, and without food (air tray).”

• “my law work, pictures, motion was all thrown

away and Sergeant T. Haire is responsible.”

Id. at 5.

In the “Statement of Claims” section, Plaintiff states that he asserts

an Eighth-Amendment claim and a Fourteenth-Amendment claim. Id. at

7. Although Plaintiff states his due process claim is against T. Haire,

Plaintiff does not specify the particular Defendant(s) against whom he

asserts the Eighth Amendment claim. Id. at 6–7.

STANDARD

The District Court is required to review Plaintiff’s complaint,

identify cognizable claims and dismiss the complaint, or any portion

thereof, if the complaint “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from

a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)–(b);

see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (applying the same standard to in forma

pauperis proceedings). Determining whether a complaint states a claim

upon which relief can be granted is governed by the standard set forth in

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6); Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1485 (11th Cir. 1997). To

survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff Fails to State a Due-Process Claim Against T. Haire

Plaintiff asserts that T. Haire violated the Fourteenth Amendment

when Haire discarded Plaintiff’s property. Doc. 12 at 6.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits

deprivations of property “without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend.

XIV, § 1. To state a claim for a denial of due process, a plaintiff must

allege:

(1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected property interest;

(2) state action; and

(3) constitutionally-inadequate process.

Cryder v. Oxendine, 24 F.3d 175, 177 (11th Cir. 1994); see Catron v. City

of St. Petersburg, 658 F.3d 1260, 1266 (11th Cir. 2011); Grayden v.

Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003).

As to the third element, when a state official was not acting

pursuant to any established state procedure, but rather was engaging in

a “random, unauthorized” act, the State is not required to provide pre-

deprivation process. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). The

Due Process Clause is satisfied if the state provides sufficient post-

deprivation process. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543–44 (1984).

Florida law provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for theft

of inmate property by prison guards. Inmates may file a tort action in

state court to recover damages for destruction of property. See Fla. Stat.

§ 768.28(1); Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1331 (11th Cir. 2009).

The existence of a private cause of action under Florida law

provides Plaintiff with a meaningful post-deprivation remedy to

challenge the loss of property caused by prison guards. Case, 555 F.3d at

1331; see Loor v. Bailey, 708 F. App’x 992, 994–95 (11th Cir. 2017); Smith

v. Israel, 619 F. App’x 839, 842 (11th Cir. 2015). Plaintiff, therefore, has

failed to state a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.

B. Plaintiff Fails to State a Condition-of-Confinement Claim

An Eighth-Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim entails

three elements:

(1) the plaintiff endured conditions that were sufficiently serious to

violate the Eighth Amendment;

(2) the defendant acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind

with regard to the conditions at issue; and

(3) there is a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct

and the alleged constitutional injury.

Saunders v. Sheriff of Brevard Cnty., 735 F. App’x 559, 564 (11th Cir.

2018); Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004).

1. Plaintiff Fails to Allege Serious Conditions

In determining whether conditions were “sufficiently serious,” “only

those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s

necessities” violate the Eighth Amendment. Hudson v. McMillian, 503

U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] prisoner’s mere

discomfort, without more, does not offend the Eighth Amendment.”

Chandler, 379 F.3d at 1295. “[T]he challenged condition must be

‘extreme,’” and at the very least must pose “‘an unreasonable risk of

serious damage to [the prisoner’s] future health’ or safety.” Id. at 1289

(quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993)). “Restrictive” and

“even harsh” prison conditions simply “are part of the penalty that

criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).

(a). The Clothing Restriction

Here, Plaintiff alleges that on May 30, 2025, he was placed on

property restriction, which entailed being confined in a cell while wearing

only underwear. But Plaintiff does not allege the duration of the

restriction.

Plaintiff’s paltry allegations are insufficient to state a claim.

Federal courts routinely hold that mere confinement “without clothing

(other than boxers), bedding, or hygienic materials for 72 hours . . . is not

the type of extreme prison conditions that create a substantial risk of

serious harm.” Woodson v. Whitehead, 673 F. App’x 931, 932 (11th Cir.

2016); O’Connor v. Kelley, 644 F. App’x 928, 932 (11th Cir. 2016)

(prisoner’s placement on strip-cell status for longer than 72 hours during

January in Florida, without a blanket, mattress or bed and with only a

“suicide shroud,” did not violate the Eighth Amendment).

(b). The Food Restriction

Plaintiff also alleges that he was denied food by an unknown

person. Doc. 12 at 5. But Plaintiff does not allege:

• the duration of the denial of food;

• the extent of the denial of food; and

• any adverse consequences that Plaintiff suffered from the

denial of food.

Although a prisoner is entitled to reasonably adequate food, “a

prison does not violate the Eighth Amendment by feeding a prisoner

minimal amount of food for a limited number of days.” Hernandez v. Fla.

Dep’t of Corr., 281 F. App’x 862, 865 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Novak v.

Beto, 53 F.2d 661, 665, 668 (5th Cir. 1971)). For example, the Eleventh

Circuit noted that a prisoner’s confinement in a strip cell for 10 days in

October where he was not given any food for 24 hours “d[id] not rise to

the level of cruel and unusual deprivations.” Turner v. Warden, GDCP,

650 F. App’x 695, 701–02 (11th Cir. 2016). Plaintiff’s allegation that he

was “denied food” by some unidentified individual over some unknown

period of time “stops short of the line between possibility and

plausibility.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558.

The undersigned afforded Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his

complaint to include facts that would allow the District Court to plausibly

infer Plaintiff endured sufficiently deleterious conditions. But Plaintiff

failed to make such allegations.

2. Failure to Allege Deliberate Indifference

Plaintiff’s condition-of-confinement claim fails for a second

independent reason: Plaintiff’s allegations fail to satisfy the subjective

element.

As for the subjective element, a plaintiff must allege that the

defendants acted “‘with a sufficiently culpable state of mind’ with respect

to the condition at issue”—that is, deliberate indifference. Chandler, 379

F.3d at 1289 (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8). To satisfy the deliberate-

indifference element, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant “was

actually, subjectively aware that his own conduct caused a substantial

risk of serious harm to the plaintiff.” Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251,

1262 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839

(1970)). That is, a plaintiff must allege “that the defendant acted with

‘subjective recklessness’” and “the defendant actually knew that his

conduct—his own acts or omissions—put the plaintiff at substantial risk

of serious harm.” Id. at 1253.

Here, Plaintiff simply alleges “[o]n May 30, 2025, at 8:30 am

Michael Davis was put on property restriction (“property”), no blue

uniforms, no socks. Only boxer in a 60 degrees AC unit, and without food

(air tray).”

Despite detailed instructions from the undersigned—not to

mention the instructions found on the complaint form—Plaintiff failed to

allege that any of the named Defendants were responsible for denying

Plaintiff clothing and food.

But even if the District Court were to assume that every Defendant

denied Plaintiff food and clothing, Plaintiff failed to allege that this posed

a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff.

For this reason, too, Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth-Amendment

conditions-of-confinement claim.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned respectfully

RECOMMENDS that the District Court:

1. DISMISS this civil action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A

and 1915; and

2. DIRECT the clerk of the court to close the case file.

At Pensacola, Florida on this 17th day of March 2026.

/s/ Michael J. Frank

Michael J. Frank

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

The District Court referred this case to a magistrate

judge to address preliminary matters and to make

recommendations regarding dispositive matters. See

N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed R.

Civ. P. 72(b). Objections to these proposed findings and

recommendations must be filed within fourteen days of

the date of the report and recommendation. Any

different deadline that may appear on the electronic

docket is for the court’s internal use only and does not

control. An objecting party must serve a copy of its

objections upon all other parties. A party who fails to

object to the magistrate judge’s findings or

recommendations contained in a report and

recommendation waives the right to challenge on

appeal the District Court’s order based on unobjected-

to factual and legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1;

28 U.S.C. § 636.