Wilson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MICHAELA W.,1

Plaintiff,

v. 23-CV-782-LJV

DECISION & ORDER

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant.

On August 3, 2023, the plaintiff, Michaela W. (“Michaela”), brought this action

under the Social Security Act (“the Act”). Docket Item 1. She seeks review of the

determination by the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) that she was

not disabled.2 Id. On December 8, 2023, Michaela moved for judgment on the

pleadings, Docket Item 8; on February 2, 2024, the Commissioner responded and

cross-moved for judgment on the pleadings, Docket Item 12; and on February 16, 2024,

Michaela replied, Docket Item 13.

1 To protect the privacy interests of Social Security litigants while maintaining

public access to judicial records, this Court will identify any non-government party in

cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) only by first name and last initial. Standing Order,

Identification of Non-Government Parties in Social Security Opinions (W.D.N.Y. Nov.

18, 2020).

2 Michaela applied for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”), which is paid to a

person with a disability who also demonstrates financial need. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a).

For the reasons that follow, this Court denies Michaela’s motion and grants the

Commissioner’s cross motion.3

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“The scope of review of a disability determination . . . involves two levels of

inquiry.” Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 985 (2d Cir. 1987). The court “must first

decide whether [the Commissioner] applied the correct legal principles in making the

determination.” Id. This includes ensuring “that the claimant has had a full hearing

under the . . . regulations and in accordance with the beneficent purposes of the Social

Security Act.” Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (citation modified)

(quoting Cruz v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1990)). Then, the court “decide[s]

whether the determination is supported by ‘substantial evidence.’” Johnson, 817 F.2d at

985 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)).

“Substantial evidence” means “more than a mere scintilla. It means such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison

Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). “The substantial evidence standard means

once an ALJ finds facts, [the court] can reject those facts only if a reasonable fact finder

would have to conclude otherwise.” Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443,

448 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation modified) (emphasis in original); see McIntyre v. Colvin, 758

F.3d 146, 149 (2d Cir. 2014) (“If evidence is susceptible to more than one rational

3 This Court assumes familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history,

and the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) and refers only to the facts

necessary to explain its decision.

interpretation, the Commissioner’s conclusion must be upheld.”). But “[w]here there is a

reasonable basis for doubt whether the ALJ applied correct legal principles, application

of the substantial evidence standard to uphold a finding of no disability creates an

unacceptable risk that a claimant will be deprived of the right to have her disability

determination made according to the correct legal principles.” Johnson, 817 F.2d at

986.

DISCUSSION

I. THE ALJ’S DECISION

On May 31, 2022, the ALJ found that Michaela had not been under a disability

since August 13, 2020, the date her application was filed. See Docket Item 5 at 30–31.

The ALJ’s decision was based on the five-step sequential evaluation process under 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a) and 416.920(a). See id. at 20–21.

At step one, the ALJ found that Michaela had not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since the date her application was filed. Id. at 21. At step two, the ALJ found

that Michaela suffered from two severe, medically determinable impairments: “learning

disorder/neurodevelopmental disorder and anxiety disorder.” Id. at 22.

At step three, the ALJ found that Michaela’s severe, medically determinable

impairments did not meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R.

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. See id. More specifically, the ALJ found that

Michaela’s impairments did not meet or medically equal listing 12.06 (anxiety and

obsessive-compulsive disorders) or 12.11 (neurodevelopmental disorders). Id. In

assessing Michaela’s mental impairments, the ALJ found that Michaela was mildly

limited in adapting or managing herself and moderately limited in understanding,

remembering, or applying information; interacting with others; and concentrating,

persisting, or maintaining pace. Id. at 22–23.

The ALJ then found that Michaela had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”)4

to “perform work a full range of work at all exertional levels” except that:

[Michaela] can understand, remember, and carry out simple[,]

routine instructions and tasks; she can maintain attention and

concentration and regular attendance at work for simple[,] routine

work; but she cannot make independent decision[s] or set her own

goals, nor can she perform strict production quotas as with assembly

line work. She is limited to minimal changes in work routine and

processes, and occasional interaction with supervisors, co-workers,

and the general public. Finally, she cannot do team or tandem work.

Id. at 23.

At step four, the ALJ found that Michaela had no past relevant work. Id. at 29.

But given Michaela’s age, education, and RFC, the ALJ found at step five that Michaela

could perform substantial gainful activity as a cleaner, laundry worker, or kitchen helper.

Id. at 29–30; see Dictionary of Occupational Titles 323.687-0914, 1991 WL 672783

(Jan. 1, 2016); id. at 361.684-014, 1991 WL 672983 (Jan. 1, 2016); id. at 318.687-010,

1991 WL 672755 (Jan. 1, 2016). The ALJ therefore found that Michaela had not been

under a disability since the date her application was filed. See Docket Item 5 at 30.

II. ALLEGATIONS

Michaela raises one argument: that the ALJ failed to account for limitations in the

opinions of D. Brown, Psy.D.; L. Dekeon, Psy.D.; and Todd Deneen, Psy.D.—opinions

4 A claimant’s RFC is the most “an individual can still do despite his or her

limitations . . . in an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing basis.” SSR 96-

8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *2 (July 2, 1996). “A ‘regular and continuing basis’ means 8

hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule.” Id.; see Melville v.

Apfel, 198 F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1999).

that the ALJ found at least somewhat “persuasive.” See Docket Item 8-1 at 11–16. For

the reasons that follow, this Court disagrees.

III. ANALYSIS

An ALJ must “weigh all of the evidence available to make an RFC finding that [is]

consistent with the record as a whole.” Matta v. Astrue, 508 F. App’x 53, 56 (2d Cir.

2013); accord Schillo v. Kijakazi, 31 F.4th 64, 78 (2d Cir. 2022). But that does not mean

that an RFC must “perfectly correspond with any of the opinions of medical sources

cited in [an ALJ’s] decision,” Matta, 508 F. App’x at 56, or even be based on opinion

evidence, see Rubin v. Martin O’Malley, Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 116 F.4th 145, 155 (2d

Cir. 2024). So long as an ALJ considers all the medical evidence and appropriately

analyzes any medical opinions, an RFC consistent with the record is not error. See 20

C.F.R. § 416.945; Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that

remand is not necessary “[w]here an ALJ’s analysis at Step Four regarding a claimant’s

functional limitations and restrictions affords an adequate basis for meaningful judicial

review, applies the proper legal standards, and is supported by substantial evidence”).

On December 21, 2020, Dr. Deneen completed a psychiatric evaluation of

Michaela. See Docket Item 5 at 303–06. He opined that Michaela had no limitations in

using judgment to make decisions; interacting appropriately with others; sustaining a

routine and regular attendance; maintaining hygiene and dressing appropriately; and

being aware of normal hazards and taking appropriate precautions. Id. at 305. He also

found that Michaela had only mild limitations in understanding, remembering, and

applying simple instructions and in regulating emotions, controlling behavior, and

maintaining well-being. Id. On the other hand, Dr. Deneen found Michaela to be

moderately limited in understanding, remembering, and applying complex instructions

and in sustaining concentration and performing at a consistent pace. Id. He concluded

that “[t]he results of the examination appear[ed] to be consistent with psychiatric and

cognitive problems” but that those problems “d[id] not appear to be significant enough to

interfere with [Michaela’s] ability to function on a daily basis.” Id. at 306.

On February 12, 2021, Dr. Brown completed a mental RFC assessment. See

Docket Item 5 at 70–80. Dr. Brown opined that Michaela was “[n]ot significantly limited”

in understanding, remembering, and carrying out short and simple instructions; working

within a schedule and maintaining regular attendance; making simple, work-related

decisions; interacting appropriately with coworkers; and responding appropriately to

changes in the workplace. Id. at 75–77. But Dr. Brown found that Michaela had

moderate limitations in understanding and remembering detailed instructions;

maintaining attention and concentration for extended periods; sustaining an ordinary

routine without special supervision; working with others without being distracted;

performing at a consistent pace; interacting appropriately with the general public; and

making plans independently of others. Id. at 75–78. And Dr. Brown found Micheala to

be markedly limited in carrying out detailed instructions. Id. at 75. Dr. Brown concluded

that, “[g]iven [Micheala’s] psychiatric[] impairments[,] she should be capable of

performing simple[,] low public contact work.” Id. at 72.

Dr. Dekeon later reviewed the record and affirmed Dr. Brown’s findings. See id.

at 88–89.

The ALJ found Dr. Brown’s opinion and Dr. Dekeon’s opinion to be persuasive,

and he found Dr. Deneen’s opinion to be partially persuasive. See id. at 27–28. More

specifically, the ALJ discounted Dr. Deneen’s opinion insofar as Dr. Deneen found

Michaela less limited than Drs. Brown and Dekeon opined. See id. at 28. Michaela

argues that in light of those “persuasive” opinions, the ALJ erred by not including

restrictions in the RFC addressing their moderate limitations—that is, in “maintain[ing]

attention and concentration for extended periods, sustain[ing] an ordinary routine

without interruptions . . ., and perform[ing] at a consistent pace without an unreasonable

number and length of rest periods.” Docket Item 8-1 at 14–15. But that argument is

factually incorrect.

To begin, the RFC restricted Michaela to “simple[,] routine work” involving only

“simple[,] routine instructions and tasks” and with “minimal changes in work routine and

processes.” Docket Item 5 at 23. Courts in this Circuit repeatedly have found such

restrictions sufficient to account for moderate limitations like those that Drs. Deneen,

Brown, and Dekeon found. See, e.g., Karl E. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2025 WL

3003714, at *5 n.5 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2025) (“[T]he ALJ limited [the p]laintiff to ‘simple

tasks,’ which accounts for [the p]laintiff’s moderate difficulty in concentrating, persisting,

or maintaining pace.”); Arthur M. v. Saul, 2021 WL 2309884, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. June 7,

2021) (“[T]he restrictions imposed by the RFC, including that [the] plaintiff can perform

only simple and routine tasks . . . are sufficient to account for [the] plaintiff’s moderate

limitations with regard to completing a normal workday or workweek without interruption

as well as performing at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length

of rest periods.”); see also Denise Marie T.-W. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2024 WL

4162490, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2024) (“Moderate limitations in some or all areas of

mental functioning may be accounted for in an RFC by limiting a plaintiff to simple,

routine work . . . .”). So the limitations incorporated in the RFC—that Michaela could

perform only “simple, routine work” and complete only “simple[,] routine instructions and

tasks”—accounted for the limitations in Drs. Deneen, Brown, and Dekeon’s opinions.

See Docket Item 5 at 23.

What is more, and as noted above, Dr. Deneen explicitly found that Michaela’s

mental health issues “d[id] not appear to be significant enough to interfere with

[Michaela’s] ability to function on a daily basis.” Id. at 306. And Drs. Brown and

Dekeon agreed that notwithstanding Michaela’s impairments, she could perform

“simple, low public contact work.” See id. at 72 (Dr. Brown), 88–89 (Dr. Dekeon). The

RFC’s limitation to “simple[,] routine work” and only “occasional interaction with

supervisors, co-workers, and the general public” was therefore more than sufficient to

account for Michaela’s mental health issues. See id. at 23.

In fact, while Dr. Deneen opined that Michaela was not limited in interacting with

others, see id. at 305, the ALJ accepted the opinions of Dr. Brown and Dr. Dekeon that

she had moderate limitations in that domain, see id. at 28. Consistent with that

conclusion, the RFC limited Michaela to only “occasional interaction with supervisors,

co-workers, and the general public” and to no “team or tandem work.” See id. at 23. In

other words, the ALJ agreed with the most restrictive limitations about which the doctors

opined, and the RFC included restrictions addressing those limitations. That certainly

was not error.

Michaela also argues that the ALJ erred by failing to explain how the RFC

accounted for the limitations about which Drs. Deneen, Brown, and Dekeon opined.

See Docket Item 8-1 at 13. But “[a]n ALJ does not have to state on the record every

reason justifying a decision,” Valdez-Ocasio v. Kijakazi, 2023 WL 3573761, at *1 (2d

Cir. May 22, 2023) (quoting Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d

Cir. 2012)); rather, so long as an ALJ’s decision provides “an adequate basis for

meaningful judicial review . . . and is supported by substantial evidence,” there is no

error, Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013). And that is precisely the

case here.

In sum, the ALJ crafted an RFC that was consistent with the opinions of Drs.

Deneen, Brown, and Dekeon and with the medical evidence in the record. Indeed, the

ALJ addressed the most severe limitations in those opinions and explicitly accounted for

them in the RFC. Because the ALJ was “entitled to weigh all of the evidence available

to make an RFC finding that was consistent with the record as a whole,” Matta v.

Astrue, 508 F. App’x 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2013), and because the ALJ did just that, his

decision was supported by substantial evidence. This Court will not second-guess it.

See Genier v. Astrue, 606 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2010).

CONCLUSION

The ALJ’s decision was not contrary to the substantial evidence in the record, nor

did it result from any legal error. Therefore, and for the reasons stated above,

Michaela’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, Docket Item 8, is DENIED, and the

Commissioner’s cross motion for judgment on the pleadings, Docket Item 12, is

GRANTED. The complaint is DISMISSED, and the Clerk of Court shall close the file.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: April 15, 2026

Buffalo, New York

/s/ Lawrence J. Vilardo

LAWRENCE J. VILARDO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE