“[P]arents who are not attorneys may not bring a pro se action on their child’s behalf. . . .”
How later courts described this case
- “[P]arents who are not attorneys may not bring a pro se action on their child’s behalf. . . .”
- “[T]he IDEA guarantees individually tailored educational services, while Title II and § 504 promise non-discriminatory access to public institutions.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
RAFAEL CAMACHO, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No: 8:25-cv-03355-JLB-NHA
THE SCHOOL BOARD OF
PINELLAS COUNTY, FLORIDA,
Defendant.
/
ORDER
Proceeding pro se, Plaintiff Rafael Camacho, Jr. filed a Complaint bringing
several claims against Defendant School Board of Pinellas County (“SBPC”) on
behalf of his minor son, R.J.C, including: (I) a substantive due process violation
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (II) a procedural due process violation pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983; (III) a disability-based discrimination under Title II and Section
504;1 (IV) a municipal liability claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (V) for
injunctive and declaratory relief. (Doc. 9). The same day, Plaintiff filed a Motion
for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunctive Relief (Doc. 10). The
Court declined to issue a temporary restraining order but reserved ruling on the
motion for preliminary injunction (Doc. 15).
Before the Court now is SBPC’s Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion
1 The Court construes Plaintiff’s disability discrimination claim as a claim under Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). (Doc. 16 at 1); see Fry v. Napoleon Cmty. Schs.,
580 U.S. 154, 170–71 (2017) (“[T]he IDEA guarantees individually tailored educational
services, while Title II and § 504 promise non-discriminatory access to public institutions.”).
for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 24) and Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint
(Doc. 25). Defendant’s Response and Motion to Dismiss challenge whether
Plaintiff’s Complaint is properly before this Court. Accordingly, Plaintiff is
DIRECTED to respond to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss on or before February 20,
2026.
As a preliminary matter, the Court reminds Plaintiff that he cannot bring
claims on behalf of his minor child without an attorney. (See Doc. 16 at 1–2); Devine
v. Indian River Cnty. Sch. Bd., 121 F.3d 576, 582 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[P]arents who
are not attorneys may not bring a pro se action on their child’s behalf. . . .”),
overruled in part on other grounds by Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City
Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007). Though there is an exception allowing parents to
represent a minor child pro se for IDEA claims, there is no such exception for
Plaintiff’s remaining claims. (See Doc. 16 at 1–2) (citing Winkelman, 550 U.S. at
533). Thus, Plaintiff must obtain counsel on or before April 10, 2026, to pursue
Counts I, II, IV, and V.2 (See id.).
That said, upon careful review of the entire Complaint, the Court shares
Defendant’s concern that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims.
(See Doc. 25) (arguing that each of the claims is brought pursuant to IDEA and that
2 The Court strongly encourages Plaintiff to consider consulting a private attorney or, if he
cannot afford a private attorney’s fees, a legal aid service, who might provide assistance for
free. One legal aid service, for example, is the Bay Area Volunteer Legal Services. The Bay
Area Volunteer Legal Services can be contacted at the following address: 1302 N. 19th St.,
Suite 400, Tampa, Florida 33605 and may be reached at (800) 625-2257.
Plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing such claims
to the Court). Indeed, the Amended Complaint does not allege exhaustion of
administrative remedies. (See Doc. 9).3
The crux of the Amended Complaint is the alleged insufficiency of
Defendant’s Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) for R.J.C. to prevent injury
during seizures, putting R.J.C. at medical risk and depriving him of a meaningful
education. (See generally id.). “[W]hen the gravamen of a complaint seeks redress
for a school’s failure to provide a [free appropriate public education], even if not
phrased or framed in precisely that way,” it requires exhaustion of the
administrative remedies under IDEA. Fry, 580 U.S. at 755. “[A]ny other approach .
. . would allow plaintiffs to evade the Act’s restrictions through artful pleading.” Id.
(citation omitted).
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3 In layman’s terms, certain federal claims cannot be brought in federal court until the
claimant’s issue/dispute is addressed at all levels of a governmental entity, like a public
school board.
Accordingly, Plaintiff is ORDERED to respond to Defendant’s Motion to
Dismiss on or before February 20, 2026, addressing its argument on exhaustion of
administrative remedies. If Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that the exhaustion
requirement has been met, the Court is inclined to dismiss the Complaint for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. Further, the Court recognizes that Plaintiffs Motion for
Preliminary Injunction is currently pending and will reserve ruling on the motion
until subject-matter jurisdiction is established.
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on February 6, 2026.
JOHN L. BADALAMENTI
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE