The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________________
BRISELIDA R.,
Plaintiff,
vs. 5:25-CV-210
(MAD/PJE)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
____________________________________________
APPEARANCES: OF COUNSEL:
HILLER COMERFORD INJURY IDA COMERFORD, ESQ.
& DISABILITY LAW JUSTIN M. GOLDSTEIN, ESQ.
6000 North Bailey Avenue - Suite 1a
Amherst, New York 14226
Attorneys for Plaintiff
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION LUIS PERE, ESQ.
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, Maryland 21235
Attorney for Defendant
Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge:
ORDER
Plaintiff, Briselida R., commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking
review of the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner") denying her
application for disability insurance benefits. See Dkt. No. 1.
In a Report-Recommendation & Order dated February 23, 2026, Magistrate Judge Paul J.
Evangelista recommended that (1) Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings be denied; (2)
Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings be granted; and (3) the Commissioner's
decision be affirmed. See Dkt. No. 18. On March 7, 2026, Plaintiff filed objections.
"'As to a dispositive matter, any part of the magistrate judge's recommendation that has
been properly objected to must be reviewed by the district judge de novo.'" Nambiar v. Cent.
Orthopedic Grp., LLP, 158 F.4th 349, 358 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting Arista Recs., LLC v. Doe 3,
604 F.3d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 2010)). "If a party fails to properly object to the [report-
recommendation], the district judge reviews the [report-recommendation] only for clear error."
Id. at 359 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) advisory committee's note to 1983 amendment).
"A proper objection must be specific." Id. "'A plaintiff is deemed to have [forfeited] an
objection to a magistrate judge's report if he does not present his claims to the district court.'" Id.
(quoting Martin v. Duffy, 858 F.3d 239, 245 (4th Cir. 2017)) (alteration in original). "In order to
preserve for appeal an issue in a magistrate judge's report, a party must object to the finding or
recommendation on that issue with sufficient specificity so as reasonably to alert the district court
of the true ground for the objection." Id. (citing Miller v. Brightstar Asia, Ltd., 43 F.4th 112, 120-
21 (2d Cir. 2022)) (additional citation omitted). "'Just as a complaint stating only "I complain"
states no claim, an objection stating only "I object" preserves no issue for review.'" Id. (quoting
Lockert v. Faulkner, 843 F.2d 1015, 1019 (7th Cir. 1988)). "'The point of making objections is to
tell the district judge – who, under § 636(b)(1) must make the final decision and enter judgment –
what issues the parties actually dispute.'" Id. (citation omitted). "'Merely referring the court to
previously filed papers or arguments does not constitute an adequate objection.'" Id. (quoting
Mario v. P & C Food Mkts., 313 F.3d 758, 766 (2d Cir. 2002)).
"A proper objection generally may not raise new arguments not previously made before
the magistrate judge." Id. (citing Fischer v. Forrest, 968 F.3d 216, 221 (2d Cir. 2020) (affirming
district judge's decision to disallow objections advancing an argument that "had not been raised
during summary judgement proceedings before the Magistrate Judge"); Bus. for a Better N.Y. v.
Angello, 341 Fed. Appx. 701, 706 (2d Cir. 2009) (summary order) (noting that the court need not
consider arguments "raised for the first time in the objections to the report and
recommendation")). "[D]istrict courts in th[e Second] Circuit have held that when 'the party
makes only conclusory or general objections, or simply reiterates his original arguments, the
[district court] reviews the Report and Recommendation only for clear error.'" Id. at 361 (citation
omitted). "But . . ., that principle should be applied only 'when the objections are nonspecific or
merely perfunctory responses argued in an attempt to engage the district court in a rehashing of
the same arguments set forth in the original petition.'" Id. (citation omitted). "Where a litigant's
objections take 'issue with a specific legal conclusion in the report and recommendation,' they
should be considered de novo, even if they repeat an argument raised before the magistrate
judge." Id. (citation omitted).
After the appropriate review, "the court may accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part,
the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Plaintiff argues that Magistrate Judge Evangelista erred by (1) "fail[ing] to address
Plaintiff's argument that the ALJ failed to consider the second portion of the supportability factor
as required under the regulations"; (2) relying on evidence in Plaintiff's treatment notes that
contained "carry-over language and does not reflect the content of the individual treatment notes";
(3) failing to acknowledge that "[t]he ALJ's summation of the evidence generally omits all
references to ongoing symptoms and medication changes"; and (4) stating that the non-examining
medical consultants reviewed certain treatment records when that "is factually inaccurate." Dkt.
No. 19 at 1-6.1
1 Citations are to the pagination generated by CM/ECF in the header of each page.
Although some of the arguments Plaintiff raises before this Court were already argued to
Magistrate Judge Evangelista, Plaintiff has "lodge[d] [] specific objection[s] to [] specific
aspect[s] of the" Report-Recommendation & Order such that "the district judge must review those
arguments de novo." Nambiar, 158 F.4th at 361.
Plaintiff does not object to Magistrate Judge Evangelista's recitation of the factual and
procedural background of the case or the applicable statutory authority, legal standards, and
relevant case law. See Dkt. Nos. 18, 19. Plaintiff likewise does not object to Magistrate Judge
Evangalista's discussion concerning the prior remand of Plaintiff's disability case. The Court has
reviewed and finds no clear error in those portions of the Report-Recommendation & Order and
assumes the parties' familiarity with the same.
A. Supportability of Medical Opinions
Plaintiff contends Magistrate Judge Evangelista did not address her arguments challenging
the ALJ's consideration of the supportability of the medical opinions of Dr. Toni Usev, N.P.;
Licensed Mental Health Counselor Kate Alberts; and State Agency Psychological Consultants L.
Hoffman, Ph. D. and Y. Sherer, Psy. D. See Dkt. No. 19 at 1-2, 6-7. As to Consultative
Psychiatric Examiner Corey Anne Grassl, Psy. D., Plaintiff acknowledges that Magistrate Judge
Evangelista discussed the supportability factor but disagrees with his conclusion. See id. at 7.
In her initial brief, Plaintiff argued that "the ALJ erred when failing to consider the
supportive examinations within the opinions." Dkt. No. 12 at 23, 26. Plaintiff also asserted the
ALJ's conclusion that Drs. Hoffman and Sherer's opinions were "supported is unsupported." Id. at
27.
First, Plaintiff is correct that Magistrate Judge Evangelista did not reference Plaintiff's
specific argument concerning the narrative explanations provided in Dr. Usev and Ms. Alberts'
treating provider medical opinions. In his Report-Recommendation & Order, Magistrate Judge
Evangelista recited the conclusions from the medical opinions and quoted the ALJ's decision
related thereto. He concluded that "the record clearly demonstrates that the ALJ considered the
supportability and consistency of NP Usev's and LMHC Alberts's opinions with their own records
and the record as a whole as he summarized the treatment providers' records and Plaintiff's
activities of daily living in the decision." Dkt. No. 18 at 16.
The supportability factor concerns "the objective medical evidence and supporting
explanations presented by a medical source." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1) (emphasis added).
Magistrate Judge Evangalista concluded that the ALJ appropriately considered the objective
medical evidence cited in Dr. Usev and Ms. Alberts' opinions. See Dkt. No. 18 at 16. Magistrate
Judge Evangalista did not conclude that the ALJ sufficiently analyzed the supportability of the
opinions based on the ALJ's reference to the medical provider's supporting explanations.
Nevertheless, Magistrate Judge Evangalista quoted the ALJ's acknowledgment that "Ms. Usev
and Ms. Alberts supported their opinions with narrative comments and citations to certain mental
health signs and symptoms . . . ." Id. at 15 (quoting Dkt. No. 8-8 at 16). The ALJ is required
under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1) to consider the objective medical evidence and supporting
explanations provided by a medical source, and he did just that.
Plaintiff disagrees, arguing that the ALJ failed to (1) "explain how the supportive
explanations were insufficient to credit any portion of the opinions as persuasive;" and (2)
"discuss the actual content of the opinions anywhere in the decision." Dkt. No. 19 at 3. Plaintiff's
assertions are (1) false and (2) irrelevant.
The ALJ expressly acknowledged Dr. Usev and Ms. Alberts' support for their own
opinions through their narrative commentary and reference to Plaintiff's "mental health signs and
symptoms" but determined that those opinions were "inconsistent with the opinions of the State
agency medical consultants, inconsistent with the mild and moderate work-related mental
limitations assigned by Dr. Grassl, and inconsistent with evidence described below regarding the
mental status examination findings from the longitudinal records and the claimant's favorable
response to mental health treatment." Dkt. No. 8-8 at 16. Essentially, the ALJ determined that
the lack of consistency between Dr. Usev and Ms. Alberts' opinions and the rest of the
administrative record was not outweighed by the opinions' internal supportability. Plaintiff has
not presented any legal authority which stands for the proposition that an ALJ cannot conclude
that consistency outweighs supportability. See Dkt. No. 19. Rather, "[w]hile a treating
physician's opinion is entitled to deference, an ALJ may credit the opinion of a consultative
examiner over that of a treating physician when the consultative examiner's opinion is more
consistent with and better supported by the medical record." Thomas K. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,
610 F. Supp. 3d 524, 531 (W.D.N.Y. 2022).
Likewise, Plaintiff has not cited a single case which holds that an ALJ must recite "the
actual content of the opinions [] in the decision." Dkt. No. 19 at 3. It is well settled that "[a]n
ALJ need not recite every piece of evidence that contributed to the decision, so long as the record
'permits [the Court] to glean the rationale of an ALJ's decision.'" Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d
172, 178, n.3 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d Cir. 1983));
"[W]here an ALJ's analysis 'affords an adequate basis for meaningful judicial review, applies the
proper legal standards, and is supported by substantial evidence such that additional analysis
would be unnecessary or superfluous, . . . remand is not necessary merely because an explicit
function-by-function analysis was not performed.'" Sandra M. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:22-
CV-00485, 2023 WL 4972707, *6 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2023) (quoting Cichocki, 729 F.3d at 177).
Next, as to non-examining consultative examiners, Drs. Hoffman and Sherer, Plaintiff
argues the ALJ's statement that their opinions were "'supported by detailed narrative rationales,
which cite supporting objective medical evidence and other evidence from the record,' is
inaccurate, and Judge Evangelista fails to explain how the ALJ complied with the supportability
factor." Dkt. No. 19 at 7. In her initial brief, Plaintiff asserted the ALJ's statement was in error
because the non-examining consultants "cited to minimal evidence, did not review the complete
record, and failed to explain how any of their findings are supported." Dkt. No. 12 at 27.
As explained, the supportability factor concerns a medical source's reliance on "objective
medical evidence and supporting explanations." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1). The ALJ stated
that Drs. Hoffman and Sherer "supported" their opinions "by detailed narrative rationales, which
cite supporting objective medical evidence and other evidence from the record." Dkt. No. 8-8 at
15. That statement is factually accurate and sufficient to meet the requirement set forth in 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1). In both opinions, the medical sources provided narratives under the
"additional explanation" portion of the opinions, see Dkt. No. 8-3 at 16, 37, and cited specific
treatment records they believed supported their conclusions, see id. at 10, 32-33. The Court,
therefore, finds that the ALJ's conclusion is supported by substantial evidence and does not
constitute legal error.
Plaintiff also argues that "the ALJ's evaluation of Dr. Grassl's opinion is insufficient under
the supportability factor." Dkt. No. 19 at 7. Magistrate Judge Evangalista concluded otherwise,
determining that "the ALJ adequately articulated his analysis of the supportability factor, and the
record supports the ALJ's findings." Dkt. No. 18 at 22. Plaintiff contends the ALJ did not
"adequately articulate" why Dr. Grassl's "the examination is consistent with mild and moderate
limitations and inconsistent with the marked limitations." Dkt. No. 19 at 7.
Dr. Grassl, the examining psychiatric consultant, concluded that Plaintiff was "markedly
limited in her ability to regulate emotions, control behavior, and maintain well being, sustain an
ordinary routine and regular attendance at work, sustain concentration and perform a task at a
consistent pace, and use reason and judgment to make work-related decision." Dkt. No. 8-13 at
567. Dr. Grassl determined that Plaintiff had mild or moderate limitations in all other mental
health categories. See id. The ALJ concluded that "[t]he mild and moderate work-related mental
limitations described by Dr. Grassl are persuasive, as they are supported by her own mental status
examination findings and are consistent with the opinions of the State agency psychological
consultants, as well as evidence described below . . . ." Dkt. No. 8-8 at 15. He then stated that the
marked limitations were "inconsistent with the opinions of the State agency," "the evidence
described below regarding the mental status examination findings from the longitudinal records[,]
and the claimant's favorable response to mental health treatment." Id. at 16.
Plaintiff is correct that the ALJ did not address each specific marked limitation, such as
the ability to regulate emotions, and compare that to a specific portion of Dr. Grassl's examination
and explain why the two things did not match. The ALJ also did not mention a specific mild
limitation, such as the ability to follow simple instructions, and relate that back to a precise
examination finding. However, Plaintiff has presented no case law mandating such an analysis
from the ALJ. See Dkt. No. 12 at 26; Dkt. No. 19 at 7. Plaintiff also presents no legal authority
for the proposition that, because the ALJ found the doctor's opinion to be partially supported by
its own examination, then the ALJ must explain precisely why the examination did not support
other portions of the opinion. Although such a thorough analysis would undoubtedly be
beneficial, without any legal authority requiring such efforts, the Court cannot find remandable
error. Rather, precisely as Magistrate Judge Evangelista concluded, the ALJ discussed the
consistency and supportability of Dr. Grassl's opinion, referenced Dr. Grassl's own examination
as well as the opinions and evidence of other medical sources. That is sufficient to meet the
requirements of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c.
The ALJ's conclusions are also supported by substantial evidence. Although Dr. Grassl
opined that Plaintiff had marked limitations in certain areas of functioning, and Plaintiff appeared
on examination to be disheveled, anxious, and unfocused, there are other medical opinions in the
record indicating that Plaintiff does not have marked mental health limitations as well as
treatment notes reflecting normal examinations and controlled symptoms with medication. See,
e.g., Dkt. No. 8-13 at 37-40, 44-46, 51-52, 69-71, 97-99.
Importantly, Magistrate Judge Evangelista took the extra step that the ALJ did not.
Magistrate Judge Evangelista noted each of Dr. Grassl's opined significant limitations and
compared them to treatment records. See Dkt. No. 18 at 22-23. Magistrate Judge Evangelista's
analysis sets forth the precise substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's decision. Also, as
Magistrate Judge Evangelista noted, it is not this Court's function to reweigh the ALJ's
consideration of those records. See id. at 23; see also Warren v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:15-
CV-1185, 2016 WL 7223338, *9 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2016), R. & R. adopted, 2016 WL 7238947
(N.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2016) ("When applying the substantial evidence test to a finding that a
plaintiff was not disabled, the Court “will not reweigh the evidence presented at the
administrative hearing, . . . nor will it determine whether [the applicant] actually was disabled.
[Rather,] [a]bsent an error of law by the Secretary, [a] court must affirm her decision if there is
substantial evidence [in the record] to support it") (citations omitted). Therefore, the Court rejects
Plaintiff's arguments regarding the ALJ's analysis of the supportability factor related to the
various medical opinions.
B. Treatment Notes, Medication Changes, and Ongoing Symptoms
Plaintiff argues that Magistrate Judge Evangelista failed to "acknowledge the evidence
cited by the ALJ as inconsistent with the opinions of greater limitations is carry-over language
and does not reflect the content of the individual treatment notes." Dkt. No. 19 at 3. Plaintiff
made this argument concerning the "carry-over language" in her opening brief. Dkt. No. 12 at 21.
In the ALJ's decision, he noted that "[m]ore recent mental health treatment records
consistently state that, on examination," were within normal limits and "[a]ll or nearly all of the
preceding examination findings and statements about the claimant's favorable response to mental
health treatment appear in each and every one of the mental health treatment records" between
September 2022 and April 2024. Dkt. No. 8-8 at 16. Plaintiff contends the ALJ relied only on
the "'reason for visit' [section] in the treatment notes to find Plaintiff's symptoms were 'well
controlled'" as opposed to the "subjective presentation and evaluation" section. Dkt. No. 19 at 4.
Plaintiff contends the former is copied and pasted from past notes, whereas the latter is updated
from each visit. See id.; see also Dkt. No. 12 at 21-22.
Plaintiff's argument is unfounded. The Court agrees that it would be inappropriate for an
ALJ to rely on a single notation in treatment records that a plaintiff was doing well or improving
if that notation was simply copied and pasted from past records and the ALJ ignored updated
statements demonstrating worsening symptoms. That is not, however, what the ALJ did.
It is true that, throughout Plaintiff's treatment record, there is a redundant phrase within
the "reason for visit" section of progress notes which states that Plaintiff "is a 46-year-old
Hispanic female with past psychiatric history significant for depression, anxiety, mood instability,
suicidal ideation, was presented with well controlled symptoms with established medication
regiment." Dkt. No. 8-13 at 36, 42, 48, 54, 60, 66, 73, 80, 87, 94. However, the dozens of pages
of records the ALJ cited to support his contention that Plaintiff's "psychiatric symptoms are 'well
controlled' with medication," and she had a "favorable response to mental health treatment"
include the "reason for visit," "review of symptoms," "history," "mental status evaluation,"
medication information," and "plan" sections of treatment notes. See Dkt. No. 8-8 at 16 (citing
e.g., Dkt. No. 8-13 at 59-65, 524-29, 552-56). Plaintiff is correct that her medications were
changed over the course of her treatment, but she is incorrect that "the ALJ's summation of the
treatment notes was incomplete and inaccurate" because the ALJ explicitly cited numerous pages
of treatment records which demonstrate medication changes. Dkt. No. 19 at 5. The records cited
by the ALJ reflect that, despite the changes in her medication, Plaintiff was "[n]ot anxious," she
had normal insight and judgment, her thought process was "logical", and she had "well-controlled
symptoms with established medication regiment." Dkt. No. 8-13 at 37-40, 44-46, 51-52, 69-71,
97-99.
The Court finds the ALJ's discussion of Plaintiff's medication and its impact on her mental
health symptoms to be supported by substantial evidence. See Mary M. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,
No. 1:22-CV-00939, 2024 WL 1045211, *9 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2024) (affirming an ALJ's
decision where "it is not as if the ALJ found that Plaintiff was free from mental health symptoms
after September 2020. Rather, the ALJ found that Plaintiff still had moderate mental health
symptoms, but that they continued to be well-managed by medication and counseling, and
nothing cited by Plaintiff on this point shows that the ALJ improperly ignored evidence that her
limitations were more than moderate"); Imani L. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:20-CV-00774
2022 WL 17546509, *4 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2022) ("[T]he change or increase of medication does
not necessarily deem a medical opinion stale particularly where, as here, the opinion is consistent
with the record").
Plaintiff likewise contends Magistrate Judge Evangelista erred in addressing her
arguments concerning the consistency factor because "[t]he ALJ's summation of the evidence
generally omits all references to ongoing symptoms and medication changes. . . . The ALJ failed
to resolve any conflict in the evidence when failing to address the supportive findings in the
treatment notes." Dkt. No. 19 at 5. Plaintiff argues that Magistrate "Judge Evangelista fails to
address the actual content of the treatment notes or reconcile the evidence with the ALJ's
findings." Id.
Plaintiff is, again, asking Magistrate Judge Evangelista and this Court to reweigh the
evidence that was before the ALJ. The ALJ acknowledged that "[m]ental health treatment records
from 2020 and 2021 repeatedly state that, during mental status examinations, the claimant had an
anxious mood and a depressed affect." Dkt. No. 8-8 at 16. The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff
reported she had "deficits in attention and concentration, which make it difficult for her to finish
tasks," "that she lacks motivation and has deficits in attention and concentration," "[s]he stated
that she has chronic pain and a history of several mental breakdowns," and "she worries a lot, is
depressed, becomes overwhelmed, and is afraid of having more mental breakdowns." Id. at 9-11.
The ALJ referenced Plaintiff's consistent "mild" anxiety and depression. Id. at 13. He also
referenced Plaintiffs "residual depression and anxiety due to situational and financial problems."
Id. at 14. The ALJ mentioned Dr. Grassl's marked limitation findings, as well as Dr. Usev and
Ms. Alberts' more limiting opinions. See id. at 15-16.
The fact that the ALJ rejected the severity of Plaintiff's subjective statements and some of
the medical opinions does not give this Court grounds for remand because "[t]he substantial
evidence standard is highly deferential." Peets v. Kijakazi, No. 21-3150, 2022 WL 17725391, *1
(2d Cir. Dec. 16, 2022). "[O]nce an ALJ finds facts, we can reject those facts only if a reasonable
factfinder would have to conclude otherwise." Spottswood v. Kijakazi, No. 23-54-CV, 2024 WL
89635, at *2 (2d Cir. Jan. 9, 2024) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The Court is "not to
reweigh evidence and must uphold a determination when evidence is susceptible to more than one
rational interpretation." Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted).
The ALJ acknowledged the spectrum of Plaintiff's symptoms and limitations presented in
the entire record, including those in all of the medical opinions, and explained his determination
that the record supported a determination of Plaintiff being subject to the lesser limitations. It is
not the Court's job to second guess that determination.
C. Records Relied Upon by Non-Examining Consultants
Plaintiff argues that Magistrate Judge Evangalista incorrectly stated that "the transcript
shows the records received included documents from 2020 to 2023," Dkt. No. 18 at 19, because
non-examining consultants Drs. Hoffman and Sherer completed their opinions in January and
November 2021. Dkt. No. 19 at 6. Plaintiff is partially correct.
In Magistrate Judge Evangelista's Report-Recommendation & Order, he stated that Dr.
Hoffman's opinion was from November 2022. See Dkt. No. 18 at 18. The administrative
transcript page cited by Magistrate Judge Evangelista demonstrates the inaccuracy of his
statement because the record indicates, " L. Hoffman, PhD (38) 11/05/2020." Dkt. No. 8-3 at 16.
This mistake, however, does not change the accuracy of Magistrate Judge Evangelista's
conclusion.
Magistrate Judge Evangelista correctly stated that Dr. Sherer affirmed Dr. Hoffman's
findings in 2021, Dr. Sherer came to similar findings in June 2023, and a third consultant affirmed
those findings in November 2023. See Dkt. No. 18 at 18-19 (citing Dkt. No. 8-3 at 37; Dkt. No.
8-9 at 100, 121).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding the opinions of the non-examining
consultants to be persuasive. See Dkt. No. 12 at 26-27. Magistrate Judge Evangelista rejected
that argument, in part, because those doctors reviewed "documents from 2020 to 2023." Dkt. No.
18 at 19. Although Plaintiff is correct that Dr. Hoffman did not review documents after 2020, the
other consultants did. Magistrate Judge Evangelista's statement, which relates to all of the non-
examining psychological consultants, was therefore correct.
"It is well settled that an ALJ is entitled to rely upon the opinions of both examining and
non-examining State agency medical consultants, since such consultants are deemed to be
qualified experts in the field of social security disability." Schlichting v. Astrue, 11 F. Supp. 3d
190, 204 (N.D.N.Y. 2012). "'Nonetheless, the ALJ may not credit a non-examining physician's
opinion over that of a treating physician's where the non-examining physician's opinion
considered less than the full record and the subsequent medical evidence may have altered the
opinion.'" Robinson v. Saul, No. 3:18-CV-01605, 2020 WL 652515, *9 (D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2020)
(quoting West v. Berryhill, No. 3:17-CV-1997, 2019 WL 211138, *5 (D. Conn. Jan. 16, 2019)).
The ALJ did not rely solely on Drs. Hoffman or Sherer's 2020 opinions. Rather, the ALJ
based his decision on all of the opinions from the non-examining state agency consultants which
included a review of Plaintiff's treatment records from 2020 through 2023. See Dkt. No. 8-8 at
15; Dkt. No. 8-9 at 114-34. Plaintiff's argument that the consultant's "cited to minimal evidence,
did not review the complete record, and failed to explain how any of their findings are supported"
is inaccurate. Dkt. No. 12 at 27.
Rather, the ALJ's consideration of those opinions is supported by substantial evidence and
free from legal error because each opinion contained a supportive narrative and citations to
objective evidence and was consistent with the objective evidence from other medical sources.
See Dkt. No. 8-8 at 15; see also Christopher V. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:24-CV-01418, 2026
WL 678529, *8 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2026), R&R adopted, No. 5:24-CV-1418, Dkt. No. 16
(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2026). As such, the ALJ did not err in relying on those opinions to form
Plaintiff's residual function capacity.”
Accordingly, after carefully reviewing the Report-Recommendation & Order, the entire
record in this matter, and the applicable law, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Magistrate Judge Evangelista's Report-Recommendation & Order (Dkt.
No. 18) is ADOPTED in its entirety for the reasons set forth herein; and the Court further
ORDERS that Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 12) is DENIED;
and the Court further
ORDERS that Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 16) is
GRANTED; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in Defendant's favor and
dismiss Plaintiff's complaint; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Order on the parties in
accordance with the Local Rules.
IT ISSO ORDERED.
Dated: March 24, 202 NW hg Je
Albany, New ork _SLp =~ LL. fre ee
U.S. District Judge
? Plaintiff argues in her objections that, because the ALJ erred in making the residual functional
capacity determination, then the step-five determination is also in error. See Dkt. No. 19 at 8. As
the Court has found the ALJ's step-four decision to be supported by substantial evidence, it need
not address this additional argument.
15