Scott

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

ANTHONY SCOTT, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

v. § No. 3:24-cv-3144-X (BT)

§

STATE OF TEXAS, et al., §

§

Defendants. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION

OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Anthony Scott filed this pro se civil action against the State of

Texas, Dallas County, Danielle Uher, Thomas A. D’Amore, and “unknown

others.” See Sec. Am. Compl. (ECF No. 12). The Court granted him leave to

proceed in forma pauperis and withheld service of process pending judicial

screening. Order (ECF No. 9). Now, for the reasons stated, the District Judge

should dismiss without prejudice Scott’s claims against the State of Texas and

dismiss with prejudice his remaining claims.

Background

As best the Court understands his pleadings, Scott alleges that he is a

disabled American Indian who was convicted by a state court that lacked

jurisdiction and that Defendants subjected him to solitary confinement and

prolonged his incarceration beyond his release date.1 See First Am. Compl. at 1–2

1 In 2009, Scott pleaded guilty to multiple drug-related charges in Dallas County

and was sentenced to four years’ incarceration to be served concurrently with a

(ECF No. 6); see also MJQ Resp. (ECF No. 11); Sec. Am. Compl. (ECF No. 12). He

allegedly suffered “treatment or non treatment” that resulted in permanent mental

harm—including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), schizoaffective disorder,

and bipolar disorder—as well as unspecified physical harm. First Am. Compl. at 2.

Such harm purportedly prevented Scott from obtaining gainful employment in

Texas, prompting him to move to Oklahoma. See id. at 1–2. Scott states that his

mental and physical condition has worsened following this move. Id. at 1. Scott

also claims that he suffered discrimination on account of his disabilities and that

Defendants violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and the

Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA). See Sec.

Am. Compl. at 2. Scott seeks $5 million in damages and “corrective medical

treatment.” First Am. Compl. at 1; Sec. Am. Compl. at 3.

Legal Standards and Analysis

A district court may summarily dismiss a complaint filed IFP if it concludes

the action is: (1) frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim on which relief may

be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and

prior sentence in the custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ).

See State of Tex. v. Scott, F-07-24183 (203rd Jud. Distr. Ct.); State of Tex. v. Scott,

F-08-40082 (203rd Jud. Distr. Ct.); State of Tex. v. Scott, F-09-23749 (203rd Jud.

Distr. Ct.).

must plead those facts with enough specificity “to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level[.]” Id. at 555. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662

(2009). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, the

plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

The Court liberally construes Scott’s pleadings as asserting claims under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, the ADA, the RFRA, and the RLUIPA. For the following reasons, the

District Judge should dismiss each of these claims.

I. Sovereign immunity bars Scott’s claims against the State of Texas.

“Absent waiver, the immunity of a state from suit as signified by, but not

fully expressed in, the Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional barrier.” Stramaski

v. Lawley, 44 F.4th 318, 321–22 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Corn v. Miss. Dep’t of Pub.

Safety, 954 F.3d 268, 374, 376 (5th Cir. 2020)). “ ‘Federal courts are without

jurisdiction over suits against a state, a state agency, or a state official in his official

capacity unless the state has waived its sovereign immunity or Congress has clearly

abrogated it.’ Texas has not consented by statute, and [42 U.S.C.] § 1983,” for

example, “does not abrogate state sovereign immunity.” NiGen Biotech, L.L.C. v.

Paxton, 804 F.3d 389, 393–94 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Moore v. La. Bd. of

Elementary & Secondary Educ., 743 F.3d 959, 963 (5th Cir. 2014)) (further

citation omitted).

Scott has identified no waiver or abrogation of sovereign immunity. His

contention that the State of Texas has waived its immunity is threadbare and

devoid of any support. See Sec. Am. Compl. at 2–3; see also Jennings v. Abbott,

538 F. Supp. 3d 682, 691 (N.D. Tex. 2021) (“The State of Texas has not waived its

sovereign immunity from section 1983 claims.”). Therefore, the District Judge

should dismiss Scott’s claims against the State for lack of jurisdiction.

II. Scott fails to state a claim for municipal liability against Dallas

County.

To establish a claim for municipal liability under § 1983, “a plaintiff must

show the deprivation of a federally protected right caused by action taken

‘pursuant to an official municipal policy.’ ” Valle v. City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536,

541 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)).

“A plaintiff must identify: ‘(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a

policymaker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a

constitutional violation whose ‘moving force’ is that policy or custom.’ ” Id. at 541–

42 (citing Pineda v. City of Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002)) (further

citation omitted).

The Magistrate Judge’s Questionnaire (MJQ) asked Scott to identify the

official policy or custom of Dallas County pursuant to which his rights were

allegedly violated. MJQ at 5. Scott responded that “Dallas County records SHOWS

[sic.] a policy or custom of actual or constructive knowledge and a number of

constitutional violations whose ‘moving’ force is one or more of those

policy/custom [sic.], going back to 1864.” Resp. at 1. Scott did not submit or

otherwise identify any such records. His conclusory allegation is insufficient to

state a claim for municipal liability. See Nieman v. City of Dallas, 2015 WL

5076784, at *7 (N.D. Tex. July 21, 2015), rec. adopted, 2015 WL 5089580 (N.D.

Tex. Aug. 27, 2015) (dismissing § 1983 claims against municipality where plaintiff

provided only conclusory allegations that the municipality was on notice of a policy

or custom causing the deprivation of constitutional rights).

Scott fails to plead the existence of a policy, custom, or action by a final

policymaker. Thus, the District Judge should dismiss Scott’s claims against Dallas

County.

III. Scott fails to state a claim against D’Amore or Uher.

Scott’s pleadings identify Thomas D’Amore and Danielle Uher as

Defendants, but he does not explain how either individual violated his rights or

could be liable to him. Scott’s pleadings do not include specific allegations against

D’Amore or Uher. To the extent Scott intends to sue D’Amore or Uher under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, such a claim may be brought only against a person acting under

color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Scott does not allege that

D’Amore and Uher are state actors. Thus, the District Judge should dismiss Scott’s

claims against D’Amore and Uher.

IV. Scott otherwise fails to state a claim for relief.

A. Due Process

Scott states that Defendants kept him confined past his release date despite

court orders requiring that he be released. Sec. Am. Compl. at 1–2.

Custodial officials have a duty to release their inmates in a timely

manner. Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 445 (5th Cir.2011). Holding

a prisoner beyond his release date “constitutes a deprivation of due

process.” Id. (citing Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527, 532 (5th Cir.1980)). Prison

officials can be held liable if they maintain a record keeping system in which time

calculation errors are likely. Id. (citing Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d 1210, 1215 (5th

Cir.1976)). But prison custodians are entitled to qualified immunity and will only

be held liable if their conduct is objectively unreasonable and it is shown that they

have been deliberately indifferent to the inmate’s right to be

released. Id. Inadvertent clerical oversights and errors beyond the official’s control

are not actionable violations. Id.

Scott provides no support for his conclusory allegation that prison officials

kept him confined past his release date—or the identities of prison officials

responsible for such a decision. The District Judge should dismiss Scott’s due

process claims. See Gibson v. Thaler, 2011 WL 867055, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 10,

2011) (noting that a court had previously dismissed claim that prison officials kept

the plaintiff incarcerated past his release date where the claim was “factually

baseless”); see id. (dismissing claim that prisoner was confined beyond his release

date where the plaintiff “failed to identify a defendant who has any direct

connection to his confinement”).

B. Eighth Amendment

Scott also alleges that Defendants caused him harm by keeping him in

solitary confinement. See Sec. Am. Compl. at 1–2. The Court construes Scott’s

allegations as asserting a claim under the Eighth Amendment for cruel and

unusual punishment.

The Fifth Circuit has held that “absent extraordinary circumstances,

administrative segregation as such, being an incident to the ordinary life as a

prisoner, will never be grounds for a constitutional claim.” Hernandez v.

Velasquez, 522 F.3d 556, 562 (5th Cir. 2008). And the Supreme Court has

explained that, while placement in solitary confinement for

an indeterminate amount of time may amount to cruel and unusual punishment,

a determinate time in segregation—where the conditions are not materially

different from those affecting other prisoners—are within the authority of the

prison administrator and not cruel or unusual. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678,

686 (1978).

Cases in which segregated confinement is atypical enough to implicate a due

process liberty interest involve circumstances much harsher than those presented

here. In Wilkerson v. Stalder, the Fifth Circuit held that due process might have

been violated when the plaintiff had been kept on lockdown status for thirty

years. Wilkerson v. Stalder, 329 F.3d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 2003) (remanding for

determination whether such confinement was “atypical” under Sandin v.

Conner, 515 U.S. 472, (1995)). Scott’s assignment to solitary confinement for less

than a year is not the equivalent of the thirty years in administrative segregation

like the plaintiff in Wilkerson.

Scott has not alleged that the conditions of his solitary confinement posed a

significant or atypical hardship. Thus, Scott has failed to state a claim under the

Eighth Amendment.

C. ADA

The ADA prohibits discrimination against individuals with a qualifying

disability. Kemp v. Holder, 610 F.3d 231, 234 (5th Cir. 2010). To state a claim

under the ADA, a plaintiff must show, among other things, that he is “disabled

within the meaning of the ADA.” Kemp, 610 F.3d at 235 (citing Talk v. Delta

Airlines, Inc., 165 F.3d 1021, 1024 (5th Cir. 1999)). Under the ADA, a “disability”

is defined as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or

more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or

(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. §

12102(1)). The term “major life activities” includes “caring for oneself, performing

manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending,

speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating,

and working.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)).

Scott generally alleges that he has a “disability.” See Compl. at 4; Sec. Am.

Compl. at 2. However, Scott fails to state what his disability is or otherwise explain

how he is disabled. He also fails to provide any facts suggesting he is substantially

limited in one or more major life activities. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(1)).

When asked to provide this information in response to the MJQ, Scott merely

submitted a conclusory and nonsensical statement that failed to establish the

elements for a claim under the ADA:

Defendants KNEW of competency, and harm caused by solitary

confinement Failed to prevent prosecutor from entering before Grand

Jury that had taken an oath AS employees of the Court, voiding their

indictment. A CLEAR ADA violation.

Resp. at 2. Scott has failed to state a claim under the ADA.

D.RFRA and RLUIPA

Scott also states, without more, that Defendants violated his rights under

RFRA and RLUIPA. See Sec. Am. Compl. at 2. But Scott has not stated a viable

claim under either statute.

Initially, the Court observes that RFRA only applies to federal government

actors. See Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly Springs, 697 F.3d 279, 289 (5th

Cir. 2012) (citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532–36 (1997); A. A. ex

rel. Betenbaugh v. Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 611 F.3d 248, 258–59 (5th Cir.

2010)). Scott does not plead any facts suggesting Defendants are federal actors. On

this basis alone, the District Judge should dismiss

Scott’s RFRA claim. See, e.g., Witherspoon v. Waybourn, 2021 WL 2635917, at

*10 (N.D. Tex. June 25, 2021) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss

prisoner’s RFRA claim because defendant was “not a federal actor and,

therefore, RFRA [did] not apply”); Guillory v. Jones Cnty. Jail, 2014 WL 5847536,

at *2 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 12, 2014) (concluding prisoner failed to state a RFRA claim

against sheriff, who was a state actor).

Construing Scott’s claim as one under the Texas Religious Freedom

Restoration Act (TRFRA) fares no better. TRFRA prohibits a governmental

regulation from substantially burdening a person’s religious free exercise unless

the regulation “is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and

employs the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. Tex. Civ. Prac. &

Rem. Code Ann. § 110.003(a)–(b). Similarly, “RLUIPA requires that prison

officials refrain from (1) substantially burdening an inmate’s free exercise of his

religion unless, when strictly scrutinized, (2) the burden ‘is in furtherance of a

compelling governmental interest’ and ‘is the least restrictive means of furthering

that compelling interest.’ ” Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Tex., 560 F.3d 316, 331

(5th Cir. 2009) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–1(a) (2006)).

Under TRFRA and RLUIPA, however, a plaintiff may not pursue a claim

against a defendant in his individual capacity, nor may he successfully bring an

official capacity claim against a defendant for money damages because such a claim

is barred under the Eleventh Amendment. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §

110.005(d) (“A person may not bring an action for damages or declaratory or

injunctive relief against an individual. . . .”); Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 331 (holding

that “RLUIPA does not create a cause of action against defendants in their

individual capacities” and any award of damages against defendants in their

official capacities “is barred by Texas’s sovereign immunity”); see, e.g., McCreary

v. Richardson, 738 F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“An inmate is not

entitled to monetary damages under RLUIPA for a suit brought against a

correctional officer in his individual capacity.”); DeMoss v. Crain, 636 F.3d 145,

151 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (“RLUIPA does not create a cause of action for

damages against ‘Texas and the defendants in their official capacities,’ nor does it

create a ‘cause of action against defendants in their individual capacities.’ ”)

(quoting Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 331 & n.51) (footnote omitted)); Wagner v. Tex.

Dep’t of Crim. Just., 2018 WL 7133701, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 16,

2018) (recommending dismissal of prisoner’s TRFRA claim against defendant in

his official capacity for money damages because such claim is barred by the

Eleventh Amendment); McKennie v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 2011 WL 13237553,

at *3 (W.D. Tex. May 24, 2011) (dismissing prisoner’s TRFRA claim against

defendant in official capacity where “the State of Texas [was] the real party in

interest, and the Eleventh Amendment bar[red] the Court from exercising subject-

matter jurisdiction over [prisoner’s] TRFRA claims”).

Here, Scott seeks $5 million in damages. See Sec. Am. Compl. at 2. He does

so against named defendants—whom he does not allege are employed at any TDCJ

facility—and “unknown others.” Id. at 1. The Court interprets these “unknown

others” to be officials employed at TDCJ facilities. Because Scott cannot pursue a

TRFRA or RLUIPA claim against these Defendants for money damages in their

individual or official capacities, the District Judge should dismiss such claims.

V. Scott fails to state a claim against unnamed Defendants residing

in Oklahoma and California.

Scott suggests that he has been harmed by employees of the Oklahoma

Department of Corrections—and potentially someone in Pelican Bay, California.

See Sec. Am. Compl. at 2. To the extent that Scott wishes to raise these claims in

this proceeding, Scott has failed to explain how these individuals are connected to

his incarceration in Texas or could be liable to him under any legal theory.

Leave to Amend

“Rule 15 is a liberal standard that favors leave, but that preference has no

purchase when amendment cannot cure the defect.” Ellsworth v. Dallas Tex. Dep’t

of Veteran Affs., --- F.4th ---, 2025 WL 3239806, at *5 (5th Cir. Nov. 20, 2025)

(O’Connor); see also Sanders v. Deluxe, 2025 WL 3491013, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Nov.

14, 2025) (Rutherford, J.), rec. adopted, 2025 WL 3488340 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 4,

2025) (“Ordinarily, a pro se plaintiff should be granted the opportunity to amend

her complaint prior to a dismissal.”). Indeed, leave to amend is not required when

plaintiff have already pleaded their “best case.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764,

767–68 (5th Cir. 2009).

Scott has filed three complaints and responded to an MJQ. “A

verified questionnaire response allows a plaintiff to plead his or her best case and

is a valid way for a pro se litigant to amend his complaint.” Merchant v. Garland

Police Dep’t, 2022 WL 1158262, at *7 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2022), rec.

accepted 2022 WL 1158005 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2022) (citing Nixon v. Abbott, 589

F. App’x 279 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam)). Thus, Scott has had ample opportunity

to plead his best case and further leave to amend is not necessary or warranted.

Recommendation

The Court lacks jurisdiction over Scott’s claims against the State of Texas,

and the District Judge should dismiss those claims without prejudice. The District

Judge should dismiss with prejudice the rest of Scott’s claims under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

SO RECOMMENDED.

January 26, 2026

REBECCA om

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of this report and recommendation will be served on all parties in the

manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of this report and

recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being

served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(4); FED. R. Civ. P. 72(b). To be specific,

an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which

objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation where the disputed determination

is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the

briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written

objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal

conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district

court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Auto.

Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

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