GLADU

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

NICHOLAS A. GLADU, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:22-cv-00134-SDN

)

MATTHEW MAGNUSSON, )

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OMNIBUS ORDER

Plaintiff Nicholas Gladu sued various employees and administrators at the Maine

State Prison (“MSP”), where Mr. Gladu is incarcerated. He alleges they violated his rights

by preventing him from possessing magazines and books with images of male nudity. On

September 12, 2025, Defendants Randall Liberty, James Hancox, Myles Reid, and

Matthew Magnusson moved for judgment on the pleadings. ECF No. 281. For the

following reasons, the motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Mr.

Gladu also filed several other miscellaneous motions, each of which are DENIED for the

reasons stated below. ECF Nos. 282, 295, 296, 297, 303.

BACKGROUND

The Court has previously summarized the factual allegations in its order granting

Mr. Gladu’s motion for leave to file a Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”). See ECF No.

237 at 2–8; ECF No. 238 (TAC). The standard of review of a motion for judgment on the

pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c)—under which Defendants bring

their motion—“is the same as that for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Marrero-

Gutierrez v. Molina, 491 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2007). Unlike a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a Rule

12(c) motion implicates the pleadings as a “whole.” Gulf Coast Bank & Tr. Co. v. Reder,

355 F.3d 35, 38 (1st Cir. 2004). During its review of the pleadings, “the court must view

the facts contained in the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and

draw all reasonable inferences” in his favor. Perez-Acevedo v. Rivero-Cubano, 520 F.3d

26, 29 (1st Cir. 2008) (quotation modified). Because Mr. Gladu is pro se, the Court

construes his filings liberally. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). “The

pleadings of a pro se plaintiff may be interpreted in light of his . . . supplemental

submissions.” Flanders v. Mass Resistance, No. 12-CV-00262, 2013 WL 2237848, at *9

(D. Me. May 21, 2013).

The relevant facts are as follows. Mr. Gladu openly identifies as “gay/queer.” ECF

No. 238 ¶ 1. He alleges Maine Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) policy number 21.2

permits incarcerated individuals at the Maine State Prison (“MSP”) to possess printed

materials which depict adult nudity regardless of gender. Id. ¶ 3; see ECF No. 299-1

(“Policy 21.2”). Beginning in 2022, Mr. Gladu began facing difficulties receiving materials

depicting male nudity; he alleges MSP officers prevented him from receiving new

materials and confiscated his existing materials because of personal biases against gay

people. See ECF No. 238 ¶¶ 5, 51–52, 87. Mr. Gladu further argues Defendants imposed

a “porn-restriction” on him because he filed internal grievances about the alleged

discrimination in March 2022 and filed a lawsuit against MSP officials in 2018. Id. ¶¶ 5,

103. He believes he is the only prisoner at MSP who is subject to such a restriction on

pornographic materials. Id. ¶¶ 83–84. Defendants “contest most—if not all—of the

substantive factual allegations” that Mr. Gladu presents in the TAC. ECF No. 281 at 1 n.1.

LEGAL STANDARD

Dismissal is only appropriate on a motion for judgment on the pleadings if the

pleadings, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, fail to support a

“plausible entitlement to relief.” Rodriguez-Ortiz v. Margo Caribe, Inc., 490 F.3d 92, 95

(1st Cir. 2007) (quotation modified). A claim has facial plausibility “when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks

for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. For the

complaint to survive, it must state a claim that “raise[s] a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

In reviewing a 12(c) motion, the Court must “separate the complaint’s factual

allegations (which must be accepted as true) from its conclusory legal allegations (which

need not be credited).” Guadalupe-Báez v. Pesquera, 819 F.3d 509, 514 (1st Cir. 2016)

(quotation modified). The Court may not resolve contested facts and may enter judgment

“only if the properly considered facts conclusively establish the movant’s point.” R.G. Fin.

Corp. v. Vergara-Nuñez, 446 F.3d 178, 182 (1st Cir. 2006). Assertions made in the

complaint that have not been denied in the answer are taken as true. See McCurdy v.

Cumberland Cnty., Me., No. 23-CV-00223, 2024 WL 490837, at *1 (D. Me. Feb. 8, 2024).

“Where material facts are disputed, the Court must deny the motion.” Child.’s Hosp. Corp.

v. Cakir, 183 F. Supp. 3d 242, 245 (D. Mass. 2016).

ANALYSIS

Mr. Gladu’s TAC brings seven counts against all Defendants. First, he alleges

unlawful censorship of publications in violation of the First Amendment (Count I). ECF

No. 238 at 17. Second, he asserts a denial of equal protection based on his sexual

orientation (Count II). Id. Third, he asserts violations of due process when Defendants

seized and confiscated his pornographic materials without notice or an opportunity to be

heard (Count III). Id. at 18. Fourth, he asserts Defendants conspired together to deprive

him of his constitutional rights (Count IV). Id. Fifth, he asserts a Takings Clause violation

for confiscating the materials already in his possession (Count V). Id. at 19. Sixth, he

brings a violation of the Maine Civil Rights Act, 5 M.R.S. § 4682, for the aforementioned

violations (Count VI). Id. Seventh, he asserts Defendants impermissibly retaliated against

him for engaging in protected conduct in the form of filing grievances and a lawsuit about

his restricted status (Count VII). Id. The Court will address each count in turn.

I. Constitutional Claims

Each of Mr. Gladu’s constitutional claims were brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983. Defendants assert qualified immunity protects them, as government officials,

from liability for civil actions taken under color of state law pursuant to section 1983. See

ECF No. 281 at 9. The qualified immunity doctrine “provides defendant public officials an

immunity from suit and not a mere defense to liability.” Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568

F.3d 263, 268 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)).

Defendants assert they are immune from suit and therefore should be dismissed as

defendants. Alternatively, Defendants assert Mr. Gladu fails to state a claim on each

count. ECF No. 281 at 6, 16.

The relevant qualified immunity inquiry is a two-part test. First, the Plaintiff must

show the facts alleged or shown make out a violation of a constitutional right. Maldonado,

568 F.3d at 269 (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 243–44 (2009)). Second, the

right must be “clearly established” at the time of Defendants’ alleged violation. Id.

The “clearly established” inquiry itself has two elements. MacDonald v. Town of

Eastham, 745 F.3d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 2014). “The first focuses on the clarity of the law at the

time of the violation.” Id. (quotation modified). “While [the Supreme] Court’s case law

does not require a case directly on point for a right to be clearly established, existing

precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”

White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (quotation modified). The Court must look “mainly

to Supreme Court and First Circuit precedent, [but also] consider[] cases from other

courts, and certain non-case-law sources, like statutes, prison regulations, and

government studies and reports.” Cintron v. Bibeault, 148 F.4th 37, 52 (1st Cir. 2025)

(quotation modified). The second aspect “focuses more concretely on the facts of the

particular case and whether a reasonable defendant would have understood that his

conduct violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Penate v. Hanchett, 944 F.3d 358,

366 (1st Cir. 2019) (quotation modified). “Officials can still be on notice that their conduct

violates established law even in novel factual circumstances.” Cintron, 148 F.4th at 52

(quotation modified). Ultimately, qualified “immunity protects all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” White, 580 U.S. at 79 (quotation

modified).

A. First Amendment (Count I)

Mr. Gladu’s First Amendment claim fails for the same reasons for which the Court

previously granted qualified immunity to Defendant Mr. Stanley in its prior order. See

ECF No. 277 at 8–10. A prisoner’s First Amendment right to possess pornographic

publications depicting nudity is not clearly established. Contrary to Mr. Gladu’s

assertions, prisons may have reasons “reasonably related to legitimate penological

interests” to ban sexually explicit material. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987); see

ECF No. 277 at 8 (collecting cases). Mr. Gladu’s citations to Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490

U.S. 401 (1989), do not salvage his argument. Thornburgh reaffirmed the reasoning in

Turner, finding that courts should give “considerable deference to the determinations of

prison administrators who, in the interest of security, regulate the relations between

prisoners and the outside world,” including by limiting sexually explicit material. Id. at

408. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Count I.

B. Equal Protection (Count II)

Mr. Gladu brings an as-applied equal protection claim, see ECF No. 294 at 8; ECF

No. 238 at 17, arguing he is treated differently than other prisoners based on his sexual

orientation. Specifically, he points to Policy 21.2, which governs prisoner mail and

communication, to assert he is being denied access to materials with male nudity when

he attempts to order sexually explicit materials from the publisher and MDOC staff refuse

to deliver it to him. ECF No. 238 ¶¶ 88–92.

To assert an as-applied equal protection challenge, a plaintiff must show the

government policy operates unconstitutionally as applied to his situation. See Doe v.

Austin, 755 F. Supp. 3d 51, 66 (D. Me. 2024). The Equal Protection Clause provides that

“[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the

laws,” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, and requires that “all persons similarly situated be

treated alike,” Rocket Learning, Inc. v. Rivera-Sánchez, 715 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2013)

(quotation modified). The Court must conduct a three-step inquiry to determine whether

the MSP’s policies around sexually explicit material violate Mr. Gladu’s equal protection

rights. First, the Court “identif[ies] whether the challenged classification is explicitly

based upon sex or neutral on its face.” Austin, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 66 (quoting

Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 513 F. Supp. 3d 215, 228 (D. Mass.

2021)). If the policy is “facially neutral,” the Plaintiff must show “disparate impact and an

intent to discriminate on the basis of sex.” Id. at 67. Second, the Court “‘determine[s] the

appropriate level of scrutiny’ to apply to the challenged classification.” Id. (quoting Toledo

v. Sanchez, 454 F.3d 24, 33 (1st Cir. 2006)). Third, the Court evaluates whether

Defendants’ justifications for the classification survive that level of scrutiny. Id.

Procedure E of Policy 21.2, which governs receipt of certain publications in the

mail, makes no mention of prohibitions based on the gender of the people partaking in

the explicit material, nor does it prohibit certain inmates at the prison from possessing

material based on their sexual orientation. See ECF No. 299-1 at 17–19. The contested

policy is thus neutral on its face.

The second question is what level of scrutiny applies. The First Circuit does not

explicitly recognize sexual orientation as a suspect class for equal protection purposes.

See, e.g., Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 61 (1st Cir. 2008); Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of

Health & Hum. Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 9–10 (1st Cir. 2012); see also Galdos-Shapiro v. Town

of Great Barrington, No. CV 24-30070, 2025 WL 2959878, at *14 (D. Mass. Oct. 17,

2025) (recognizing the district court is bound by Cook and Massachusetts). As such, the

Court will apply the lowest level of scrutiny: rational basis. See F.C.C. v. Beach Commc’ns,

Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (A government classification that “neither proceeds along

suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against

equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could

provide a rational basis for the classification.”). Thus, the Court must “ascertain some

relation between the classification and the purpose it served” to determine whether the

government action is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. Romer v.

Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).

In applying rational basis review at the motion to dismiss stage, the Court accepts

as true the Plaintiff’s allegations that he is similarly situated to other members of the class

but must evaluate whether he has properly “negate[d] the purported justification” for the

government policy at issue. BoylstonD3 LLC v. Galvin, 496 F. Supp. 3d 692, 698 (D.

Mass. 2020); see also Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 315 (placing the burden on plaintiff

to refute every possible legitimate basis for the subject legislation). Here, Mr. Gladu has

not plausibly alleged that no rational basis exists. As this Court has previously stated,

“there may be legitimate penological rationales that form a rational basis to restrict Mr.

Gladu in particular—who is serving a sentence for various sex crimes involving a minor,

including possession of sexually explicit materials—from now possessing sexually explicit

materials in prison.” ECF No. 277 at 9 (citing Gladu v. Waltz, No. 18-CV-00275, 2020 WL

6385618, at *2 (D. Me. Oct. 30, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL

7344706 (D. Me. Dec. 14, 2020), aff’d, No. 21-1010, 2022 WL 20437774 (1st Cir. Oct. 24,

2022)). Mr. Gladu has not advanced anything that would negate the fact that the prison

has a rational desire to restrict materials for certain inmates. Similarly, Policy 21.2, which

Mr. Gladu has put at issue here, provides guidelines for why a prison official may restrict

certain sexually explicit materials. See ECF No. 299-1 at 17–19 (prohibiting materials that,

inter alia, depict sexual acts with children or animals or which are sent to sex offenders).

Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Mr. Gladu, he has not shown how

this particular policy fails to advance the legitimate government interest articulated.

Accordingly, Mr. Gladu fails to state a cognizable equal protection claim, and it was

not objectively unreasonable for Defendants to restrict Mr. Gladu’s access to these

materials. See Conlogue v. Hamilton, 906 F.3d 150, 154 (1st Cir. 2018) (“[O]nly those

officials who should have known that their conduct was objectively unreasonable are

beyond the shield of qualified immunity . . . .”). Respondents are entitled to qualified

immunity on Count II.

C. Due Process Under the Fourteenth Amendment (Count III)

Mr. Gladu’s third claim is that Defendants violated the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment by depriving him of his property—the sexually explicit

materials—without notice or the opportunity to be heard. ECF No. 238 at 18.

The Fourteenth Amendment says that state officials may not deprive persons of

property without “due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The amount of process

due depends on the circumstances. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).

Critically, the due process analysis differs depending on whether the deprivation results

from “random, unauthorized” conduct by state officials or from conduct “pursuant to

established state procedure.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532 (1984).

Defendants argue confiscation of Mr. Gladu’s materials constitutes random,

unauthorized conduct—meaning he was deprived by allegedly intentional misconduct by

individual officers rather than pursuant to a government policy. See ECF No. 281 at 11–12.

Even construing Mr. Gladu’s pro se briefings liberally, he does not contest the legality of

policies that generally allow inmates to possess sexually explicit material; rather, he

argues that individual Defendants acted improperly under their own discretion by

denying him access to the materials, rendering each deprivation a discrete instance of

intentional misconduct.1 See ECF No. 238 ¶¶ 93–95. Because Mr. Gladu alleges the

1 The inverse of this argument is that prison officials conducted the confiscations pursuant to the general

prison policies prohibiting possession of certain material by people convicted of sex offenses and/or Policy

21.2 prohibiting receipt of certain sexually explicit material in the mail. Under that view, the deprivations

would not have occurred “as a result of the unauthorized failure of agents of the State to follow established

state procedure,” but rather because of the existing procedures themselves. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527,

543 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Because Defendants

“action[s] w[ere] a deviation from, and not a reflection of, an established state procedure”

allowing prisoners to possess sexually explicit materials, the claim “has no legal basis in a

section 1983 case.” Watson v. Caton, 984 F.2d 537, 541 (1st Cir. 1993).

Where the loss of property results from a “random, unauthorized act by a state

employee”—rather than from an established state procedure—“the state cannot predict

when the loss will occur.” Hudson, 468 U.S. at 532. Hence, due process is satisfied so long

as the state provides a meaningful post-deprivation remedy; no pre-deprivation hearing

is required. See id. at 533 (“[A]n unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a

state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for

the loss is available.”). Here, Policy 21.2 permits a prisoner to use the internal grievance

process to “grieve a decision related to mail” after it has been withheld from delivery. ECF

No. 299-1 at 28. Mr. Gladu availed himself of exactly that process, pleading in the TAC

that he submitted multiple grievances to Defendants on different dates in March 2022 as

evidence of that process. ECF No. 238 ¶ 103. Moreover, Maine law also provides Mr.

Gladu a tort-claim procedure to recover for any damages should he seek review of the

prison’s final decision. See M.R. Civ. P. 80C(a); Anctil v. Cassese, 2020 ME 59, ¶ 15, 232

A.3d 245, 251 (recognizing the prison grievance process as a “meaningful post-

deprivation remedy” for the confiscation of paperwork by a prison official). Together,

these available remedies satisfy the constitutional requirement of meaningful post-

appear to concede the challenged seizures were instances of intentional misconduct, see ECF No. 281 at

11–12, the Court does not reach the question of whether Defendants acted pursuant to an “established state

procedure” and thus does not analyze the deprivations under that framework. See, e.g., Godin v.

Machiasport Sch. Dep’t Bd. of Dirs., 831 F. Supp. 2d 380, 389 (D. Me. 2011) (evaluating due process

challenge when defendants “followed an established state procedure”).

deprivation process. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 128–29 (1990); Lowe v. Scott,

959 F.2d 323, 340 (1st Cir. 1992).

Mr. Gladu thus fails to plead a violation of a constitutional right under the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity on Count III.

D. Fifth Amendment Takings Clause (Count V)

Mr. Gladu’s fifth cause of action asserts Defendants violated the Takings Clause of

the Fifth Amendment when they confiscated seven books and magazines he had in his

possession which contained adult male nudity. ECF No. 238 at 19.

The Takings Clause prohibits the taking of private property by the government

without just compensation. U.S. Const. amend. V. A takings claim must be based on the

government’s rightful exercise of its property, contract, or regulatory powers, and

therefore does not arise when rights or property have been impaired through “unlawful

government action.” Golder v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 513, 518 (1988). Because Mr. Gladu

here asserts that the seizure of the materials was unlawful, rather than pursuant to a

government policy or law, his Takings Clause claim is misplaced. See Watrous v.

Salisbury, No. C.A. 09-599, 2010 WL 2035364, at *6 (D.R.I. Apr. 27, 2010), report and

recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 2025174 (D.R.I. May 20, 2010) (dismissing Takings

Clause claim where plaintiff asserted prison officials illegally took his personal property).

Plaintiff’s claim is not clearly established, and Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity as to Count V.

E. First Amendment Retaliation (Count VII)

Mr. Gladu alleges Defendants retaliated against him in violation of the First

Amendment when they placed him on a “porn restriction”—understood here to mean a

blanket prohibition on receiving or possessing sexually explicit materials—following

grievances of sexual orientation discrimination and the filing of his prior lawsuit

concerning possession of sexual materials.2 ECF No. 238 at 19; see Gladu v. Waltz, 2020

WL 6385618, at *1.

To establish a First Amendment retaliation claim against prison officials, a plaintiff

must plead sufficient facts to show that “he engaged in a protected activity, that the state

took an adverse action against him, and that there is a causal link between the former and

the latter.” Hannon v. Beard, 645 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 2011). Defendants do not dispute

that Mr. Gladu engaged in protected activity by filing grievances and legal actions and

that the “porn restriction” constitutes adverse action in this instance. See ECF No. 281 at

14. Defendants’ primary contention is that the causal connection is lacking—specifically

that Defendants imposed the restriction before Mr. Gladu filed his grievances. See id.

The TAC recounts the following timeline: On or about January 6, 2022, Mr. Gladu

received a Playgirl magazine in the mail, which Defendants allegedly destroyed but for

which the prison reimbursed him the cost. ECF No. 238 ¶¶ 40–45. On February 24, the

prison received four more Playgirl magazines in the mail and rejected them. Id. ¶ 46. On

March 4, Mr. Gladu attempted to speak to Defendant Officer Reid about the decision to

reject the four magazines. Id. ¶ 53. On March 9, Mr. Gladu filed a formal complaint with

Defendant Warden Magnusson about the rejection of the four magazines. Id. ¶ 55. On

March 16, Mr. Gladu’s brother ordered eight books depicting male nudity from Amazon,

which the prison received and rejected. Id. ¶¶ 56–57. On March 18, Mr. Gladu received a

disposition form stating the books had been rejected, but which did not explain the

2 Mr. Gladu filed the prior lawsuit on July 11, 2018. See Dkt. No. 18-cv-00275, ECF No. 1 (D. Me. 2018).

rationale for the rejections. Id. ¶ 59. On March 22, the prison rejected another book with

male nudity, id. ¶ 61, and on March 25, Mr. Gladu received another disposition form

explaining the rejection, id. ¶ 62. Starting on March 31, Mr. Gladu made several requests

to Defendants for official information about the “porn restriction,” but received no

response. Id. ¶ 69. In April 2022, Mr. Gladu’s unit manager claimed to have received an

email from Defendants Warden Magnusson and Officer Hancox advising that the

restriction “had been in effect since the final judgment in Gladu’s prior lawsuit”3 and that

Defendants understood the “prior lawsuit had resulted in a complete prohibition of Gladu

from ever again possessing any sort of sexually explicit materials even if those materials

would otherwise be allowable under MDOC policy.”4 Id. ¶ 70. In June 2022, Defendants

further restricted Mr. Gladu’s materials, confiscating several books of erotic fiction that

contained no nude imagery. Id. ¶¶ 77–78.

Construing all facts in Mr. Gladu's favor, as the Court must at this stage, see

Vergara-Nuñez, 446 F.3d at 182, the timeline Mr. Gladu puts forth supports a plausible

causal connection. Mr. Gladu commenced his first lawsuit in 2018, and judgment was

entered on December 15, 2020—the date Warden Magnusson and Officer Hancox

allegedly cited in their email as the trigger for the restriction. Both events predate the first

mail rejections Mr. Gladu experienced in early 2022. Mr. Gladu filed his first official

complaint with the Warden on March 9, 2022, evidently upon first realizing that his mail

was being purposely restricted rather than incidentally rejected for failure to comply with

3 The Clerk of Court entered judgment in the original district court case on December 15, 2020. See Dkt.

No. 18-cv-00275, ECF No. 298. The First Circuit affirmed the judgment on October 24, 2022. See Dkt. No.

18-cv-00275, ECF No. 312.

4 Because the parties do not raise the issue, the Court does not address here whether Defendants’ legal

interpretation of the previous lawsuit’s judgment was objectively reasonable under the qualified immunity

analysis.

other mail policies. Defendants then subjected him to additional mail rejections and

property confiscations in the months that followed.

The Court finds the TAC adequately pleads a causal and temporal connection

between Mr. Gladu’s protected activity—the filing of the first lawsuit and the complaints

made in March 2022—and the subsequent confiscations of property. Construing the facts

in Mr. Gladu's favor, the TAC plausibly alleges that his protected activity “was a

substantial or motivating factor for the adverse [action].” Padilla-García v. Rodríguez,

212 F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 2000). Thus, Mr. Gladu has properly asserted the violation of a

constitutional right. The Court proceeds to the second prong of the qualified immunity

analysis: whether the right was clearly established at the time of the retaliatory action. See

City of Escondido, Cal. v. Emmons, 586 U.S. 38, 42 (2019) (per curiam).

A government official’s conduct violates clearly established law when the “contours

of the right [are] sufficiently clear” such that every “reasonable official would understand

that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640

(1987). The test focuses on the “objective reasonableness” of the official’s conduct.

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). MSP officials knew, or reasonably should

have known, that retaliation predicated on filing a prison grievance is prohibited.

Defendants’ own briefing acknowledges as much. See ECF No. 281 at 14 (“While the filing

of a prison grievance can be considered protected activity for purposes of the First

Amendment . . . .”) (citing Hannon, 645 F.3d at 48)); Hannon, 645 F.3d at 48 (“The

[incarcerated] plaintiff, in filing his own grievances and legal actions, plainly engaged in

protected activity.”). It is equally clear that an inmate’s pursuit of litigation related to his

treatment in prison is protected activity. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977),

abrogated on other grounds by Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996) (“It is now

established beyond doubt that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the

courts.”); U.S. Const. amend. I (establishing the First Amendment right “to petition the

Government for a redress of grievances”).

Based on the record currently before the Court, Defendants are not entitled to

qualified immunity on Mr. Gladu’s First Amendment retaliation claim.5 The portion of

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count VII is DENIED.

II. Other Claims

A. Conspiracy (Count IV)

Mr. Gladu asserts Defendants conspired to violate his constitutional rights in

violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3). ECF No. 238 at 18. To plead a conspiracy

under section 1985, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting (1) a conspiracy; (2) a

conspiratorial purpose to deprive a class of persons of equal protection of the laws; (3) an

overt act in furtherance thereof; and (4) either (a) an injury to person or property, or (b)

a deprivation of a constitutionally protected right or privilege. Stand With US Ctr. for

Legal Just. v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 158 F.4th 1, 24 (1st Cir. 2025). Because Mr. Gladu fails

to present a viable equal protection claim, see supra Subsection I.B, his conspiracy claim

fails as well, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (holding threadbare recitals of the elements

supported by conclusory statements are insufficient to sustain a claim for relief).

Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Count IV is GRANTED.

5 Moreover, Defendants state in their response that they contest most, if not all, of Mr. Gladu’s factual

assertions. ECF No. 281 at 1 n.1. Where material facts are disputed, the Court must deny the motion for

judgment on the pleadings. See Cakir, 183 F. Supp. 3d at 245. Accordingly, whether Defendants’ conduct

was predicated on Mr. Gladu’s protected activity is a disputed material fact which precludes judgment for

Defendants at this stage.

B. Violation of the Maine Civil Rights Act (Count VI)

Mr. Gladu asserts a violation of the Maine Civil Rights Act (“MCRA”), 5 M.R.S.

§ 4682, predicated on the aforementioned violations of his constitutional rights, see ECF

No. 238 at 19. The disposition of a section 1983 claim “also controls a claim under the

MCRA.” Berube v. Conley, 506 F.3d 79, 85 (1st Cir. 2007). Because Mr. Gladu fails to

establish constitutional violations on Counts I through V, Defendants are entitled to

dismissal on those corresponding MCRA claims as well. The Court nonetheless exercises

supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining MCRA retaliation claim, as Mr. Gladu has

stated a cognizable First Amendment retaliation claim. See Ayotte v. Barnhart, 973 F.

Supp. 2d 70, 83 (D. Me. 2013) (maintaining supplemental jurisdiction over an MCRA

retaliation claim when the plaintiff established a viable First Amendment retaliation

claim). Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Count VI is GRANTED IN PART and

DENIED IN PART.

III. Miscellaneous Other Motions

Mr. Gladu has filed several other motions unrelated to Defendants’ motion for

judgment on the pleadings, which the Court addresses in turn.

A. Motion to Reconsider Magistrate Judge’s Order on Pending Motions

Mr. Gladu objects, ECF No. 282, to the Magistrate Judge’s September 12, 2025,

order denying several of his discovery motions, ECF No. 280. Mr. Gladu specifically

challenges the Magistrate Judge’s decision to prohibit Mr. Gladu from taking written

depositions of several witnesses and to deny a protective order for nonparty witnesses.

ECF No. 282 at 3.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a) provides that “[t]he district judge in the case

must consider timely objections [to a Magistrate Judge’s order] and modify or set aside

any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a);

see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). The Court finds no clear error or legal defect in the

Magistrate Judge's order. As the Magistrate Judge correctly noted, written depositions

“are generally disfavored, and rarely, if ever, used in modern litigation under any

circumstances,” ECF No. 280 at 2 (quoting Foley v. Baker, No. 21-CV-10615, 2022 WL

3088049, at *2 (D. Mass. Aug. 3, 2022)); see ECF No. 280 at 2, and Mr. Gladu remains

free to pursue written interrogatories as an alternative means of obtaining information

from witnesses. As to the requested protective orders, Mr. Gladu has offered no evidence

that MSP staff would intimidate or retaliate against nonparty witnesses for participating

in this lawsuit, and therefore has not demonstrated the “good cause” required to justify

such relief. See id. at 4. Nor has Mr. Gladu established that he is unable to produce the

documents Defendants have requested, providing no basis for the additional protective

order he seeks on that ground.

Accordingly, Mr. Gladu’s motion to reconsider, ECF No. 282, is DENIED, and the

Magistrate Judge’s order, ECF No. 280, is AFFIRMED.

B. Motion for District Court to Take Judicial Notice of Its Own Docket

and MDOC Policy

Mr. Gladu moves this Court take judicial notice of the earlier lawsuit discussed

above, Gladu v. Waltz, 2020 WL 6385618, and MDOC’s Policy 21.2. ECF No. 295. The

Court has already determined which portions of the Waltz lawsuit are relevant,

specifically the date on which judgment was entered. See supra Subsection I.E. The Court

declines to take notice of the facts alleged in that lawsuit, as the instant suit concerns

separate claims and factual circumstances. The Court properly relies only on the parties’

pleadings and the facts alleged in the TAC in order to reach its conclusion in this case. The

Court has reviewed MDOC policies only to the extent they bear on Plaintiff’s claims.

Accordingly, this motion and the related requests for an extension of time to file

accompanying exhibits are DENIED. ECF Nos. 295, 296, 297; see ECF No. 298 (filing of

attachments).

C. Motion for Evidentiary Hearing

Mr. Gladu moves the court for an evidentiary hearing to evaluate the veracity of his

claims that he lacks access to the prison law library. ECF No. 303. Defendants oppose the

motion, asserting Mr. Gladu has adequate access to the law library and legal research tools

but refuses to comply with the conditions governing that access. ECF No. 304.

Under Bounds v. Smith, “the fundamental constitutional right of access to the

courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of

meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries.” 430 U.S. at

828. However, Bounds “did not create an abstract, freestanding right to a law library.”

Casey, 518 U.S. at 351. Instead, “‘meaningful access to the courts is the touchstone’” of

the inquiry, and the inmate must “demonstrate that the alleged shortcomings in the

library or legal assistance program hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim.” Id.

(quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 823).

Mr. Gladu fails to make that showing. His numerous filings in this case—and his

success here on maintaining two claims—demonstrate that he has not been hindered in

presenting his legal arguments. Even assuming as true the disputed facts about his use of

a legal research tablet or law librarian access, the record demonstrates he has not been

hindered in his efforts to pursue a legal claim.

Accordingly, Mr. Gladu’s motion for an evidentiary hearing is DENIED. ECF No.

303.

CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

ECF No. 281. Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment

claim (Count I), the Equal Protection claim (Count II), the Due Process claim (Count III),

and the Takings Clause claim (Count V), and these counts are each DISMISED. Plaintiff

fails to state a viable claim on the conspiracy claim (Count IV), which is DISMISSED.

Defendants’ motion to dismiss the First Amendment retaliation claim (Count VII) is

DENIED. The Court retains supplemental jurisdiction over the MCRA retaliation claim

(Count VI).

Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider the Magistrate Judge’s discovery order is

DENIED, ECF No. 282, and the Magistrate Judge’s order is AFFIRMED, ECF No. 280.

Plaintiff’s motions for judicial notice are DENIED. ECF Nos. 295, 296, 297. Plaintiff’s

motion for an evidentiary hearing is DENIED. ECF No. 303.

SO ORDERED.

Dated this 15th day of April, 2026.

/s/ Stacey D. Neumann

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE