Opinion

Shatyra Johnson v. Romello Love

Court
Court of Appeals of Tennessee
Filed
Jun 28, 2023
Status
Unpublished
Author
Judge Jeffrey Usman
On the bench
Judge Jeffrey Usman
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 40.2%

The opinion

06/28/2023

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

Assigned on Briefs March 1, 2023

SHATYRA JOHNSON v. ROMELLO LOVE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County

No. CT-004137-21 Jerry Stokes, Judge

___________________________________

No. W2022-00293-COA-R3-CV

___________________________________

The Appellant challenges the circuit court’s grant of an order of protection, asserting that

the evidence preponderates against the finding that the Appellant stalked the Appellee.

Because the order of protection has expired by its own terms, we dismiss the appeal as

moot.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Appeal Dismissed

JEFFREY USMAN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN W. MCCLARTY and

CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, JJ., joined.

P. Craig Grinstead, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Romello Love.1

MEMORANDUM OPINION2

I.

Appellant Romello Love, asks this court to reverse the circuit court’s order of

protection enjoining Mr. Love from having contact with his ex-wife Shatyra Johnson.

Based on Ms. Johnson’s petition for an order of protection and from the Statement of

Evidence3 filed by Mr. Love, the parties were divorced around 2012 and co-parented their

1

The Appellee, Shatyra Johnson, did not file a responsive brief.

2

Under Rule 10 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Appeals, “[t]his Court, with the concurrence of all

judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum

opinion when a formal opinion would have no precedential value.”

3

Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 24, the appellant may file a statement of the evidence

in the absence of a transcript. Rule 24 requires that the statement be certified by appellant or appellant’s

two children amicably for a lengthy period of time. In 2021, the parties were litigating

custody, and Mr. Love, Ms. Johnson, and Marshall Chism, who was Ms. Johnson’s

intimate partner, all sought orders of protection from the general sessions court. Ms.

Johnson alleged that Mr. Love on one occasion followed her, driving erratically, and that

on another occasion he came to the bus stop where she was dropping off the parties’ son.

Mr. Love alleged that Mr. Chism harassed him through repeated telephone calls, which

included death threats. Mr. Chism alleged that Mr. Love followed him on two occasions.

Ms. Johnson filed her petition for an ex parte order of protection in the General

Sessions Court on September 28, 2021, and the temporary ex parte order was granted. The

case was transferred to Shelby County Circuit Court to be consolidated with the other

matters being litigated among the parties. After a hearing, the circuit court, based on a

finding of stalking, granted the order of protection barring Mr. Love from having contact

with Ms. Johnson. The order stated that it took effect on December 20, 2021, and it was

entered on February 7, 2022. The order also included in its terms an expiration date, noting,

“This Order ends (date) 6/20/22.” According to the statement of evidence, the circuit court

likewise granted the order of protection sought by Mr. Chism. See Chism v. Love, No.

W2022-00294-COA-R3-CV (appealing the order of protection granted to Mr. Chism).

Mr. Love filed a timely appeal challenging the entry of the order of protection.

II.

On appeal, Mr. Love argues that the order of protection should be reversed because

Ms. Johnson did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Love stalked her.

See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-3-602(a); 39-17-315. As noted above, the order of protection,

by its own terms, expired on June 20, 2022, which is long before he filed his appellate brief

on September 7, 2022. Nevertheless, the appellate brief did not address this court’s

jurisdiction over an expired order of protection. We conclude that the appeal should be

dismissed as moot.

A case becomes moot when it “no longer serves as a means to provide some sort of

judicial relief to the prevailing party.” Norma Faye Pyles Lynch Family Purpose LLC v.

Putnam Cnty., 301 S.W.3d 196, 204 (Tenn. 2009). Moreover, this court “is limited to

deciding issues that qualify as justiciable, meaning issues that place some real interest in

dispute.” City of Memphis v. Hargett, 414 S.W.3d 88, 96 (Tenn. 2013) (citing Colonial

Pipeline Co. v. Morgan, 263 S.W.3d 827, 838 (Tenn. 2008)). This court “must practice

restraint in addressing issues when the parties ‘do not have a continuing, real, live, and

substantial interest in the outcome.’” Krohn v. Krohn, No. M2021-01020-COA-R3-CV,

counsel as an accurate account of the proceedings and that it be filed within 60 days of the notice of appeal.

The statement of the evidence included in the record does not contain any certification as to accuracy and

was filed on May 24, 2022, more than 60 days after the notice of appeal filed March 8, 2022. The record

reveals no objections. Given our disposition of the case, the facts are provided purely for context.

-2-

2023 WL 2492190, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2023) (quoting Norma Faye Pyles, 301

S.W.3d at 210). Because mootness implicates justiciability, this Court is “obligated

independently to raise the question sua sponte,” even in the absence of any request by a

party. Hooker v. Haslam, 437 S.W.3d 409, 433 (Tenn. 2014). In this case, Mr. Love’s

appellate brief did not address jurisdiction, although the brief was filed months after the

order of protection had expired, and Ms. Johnson, the appellee, did not file a brief.

This court has, on numerous occasions, dismissed an appeal of an order of protection

for mootness when the order of protection had expired by the time the appellate opinion

was rendered. See Tenney ex rel. Desirae B. v. Bullington, No. M2020-01432-COA-R3-

CV, 2021 WL 5562714, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2021) (“Furthermore, this court

routinely dismisses appeals as moot when the disputed order of protection expires before

the appeal is considered.”); Ruzzene v. Stewart, No. E2019-00291-COA-R3-CV, 2020 WL

4556828, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2020) (dismissing an appeal of an order of

protection as moot when no exceptions to the mootness doctrine were asserted); Anders v.

Anders, No. W2017-00071-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 2174127, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. May

11, 2018) (pretermitting all issues because the order of protection had expired and the

appeal was accordingly moot); Brown v. Nunley, No. W2016-00646-COA-R3-CV, 2017

WL 2928792 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 10, 2017) (because the appellant only challenged the

order of protection which had already expired, the appeal was moot); Miller v. Miller, No.

E2009-02090-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 1947653, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14, 2010);

Winningham v. Strotter, No. 03A01-9112-CV-00423, 1992 WL 94717, at *1 (Tenn. Ct.

App. May 8, 1992) (concluding that the appeal was moot when the order of protection had

long expired).

Here, the order expired by its own terms on June 20, 2022. There is nothing in the

record to show that it was ever extended. Mr. Love never made any argument addressing

this court’s jurisdiction, despite the fact that the order expired long before he filed his

appellate brief. Based upon the record before us, we conclude that there is no live

controversy between the parties and that the appeal must be dismissed as moot. Costs are

taxed to the Appellant, Romello Love.

________________________________

JEFFREY USMAN, J.

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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