Brown v. the Brita Products Company

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NICHOLAS BROWN, individually No. 24-6678

and on behalf of all others similarly

D.C. No.

situated,

2:23-cv-07851-

DMG-RAO

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

OPINION

THE BRITA PRODUCTS

COMPANY,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Dolly M. Gee, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 5, 2026

Pasadena, California

Filed April 16, 2026

Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw, Ana de Alba, and Eric C.

Tung, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Wardlaw

2 BROWN V. THE BRITA PRODUCTS CO.

SUMMARY *

Products Liability / California Law

The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a

putative class action brought by Nicholas Brown against The

Brita Products Company alleging violations of California

law in connection with Brita’s water filter products labeling.

Brown alleged that, as a result of misrepresentations and

omissions, he purchased a Brita filter, but he would not have

purchased or paid as much as he did for the filter had he

known that it does not reduce to below lab detectable levels

various hazardous contaminants.

Omissions may be the basis of claims under California

consumer protections laws. An omission is material if a

reasonable consumer would attach importance to its

existence or nonexistence in determining his choice of action

in the transaction at issue.

The panel held that no reasonable consumer would

expect Brita’s Products to perform as Brown alleged he

subjectively expected that they would. A reasonable

consumer would not have attached importance to the fact

that Brita’s Products do not remove or reduce common

contaminants to health to below lab detectable

limits. Because the complaint failed to meet the reasonable

consumer standard, the district court did not err by holding

that Brown’s material omission claim failed as a matter of

law.

*

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.

BROWN V. THE BRITA PRODUCTS CO. 3

The panel held that the district court properly denied

Brown leave to amend his complaint because amendment

would be futile.

COUNSEL

Brent A. Robinson (argued), Bahar Sodaify, Katelyn M.

Leeviraphan, Ashley M. Boulton, Ryan Clarkson, Glenn A.

Danas, and Alan Gudino, Clarkson Law Firm PC, Malibu,

California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Jonah M. Knobler (argued), Shelli G. Gimelstein, and Steven

A. Zalesin, Patterson Belknap Webb & Tyler LLP, New

York, New York; Mark A. Neubauer, Carlton Fields LLP,

Los Angeles, California; for Defendant-Appellee.

4 BROWN V. THE BRITA PRODUCTS CO.

OPINION

WARDLAW, Circuit Judge:

Would a reasonable consumer expect a fifteen-dollar

water filter to “remove or reduce to below lab detectable

limits common contaminants hazardous to health” in tap

water, notwithstanding clear disclosures to the contrary? We

conclude that reasonable consumers would not have that

expectation.

Nicholas Brown brought a putative class action against

The Brita Products Company (“Brita”) for: (1) violation of

the California Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus.

& Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.; (2) violation of the California

False Advertising Law (“FAL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code

§ 17500, et seq.; (3) violation of the California Consumer

Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, et

seq.; (4) Breach of Warranty; and (5) Unjust

Enrichment/Restitution. Brita removed the case to federal

1

court on September 20, 2023, and the district court granted

Brita’s motion to dismiss without leave to amend. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Brita manufactures, markets, advertises, and sells water

filters and compatible pitchers and dispensers (the

“Products”). Its Products appear in stores across the country.

Brita offers filters with different capabilities that cater to

consumers’ various needs and preferences. The Standard

1

The Complaint brings claims on behalf of a nationwide class, as well

as a California sub-class. The California law claims are brought on

behalf of the sub-class.

BROWN V. THE BRITA PRODUCTS CO. 5

Filter, Brita’s lowest cost filter, is certified to reduce five

contaminants—copper, mercury, cadmium, chlorine, and

zinc—to below the levels recommended by the National

Sanitation Foundation (“NSF”) and United States

Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”). The Elite

Filter, a more expensive model, reduces more than a dozen

other contaminants to less than or equal to NSF/EPA

recommended levels.

Brita’s packaging discloses that it “reduces” certain

harmful contaminants, consistent with the capability of the

filter purchased. For example, the Brita Everyday Water

Pitcher, which includes the Standard Filter, represents on the

front label that it “Reduces Chlorine (taste & odor),

Mercury, Copper and more” and directs consumers to “see

back panel for details.” The back label states that the

“Brita® Water Filtration Pitcher reduces the following

harmful contaminants that may be in your tap water,”

identifying “Copper,” “Mercury,” “Cadmium,” “Chlorine

(taste and odor),” and “Zinc (metallic taste).” It further

states that “[t]he Brita® Pitcher Filter . . . has been tested and

certified by NSF International in all Brita® pitchers and

dispensers against NSF/[American National Standards

Institute (“ANSI”)] Standards 42 and 53 for the reduction of

the claims specified on the Performance Data Sheet.”

Brita’s Products also reference, by a QR code or

otherwise, additional sources of information concerning

each Product’s filtering capabilities known as “Performance

Data Sheets.” Performance Data Sheets contain more

detailed information on exactly which contaminants are

filtered by Brita’s Products, and to what extent. For

6 BROWN V. THE BRITA PRODUCTS CO.

example, the Standard Filter’s Performance Data Sheet

discloses the following information:

Brown purchased the Brita Everyday Water Pitcher with

the Standard Filter for approximately fifteen dollars at a

store in Los Angeles in 2022. Brown alleged that he

reviewed the Product’s labels and packaging and concluded

from various representations that the Product “removes or

reduce[s] common contaminants hazardous to health . . . to

below lab detectable limits.” Specifically, Brown

challenged the following representations on the Product’s

packaging (collectively the “Challenged Representations”):

• “BRITA WATER FILTRATION

SYSTEM”

• “Cleaner, Great-Tasting Water”

BROWN V. THE BRITA PRODUCTS CO. 7

• “Healthier, Great-Tasting Water”

• “The #1 FILTER”

• “REDUCES Chlorine (taste and odor)

and more!”

• “REDUCES Chlorine (taste and odor),

Mercury, Copper and more”

• “Reduces 3X Contaminants”

He further alleged that Brita “fails to state, expressly, clearly,

and conspicuously on the Products’ packaging and labels

that the Products will not remove or reduce contaminants

hazardous to health . . . to below lab detection limits.”

Brown alleged that, as a result of the alleged

misrepresentations and omissions, he purchased the filter,

but that he would not have purchased or paid as much as he

did for the filter had he known that it does not reduce to

below lab detectable levels various hazardous contaminants,

including arsenic, chromium-6, nitrate and nitrites,

perfluorooctanoic acid (“PFOA”), perfluorooctane sulfonate

(“PFOS”), radium, total trihalomethanes (“TTHMs”), and

uranium, collectively the “Common Hazardous

Contaminants.” He alleged that “[n]o matter where people

reside, or their socioeconomic status and educational

background, consumers expect that when they purchase a

water filtration device, particularly one with the Challenged

Representations at issue here, that it will remove and

effectively reduce hazardous contaminants commonly found

in drinking water.”

8 BROWN V. THE BRITA PRODUCTS CO.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Brita moved to dismiss Brown’s complaint shortly after

removing it to federal court. The district court dismissed the

complaint in full, without leave to amend. The district court

first analyzed Brown’s claims of alleged affirmative

misrepresentations. Applying the reasonable consumer test,

the district court concluded that Brown’s misrepresentation

allegations were “simply not plausible” because no

reasonable consumer would “adopt Brown’s interpretation”

of Brita’s Products’ capabilities. The district court also

acknowledged that Brita makes its Performance Data Sheets

accessible to consumers via a QR code on its Products’

labels, and that consumers are able to read the Performance

Data Sheets to understand the Products’ limitations. The

district court next turned to Brown’s claims of alleged

material omissions. The district court concluded that Brita

had not failed to disclose any material fact because “no

reasonable consumer would behave differently if he knew

that the product did not reduce or remove all common

contaminants but only those identified.”

The district court then examined Brown’s “unlawful”

claims under the UCL, CLRA, and FAL, in which Brown

alleged that Brita violated the California Health & Safety

Code by failing to register with a proper regulatory agency

and failing to clearly identify on packaging the contaminants

that the Products have been certified to remove or reduce.

The district court concluded that Brown lacked standing to

bring a UCL, FAL, or CLRA claim based on Brita’s

admitted failure to register its products because Brown did

not purchase any of the unregistered products, and therefore

he could not assert these claims on behalf of the class. The

district court concluded in the alternative that even if Brown

had standing to bring these claims, Brown’s claim was

BROWN V. THE BRITA PRODUCTS CO. 9

“based on an alleged failure to have a lab certify that Brita’s

Products ‘remove’ common hazardous contaminants,” and

Brita’s Products were in fact certified by NSF and ANSI.

Having concluded that the underlying statements were not

actionable under the UCL, FAL, and CLRA, the district

court dismissed Brown’s common law claims.

Lastly, the district court denied leave to amend. The

district court noted that it had reviewed the Products’ labels

and relevant contaminant standards, and that amendment

would be futile because Brown’s claims failed as a matter of

law.

Brown filed a timely notice of appeal, limited to two

issues. First, Brown argues that the district court erred by

dismissing his UCL, FAL, and CLRA claims arising out of

Brita’s alleged material omissions because the district court

did not analyze whether Brita had a duty to disclose

information based on: (i) an unreasonable safety hazard, and

(ii) a central function defect. Second, Brown argues that the

district court erred by dismissing the complaint without

leave to amend.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for

failure to state a claim de novo. Loffman v. Cal. Dep’t of

Educ., 119 F.4th 1147, 1158 (9th Cir. 2024). “In assessing

whether a plaintiff has stated a claim, we accept as true all

well-pleaded factual allegations, and construe all factual

inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id.

(quoting Parents for Privacy v. Barr, 949 F.3d 1210, 1221

(9th Cir. 2020)). A district court’s decision to dismiss a

complaint without leave to amend is reviewed for abuse of

discretion. Election Integrity Project Cal., Inc. v. Weber,

113 F.4th 1072, 1099 (9th Cir. 2024). “A district court does

10 BROWN V. THE BRITA PRODUCTS CO.

not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend where

‘any further amendment to the complaint would likely prove

futile.’” Id. (quoting Allen v. City of Beverly Hills, 911 F.2d

367, 373 (9th Cir. 1990)).

IV. DISCUSSION

The UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent

business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or

misleading advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200.

The FAL prohibits “untrue or misleading” statements made

in business “as part of a plan or scheme with the intent” not

to engage in such business “as so advertised.” Id. § 17500.

The CLRA prohibits “unfair methods of competition and

unfair or deceptive acts or practices . . . undertaken by any

person in a transaction intended to result or that results in the

sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer.” Cal.

Civ. Code § 1770(a). To state a claim under any of these

three consumer protection statutes, the plaintiff must allege

sufficient facts to satisfy the “reasonable consumer

standard.” Noohi v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc., 146

F.4th 854, 868 (9th Cir. 2025).

A. Material Omission

“Omissions may be the basis of claims under California

consumer protections laws, but ‘to be actionable the

omission must be contrary to a representation actually made

by the defendant, or an omission of a fact the defendant was

obliged to disclose.’” Hodsdon v. Mars, Inc., 891 F.3d 857,

861 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Daughtery v. Am. Honda Motor

Co., 144 Cal. App. 4th 824, 835 (2006) (emphasis

removed)).

The parties agree that, absent a contrary

misrepresentation, a duty to disclose arises under California

BROWN V. THE BRITA PRODUCTS CO. 11

law if either (1) a product contains a defect that poses an

unreasonable safety risk; or (2) a product contains a defect

that defeats its central function. See Hodsdon, 891 F.3d at

861–62, 64. The parties also agree that even if one of those

two tests is met, an omission is actionable only if it is

material. See Noohi, 146 F.4th at 868.

“An omission is material if a reasonable consumer would

attach importance to its existence or nonexistence in

determining his choice of action in the transaction in

question.” 2 Daniel v. Ford Motor Co., 806 F.3d 1217, 1225

(9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). The reasonable consumer standard is not satisfied

where plaintiffs allege only “a mere possibility that [the]

label might conceivably be misunderstood by some few

consumers viewing it in an unreasonable manner.” Ebner v.

Fresh, Inc., 838 F.3d 958, 965 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). “Rather, the

reasonable consumer standard requires a probability that a

significant portion of the general consuming public or of

targeted consumers, acting reasonably in the circumstances,

could be misled.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation

2

Brown relies on Stearns v. Ticketmaster Corp., 655 F.3d 1013, 1022

(9th Cir. 2011), to argue that this standard is distinct from the reasonable

consumer standard. We disagree. Stearns quoted the standard set forth

in Steroid Hormone Prods. Cases, 181 Cal. App. 4th 145, 157 (2010),

which explained that in a California consumer fraud case, a

misrepresentation or omission is material if “a reasonable person would

find [the misrepresented or omitted fact] important when determining

whether to purchase a product[.]” That test is the reasonable consumer

standard. See Noohi, 146 F.4th at 868; see also Williams v. Gerber

Prods. Co., 552 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008). And, California courts

have long applied the reasonable consumer standard to claims arising

under the UCL, CLRA, and FAL. See Consumer Advocs. v. Echostar

Satellite Corp., 113 Cal. App. 4th 1351, 1360 (2003).

12 BROWN V. THE BRITA PRODUCTS CO.

omitted); see also Moore v. Trader Joe’s Co., 4 F.4th 874,

881–82 (9th Cir. 2021) (same); Gerber Prods. Co., 552 F.3d

at 938 (“Under the reasonable consumer standard, [the

plaintiff] must show that members of the public are likely to

be deceived.” (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted)). Even assuming that Brown’s allegations meet

either the unreasonable safety hazard or central function

defect test, he still cannot establish that Brita had a duty to

disclose that its Products do not completely remove or

reduce to below lab detectable levels all of the Common

Hazardous Contaminants. Such a disclosure would not be

important to a reasonable consumer in light of Brita’s other

disclosures on its Products’ packaging and the objective

unreasonableness of such an expectation.

The district court properly held that no reasonable

consumer would expect Brita’s Products to perform as

Brown alleges he subjectively expected that they would. As

a matter of law, no reasonable consumer would expect

Brita’s low-cost filters to completely remove or reduce to

below lab detectable levels all contaminants present in tap

water, particularly in light of Brita’s extensive disclosures to

the contrary. Brita discloses that its Products “reduce”

contaminants from tap water, not that the Products remove

contaminants entirely. Brita’s Products also specifically

disclose the contaminants that are reduced and provide easily

accessible information (the Performance Data Sheets) as to

the extent to which each specified contaminant is reduced.

For example, the Standard Filter’s packaging discloses

that it reduces five specified contaminants—copper,

mercury, cadmium, chlorine, and zinc—to below the levels

recommended by the NSF and EPA. The associated

Performance Data Sheet discloses the level to which each of

the five contaminants is reduced and informs consumers as

BROWN V. THE BRITA PRODUCTS CO. 13

to the testing methodology and standards used to determine

those levels. Given all of this readily accessible information,

it is difficult to see how a reasonable consumer could

conclude, as Brown allegedly did, that Brita’s Standard

Filter and compatible Everyday Water Pitcher “removes or

reduce[s] common contaminants hazardous to health,

including the Common Hazardous Contaminants, to below

lab detectable limits.”

Accordingly, we hold that a reasonable consumer would

not have attached importance to the fact that Brita’s Products

do not “remove or reduce common contaminants hazardous

to health, including the Common Hazardous Contaminants,

to below lab detectable limits.” Indeed, knowledge of the

Products’ limitations is consistent with the disclosures Brita

did make. Because a reasonable consumer has been made

aware of the Products’ limitations, we cannot say that a

reasonable consumer would have been misled by Brita’s

omission of these limitations on its Products’ packaging.

Ebner, 838 F.3d at 965.

Because the complaint fails to meet the reasonable

consumer standard, the district court did not err by holding

that Brown’s material omission claim fails as a matter of

law.

B. Leave to Amend

We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s

dismissal of Brown’s complaint without leave to amend.

Election Integrity Project Cal., Inc., 113 F.4th at 1099. We

review the futility of an amendment de novo. United States

v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir. 2011).

“The standard for granting leave to amend is generous.” Id.

(citation omitted). While “we do not lightly affirm a denial

of leave to amend,” we will do so where the plaintiff “simply

14 BROWN V. THE BRITA PRODUCTS CO.

wishes to plead more specifically,” and “the claim would

certainly be defeated” even with the amendment. Roth v.

Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 629 (9th Cir. 1991).

On appeal, Brown argues that we should allow

amendment to: (1) “clarif[y] the issue” of materiality; and

(2) “clarify exactly how Brita’s position as the manufacturer

and marketer of the Products placed it in a position with

superior knowledge of the Products’ inability to protect

consumers from exposure to Common Hazardous

Contaminants,” including through “allegations regarding

Brita’s exclusive access to non-public data concerning the

efficacy of the Products’ filtration abilities.” But no

amendment could save Brown’s complaint from the

conclusion that reasonable consumers have not been

“misle[d] . . . into believing that the Products remove or

reduce to below lab detection limits common contaminants

from their drinking water that are hazardous to health,

including the Common Hazardous Contaminants.”

Moreover, even if Brita had access to non-public data which

shed further light on its Products’ capabilities, that would not

change the fact that Brita has never claimed that its Products

perform as Brown expected them to. Nor would those

additional allegations change our conclusion that no

reasonable consumer would expect such performance from

Brita’s Products. Because Brita’s liability under the

consumer protection statutes rises and falls with the

reasonableness of the alleged expectation, Brown’s claims

fail as a matter of law. See Noohi, 146 F.4th at 868 (to state

a claim under the UCL, FAL, or CLRA, the complaint must

allege facts sufficient to meet the reasonable consumer

standard). The district court did not abuse its discretion by

denying leave to amend. See Roth, 942 F.2d at 629.

BROWN V. THE BRITA PRODUCTS CO. 15

V. CONCLUSION

The district court properly granted Brita’s motion to

dismiss because a reasonable consumer would not expect

Brita’s Products to perform according to Brown’s subjective

and unreasonable expectations. The district court also

properly denied Brown leave to amend his complaint

because amendment would be futile.

AFFIRMED.