Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

)

ANDREA JAYE MOSBY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

)

v. ) No. 2:23-cv-02099-SHM-tmp

)

REAVES LAW FIRM, PLLC, )

)

Defendant. )

)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT/JUDGMENT DEBTOR TO

APPEAR FOR DEPOSIION AND FOR SANCTIONS

Before the Court is Plaintiff Andrea Jaye Mosby’s December

8, 2025 Motion to Compel Defendant/Judgment Debtor Reaves Law

Firm, PLLC (“the “Law Firm”) to Appear for Deposition and for

Sanctions. (ECF No. 95.) Defendant has not responded to the

Motion. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion is

GRANTED.

I. Background

On August 21, 2025, the Court entered Judgment in favor of

Plaintiff and against Defendant Law Firm in the amount of

$3,631,095.92. (ECF No. 78.) Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal

on September 23, 2025. (ECF No. 93.)

As part of the efforts to collect the judgment debt,

Plaintiff has pursued post-judgment discovery to determine the

nature, location, and extent of Defendant/Judgment Debtor’s

assets and property on which execution can issue. (ECF No. 95-2

at 3.) By Plaintiff’s account—which is undisputed by Defendant

and documented by email correspondence attached to Plaintiff’s

Motion—Plaintiff has attempted to schedule depositions with

Henry Reaves c/o Defendant/Judgment Debtor, Henry Reaves

individually, and Neva Reaves since October 2025.1 Defendant

and Henry Reaves have not cooperated with those efforts. (ECF

No. 95 at 2-4.) On December 3, 2025, Defendant/Judgment Debtor

and Henry Reaves failed to appear at properly noticed

depositions. (ECF No. 95 at 3.) To date, no depositions have

been taken and no documents have been provided. (ECF No. 95 at

4.)

II. Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69(a)(2), a judgment

creditor, “[i]n aid of the judgment or execution, . . . may

obtain discovery from any person—including the judgment debtor—

as provided in [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] or by the

procedure of the state where the court is located.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 69(a)(2). “A judgment creditor is entitled to utilize

the full panoply of federal discovery measures provided for

1 Plaintiff requests Defendant to produce documents for inspection at the

depositions under Federal Rule 30(b)(2) and Rule 34. (ECF No. 95-2 at 4.)

under federal and state law to obtain information from parties

and non-parties alike.” United States v. Edmond, No. 2:13-cv-

02938-STA-tmp, 2016 WL 11543254, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. June 27,

2016) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “[T]he scope of

postjudgment discovery is very broad[.]” United States v.

Conces, 507 F.3d 1028, 1040 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation and

quotations omitted).

Post-judgment discovery plays a crucial role in the

execution of a judgment by allowing a judgment creditor “to

obtain information . . . about assets on which execution can

issue or about assets that have been fraudulently transferred.”

Iron Workers Dist. Counsel of S. Ohio & Vicinity Benefit Trust

v. Matheny & Sons Gen. Contracting, LLC, No. 3:21-cv-00081,

2023 WL 3570605, at 2 (S.D. Ohio May 19, 2023) (quoting Searcy

v. GUUAS, LLC, No. 2:19-CV-03124, 2021 WL 2256220, at *1 (S.D.

Ohio 2021); see also Scioto Constr., Inc. v. Morris, 2007 WL

108906, *2 (E.D. Tenn. 2007).

A judgment creditor may avail itself of oral depositions

and document inspection requests provided by the Federal Rules.

Under Rule 30, “a party may, by oral questions, depose any

person, including a party, without leave of the court . . . .”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(1). A notice to depose a person may be

accompanied by a request under Rule 34 for the deponent to

produce documents at the deposition for inspection. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 30(b)(2). The party seeking to depose another “must

give reasonable written notice . . . . The notice must state

the time and place of the deposition and, if known, the

deponent’s name and address.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(1).

Where a party fails to comply with a permitted discovery

request, the party seeking discovery may move for an order

compelling compliance under Federal Rule 37. Fed. R. Civ. P.

37(a). It is within a court’s discretion to grant a motion to

compel. See Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 604 (6th Cir.

1993).

If a court grants a motion to compel, the court “must,

after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the party or

deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion . . . to pay the

movant’s reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion,

including attorney's fees.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)

(emphasis added). However, the court “must not order this

payment if: (i) the movant filed the motion before attempting

in good faith to obtain the disclosure or discovery without

court action; (ii) the opposing party’s nondisclosure,

response, or objection was substantially justified; or (iii)

other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(i)-(iii).

Where a party fails to comply with an appropriate

discovery request, the party seeking discovery may also move

for sanctions under Federal Rule 37. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)-(f).

The Rules specifically provide for sanctions for a party’s

failure to appear at a deposition after being served with

proper notice and for a failure to respond to a request for

document inspection. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).

Available sanctions include the payment of “reasonable

expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure,

unless the failure was substantially justified or other

circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Fed R. Civ. P.

37(d)(3).

III. Analysis

A. Summary of Events

On October 29, 2025, Counsel for Plaintiff served

deposition notices for the depositions of Henry Reaves, Neva

Reaves, and Defendant Law Firm on November 17, 2025 by email to

Henry Reaves’ email address. (ECF No. 95-1 at 6-7.) The same

day, Henry Reaves responded to the email confirming receipt of

the notices and representing that neither he nor Neva Reeves

was available to be deposed on that date. (ECF No. 95-1 at 5.)

He did not explain the nature of his conflict2 but simply said

2 Mr. Reaves explained that Neva Reaves was in the “final trimester of a

high-risk geriatric pregnancy with a scheduled C-section delivery date of

January 8, 2026” and “will not be attending a deposition prior to her

delivery and recovery period.” (ECF No. 95-1 at 5.) Plaintiff’s counsel

that he was not available from November 17 through the end of

Thanksgiving week and asked Plaintiff’s counsel to “please

confer and propose available dates in early December for my

deposition.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s counsel responded less than ten

minutes later, proposing December 1, 3, or 4 for Mr. Reaves’

and Defendant Law Firm’s depositions. (ECF No. 95-1 at 5.)

After securing Plaintiff’s agreement to reschedule the

depositions noticed for November 17, 2025, on the

representation that Mr. Reaves was unavailable that day but

available in early December and wished to “confer” on the

matter, Mr. Reaves failed to reply to emails attempting to

confirm an alternative date for the depositions. Five days

after Plaintiff’s counsel had offered alternative dates as

requested, Plaintiff’s counsel followed up on November 3,

asking Mr. Reaves if he would be available to be deposed on

December 1, 3, or 4. (ECF No. 95-1 at 1-2.) An additional

fourteen days passed without any response from Mr. Reaves.

By failing to respond for nearly three weeks, Mr. Reaves

forced Plaintiff to reschedule the depositions unilaterally or

accept an indefinite delay in post-judgment discovery critical

to executing on the Judgment. Plaintiff chose the former

option. On November 17, 2025, using the limited information Mr.

agreed to postpone the scheduling of Neva Reaves’ deposition. (ECF No. 95-1

at 4.)

Reaves had provided about his availability to best ensure the

noticed date would work for him, Plaintiff’s counsel served

notices for depositions on December 3, 2025. (ECF No. 95-1 at.)

On November 18, 2025, Mr. Reaves broke his extended

silence to respond to the second deposition notice with a one-

sentence email: “I’m filing chapter 11, I’ll send you the

petition.” (ECF No. 95-3 at 3.) Mr. Reaves was then silent for

another two weeks. He never filed a bankruptcy petition or

otherwise confirmed that Defendant Law Firm had filed for

bankruptcy. On November 30, 2025, Plaintiff’s counsel sought to

confirm whether Defendant had filed for bankruptcy and

emphasized that “[i]f not, we intend to go forward with the

depositions that we noticed for Dec. 3.” (ECF No. 95-3 at 3.)

Mr. Reaves did not respond.

At noon on December 2, 2025, one day before the scheduled

deposition, Plaintiff’s counsel again followed up with Mr.

Reaves, confirming that the depositions were scheduled for the

next day and that a court reporter and videographer had been

booked and would bill Plaintiff if Mr. Reaves did not attend.

(ECF No. 95-3 at 1-2.) Plaintiff’s counsel asked for “the

courtesy of a response” about whether Mr. Reaves planned to

attend. (ECF No. 95-3 at 1.) At 10:35PM on December 2, 2025,

the evening before the noticed depositions, Mr. Reaves

responded, “I never said I was available at that time. I won’t

be able to attend.” (ECF No. 95-3 at 1.) Mr. Reaves did not

attend the depositions on December 3, 2025. (ECF No. 95-4.)

On December 8, 2025, Plaintiff brought the instant Motion

asking the Court to order Defendant/Judgment Debtor and Mr.

Reaves to appear for depositions at a date, time, and location

within 21 days of the Court’s order, subject to sanctions for

non-compliance. (ECF No. 95 at 4.) Plaintiff also requests that

the Court award her reasonable attorney’s fees and costs

associated with Defendant’s and Mr. Reaves’ failure to appear

for depositions on December 3, 2025, and with bringing this

Motion. (ECF No. 95 at 4.)

B. Motion to Compel

There is no question that Plaintiff served Defendant with

proper, reasonable notice of the depositions to be held on

December 3, 2025. The notice clearly stated the date of the

depositions as December 3, 2025, the time of the depositions as

9:00AM for Henry Reaves c/o Defendant and 10:30AM for Henry

Reaves, individually, and the place of the depositions as

Donati Law, PLLC, 1545 Union Ave., Memphis TN, 38104. (ECF No.

95-2.) The notice was served a reasonable sixteen days before

the depositions. See, e.g. Anderson v. Furst, No. 2:17-12676,

2019 WL 2284731, at *4 (E.D. Mich. May 39, 2019) (nine-days’

notice reasonable given the facts and circumstances of the

case).

There is no question that Defendant and Mr. Reaves failed

to appear for the properly noticed depositions.3 (ECF No. 95-

4.) Mr. Reaves’ failure to appear is not excused by his

representation to Plaintiff’s counsel on November 18, 2025,

that Defendant intended to file bankruptcy, which would have

automatically stayed proceedings, including the scheduled

depositions. Defendant did not, in fact, file bankruptcy before

the depositions and has not filed to date.4

Mr. Reaves’ failure to appear is not excused by his email

to Plaintiff’s counsel at 10:35PM on December 2, the evening

before the depositions scheduled for December 3 at 9:00AM,

saying he was not available at the scheduled time and would not

be attending. If Mr. Reaves in fact had an unavoidable conflict

so that he was unable to attend the depositions on December 3,

he failed to communicate that information in a timely way and

to engage in good faith discussions to reschedule, despite

sixteen days’ notice in which to do so.

Defendant’s unexcused failure to attend the properly

noticed depositions on December 3, 2025, in which Plaintiff

sought information to which she was entitled as a judgment

creditor, warrants granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel

3 By failing to attend, Defendant has also failed to provide documents for

inspection as requested under Rule 34.

4 If Defendant has filed for bankruptcy, it has failed to notify the Court

as required.

Defendant/Judgment Debtor and Mr. Reaves to appear for

depositions and to produce the requested documents for

inspection.5

C. Motion for Sanctions

Before imposing sanctions under Rule 37, courts in the

Sixth Circuit ask whether (1) the party's failure to cooperate

in discovery is due to willfulness, bad faith, or fault, (2)

whether the adversary was prejudiced by the party's failure to

cooperate in discovery, and (3) whether the party was warned

that failure to cooperate could lead to the sanction.6 Freeland

v. Amigo, 103 F.3d 1271, 1277 (6th Cir. 1997) (citation

omitted).

5 “Plaintiff's requests, which seek information regarding the existence and

whereabouts of Defendant's assets, constitute exactly the type of discovery

requests permissible under Federal Rule 69(a)(2).” Miller v. Ability

Recovery Servs., LLC, No. 1:18-cv-266, 2020 WL 2838597, at *2 (S.D. Ohio

June 1, 2020)

6 When the sanction of dismissal is sought, courts consider a fourth factor:

whether less drastic sanctions were first imposed or considered. Freeland,

103 F.3d at 1277. That factor is not relevant here. See Holbrook v. Ownbrix

Int’l Corp., No. 2:19-cv-5087, 2021 WL 783550, at *3n. 2 (W.D. Tenn. Mar.

1, 2021).

Although many courts in this Circuit apply the Freeland factors when

imposing any sanction under Rule 37, including monetary sanctions, courts

are inconsistent on whether review of the factors is only necessary when

considering the sanction of dismissal. Compare Chandler v. Daly, No. 06–

2742 B/P., 2008 WL 2357673, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. June 4, 2008)(“The Sixth

Circuit has articulated four factors to be addressed by the court in

assessing whether . . . monetary sanctions are warranted” for failure to

cooperate with discovery) with Oro BRC4, LLC v. Silvertree Apartments,

Inc., No. 2:19-cv-5087, 2022 WL 19558082, at *12 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 18, 2022)

(finding four-fact test inapposite when invoking monetary sanctions under

37(d) given compulsory language).

1. Willfulness, Bad Faith, or Fault

Defendant and Mr. Reaves’ failure to cooperate with

Plaintiff’s repeated, good faith efforts to schedule

depositions and their failure to appear at the depositions

noticed for December 3, 2025, were willful and in bad faith.

See Papucci v. A. Ray Brown Family Inv. LP, No. 1:21-cv-280,

2025 WL 622070, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 2025)(“After a

pattern of evasive and inadequate communication regarding

scheduling of the deposition, Defendant ultimately failed to

ensure its appearance, or otherwise provide notice that it

would not attend the deposition. Fault, here, therefore lies

with Defendant.”); In re Berkeley, No. 24-12845, 2026 WL

404202, at *4 (Bankr. ND Ohio Feb. 1, 2026) (“[Defendant’s]

failure to cooperate with [Plaintiff’s counsel] (despite his

repeated requests) to establish a deposition date, failure to

appear at [the] deposition, . . . and failure to provide any

other evidence precludes [Defendant] from meeting its burden of

showing that [the] failure to appear . . . was due to

inability, not willfulness or bad faith.”)(citation, brackets,

and quotation marks omitted); see also Maldonado v. Thomas M.

Cooley Law Sch., 65 F. App'x 955, 956-57 (6th Cir. 2003)

(affirming a finding of willfulness and bad faith where

plaintiff failed to appear for noticed deposition and declined

to coordinate with defense counsel for a new deposition date);

TERA II, LLC v. Rice Drilling D, LLC, 2:19-cv-2221, 2022 WL

34397, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 4, 2022) (deponent’s last-minute

notice that it would not attend noticed deposition was

willful). Defendant has not replied to Plaintiff’s Motion to

explain its failure to appear. See McGowan v. Dell Comput.

Corp., No. 3:04-0996, 2007 WL 2327063, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Aug.

10, 2007)(“[E]ven now, [Defendant] fails to provide a

legitimate reason for his failure to appear at

his deposition.”).

2. Prejudice

Plaintiff was prejudiced when Defendant failed to appear

for the December 3 depositions. “The deponents’ failure to

appear has needlessly delayed enforcement of the judgment and

increased expenses and costs.” (ECF No. 95 at 4.) Plaintiff was

required to pay for the services of a court reporter and

videographer despite Defendant’s non-appearance and had to

prepare the instant motion. See Harmon v. CSX Transp., Inc.,

110 F.3d 364, 368 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding prejudice where

party seeking discovery was “required to waste time, money, and

effort in pursuit of cooperation which [plaintiff] was legally

obligated to provide”).

3. Warning

The Court has not previously warned Defendant and Mr.

Reaves that failing to appear for noticed depositions and

failing to produce requested documents could lead to sanctions.

However, Defendant, a law firm, and Mr. Reaves, an attorney,

were aware that failure to cooperate with discovery could lead

to sanctions. Papucci, 2025 WL 622070, at *2. Moreover, “no one

factor is dispositive . . . .” in the decision to impose

sanctions. Mager v. Wis. Cent. Ltd., 924 F.3d 831, 837 (6th

Cir. 2019) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

4. Imposition of Sanctions

Plaintiff made good-faith attempts to obtain Defendant’s

cooperation with post-judgment discovery, Defendant’s failure

to cooperate was not substantially justified, and no

circumstances would make an award of expenses against Defendant

unjust. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(i)-(iii). The imposition of

expenses against Defendant, including attorney’s fees, is

warranted to compensate Plaintiff for the reasonable expenses

incurred in bringing this Motion and caused by Defendant’s

failure to appear at the noticed depositions.

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request for reasonable

expenses, including attorney’s fees (1) incurred in making the

Motion to Compel pursuant to Rule 37(a)(5)(A) and (2) caused by

Defendant’s failure to appear for depositions and produce

documents for inspection pursuant to Rule 37(d)(3).

IV. Conclusion

The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel and for

Sanctions.

Defendant/Judgment Debtor Law Firm and Henry Reaves are

ORDERED to appear for depositions between April 20, 2026, and

May 11, 2026. If the parties are unable to agree on a date

within that window, Defendant Law Firm and Henry Reaves are

ORDERED to appear for depositions on May 13, 2026, at 9:00

a.m., at a location designated by Plaintiff’s counsel.

Defendant Law Firm and Henry Reaves are ORDERED to produce

legible copies of all documents previously requested.

Plaintiff is DIRECTED to file an affidavit verifying the

expenses incurred within fourteen (14) days of this Order.

Defendant is permitted to respond to Plaintiff’s accounting of

expenses within seven (7) days of service of the affidavit.

Defendant is cautioned that failure to comply with the

terms of this Order may result in the imposition of additional

sanctions, including but not limited to, civil contempt. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2),(d)(3).

SO ORDERED this 16th day of April, 2026.

/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.Saays, Jr.

SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE