Opinion

Opinion

Court
District Court, M.D. Florida
Filed
Feb 6, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 40.2%

“[P]arents who are not attorneys may not bring a pro se action on their child’s behalf. . . .”

How later courts described this case

  • “[P]arents who are not attorneys may not bring a pro se action on their child’s behalf. . . .”
  • “[T]he IDEA guarantees individually tailored educational services, while Title II and § 504 promise non-discriminatory access to public institutions.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

RAFAEL CAMACHO, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 8:25-cv-03355-JLB-NHA

THE SCHOOL BOARD OF

PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA,

Defendant.

/

ORDER

Proceeding pro se, Plaintiff Rafael Camacho, Jr. filed a Complaint bringing

several claims against Defendant School Board of Pinellas County (“SBPC”) on

behalf of his minor son, R.J.C, including: (I) a substantive due process violation

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (II) a procedural due process violation pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983; (III) a disability-based discrimination under Title II and Section

504;1 (IV) a municipal liability claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (V) for

injunctive and declaratory relief. (Doc. 9). The same day, Plaintiff filed a Motion

for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunctive Relief (Doc. 10). The

Court declined to issue a temporary restraining order but reserved ruling on the

motion for preliminary injunction (Doc. 15).

Before the Court now is SBPC’s Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion

1 The Court construes Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim as a claim under Individuals

with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). (Doc. 16 at 1); see Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs.,

580 U.S. 154, 170–71 (2017) (“[T]he IDEA guarantees individually tailored educational

services, while Title II and § 504 promise non-discriminatory access to public institutions.”).

for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 24) and Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint

(Doc. 25). Defendant’s Response and Motion to Dismiss challenge whether

Plaintiff’s Complaint is properly before this Court. Accordingly, Plaintiff is

DIRECTED to respond to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss on or before February 20,

2026.

As a preliminary matter, the Court reminds Plaintiff that he cannot bring

claims on behalf of his minor child without an attorney. (See Doc. 16 at 1–2); Devine

v. Indian River Cnty. Sch. Bd., 121 F.3d 576, 582 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[P]arents who

are not attorneys may not bring a pro se action on their child’s behalf. . . .”),

overruled in part on other grounds by Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City

Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007). Though there is an exception allowing parents to

represent a minor child pro se for IDEA claims, there is no such exception for

Plaintiff’s remaining claims. (See Doc. 16 at 1–2) (citing Winkelman, 550 U.S. at

533). Thus, Plaintiff must obtain counsel on or before April 10, 2026, to pursue

Counts I, II, IV, and V.2 (See id.).

That said, upon careful review of the entire Complaint, the Court shares

Defendant’s concern that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims.

(See Doc. 25) (arguing that each of the claims is brought pursuant to IDEA and that

2 The Court strongly encourages Plaintiff to consider consulting a private attorney or, if he

cannot afford a private attorney’s fees, a legal aid service, who might provide assistance for

free. One legal aid service, for example, is the Bay Area Volunteer Legal Services. The Bay

Area Volunteer Legal Services can be contacted at the following address: 1302 N. 19th St.,

Suite 400, Tampa, Florida 33605 and may be reached at (800) 625-2257.

Plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing such claims

to the Court). Indeed, the Amended Complaint does not allege exhaustion of

administrative remedies. (See Doc. 9).3

The crux of the Amended Complaint is the alleged insufficiency of

Defendant’s Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) for R.J.C. to prevent injury

during seizures, putting R.J.C. at medical risk and depriving him of a meaningful

education. (See generally id.). “[W]hen the gravamen of a complaint seeks redress

for a school’s failure to provide a [free appropriate public education], even if not

phrased or framed in precisely that way,” it requires exhaustion of the

administrative remedies under IDEA. Fry, 580 U.S. at 755. “[A]ny other approach .

. . would allow plaintiffs to evade the Act’s restrictions through artful pleading.” Id.

(citation omitted).

—Rest of page intentionally left blank —

3 In layman’s terms, certain federal claims cannot be brought in federal court until the

claimant’s issue/dispute is addressed at all levels of a governmental entity, like a public

school board.

Accordingly, Plaintiff is ORDERED to respond to Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss on or before February 20, 2026, addressing its argument on exhaustion of

administrative remedies. If Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the exhaustion

requirement has been met, the Court is inclined to dismiss the Complaint for lack of

subject-matter jurisdiction. Further, the Court recognizes that Plaintiffs Motion for

Preliminary Injunction is currently pending and will reserve ruling on the motion

until subject-matter jurisdiction is established.

ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on February 6, 2026.

JOHN L. BADALAMENTI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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