Skeldon

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

JEFFREY SKELDON )

)

v. ) Case No. 3:25-cv-00703

)

TEXTRON AVIATION, INC. )

TO: Honorable Aleta A. Trauger, United States District Judge

R E P O R T A N D R E C O M E N D A T I O N

By Order entered July 28, 2025 (Docket Entry No. 8), the Court referred this pro se lawsuit

to the Magistrate Judge for pretrial proceedings under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), Rule

72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the Local Rules of Court.

Presently pending is the motion to dismiss (Docket Entry No. 13) filed by Defendant

Textron Aviation, Inc. The motion is opposed by Plaintiff. For the reasons set out below, the

undersigned respectfully recommends that the motion be GRANTED and this lawsuit be

DISMISSED.

I. BACKGROUND

Jeffrey Skeldon (“Plaintiff”) is resident of Madison, Tennessee, and a former employee of

Textron Aviation, Inc. (“Textron” or “Defendant”). On June 25, 2025, he filed this pro se lawsuit,

seeking damages against Defendant based on a claim that Defendant took three wrongful

employment actions against him. See Complaint (Docket Entry No. 1). Plaintiff subsequently

filed an amended complaint, which is the operative complaint in the case. See Amended Complaint

(Docket Entry No. 11).

Defendant is a business headquartered in Kansas that operates in the aviation industry.

Plaintiff worked for Defendant as a Tube Fabricator and a Line Service Attendant from April 15,

2019, to July 1, 2022, when he was terminated from his employment. Id. at ¶¶ 7-9. Plaintiff asserts

that he was a covered employee under a Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) that exists

between Textron and The International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, District

Lodge #70, Local Lodge #774 (“the Union”). Id. at ¶ 10. Prior to his termination, Plaintiff

received two work suspensions in 2022. Id. at ¶¶ 16 and 33. He alleges that the three disciplinary

actions – the two work suspensions and the termination – which were each based on allegations of

work performance/safety shortcomings on his part, were factually unsupported and violated the

CBA because they were “accelerated, exceedingly excessive, arbitrary, and wrongfully applied

based on the facts and circumstances of the events and a violation of the letter and spirit of the

progressive disciple policy and ARTICLE 31 DISCIPLINE of the [CBA].” (emphasis in original).

Id. at ¶¶ 12 and 91-92. Plaintiff alleges that he filed grievances with the Union after each of the

disciplinary actions but that the Union did not pursue the matters through arbitration on his behalf.

Id. at ¶¶ 81-85. Attached to Plaintiff’s amended complaint are a copy of the CBA and documents

related to the disciplinary actions and his grievances. See Docket Entry Nos. 11-1 through 11-7.

In lieu of an answer, Defendant filed the pending motion to dismiss. Seeking dismissal of

the lawsuit under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant raises several

arguments: (1) Plaintiff’s factual allegations, even if accepted as true, do not state a facially

plausible claim for relief; (2) Plaintiff failed to exhaust the available grievance procedures set out

in the CBA because the grievances that he filed were not pursued through the final steps; (3)

Plaintiff’s lawsuit is barred by the applicable statute of limitations; and, (4) Plaintiff’s claim, even

if found to be exhausted and timely filed, is subject to the mandatory arbitration agreement that is

contained in the CBA. See Defendant’s Memorandum in Support (Docket Entry No. 14).

Defendant requests the Court compel arbitration in the event that the lawsuit is not dismissed. Id.

at 11.

In response, Plaintiff argues the merits of his claim and contends that his allegations state

a facially plausible claim for relief. See Response (Docket Entry No. 19) at 3-9. Plaintiff contends

that he should be deemed to have exhausted his grievance remedies under the CBA because he

took all steps that were available to him as an employee and that only the Union was permitted to

engage in the final two steps of the grievance process or in arbitration. Id. at 9-10. Plaintiff

contends that he is not suing his Union for breach of its duty of representation and that the CBA

“does not explicitly contain language that strictly forbids [him] from seeking individual legal

recourse, under any circumstances against the Defendant in a court of law. Courts have allowed

CBA covered employees to seek individual recourse against a company in federal court.” Id. at

11. Plaintiff requests that, in lieu of dismissal, he be granted leave to amend his complaint to

correct any pleading deficiencies and/or that the Court compel arbitration. Id. at 12.

In reply, Defendant argues that nothing set out in Plaintiff’s response adequately rebuts its

arguments for dismissal. See Reply (Docket Entry No. 20).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In deciding a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must take all of the

factual allegations in the complaint as true, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and must

construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007).

Because Plaintiff in this case is litigating pro se, the Court is also required to view his pleadings

with some measure of a liberal construction. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972);

Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1991).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations,

accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. Thus, dismissal

is appropriate only if “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support

of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Guzman v. U.S. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., 679

F.3d 425, 429 (6th Cir. 2012). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court is not required to accept

summary allegations, legal conclusions, or unwarranted factual inferences. Mixon v. Ohio, 193

F.3d 389, 400 (6th Cir. 1999); Lillard v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th Cir. 1996).

The Court also cannot supply or assume facts that are not pled or create claims for a party that are

not pled. See Bell v. Tennessee, 2012 WL 996560 at *9 (E.D. Tenn. March 22, 2012) (quoting

Thompson v. A.J. Rose Mfg. Co., 208 F.3d 215 (6th Cir. 2000)).

In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court may consider the complaint and any

exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits

attached to a defendant’s motion to dismiss provided they are referred to in the Complaint and are

central to the claims. Bassett v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir.

2008).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff does not set out in his amended complaint a specific legal basis for his cause of

action. However, his claim against Defendant for implementing employment discipline in violation

of the CBA is essentially a claim that Defendant breached the CBA. To the extent that the claim

is asserted by Plaintiff as a state law claim, the claim is preempted by Section 301 of the Labor

Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), because the claim relies entirely upon

interpretation of the terms of the CBA. Section 301 provides that:

Suits for violations of contracts between an employer and a labor organization

representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ... may be brought in

any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties....

29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The law is well-settled that Section 301 requires federal preemption of claims

based on state law if those claims are inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of

the CBA. Baltrusaitis v. Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of

Am., 133 F.4th 678, 684-86 (6th Cir. 2025); Mattis v. Massman, 355 F.3d 902, 905 (6th Cir. 2004);

Smith v. Ameritech, 129 F.3d 857, 868 (6th Cir. 1997); DeCoe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 212,

216 (6th Cir. 1994); Jones v. Gen. Motors Corp., 939 F.2d 380, 382 (6th Cir. 1991); Smolarek v.

Chrysler Corp., 879 F.2d 1326, 1329 (6th Cir. 1989).

A preempted state law claim should either be dismissed as such or construed as a

claim brought under Section 301. See Allis- Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985)

(holding that a state law claim substantially dependent upon the terms of a labor agreement must

either be treated as a Section 301 claim or dismissed as preempted by federal labor-contract law);

Pridy v. Piedmont Nat. Gas Co., Inc., 458 F.Supp.3d 806, 825 (M.D. Tenn. 2020).

Even if the Court construes Plaintiff’s claim as being brought under Section 301, the end

result of dismissal is the same because the claim was not timely pursued by Plaintiff. Given the

clear merit of Defendant’s statute of limitations defense, to which Plaintiff fails to offer an actual

rebuttal, and given that it requires the dismissal of Plaintiff’s lawsuit in its entirety, the Court finds

it unnecessary to address any of Defendant’s alternative arguments for dismissal.

There is no express statute of limitations under Section 301. However, the Supreme Court

held in DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 461 U.S. 151 (1983), that the six-month

statute of limitations period of 29 U.S.C. § 160(b), which governs unfair labor practices before the

National Labor Relation Board, applies to Section 301 claims. 461 U.S. at 164-65. Although a

typical Section 301 claim is brought against both the employer and the union, the Supreme Court

in DelCostello noted that “it has long been established that an individual employee may bring suit

against his employer for breach of a collective bargaining agreement,” id. at 163, and the employee

may choose “to sue one defendant and not the other.” Id. at 165. See Saunders v. Ford Motor Co.,

879 F.3d 742, 750 (6th Cir. 2018). Regardless of who is named as a defendant, however, the six-

month filing period imposed by DelCostello for bringing a Section 301 claim applies. See Saunders

v. Ford Motor Co., 879 F.3d 742, 751 (6th Cir. 2018) (finding that claim for breach of collective

bargaining agreement against employer was subject to six month statute of limitations); Kurincic

v. Stein Inc., 30 F.App'x 420, 427 (6th Cir. 2002) (same); Herndon v. Atl. Auto. Components, 202

F.3d 268 (6th Cir. 1999) (Table Decision) (same); Sobolewski v. Ford Motor Co., 2024 WL

5224342, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 26, 2024) (“Disputes over a collective bargaining agreement have

a six-month statute of limitations period.”).

A Section 301 claim accrues for purposes of the running of the six-month limitation period

when an “employee discovers, or should have discovered with [the] exercise of due diligence, acts

giving rise to the cause of action.” Saunders, 879 F.3d at 751 (quoting Wilson v. Int'l Bhd. of

Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., AFL-CIO, 83 F.3d 747, 757 (6th Cir.

1996)). In the instant case, Plaintiff was clearly aware in 2022 of both the actions of Defendant

that allegedly violated the CBA and the failure of the Union to fully pursue his grievances and

arbitration. His lawsuit was not filed until nearly three years later, well beyond the applicable six-

month filing period established in DelCostello. Plaintiff’s lawsuit is simply untimely. Plaintiff

fails to offer any basis upon which to conclude otherwise and fails to set forth any basis to reject

Defendant’s statute of limitations defense. Accordingly, this action must be dismissed.

To the extent that Plaintiff requests that he be permitted under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 15 to amend his complaint in lieu of dismissal, the Court is unpersuaded by this entreaty.

First, Plaintiff has already availed himself of the opportunity to amend his complaint in the face

of Defendant’s previously filed motion to dismiss, which was denied without prejudice. See Order

entered September 12, 2025 (Docket Entry No. 12). Further, the Court will not consider Plaintiff’s

request to amend included in his Response as an actual motion to amend. Such a request must be

made through a properly supported motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), along

with a copy of the proposed amended complaint as required by Local Rule 15(a). Finally, the

Court fails to see any possible amendment that would cure the statute of limitations issue that

exists in this case and bars any path forward for Plaintiff.

R E C O M M E N D A T I O N

For the reasons set out above, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that the motion to

dismiss (Docket Entry No. 13) filed by Defendant Textron Aviation, Inc., be GRANTED and that

this lawsuit be DISMISSED as barred by the applicable statute of limitations.

ANY OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen

(14) days of service of this Report and Recommendation and must state with particularity the

specific portions of this Report and Recommendation to which objection is made. See Rule

72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 72.02(a). Failure to file written

objections within the specified time can be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal the District

Court's Order regarding the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). Any response to the objections

must be filed within fourteen (14) days after service of objections. See Federal Rule 72(b)(2) and

Local Rule 72.02(b).

Respectfully submitted,

United States Magistrate Judge