James

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

NAJEE DEVONTAE JAMES

Plaintiff,

Case No 23-cv-743

v.

Hon. Judge Franklin U.

COOK COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF Valderrama

CORRECTIONS, et al.

Defendants.

ORDER

The Fourteenth Amendment requires jail officials to “safeguard the health and

safety of pretrial detainees and section 1983 provides a cause of action for detainees

to vindicate those constitutional guarantees.”1 Plaintiff Najee Devontae James is and

was a pretrial detainee at the Cook County Department of Corrections (CCDOC). R.2

47, Third Amended Complaint (TAC). According to James, while in pretrial custody,

he was beaten, sexually assaulted, and denied medical care. James sued Thomas

Dart, the Sherriff of Cook County, along with a group of CCDOC officers, directors,

and related medical personnel under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his

constitutional rights. Presently before the Court is a motion to dismiss brought by a

subset of the Defendants—Dart, Johnson, Yoksoulian, Peraino, Lucente, and Acey

(collectively, Defendants)—for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil

1 Gonzalez v. McHenry Cnty., 40 F.4th 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2022).

2 Citations to the docket are indicated by “R.” followed by the docket number and, where

necessary, a page or paragraph citation.

Procedure 12(b)(6). R. 65, Mot. For the reasons stated herein, the Court grants in part

and denies in part Defendants’ motion.

Background3

Plaintiff Najee Devontae James was at all relevant times a pretrial detainee of

CCDOC. TAC ¶ 4. As the TAC asserts different allegations against each Defendant,

the Court addresses the allegations against each Defendant separately, where

appropriate.

A. Defendant Yoksoulian

On June 10, 2022, James was sent from CCDOC to the Cermak Section

(Cermak) of CCDOC for medical services because of a suicide attempt. Id. ¶ 21. The

staff at Cermak subsequently ordered that James be transferred to Stroger Hospital.

Id. ¶ 22. Defendant Martha Yoksoulian, a CCDOC officer, was responsible for

managing the day-to-day operations of the CCDOC. Id. ¶ 10. James contends that

Yoksoulian was also responsible for implementing and executing the policies of the

External Operations Section (ExOps) at CCDOC. Id. James alleges on information

and belief that Yoksoulian created a list for self-harm pre-trial detainees called the

“Foreign Body Ingestors,” or “F.B.I” list. Id. ¶ 23. James alleges that Yoksoulian

ordered individuals on the F.B.I. list to be placed last on the pickup list by ExOps for

transfer to Stroger. Id. ¶ 25. Yoksoulian, according to James, implemented a policy

requiring ExOps to hold F.B.I. list detainees for at least twenty-four hours before an

emergency medical transfer. Id. ¶ 26. After receiving the order to transfer James to

3 The Court accepts as true all of the well-pleaded facts in the complaint and draws all

reasonable inferences in favor of the James. Platt v. Brown, 872 F.3d 848, 851 (7th Cir. 2017).

Stroger Hospital, the ExOps waited over twenty-four hours before transporting him

to Stroger Hospital. Id. ¶ 27.

B. Defendant McGonegal

On October 1, 2022, following a death in his family, James experienced suicidal

thoughts and was seen by Margaret McGonegal, a licensed clinical professional

counselor at Cermak. Id. ¶ 11. During the visit, James informed McGonegal that he

was suicidal due to a death in his family. Id. ¶ 29. McGonegal dismissed his suicidal

thoughts and refused to send James to the psychiatric unit in Cermak. Id. ¶ 31. As a

result, James continued to suffer from depression, which caused him to cut his arm

and wrist after returning to his cell. Id. ¶ 33-34. Two days later, James was sexually

assaulted by his cellmate. Id. ¶ 35. That same day, James informed “multiple CCDOC

staff members” of the sexual assault but was ignored. Id. ¶ 36. On October 5, two

days after his sexual assault, James was sent to Cermak. Id. ¶ 37.

C. Defendant Dr. Tawadros

At Cermak, James saw Dr. Mina Tawadros. Id. ¶ 38. James thought the

consultation was for him to discuss the October 2022 sexual assault. Id. Dr.

Tawadros, however, informed him that he was sent to Cermak only for the injuries

to his left arm. Id. James told Dr. Tawadros that he had filed a grievance and

submitted a health form regarding the October 2022 sexual assault, and explained

he was sent to Cermak by Sgt. Szul. Id. ¶¶ 40, 41. Dr. Tawadros then advised against

any treatment for the sexual assault, but James persisted. Id. ¶ 43. Despite his

persistence, Dr. Tawadros “denied James a sexual assault kit and sent James to sit

outside in the cages” and cleared him to return to his cell at CCDOC. Id. ¶ 44. James,

however, refused to leave Cermak until he received a sexual assault kit. Id. ¶ 45.

When Sgt. Szul and another officer were called to escort James back to his cell, James

explained the incident to Sgt. Szul, who then spoke to Dr. Tawadros. Id. ¶¶ 46-47.

During that conversation, Dr. Tawadros falsely told Sgt. Szul that James refused the

sexual assault kit. Id. ¶ 48.

On December 27, 2022, James was again sexually assaulted by another

detainee. Id. ¶ 75. On December 30, 2022, James was sent to Cermak for a rape kit

and was again seen by Dr. Tawadros. Id. ¶ 76, 77. Dr. Tawadros told James that she

did not believe that he had been raped and refused to allow James to go to Stroger

Hospital. Id. ¶ 78. On January 1, 2023, James was seen by another doctor at the

psychiatric unit. Id. ¶ 80. The doctor placed an order to send James to Stroger for a

rape kit. Id. ¶ 81. James received the rape kit the next day but was informed that no

evidence could be collected. Id. ¶ 83. James attributes this issue to the delay initiated

by Dr. Tawadros’s refusal to send him to Stroger. Id. ¶ 83.

D. Defendant John Doe

On October 14, 2022, James was housed in a cell with an active alert indicating

that he should not have a cellmate. Id. ¶¶ 50-51. On that date, Defendant CO John

Doe permitted another inmate to enter James’s cell. Id. ¶ 49. The unknown inmate

beat, strangled, and raped James at knifepoint throughout the night. Id. ¶ 52. The

next day James was placed in segregation. Id. ¶ 53. Following the assault, James did

not receive any medical or mental health treatment for his injuries. Id. ¶ 54.

E. Defendant Johnson

On November 11, 2022, James attempted suicide while in segregation. Id. ¶

55. As a result, James was “supposed to be sent” to a psychiatric unit. Id. ¶ 56.

However, following his suicide attempt, James was placed in a holding cage in the

basement at Cermak and confined in a blue box and restraints for three consecutive

days. Id. ¶ 57. According to James, Defendant Wilesha Johnson, a CCDOC officer,

implemented a policy by which any incarcerated individual labeled as a “green suit

inmate” would be subject to a “blue box” for hours and days at a time in handcuffs

and a belly chain in the “back cages” of the Cermak basement while waiting to be

seen by Cermak medical staff, conditions James endured each time he was sent to

Cermak’s basement Id. ¶¶ 57-63.

F. Defendant Sellers

On November 13, 14, 15, and 16, 2022, James swallowed a handful of needles

in a suicide attempt. Id. ¶ 64. Defendant Thelma Sellers, a nurse at CCDOC at

Cermak, denied James any medical treatment following his suicide attempts. Id. ¶

65. Rather, James alleges that she cleared him without any medical attention. Id. ¶

66.

G. Defendant Dr. Khan

On December 19, 2022, James was sent to Cermak with symptoms of diarrhea

and vomiting. Id. ¶ 69. Upon arriving at Cermak, James was seen by Dr. Marghoob

Khan. Id. ¶ 70. James described his symptoms to Dr. Khan and informed her that he

was in pain. Id. ¶ 71. Dr. Khan, without examining James, told him he would be okay.

Id. ¶ 72. Following the visit, Dr. Khan sent James back to his unit. Id. ¶ 74.

H. Defendant Lucente

Defendant Michael Lucente was at all relevant times a CCDOC officer at

James’s facility with the rank of Director. Id. ¶ 18. On or about February 16, 2023,

James was called into Lucente’s office. Id. ¶ 84. Lucente asked James to inform him

on “dirty” officers and nurses at CCDOC. Id. ¶ 85. When James insisted that he did

not know of any, Lucente threatened to keep James on “out alone/house alone” status

for an extended period of time if he refused to comply. Id. ¶¶ 86-87. After their

meeting, James filed grievances against Lucente related to these threats. Id. ¶ 88.

Following the submission of James’s grievances, Lucente ordered James to remain on

out alone/house alone status. Id. ¶ 89.

I. Defendants Peraino and Acey

On April 28, 2023, James informed A. Peraino, a CCDOC correctional officer,

that he wanted to file a sexual assault incident report. Id. ¶ 90. Peraino told James

that he would not act on his request until he returned to his cell, subsequently

ordering several officers to use force to bring James back to his cell. Id. ¶¶ 91-92.

During this incident, “while James was restrained by a belly chain, handcuffs, and

confined in a blue box,” Defendant K. Acey, another CCDOC correctional officer,

punched James repeatedly on his right temple, causing injuries. Id. ¶ 93.

James sued the Defendants, asserting Fourteenth Amendment claims against

Defendants Yoksoulian (Count I); McGonegal (Count II); Dr. Tawadros (Count III);

John Doe (Count IV); Johnson (Count V); Sellers (Count VI); Khan (Count VII); a

First Amendment claim against Lucente (VIII); Fourteenth Amendment claims

against Peraino (Count IX); and Acey (Count X); and a Monell claim against Dart

(Count XI). R. 47. Before the Court is the Defendants Dart, Johnson, Peraino,

Lucente, and Acey’s fully briefed motion to dismiss the TAC under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Mot.

Legal Standard

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss challenges the sufficiency of the complaint.

Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chicago Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th

Cir. 2009). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must include only “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need only contain factual

allegations, accepted as true, sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The allegations “must be enough

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The

allegations that are entitled to the assumption of truth are those that are factual,

rather than mere legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.

Analysis

I. Qualified Immunity as to Defendants Lucente, Acey, and

Peraino

Defendants Lucente, Acey, and Peraino argue that James’s claims against

them are barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity. R. 65, Mot. at 11-12. Qualified

immunity “shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct does not violate

clearly established . . . constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Hernandez v. Mesa, 582 U.S. 548, 554 (2017) (cleaned up).4 “The doctrine of

qualified immunity balances dueling interests—allowing officials to perform their

duties reasonably without fear of liability on the one hand and affording members of

the public the ability to vindicate constitutional violations by government officials

who abuse their offices on the other.” Lopez v. Sheriff of Cook Cnty., 993 F.3d 981,

987 (7th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). “The purpose of qualified immunity is to protect ‘all

but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Humphrey v.

Staszak, 148 F.3d 719, 727 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,

341 (1986)).

Crucially, when a defendant raises qualified immunity, the burden shifts to

the plaintiff to defeat this defense. See Leiser v. Kloth, 933 F.3d 696, 701 (7th Cir.

2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 2722 (2020); see also Buchanan v. Pfister, 2020 WL

902829, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2020). Here, Defendants Lucente, Acey, and Peraino

have properly raised a qualified immunity defense. As a result, the burden shifts to

4 This Order uses (cleaned up) to indicate that internal quotation marks, alterations, and

citations have been omitted from quotations. See Jack Metzler, Cleaning Up Quotations, 18

Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 143 (2017).

James to defeat this defense. See Buchanan, 2020 WL 902829, at *12; see also Leiser,

933 F.3d at 701. A plaintiff may defeat qualified immunity by showing that (1) the

defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional right, and (2) the violated right was

clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Lewis v. Downey, 581 F.3d

467, 478 (7th Cir. 2009). A court can choose which element to address first. Lopez,

993 F.3d at 987.

As to the second element, “[a] plaintiff can show that a right is ‘clearly

established’ by statute or constitution in at least two ways: (1) he can point to an

analogous case establishing the right to be free from the conduct at issue; or (2) he

can show that the conduct was ‘so egregious that no reasonable person could have

believed that it would not violate clearly established rights.’” Steidl v. Fermon, 494

F.3d 623, 632 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Smith v. City of Chicago, 242 F.3d 737, 742

(7th Cir. 2001)). A right is “clearly established” if the conduct is so clearly prohibited

that every “reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is doing violates

that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). There need not be a case

exactly on point for a right to be clearly established, but “existing precedent must

place the lawfulness of the particular arrest beyond debate.” D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S.

48, 64 (2018) (cleaned up); see also Alicea v. Thomas, 815 F.3d 283, 291 (7th Cir.

2016). Still, the right must have been clearly established “in a particularized sense,

rather than at a high level of generality.” Id. Put another way, “the official must have

[had] fair warning that his conduct [was] unconstitutional.” Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d

843, 859 (7th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up).

As an initial matter, James argues that Defendants’ qualified immunity

argument is premature at the motion to dismiss stage. R. 70, Resp. at 12. On a more

substantive basis, James insists that his allegations against Lucente, Acey, and

Peraino survive the qualified immunity inquiry at this stage. Id. at 13-16. James is

correct that the Seventh Circuit has explained that “[b]ecause a qualified immunity

defense so closely depends on the facts of the case, a complaint is generally not

dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on qualified immunity grounds.” Alvarado v. Litscher,

267 F.3d 648, 651 (7th Cir. 2001). However, dismissal based on qualified immunity

“may be appropriate at the pleading stage where the plaintiff asserts the violation of

a broad constitutional right that had not been articulated at the time the violation is

alleged to have occurred.” Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 823 (7th Cir. 2019)

(cleaned up). It is within this framework that the Court examines Defendants’

qualified immunity arguments.

A. Defendant Lucente

The Court begins with Defendant Lucente. Recall that after James declined

Lucente’s invitation to snitch on “dirty” officers and nurses, Lucente threatened to

keep James on “out alone/house alone” status. After James filed a grievance, Lucente,

according to James, acted on this threat and ordered that James remain on out

alone/house alone status. In contending that Lucente violated his clearly established

constitutional right, James points to Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 866 (7th Cir.

2012), in which the Seventh Circuit found that the plaintiff adequately alleged a

violation of his First Amendment right to use the prison grievance system. After filing

a grievance, the plaintiff was retaliated against by being sent to another facility

where he had “known enemies.” See id.

The first prong of the qualified immunity analysis is satisfied, because a

pretrial detainee, like a prisoner, “has a First Amendment right to make grievances

about conditions of confinement.” Id. (quoting Watkins v. Kasper, 599 F.3d 791, 798

(7th Cir. 2010)). As to the second, James maintains that Gomez demonstrates that

this right was clearly established at the time of its alleged violation. See Resp. at 13-

14. From James’s perspective, Lucente’s alleged retaliation after the submission of

his grievance violated his First Amendment right and deterred future First

Amendment activity. In reply, Defendants do not address Gomez as it relates to their

qualified immunity argument. See R. 71, Reply at 6-8. Instead, they merely argue

that James does not state “that he was not able to file a grievance.” Id. at 7.

Defendants miss the point. True, James was able to file his initial grievance against

Defendant Lucente, but James’s central contention is that Lucente retaliated against

him for exercising a constitutionally protected right.

Recall that James has the burden of establishing that his right was clearly

established. The only case James cites, Gomez does not accomplish that task. In

Gomez, for his First Amendment retaliation claim, the plaintiff alleged that his

retaliatory transfer was a direct result of his grievance. Specifically, he alleged that

the IDOC Director sent an investigator to threaten the plaintiff with a transfer to

another prison if he pursued his grievance. Even after the plaintiff indicated that he

would no longer pursue his grievance or file a lawsuit if he could stay at his current

prison, he was told it was “too late.” No other explanation for the plaintiff’s transfer

was advanced. Gomez, 680 F.3d at 866-67. Here, by contrast, James does not allege

that the filing of his grievance was the direct cause of his continuation on out

alone/house alone status. Rather, James alleges that Defendant Lucente ordered this

continuation due to James’s refusal to snitch on “dirty” officers and nurses. In other

words, and unlike the situation in Gomez, there is no connection between James’s

filing of his grievance and any alleged First Amendment retaliation. Before James

ever filed his grievance, he had already been told that his failure to reveal dirty

correctional officers would have adverse consequences. As such, the Court finds that

James does not satisfy his burden with respect to the “clearly established” prong of

the qualified immunity analysis as it applies to Defendant Lucente, and therefore

holds that his claim against Defendant Lucente is barred.

B. Defendant Acey

James alleges that Defendant Acey punched him repeatedly in the right side

of the head “while [he] was restrained by a belly chain, handcuffs, and confined in a

blue box.” TAC ¶ 93. Notably, James admits that he does not point to a case directly

on point concerning Defendant Acey’s conduct. Resp. at 15-16. Recall that a plaintiff

may satisfy the “clearly established” prong of the qualified immunity analysis” by (1)

pointing to an analogous case establishing the right to be free from the conduct at

issue; or (2) showing that the conduct was so egregious that no reasonable person

could have believed that it would not violate clearly established rights. Steidl, 494

F.3d at 632. Here, James follows the second route. See Resp. at 15-16. If no case exists

that is directly on point, the Court must examine “all relevant case law in order to

determine whether there was such a clear trend in the case law that [it] can say with

fair assurance that the recognition of the right by a controlling precedent was merely

a question of time.” Estate of Escobedo v. Bender, 600 F.3d 770, 781 (7th Cir. 2010)

(cleaned up). Officials can be “on notice that their conduct violates established law

even in the absence of earlier cases involving fundamentally similar or materially

similar facts.” Currie v. Chhabra, 728 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Hope v.

Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002); see also Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 456 (7th

Cir.1996) (“Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, liability is not predicated upon

the existence of a prior case that is directly on point.”).

Courts in this circuit have held that punching a confined prisoner constitutes

a violation of the prisoner’s constitutional rights. See Alvarado v. Milwaukee County,

2019 WL 2075972 (E.D. Wis. May 10, 2019) (“At this stage, the plaintiff's allegations

that Jackson punched him and used her taser on him are sufficient to state a claim

against her [under Fourteenth Amendment].”). Defendants argue that James’s

allegations about Acey are “simply not plausible” because they are “merely conclusory

assertions the Court need not accept.” Reply at 8. Defendants’ argument misses the

mark. Under applicable case law, James’s allegations are sufficient at this stage to

demonstrate that Defendant Acey’s conduct amounted to a violation of James’s

clearly established constitutional rights, effectively defeating Defendant Acey’s

qualified immunity defense at this stage.

C. Defendant Peraino

Finally, the Court evaluates whether qualified immunity bars James’s claim

against Defendant Peraino. James alleges that he informed Defendant Peraino that

he sought to file a sexual assault incident report. Peraino told James that he would

not act on his request until he returned to his cell, subsequently ordering several

officers to force James back to his cell, during which altercation Defendant Acey

punched James repeatedly in the head. In support of his contention that this right

was clearly established, James leans on Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 908 (7th Cir.

2005). In Budz, the Seventh Circuit held that a defendant violates a prisoner’s

constitutional rights when he knows of “highly probable attacks.” Id. at 911. “[A]

‘substantial risk’ could exist where prison officials place a detainee in a cell in which

‘they know that there is a cobra there or at least a high probability of a cobra there.’”

Id. (quoting Billman v. Ind. Dept. of Corr., 56 F.3d 785, 788 (7th Cir. 1995)).

Specifically, the plaintiff in Budz—a Caucasian man—demonstrated that the

defendants failed to protect him from another prisoner who had a known propensity

to attack Caucasian prisoners. See id.

Here, by contrast, James alleges that Defendant Peraino failed to protect him

from harm by not allowing him to file a grievance before he was back in his cell and

by ordering other officers to physically force him back into the cell. From James’s

point of view, Defendant Peraino “ignored Plaintiff’s request, dismissed the matter,

and directed officers to use force to return Plaintiff to his cell.” Resp. at 15. James

contends that “this disregard mirrors the examples outlined in Budz.” Id. The Court

disagrees. Unlike the plaintiff in Budz, James does not allege that he was at

particular risk of harm due to Defendant Peraino’s failure to act, nor does he argue

that Defendant Peraino knew of any particular high risk of him being subject to

violence. Defendant Peraino telling James that he would not discuss the matter until

he was back in his cell is a far cry from the defendants in Budz allowing an inmate

with a known propensity for violence against Caucasian individuals to be given access

to a common recreation room where he subsequently assaulted the Caucasian

plaintiff. See Budz, 398 F.3d at 910-12. Defendants argue, and the Court agrees, that

Defendant Peraino did not prevent James from filing a grievance, but rather informed

James that he first needed to go back to his cell. See Reply at 7-8. James also fails to

establish that Defendant Peraino ordered, or even could have predicted, the level of

force subsequently used by Defendant Acey. Such conduct, based on James’s own

allegations, fails to establish that Defendant Peraino violated James’s clearly

established constitutional rights. Accordingly, James’s claim against Defendant

Peraino is barred under qualified immunity.

The Court now turns to Defendants’ 12(b)(6) arguments for dismissal.

II. James’s Fourteenth Amendment Claim Against Defendant Acey

James alleges that Defendant Acey violated his Fourteenth Amendment right

to be free from excessive force by repeatedly punching him in the right temple while

he was restrained.

Defendants argue that James fails to state a claim of excessive force, noting

that James’s allegations against Defendant Acey constitute only one sentence and

lack sufficient detail. See Mot. at 8, Reply at 5-6. The way Defendants see it, James’s

allegations as to Defendant Acey are “conclusory” and need not be accepted by the

Court. Mot. at 10, Reply at 5. Moreover, Defendants argue, “de minimis uses of force

do not implicate the Eighth Amendment.” Reply at 5.

To state a claim for excessive force, a pretrial detainee must allege that the

defendant “purposefully or knowingly” used force against him, and that that force

was “objectively unreasonable.” Morehead v. Milwaukee Cnty. Police Dep't, 2018 WL

1175356, at *2 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 5, 2018) (quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S,

389, 398 (2015)).

To begin, the Court is perplexed by Defendants’ reference to the Eighth

Amendment, especially after James correctly stated the correct standard for pretrial

detainees lies under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Resp. at 10-11. This distinction

matters. In Kingsley v. Hendrickson, the Supreme Court held that “a pretrial

detainee can prevail [on an excessive force claim] by providing only objective evidence

that the challenged governmental action is not rationally related to a legitimate

governmental objective or that it is excessive in relation to that purpose.” 576 U.S,

389, 396-97 (2015). Further, “[t]he language of the two Clauses differs, and the nature

of the claims often differs. And, most importantly, pretrial detainees (unlike convicted

prisoners) cannot be punished at all, much less ‘maliciously and sadistically.’” Id. at

400-01. Thus, in analyzing an excessive force claim under the Fourteenth

Amendment, “there is no need . . . as there might be in an Eighth Amendment case,

to determine when punishment is unconstitutional.” Id. at 401. In evaluating

Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claims, courts “may consider several factors,

including the relationship between the need to use force and the amount of force used,

the extent of the plaintiff's injury, any effort by the officer to limit his or her use of

force, the severity of the security concern, and the threat perceived by the officer.”

Thompson v. Cook County, 2023 WL 2838449, at *3 (citing Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 397).

The Court nevertheless disagrees with Defendants’ central position that

Defendant Acey’s repeated punches to James’s head were in any way “de minimis.”

See Reply at 5-6. Nothing in the complaint supports that conclusion, and indeed, case

law has found the opposite: “examples of force greater than de minimis, which could

support an excessive force claim include: punching a prisoner with a closed fist.”

Jackson v. Stubenvoll, 2022 WL 991950, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 31, 2022) (citing Thomas

v. Stalter, 20 F.3d 298, 301-02 (7th Cir. 1994) (“A punch in the face to subdue Mr.

Thomas was not necessary to carry out the court order.”)). The Court is additionally

unpersuaded by Defendants’ assertion that James’s allegations are conclusory. In

support, they cite Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 and Kingsley v. Hendrickson,

576 U.S. 389, 398-99 (2015) but proffer little additional reasoning as to why James’s

allegations about Defendant Acey’s punches and his resulting injuries are in any way

conclusory. See Reply at 5-6. Ironically enough, Defendants’ argument skews more

conclusory than James’s. James alleges that Defendant Acey “punched [him]

repeatedly in the right side of the temple resulting in injuries” “while [he] was

restrained by a belly chain, handcuffs, and confined in a blue box.” TAC ¶ 93.

Repeated punches to the head, especially while James was allegedly restrained,

extend beyond the bounds of reasonable force. Accordingly, James sufficiently states

an excessive force claim against Defendant Acey.

III. James’s Claims Against Defendants Johnson and Yoksoulian

James sues both Defendants Johnson and Yoksoulian in their official

capacities. “Government officials can be sued in their official capacity (which is really

a claim against the government entity), their individual capacity (which is a claim

against the official personally), or both.” Lamb v. Cty. of Lake, 2021 WL 4306144, at

*4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2021). To maintain an official-capacity suit under § 1983, a

plaintiff must show that his injury resulted from the execution of an official policy,

custom, or practice. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694

(1978). Moreover, “a plaintiff suing a public employee in his official capacity cannot

obtain relief unless that defendant has final policy making authority.” Jett v. Dallas

Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989); see also Long v. Mercer County, Ill., 795

F. Supp. 873, 876 n.1 (“To sue [defendant] in his official capacity, Plaintiff must allege

that [he] acted pursuant to an official policy, custom, or practice, or that he was a

municipal policy maker with final policy making authority relative to the acts

complained of.”).

James alleges that Defendants Johnson and Yoksoulian implemented or

administered policies that caused James significant harm. As to Defendant Johnson,

James asserts that she “created a policy for green suit inmates,” requiring these

prisoners “to be restrained in a blue box for hours and days at a time in handcuffs

and a belly chain, in the back cages in the Cermak Section basement while waiting

to be seen by medical staff.” TAC ¶¶ 59-63. As for Defendant Yoksoulian, James

alleges that he created an “F.B.I. list” and “implemented a policy” requiring that

individuals on the list to be put last on the pickup list for transfer to Stroger Hospital,

resulting in James’s transfer being delayed. Id. ¶¶ 23-27.

Defendants argue that Defendants Johnson and Yoksoulian are not final

policymakers and therefore cannot be held liable for actions taken in their official

capacity. Mot. at 5-7. James, in reply, “acknowledges that his claims against

Yoksoulian and Johnson in their official capacities are . . . effectively claims against

Sheriff Dart.” Reply at 5. Nevertheless, James insists that these claims remain viable

because his injuries were caused by an official policy or practice carried out within

the scope of Yoksoulian and Johnson’s official duties. Id. James maintains that

further factual discovery is necessary to determine whether Defendants Yoksoulian

and Johnson have policymaking authority on the actions in question. Resp. at 5-6

(citing Novick v. Village of Bourbonnais, 695 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1030 (C.D. Ill. 2023)).

But Novick, as Defendants correctly point out, is distinguishable. See Reply at 1-2.

The Novick court held that the police chief defendant could be considered a final policy

maker after a press conference revealed that the police chief “retains complete

authority over how criminal investigations are conducted” and that he is therefore a

“final policymaker.” Id. at 1030 (quoting Logan v. City of Evanston, 2020 WL 6020487,

at *6, (N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2020)). Here, James does not allege that Defendants Johnson

or Yoksoulian retained similar policy-making authority.

Although James alleges that Defendants Johnson and Yoksoulian effectively

“created” and “implemented” the policies which caused his injuries, he does not allege

that either Defendant possessed the requisite “final policy-making authority” to

satisfy Monell. See Valentino v. Vill. of S. Chi. Heights, 575 F.3d 664, 676 (7th Cir.

2009) (“Officials with final decisionmaking authority are deemed policymakers for

Monell purposes.”). Indeed, James concedes that his claims against Defendants

Yoksoulian and Johnson are essentially claims against Sheriff Dart. As such, the

Court agrees with Defendants Johnson and Yoksoulian that they are not final

policymakers for Monell purposes and consequently holds that James’s official

capacity claims against them must be dismissed.

IV. James’s Monell Claim Against Defendant Dart

James brings a claim for Monell liability against Sheriff Dart for the actions

committed by the other named Defendants. Under Monell, a municipality may be “on

the hook” for decisions “made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may

fairly be said to represent official policy.” Cozzi v. Village of Melrose Park, 592 F.

Supp. 3d 701, 714 (N.D. Ill. 2022) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs. of City of

New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (2018)). Sheriff Dart—in his official capacity as the head

of the Sheriff's Office—may be liable under § 1983 only if the alleged constitutional

violations resulted from the execution of one of its policies. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.

“This may be established by alleging: (1) an express policy that caused the

constitutional deprivation; (2) a widespread practice that, although not authorized by

written law or express municipal policy, is so permanent and well settled that it

constitutes a policy; or (3) that the constitutional injury was caused by a person with

final policymaking authority.” Armour v. Country Club Hills, 2014 WL 63850, at *5

(N.D. Ill. Jan. 8, 2014) (citing Lewis v. City of Chicago, 496 F.3d 645, 656 (7th Cir.

2007)).

In response to Defendants’ argument that he failed to adequately allege a

plausible Monell claim, James focuses solely on whether Sheriff Dart possesses “final

policymaking authority,” arguing that discovery is needed to answer this question.

Resp. at 16-17. But that is not the relevant question before the Court. As an initial

matter, it is uncontested that Sheriff Dart retains final policymaking authority. See

Wuerffel v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 2016 WL 1660497, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 2016)

(“In Illinois, a sheriff has final policy-making authority.”). Crucially, however, James

does not allege that Sheriff Dart himself caused his injuries. The Court therefore

focuses its attention on the first two Monell factors: whether there exists an express

policy or widespread practice that caused his constitutional deprivation. As to the

actions taken by Defendants Johnson and Yoksoulian, Defendants argue that James

fails to adequately allege that the “F.B.I.” list or green suit regulations were express

policies or widespread practices. Mot. at 14. The Court agrees with Defendants. In

sum, James has not alleged that the actions taken by Defendants Yoksoulian and

Johnson constituted an express policy, a widespread, permanent, well-settled

practice, or that Sheriff Dart caused his injuries. See Armour, 2014 WL 63850, at *5.

The same reasoning applies to James’s Monell claim as it relates to the actions

taken by the other Defendants, namely concerning improper responses to sexual

assaults and suicide attempts. Defendants argue, and the Court agrees, that James

does not allege any widespread practice or policy connected to the treatment he

received, nor does he point to any causal link between the injuries he suffered and

his treatment. Mot. at 14; see also Cozzi, 592 F. Supp. 3d at 713-14 (“The plaintiff also

must establish ‘the requisite causation, meaning ‘the policy or custom was the

moving force behind the constitutional deprivation.”) (quoting Gable v. City of

Chicago, 296 F.3d 531, 537 (7th Cir. 2002)). Accordingly, James’s Monell claim

against Sheriff Dart is dismissed.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part

Defendants Dart, Johnson, Yoksoulian, Peraino, Lucente, and Acey’s motion to

dismiss James’s Third Amended Complaint [65]. The Court grants the motion as to

James’s claims against Defendants Dart, Lucente, Peraino, Johnson, and Yoksoulian

without prejudice. The Court denies the motion as to James’s claim against

Defendant Acey.

Date: 3/16/2026 Ly é /,

United States District Judge

Franklin U. Valderrama

22