HARVEY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

CHRISTOPHER R. HARVEY, )

)

Plaintiff )

)

v. ) No. 2:24-cv-00337-KFW

)

MICHAEL J. CARL, M.D., )

)

Defendant )

ORDER ON MOTIONS IN LIMINE

Ahead of trial in this medical malpractice case, the Plaintiff filed three motions

in limine (ECF Nos. 44-46) and the Defendant filed seven (ECF Nos. 37-43). I will

address each motion in turn. All my pretrial rulings are made without prejudice to

counsel renewing any objection at trial. Similarly, counsel may request that I

reconsider a ruling in light of new evidence at trial.

Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Cumulative Expert Testimony

(ECF No. 44). DENIED. Although there is overlap between the anticipated

testimony of the Defendant’s experts, I cannot say at this juncture that their

testimony will be needlessly cumulative. See Fed. R. Evid. 403; United States v.

Santana-Vasquez, 638 F. Supp. 3d 35, 37-38 (D. Me. 2022) (denying a motion in limine

to exclude two experts from testifying about their similar conclusions because the

movant “failed to show that the testimony of both” experts “would be a needless

presentation of cumulative evidence” where the experts’ testimony concerned a

primary issue in the case (cleaned up)).

Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Bar Argument or Evidence that Maine Medical

Center Bears Fault (ECF No. 45). GRANTED WITHOUT OBJECTION.

See ECF No. 52 at 1.

Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence of Collateral Source Benefits

(ECF No. 46). GRANTED IN PART. Neither party shall refer to, inquire about, or

seek to admit evidence of collateral source benefits without first approaching sidebar

and presenting “in detail the reference, inquiry[,] or evidence counsel desires to make

or submit and the reasons why the specific reference, inquiry[,] or evidence would not

violate the collateral source rule.” Brown v. Crown Equip. Corp., 445 F. Supp. 2d 59,

71 (D. Me. 2006); see also Grover v. Boise Cascade Corp., 2004 ME 119, ¶ 24,

860 A.2d 851 (“The collateral source doctrine provides that a plaintiff who has

received compensation for her damages from sources independent of the tortfeasor

remains entitled to a full recovery. The evidence is excluded because of the

substantial likelihood of prejudicial impact. However, the collateral source evidence

may be admissible for purposes other than mitigation damages that are recoverable

from the tortfeasor.” (cleaned up)).

Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Preclude Evidence of Lost Household Services

(ECF No. 37). DENIED. Contrary to the Defendant’s arguments, the Plaintiff is

entitled to recover damages for his own lost household services. See Restatement

(Second) of Torts § 924 cmt. f (Am. L. Inst. 1979) (“The injured person is entitled to

damages for all expenses and for the value of the services reasonably made necessary

by the harm. This includes reasonable expenses for physicians, for nurses or

hospitalization and for medical supplies. It may also include reasonable expenses for

substitute help hired by the injured person to do his work; but to the extent that claim

is made, there cannot be recovery for loss of time.”); Schulz v. Chadwell,

558 S.W.2d 183, 188-89 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977) (“If [the husband] had paid for the

expense of household help and filed a claim for loss of consortium, he would have been

entitled to recover for that expense. Because [the wife] actually paid for the expense

of additional household help, we cannot see any reason why she should not be

permitted to recover for that expense.”).

Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Preclude Undisclosed Expert Opinion of

Samantha Colver, D.O. (ECF No. 38). DENIED. Fed. R. Evid. 703 permits the

Plaintiff’s expert, Barbara Bate, R.N., to disclose the information she reasonably

relied on in forming her own opinion, including the otherwise inadmissible opinion of

the Plaintiff’s primary care physician, Samantha Colver, D.O., so long as Nurse Bate

does not simply parrot Dr. Colver’s opinion. See, e.g., United States v. Pablo,

696 F.3d 1280, 1288 (10th Cir. 2012) (“If an expert simply parrots another

individual’s out-of-court statement, rather than conveying an independent judgment

that only incidentally discloses the statement to assist the jury in evaluating the

expert’s opinion, then the expert is, in effect, disclosing that out-of-court statement

for its substantive truth; the expert thereby becomes little more than a backdoor

conduit for an otherwise inadmissible statement.”).

Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Preclude Evidence of Unvested Pension

Benefits (ECF No. 39). DENIED. I am not convinced at this juncture that the

Plaintiff’s claim for loss of earning opportunity regarding potential pension benefits

is so speculative that he should be precluded from offering evidence on this issue; had

he continued to work at Bath Iron Works, it seems reasonably certain he would have

become vested in the pension plan. See Snow v. Villaci, 2000 ME 127, ¶¶ 14-17 &

n.12, 754 A.2d 360 (explaining the circumstances in which “recovery may be had for

the loss of an earning opportunity” but instructing trial courts to exclude evidence of

such loss if it is “nothing more than mere hope or speculation”). The Defendant

remains free to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of the alleged loss at trial,

and to challenge the sufficiency of the foundation for the Plaintiff’s economic expert’s

valuation of the loss.

Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Preclude Evidence of Loss of Consortium

(ECF No. 40). GRANTED IN PART. The Plaintiff’s wife may properly testify about

the impact of the Plaintiff’s alleged injuries on the Plaintiff, but it would be improper

and confusing for her to testify about the impact on herself or her marriage where

she is not making a loss of consortium claim. See Smith v. Henson, 2025 ME 55, ¶ 38,

339 A.3d 816 (explaining that a spouse who “suffers a loss of consortium from the

direct victim’s injuries, . . . may recover for damage to the interest the spouse has in

the company, society, cooperation, affection, and aid that characterizes a marriage”

(cleaned up)).

Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Preclude Evidence of Other Malpractice

Claims (ECF No. 41). GRANTED WITHOUT OBJECTION. See ECF No. 57.

Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Preclude Evidence of Liability Insurance

(ECF No. 42). GRANTED WITHOUT OBJECTION. See ECF No. 58.

Defendant’s Motion in Limine to Preclude So-Called Reptile Tactics

(ECF No. 43). DENIED. The Defendant has offered no basis for his concern that the

Plaintiff may engage in so-called reptile tactics at trial, and the Plaintiff disavows

any intent to do so. See Bohmbach v. Shivers, No. 1:22-cv-10318-JEK,

2024 WL 4505215, at *4-5 (D. Mass. Oct. 16, 2024) (denying a similar motion in

limine on similar grounds). To the extent such issues come up at trial, the Defendant

can raise an objection then.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 16, 2026

/s/ Karen Frink Wolf

United States Magistrate Judge