Opinion

Nguyen

Court
District Court, S.D. Texas
Filed
Mar 25, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 40.2%

“All of Whitley’s inadequate supervision, failure to train, and policy, practice, or custom claims fail without an underlying constitutional violation.”

How later courts described this case

  • “All of Whitley’s inadequate supervision, failure to train, and policy, practice, or custom claims fail without an underlying constitutional violation.”
  • “Official- capacity suits . . . generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” (quotation omitted)
  • holding that claims against a municipality “cannot survive” where the plaintiff “failed to demonstrate” a constitutional violation

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT March 25, 2026

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

GALVESTON DIVISION

ALEX NGUYEN, §

§

Plaintiff. §

§

V. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-cv-00204

§

A.C. MIZELL, et al., §

§

Defendants. §

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

Defendants Kenneth Brown, Jr. and Wesley Devine have each filed a motion

to dismiss. See Dkts. 28, 29. Having reviewed the briefing, the record, and the

applicable law, I recommend that both motions be granted. I also recommend that

the court sua sponte dismiss the remaining individual defendants for failure to

timely effectuate service and dismiss the Board of Trustees of the Galveston

Wharves (the “Board”) and the Doe defendants for failure to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted.

BACKGROUND

This civil rights lawsuit arises from events concerning the July 4, 2023 arrest

of Plaintiff Alex Nguyen. Nguyen alleges that “[o]n July 4, 2023,” he “was

approached, forcibly seized, and seriously injured by officers of the Port of

Galveston Police Department – without cause[ and] without warning.” Dkt. 18 at

1.

On July 1, 2025, Nguyen instituted this civil rights lawsuit against seven

named defendants: A.C. Mizell, Fernando Herrera, Devine, Brown, Jennifer

Matlage, the Port of Galveston Police Department, and the City of Galveston. See

Dkt. 1. Nguyen also named 10 Doe defendants.

On October 16, 2025—three and a half months after Nguyen filed this

lawsuit—Judge Jeffrey V. Brown entered an order observing that there had been

“no indication that the plaintiff has served or attempted to serve the defendants.”

Dkt. 7 at 1. Judge Brown gave Nguyen until December 15, 2025, to “either serve the

defendants or show cause, in writing, as to why [his] claims against the defendants

should not be dismissed for failure to timely serve them.” Id. at 2. Judge Brown

warned Nguyen: “Failure to do so may result in dismissal of this action.” Id.

On October 20, 2025, Nguyen filed an affidavit executed by process server

Jacqueline M. Williams. Williams swore under penalty of perjury that Devine was

served with a summons and complaint on July 1, 2025. See Dkt. 8.

On October 22, 2025, the Clerk’s office filed a docket entry showing that

summonses were issued to Brown, Devine, and the Port of Galveston Police

Department that same day. This October 22, 2025 docket entry is the first

indication of the Clerk’s office issuing any summonses in this matter.

On November 3, 2025, Nguyen filed returns of service of summons for

Brown and the Port of Galveston Police Department. See Dkts. 9, 10.

On November 14, 2025, Brown and the Port of Galveston Police Department

each filed motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Dkts. 11, 12. The Port of

Galveston Police Department moved to dismiss because it “is not a separate legal

entity” from the Galveston Wharves, “and is not subject to suit.” Dkt. 12 at 4.

On January 14, 2026, Nguyen filed Plaintiff’s First Amended Verified

Complaint for Damages. See Dkt. 18. Nguyen dropped the Port of Galveston Police

Department and the City of Galveston from his amended complaint, naming only

Mizell, Herrera, Devine, Brown, Matlage, the Board, and 10 Does as defendants.

At a hearing held that same day, I expressed concern that Devine had not been

served with a proper summons issued by the Clerk’s office (as opposed to a

summons request completed by Nguyen). I ordered Nguyen to file a copy of the

summons that was purportedly served on Devine by Friday, January 16, 2026. See

Dkt. 19.

On January 16, 2026—in response to my order at the January 14, 2026

hearing—Nguyen filed a summons that was issued by the Clerk of Court on October

22, 2025, which is nearly four months after Williams swore that she served Devine

with a summons and complaint. See Dkt. 21 at 2.

On January 29, 2026, I held a show-cause hearing at which Williams

admitted that her affidavit of service incorrectly reflected that she had served

Devine with a summons and complaint. In truth, Williams served Devine with only

the complaint. I admonished Williams to ensure that she files accurate affidavits

of service in the future.

On January 29, 2026, Devine filed a motion to dismiss for insufficient

service of process under Rule 12(b)(5), and for failure to state a claim under Rule

12(b)(6). See Dkt. 28. On January 30, 2026, Brown filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss. See Dkt. 29. Nguyen has responded to both motions. See Dkts. 31, 32.

For the reasons discussed below, I recommend that: (i) both motions to

dismiss be granted; (ii) that the court sua sponte dismiss the remaining individual

defendants because Nguyen has never served them; and (iii) that the court sua

sponte dismiss the Board and the Doe defendants because Nguyen cannot establish

a constitutional violation.

DISMISSAL FOR INSUFFICIENT SERVICE OF PROCESS

A. LEGAL STANDARDS

“If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the

court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the

action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made

within a specified time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). In addition to the court’s sua sponte

dismissal of a complaint for lack of service, a defendant may also move to dismiss

a complaint for “insufficient service of process.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5).

In either circumstance, “[w]hen service of process is challenged, the serving

party bears the burden of proving its validity or good cause for failure to effect

timely service.” Sys. Signs Supplies v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 903 F.2d 1011, 1013 (5th

Cir. 1990). “Proof of good cause requires at least as much as would be required to

show excusable neglect, as to which simple inadvertence or mistake of counsel or

ignorance of the rules usually does not suffice.” Thrasher v. City of Amarillo, 709

F.3d 509, 511 (5th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). “Additionally, some showing of

good faith on the part of the party seeking an enlargement and some reasonable

basis for noncompliance within the time specified is normally required.” Id.

(quotation omitted). “Pro se status does not excuse a litigant’s complete failure to

effect service.” Sys. Signs, 903 F.2d at 1013.

B. ANALYSIS

Nguyen has served only one of the defendants that he names in his operative

pleading: Brown. Nguyen claims to have served Devine, but for the reasons

discussed below, that service was insufficient. I recommend that Mizell, Herrera,

Devine, and Matlage all be dismissed for insufficient service of process. Because

Nguyen claims to have served Devine, and because Devine has filed a Rule 12(b)(5)

motion, I will address Devine separately.

1. Failure to Serve Mizell, Herrera, and Matlage

Judge Brown gave Nguyen until December 15, 2025, to “either serve the

defendants or show cause, in writing, as to why [his] claims against the defendants

should not be dismissed for failure to timely serve them.” Dkt. 7 at 2. Judge Brown

warned Nguyen in no uncertain terms: “Failure to do so may result in dismissal of

this action.” Id. Nguyen did not serve Mizell, Herrera, or Matlage by December 15,

2025. Nor did Nguyen request an extension of time to serve Mizell, Herrera, or

Matlage by December 15, 2025. In fact, according to the docket sheet, Nguyen has

never even requested summonses for Mizell, Herrera, or Matlage. Because Nguyen

has made no attempt serve Mizell, Herrera, or Matlage, as ordered by Judge

Brown, his claims against these defendants should be dismissed.

2. Failure to Serve Devine

In connection with his motion to dismiss, Devine has submitted an unsworn

declaration in which he admits that he “was served with a copy of the Plaintiff’s

Complaint” on July 1, 2025. Dkt. 28-1 at 2. Devine also declares, however, under

penalty of perjury, that he has never been personally served with a summons, has

never received a summons in the mail, and has never had a summons left at his

dwelling or usual place of abode. See id. Devine’s declaration comports with the

record, which shows that the Clerk’s office never issued a summons for any

defendant in this case until October 2025. Devine’s declaration also comports with

Williams’s representations at the January 29, 2026 hearing, in which she admitted

that she did not serve Devine with a summons. In response to the overwhelming

evidence that Devine still has not received a summons in this matter, Nguyen

argues that whether Devine received a summons involves “factual disputes

inappropriate for resolution at the pleading stage” and that, in any event, Devine

had actual notice of this proceeding. Dkt. 32 at 1. Nguyen’s arguments are

unavailing.

Nguyen “bears the burden of proving [the] validity [of service of process] or

good cause for failure to effect timely service.” Sys. Signs, 903 F.2d at 1013. That

means that Nguyen should have provided this court with a copy of a summons

issued by the Clerk’s office on or before July 1, 2025, to establish that Devine

received a summons on July 1, 2025, as Nguyen claims. Despite having ample

opportunity to provide such proof, Nguyen has never done so.

In System Signs, the Fifth Circuit held that a district court did not abuse its

discretion in dismissing a complaint for insufficient service of process even though

the pro se litigant had “attempted service on the . . . defendants more than once

within the statutory period and each defendant apparently had actual notice of the

suit.” 903 F.2d at 1013–14. The court found it significant that, as here, the court

had advised the defendant “that service was defective.” Id. at 1014. As with the

plaintiff in System Signs, Nguyen “chose to dispute the validity of service”

“[i]nstead of looking at the rules more closely.” Id. Because Nguyen “had ample

notice of a defect, but did not attempt correction,” his case against Devine should

be dismissed for failure to effect service. Id.

Nguyen’s claims should be dismissed as to Mizell, Herrera, Devine, and

Matlage for failure to effect service of process. I turn now to Nguyen’s claims

against Brown and the Board.

DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

Nguyen asserts two § 1983 claims against Brown in his individual and

official capacities: (1) unlawful seizure and false imprisonment in violation of the

Fourth Amendment and (2) accusation absent crime in violation of the Sixth

Amendment. Brown is the Chief of Police for the Port of Galveston Police

Department. As such, claims against Brown in his official capacity are really claims

against the Board. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) (“Official-

capacity suits . . . generally represent only another way of pleading an action

against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” (quotation omitted)). Nguyen also

seeks to hold the Board liable for the actions of Brown and the other individual

defendants based on a theory of ratification.

Brown, the only defendant who has been served, moves to dismiss Nguyen’s

claims against him, arguing that Nguyen fails to state a claim upon which relief

could be granted against him in either his official or individual capacities and, in

any event, that Brown is entitled to qualified immunity for claims against him in

his individual capacity. As explained below, Brown is unquestionably entitled to

qualified immunity, and thus the dismissal of Nguyen’s claims against him in his

individual capacity. Because Nguyen cannot establish a constitutional violation,

Brown (in his official capacity), the Board, and the Doe defendants are also entitled

to have Nguyen’s claims dismissed.1

1 The Fifth Circuit has held that a district court does not err in allowing non-appearing

defendants “to benefit from the appearing defendants’ favorable [dispositive] motion.”

Lewis v. Lynn, 236 F.3d 766, 768 (5th Cir. 2001). “The policy rationale for this rule is that

it would be incongruous and unfair to allow some defendants to prevail, while not

providing the same benefit to similarly situated defendants.” Id. (cleaned up).

A. LEGAL STANDARD

1. Rule 12(b)(6)

A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint when a plaintiff fails “to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a

motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is

not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility

that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

Conversely, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a

claim of entitlement to relief, this basic deficiency should be exposed at the point

of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the

court.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 (cleaned up).

When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, I accept “all well-pleaded facts as

true and view[] those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Cummings

v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., 948 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2020) (quotation

omitted). I “do not, however, accept as true legal conclusions, conclusory

statements, or naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Benfield

v. Magee, 945 F.3d 333, 336–37 (5th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). “Threadbare recitals

of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do

not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Fifth Circuit “hold[s] pro se plaintiffs to a

more lenient standard than lawyers when analyzing complaints, but pro se

plaintiffs must still plead factual allegations that raise the right to relief above the

speculative level.” Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 469 (5th Cir.

2016); see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

2. Section 1983

Section 1983 provides, in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . , subjects, or causes to

be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of

any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws, shall be liable to the party injured.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but

merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere

conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quotation omitted).

To establish § 1983 liability against Brown in his individual capacity,

Nguyen “must (1) allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws

of the United States” and (2) demonstrate that each defendant was “acting under

color of state law.” Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871, 874 (5th Cir.

2000). Even if Nguyen establishes that a constitutional right was violated, Brown

is entitled to qualified immunity unless Nguyen can show that the constitutional

right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of Brown’s alleged

conduct.

3. Qualified Immunity

“Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil liability in their

individual capacity to the extent that their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights.” Cass v. City of Abilene, 814 F.3d

721, 728 (5th Cir. 2016). It is a judicially created doctrine designed to avoid “the

expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues,

and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office.” Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982). The doctrine arises from “the danger that

fear of being sued will dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most

irresponsible public officials, in the unflinching discharge of their

duties.” Id. (cleaned up).

“Once a defendant invokes qualified immunity, the burden shifts to the

plaintiff to show that the defense is not available.” Kovacic v. Villarreal, 628 F.3d

209, 211 (5th Cir. 2010). A plaintiff seeking to overcome qualified immunity must

show: “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that

the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Ashcroft v.

al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (quotation omitted). “These steps may be

considered in either order.” Shumpert v. City of Tupelo, 905 F.3d 310, 320 (5th

Cir. 2018).

The first step asks whether the alleged facts “show the officer’s conduct

violated a constitutional right.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If

Nguyen’s allegations, viewed favorably, do not establish a constitutional violation,

no further inquiry is necessary. See id. The second step “asks whether the right in

question was clearly established at the time of the violation.” Tolan v. Cotton, 572

U.S. 650, 656 (2014) (quotation omitted). Brown is “shielded from liability for civil

damages if [his] actions did not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Hope v.

Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quotation omitted). “A right is clearly

established only if the right’s contours were sufficiently definite that any

reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was

violating it.” Mote v. Walthall, 902 F.3d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 2018) (quotation

omitted). “[T]he salient question . . . is whether the state of the law” at the time of

the incident provided Brown with “fair warning that [his] alleged treatment of

[Nguyen] was unconstitutional.” Hope, 536 U.S. at 741. Nguyen bears a heavy

burden on this prong because a right is clearly established only if relevant

precedent has “placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” al-

Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741.

“[A] plaintiff seeking to overcome qualified immunity must plead specific

facts that both allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

is liable for the harm he has alleged and that defeat a qualified immunity defense

with equal specificity.” Arnold v. Williams, 979 F.3d 262, 267 (5th Cir.

2020) (quotation omitted).

x %

With these principles in mind, I will address Nguyen’s claims against Brown.

B. ANALYSIS

1. Nguyen’s Allegations

I will assume for the sake of argument that Brown (and each of the other

individual defendants) was acting under color of state law. Even so, Nguyen cannot

show that Brown “violated a... constitutional right.” al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 735.

Nguyen’s complaint is heavy on legal conclusions and light on factual details.

I accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Unfortunately, these are the

only factual allegations that I can discern from the First Amended Complaint:

e Nguyen was arrested by unidentified officers of the Port of Galveston

Police Department on July 4, 2023.

e Mizell, Herrera, Devine, Brown, and Matlage are all officers, agents, or

employees of the Port of Galveston Police Department.

e Nguyen did not “injure, threaten, or attempt to injure” anyone.

e Nguyen did not have a warrant out for his arrest.

e “Defendants issued commands and restricted [Nguyen]’s freedom of

movement.”

e “Defendants physically seized [Nguyen] and placed him under custodial

arrest.”

e Nguyen “did not consent to the seizure or detention.”

e “No Defendant articulated the existence of a warrant, an ongoing crime,

or any immediate necessity.”

e Nguyen “was transported against his will to a detention facility.”

e Nguyen “was booked, processed, and confined.”

e Nguyen “was released without any . . . adjudication.”

e Nguyen “experienced physical pain and injury as a result of being forcibly

seized and restrained.”

10

e Nguyen “sought medical evaluation and treatment following the

detention.

Dkt. 18 at 1-5. Again, these are the only facts alleged in Nguyen’s operative

pleading.

The rest of Nguyen’s complaint is filled with legal conclusions. For example,

Nguyen’s allegation that he “was not committing, had not committed, and was not

about to commit any crime” is a legal conclusion. Id. at 4. So too is: “Plaintiff

suffered loss of liberty, emotional distress, reputation harm, and other injuries as

a direct result of Defendants’ actions.” Id. at 5. I do not “accept as true legal

conclusions, conclusory statements, or naked assertions devoid of further factual

enhancement.” Benfield, 945 F.3d at 336-37 (cleaned up).

If, considering his pro se status, I look to Nguyen’s original complaint, I can

glean a few additional facts:

e On the morning of July 4, 2023, Nguyen was parked in his truck in a

public parking area adjacent to the Galveston docks.

e An unidentified woman asked Nguyen to move his truck, claiming that

he was blocking a parking space. When Nguyen declined, the woman

called the police.

e “Mizell, Herrera, Devine, and other officers” arrived in response.

e Mizell and Herrera ordered Nguyen to move his vehicle and threatened

arrest.

e Unidentified officers ultimately arrested Nguyen and charged him with

unidentified criminal offenses.

e The arrest injured Nguyen’s right wrist, and that injury caused and

continues to cause Nguyen great pain.

e Nguyen was later released from custody and the charges against him were

dropped in August 2023.

Dkt. 1 at 4-5.

The only factual allegation specific to Brown in either Nguyen’s original or

amended complaint is this:

Defendant KENNETH BROWN JR. (“Brown”) is, upon information

and belief, a man of the age of majority, who at all relevant times was

11

acting as an officer, agent, or employee of the Port of Galveston Police

Department, within the boundaries of the Texas republic, under color

of law. Brown identified himself to Plaintiff as Chief of Police, who is

responsible for the supervision, training, and discipline of officers

under him. Sued in both individual and official capacities.

Dkt. 1 at 3; Dkt. 18 at 3.

Given the paucity of these allegations, Nguyen cannot plausibly establish a

constitutional violation by Brown (or any other defendant).

2. Nguyen Does Not State a Claim Against Brown

Nguyen does not state a claim against Brown because Nguyen does not allege

any affirmative action by Brown other than the fact that “Brown identified himself

to [Nguyen] as Chief of Police.” Dkt. 18 at 3. In his response to Brown’s motion to

dismiss, Nguyen states that his First Amended Complaint (1) “alleges that Chief

Brown . . . personally reviewed body-worn camera footage and surveillance of the

incident;” (2) that Brown “issued a written determination finding the arrest

‘justified’ despite the absence of probable cause and the subsequent dismissal of

all charges:”; and (3) that Brown’s “findings served to ratify and approve the

unconstitutional conduct of subordinate officers.” Dkt. 31 at 2. To start, only the

first allegation and part of the second allegation are factual allegations. Nguyen’s

assertions that there was an absence of probable cause for his arrest and that

Brown’s actions ratified the subordinate officers’ conduct are legal conclusions, not

factual allegations. Additionally, Nguyen did not allege anywhere in his original or

amended complaint that Brown “personally reviewed body-worn camera footage

and surveillance of the incident.” Id. In fact, the words “camera,” “footage,” and

“surveillance” do not appear in either document. See Dkt. 1; Dkt. 18. That is not to

say, however, that if Nguyen had made such an allegation, that it would make a

difference. It would not.

Because Nguyen does not allege that Brown was personally involved in

Nguyen’s arrest, Brown can only be liable in his individual capacity if Nguyen

alleges that Brown “personally was involved in the constitutional violation or that

there is a sufficient causal connection between the [Brown]’s conduct and the

constitutional violation.” Evett v. DETNTFF, 330 F.3d 681, 689 (5th Cir. 2003)

(quotation omitted). This test presumes that Nguyen can establish a constitutional

violation. He cannot.

“[W]hen a plaintiff sues a public official under § 1983, the district court must

insist on heightened pleading by the plaintiff.” Morin v. Caire, 77 F.3d 116, 121 (5th

Cir.1996). “Heightened pleading requires allegations of fact focusing specifically

on the conduct of the individual who caused the plaintiffs’ injury.” Reyes v. Sazan,

168 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir.1999). “The case should not be allowed to proceed unless

plaintiffs can assert specific facts that, if true, would overcome the defense.” Fisher

v. Dallas County, 299 F.R.D. 527, 532 (N.D. Tex. 2014). Nguyen does not identify

which officers arrested him, what he was arrested for, or which officers injured

him. Nguyen’s “failure to attribute conduct to any of the Individual Defendants or

to separate out the allegations against the various Individual Defendants makes it

impossible to determine whether the defendant in question acted in an objectively

unreasonable manner in light of clearly established constitutional standards.” Id.

at 532–33. Accordingly, Nguyen has failed to establish a constitutional violation

by Brown or any other defendant.

Because Nguyen has not established a constitutional violation, his claims

against Brown (in both his individual and official capacities), the Board, and the

Doe defendants must be dismissed. See Romero v. City of Grapevine, 888 F.3d

170, 178 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding that claims against a municipality “cannot

survive” where the plaintiff “failed to demonstrate” a constitutional violation);

Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 648 (5th Cir. 2013) (“All of Whitley’s inadequate

supervision, failure to train, and policy, practice, or custom claims fail without an

underlying constitutional violation.”); Rios v. City of Del Rio, 444 F.3d 417, 425

(5th Cir. 2006) (“[A] plaintiff must show either the supervisor personally was

involved in the constitutional violation or that there is a sufficient causal

connection between the supervisor’s conduct and the constitutional violation. It is

facially evident that this test cannot be met if there is no underlying constitutional

violation.” (cleaned up)).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, I recommend that the two pending motions

to dismiss (Dkts. 28, 29) be granted, that the court sua sponte dismiss the

remaining individual defendants for failure to effect service of process, and that

the court sua sponte dismiss the Board and the Doe defendants for failure to state

a claim.

The parties have 14 days from service of this Memorandum and

Recommendation to file written objections. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections will preclude appellate review of

factual findings and legal conclusions, except for plain error.

SIGNED this day of March 2026.

______________________________

ANDREW M. EDISON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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