“The district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Ferry’s petition insofar as it challenged the DHS’s administrative order of removal.”
How later courts described this case
- “The district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Ferry’s petition insofar as it challenged the DHS’s administrative order of removal.”
- “The Rules Governing 2254 Cases may be applied 1198, 1205 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that a federal court possesses “the discretion . . . to dismiss the 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition if it appear[s] that the petitioner was not entitled to relief”
- “An actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.” (quoting Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975))
- “The Real ID Act eliminates a district court’s jurisdiction over habeas petitions challenging final orders of removal.” (internal quotation marks omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
JOHN MICHAEL HEAD, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-25-1529-R
)
SCARLET GRANT et al., )
)
Respondents. )
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pro se Petitioner John Michael Head, an immigration detainee under an
order of removal seeks habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc.1.1
United States District Judge David L. Russell referred the matter to the
undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Doc. 5. Because Petitioner is no longer in custody and this
Court can grant no relief to Petitioner, the undersigned recommends the Court
dismiss the petition and deny the outstanding motions as moot.
I. Petitioner’s claims.
Petitioner states in his petition that an Immigration Judge (IJ) entered
a final order of removal against him on October 6, 2006. Doc. 1, at 1 & Att. 1;
1 Citations to a court document are to its electronic case filing designation
and pagination. Except for capitalization, quotations are verbatim unless
otherwise indicated.
Doc. 2. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) then released him on an
Order of Supervision (OOS). Doc. 1, at 7 (seeking immediate release on his
“previous order of supervision”). “ICE rearrested and redetain[ed]” him on
June 12, 2025. Id.
In four grounds for relief, Petitioner complains ICE is violating his due
process rights and its own regulations by keeping him in “prolonged detention”
without a bond or custody review hearing, and by re-detaining him without
prior notice or a change in his circumstances of release. Id. at 6-7. He requests
this Court order his immediate release on his previous OOS, order a custody
review “in front of a neutral decisionmaker,” restrain Respondents from
transferring him to another facility during the pendency of this action, and
declare there is no significant likelihood that ICE can remove him in the
reasonably foreseeable future. Id. at 7.
II. Respondents’ response and notices to the Court.
Respondents filed a response to the petition. Doc. 10. They noted that
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Brazil who entered the United States as a
legal permanent resident in 1982. Id. at 1-2. After several criminal convictions,
ICE placed Petitioner in removal proceedings and an IJ ordered his removal in
2006. Id. at 2. Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) was unable to
remove Petitioner to Brazil, so they released him on an OOS in January 2008.
Id. at 2-3.
In May 2024, Petitioner completed a travel document and ERO sent it to
the Brazilian consulate in Houston, Texas for approval. Id. at 3. Petitioner
moved to reopen his removal proceedings in June 2024, which the immigration
court denied in August 2024. Id. Respondents state petitioner appealed this
denial, and the appeal is “currently pending.” Id.
ICE detained Petitioner at his check-in appointment on June 12, 2025,
and issued a “Warrant of Removal/Deportation.” Id. Pending his removal, ICE
detained Petitioner at the Cimarron Correctional Facility in Cushing,
Oklahoma. Doc. 1, at 1. In August 2025, Petitioner filed a motion to stay
removal in the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) “which is currently
pending.” Id.2
On December 10, 2025, ERO sent a travel document request to the
Brazilian consulate in Houston. Id. At the time of the response on January 6,
2026, ERO was still facilitating Petitioner’s removal to Brazil. Id. However, on
January 12, 2026, Respondents filed a notice that they had scheduled
2 A review of Petitioner’s BIA case information shows no pending hearings
or appeals in the matter. See https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation
(A026-531-956) (last visited Mar. 4, 2026).
Petitioner to be moved “from [the Cimarron Correctional facility] in order to
execute his removal to Brazil after the expiration of 72 hours.” Doc. 11.3
On February 2, 2026, the undersigned ordered Respondents to update
the Court on Petitioner’s whereabouts. Doc. 14. Respondents filed a notice on
February 12, 2026, stating that “Petitioner had been scheduled for removal.”
Doc. 18. Respondents moved Petitioner to the Pine Prairie Processing Center
in Louisiana on February 9, 2026, and were removing him to Brazil on
February 25, 2026. Id. The undersigned’s check of the ICE detainee locator for
Petitioner yielded no results as Petitioner is no longer in the system. See
https://locator.ice.gov/odls/#/results (last visited Mar. 4, 2026).
III. Screening.
This Court must review a habeas petition and dismiss it “[i]f it plainly
appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not
entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases in the United States District Courts;4 see also Garza v. Davis, 596 F.3d
3 In its initial order for response to the petition, the undersigned ordered
Respondents to provide the Court with at least 72-hours “advance notice” of
their intent to move Petitioner. See Doc. 6, at 2. Petitioner objected to
Respondents’ notice stating he had no knowledge of the issuance of any travel
document to Brazil. Doc. 12, at 2.
4 The Court may apply the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases to habeas
petitions arising under § 2241. See Rule 1(b); Whitmore v. Parker, 484 F. App’x
227, 231 n.2 (10th Cir. 2012) (“The Rules Governing 2254 Cases may be applied
1198, 1205 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that a federal court possesses “the
discretion . . . to dismiss the 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition if it appear[s] that the
petitioner was not entitled to relief”). Having screened the petition, the
undersigned recommends the Court dismiss the petition as moot.
IV. The petition is moot because Petitioner is no longer in custody.
“The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless . . . he is
in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “[T]he ‘in custody’ requirement of § 2241 is
satisfied” if a petitioner files the habeas application while they are
incarcerated. King v. Ciolli, 2024 WL 1179908, at *2 (10th Cir. Mar. 19, 2024)
(citing Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998), & Riles v. INS, 310 F.3d 1253,
1256 (10th Cir. 2002)).
A § 2241 petition must be filed in the district where the prisoner is
confined. Brace v. United States, 634 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 2011).
“[J]urisdiction attaches on the initial filing for habeas corpus relief, and it is
not destroyed by a transfer of the petitioner and the accompanying custodial
change.” Santillanes v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 754 F.2d 887, 888 (10th Cir. 1985);
cf. Rumsfield v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 442 (2004).
discretionarily to habeas petitions under § 2241.” (citing Boutwell v. Keating,
399 F.3d 1203, 1211 n.2 (10th Cir. 2005))).
Petitioner was confined in this district when he filed his § 2241 petition.
See Doc. 1, at 1. But he is no longer in custody as Respondents have removed
him to his home country of Brazil. See Doc 18. Although this Court’s
jurisdiction attached when Petitioner filed his habeas corpus petition, his
release from custody renders his petition moot.
Under Article III of the Constitution, federal courts may only adjudicate
live controversies. See Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 92 (2009) (“An actual
controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the
complaint is filed.” (quoting Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975))). A
case becomes moot “if an event occurs while a case is pending . . . that makes
it impossible for the court to grant ‘any effectual relief whatever’ to a prevailing
party . . . .” Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992)
(quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)).
“Mootness . . . is a fundamental bar to judicial review that must be
accounted for at all stages of a proceeding, and applies in habeas as in any
other type of litigation.” Miller v. Glanz, 331 F. App’x 608, 610 (10th Cir. 2009).
A habeas petition does not become moot merely because a petitioner is no
longer in custody. Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether the petitioner is
subject to collateral consequences “adequate to meet Article III’s injury-in-fact
requirement.” King, 2024 WL 1179908, at *2 (quoting Spencer, 523 U.S. at 14).
Once Respondents released Petitioner from their custody, he no longer
had a redressable injury arising from his “prolonged” detention. See id.
(holding that a “petitioner must demonstrate some concrete and continuing
injury” to overcome mootness after release from custody (quoting Spencer, 523
U.S. at 7)). So the best this Court could do would be to declare he was
wrongfully in custody in the first place. But that determination and
Petitioner’s request for the Court to either stay or prevent Respondents from
executing the removal order, is wholly outside this Court’s jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Olola v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 2018 WL 11446899, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 7, 2018)
(“Applicant may not use a § 2241 habeas application challenging the
lawfulness of federal custody to seek review of an order of removal in federal
district court. . . . The courts of appeals are the sole and exclusive means for
judicial review of challenges to removal orders, and district courts are divested
of jurisdiction to do so.” (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5)); see also Ferry v. Gonzales,
457 F.3d 1117, 1131 (10th Cir. 2006) (“The district court lacked jurisdiction to
consider Ferry’s petition insofar as it challenged the DHS’s administrative
order of removal.”); Essuman v. Gonzales, 203 F. App’x 204, 211 (10th Cir.
2006) (“The Real ID Act eliminates a district court’s jurisdiction over habeas
petitions challenging final orders of removal.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(5); (b)(8)(C); (b)(9). So the Court should dismiss
the petition as moot.
V. Recommendation and notice of right to object.
Petitioner’s release from custody and removal to Brazil renders his
petition moot because there is no live case or controversy for this Court to
decide. The undersigned therefore recommends the Court dismiss the habeas
corpus petition as moot. Doc. 1. The undersigned also recommends the Court
deny as moot Petitioner’s motions to expedite. Docs. 15, 17.
The undersigned advises the parties of their right to file an objection to
this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of Court on or before March
18, 2026, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The
undersigned further advises the parties that failure to file a timely objection
to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate review of
both factual and legal issues contained herein. See Moore v. United States, 950
F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues and terminates
the referral to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the captioned matter.
ENTERED this 4th day of March, 2026.
hea Ler _
SUZANNE MITCHELL
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE