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SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2384-24
NEW JERSEY DIVISION
OF CHILD PROTECTION
AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
N.M.,
Defendant-Respondent,
and
A.C.,1
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
IN THE MATTER OF J.C.,
a minor.
________________________
Argued March 25, 2026 – Decided April 15, 2026
1
We use initials and pseudonyms to protect the confidentiality of these
proceedings. R. 1:38-3(d)(12).
Before Judges Mayer, Paganelli and Vanek.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Monmouth County,
Docket No. FN-13-0098-24.
John A. Albright, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for appellant (Jennifer N. Sellitti,
Public Defender, attorney; John A. Albright, of counsel
and on the briefs).
Catherine Reid, Designated Counsel, argued the cause
for respondent N.M. (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public
Defender, attorney; Catherine Reid, on the brief).
Julie B. Colonna, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondent New Jersey Division of Child
Protection and Permanency (Jennifer Davenport,
Attorney General, attorney; Donna Arons, Assistant
Attorney General, of counsel; Julie B. Colonna, on the
brief).
Neha Gogate, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for minor J.C. (Jennifer N. Selletti,
Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney; Meredith
Alexis Pollock, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel;
Neha Gogate, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant A.C. (father) appeals from a December 11, 2024 order denying
his motion for unsupervised parenting time with his daughter, J.C. (Julia),
without a plenary hearing, and a March 4, 2025 order terminating the litigation.
We affirm both orders.
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2
Father and defendant N.M. (mother) are the biological parents of Julia
born in January 2024. The parents have a history of involvement with plaintiff
New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division).
More than a decade before Julia's birth, in July 2012, father pleaded guilty
to third-degree endangering the welfare of a child and other charges. The
charges stemmed from an incident when father was eighteen and allegedly had
sex with a thirteen-year-old girl. As part of the sentence imposed after his guilty
plea, father was sentenced to parole supervision for life (PSL). Father's PSL
conditions prohibited unsupervised contact with minors. Since he was
sentenced, father has been charged with, and incarcerated for, parole violations
on several occasions. 2
The Division received a referral from the hospital just after Julia's birth
because mother tested positive for cocaine. Based on its investigation, the
Division learned mother was homeless, lived with individuals who used crack
cocaine, and allegedly continued to use drugs. Mother subsequently entered a
treatment program for substance abuse.
2
According to information in the record, father's parole violations occurred
between 2012 and 2022, and involved his failure to report, criminal behavior,
and drug use.
A-2384-24
3
The Division spoke to father about caring for Julia while mother
participated in a treatment program. Although father wanted to be a part of
Julia's life, he acknowledged his history of homelessness, arrests, and drug use
rendered him unable to care for his daughter.
On January 16, 2024, the Division filed a verified complaint for custody
of Julia due to concerns related to both parents' substance abuse and
homelessness. We need not detail the numerous hearings held by the Family
Part judge related to custody of Julia and the Division's services offered to
mother and father. The issue before us focuses solely on the Family Part judge's
denial of father's application to modify the conditions of his PSL and allow him
to exercise unsupervised parenting time with Julia.
The record reflects the Parole Board at some point allowed father to
exercise supervised parenting time with Julia. At a September 2024 compliance
review hearing, father told the judge that his PSL conditions precluded his
ability to have unsupervised parenting time with Julia. Father believed the judge
had the authority to allow unsupervised parenting time with Julia, despite his
PSL status, under N.J.A.C. 10A:72-2.6(c)-(f).
The judge responded that father's parole status prohibited his
unsupervised contact with any minor. She suggested father complete a "living
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with children assessment" and submit that assessment to the Parole Board with
a request for modification of his PSL conditions.
At a December 2024 compliance review and follow up Title 30 hearing,
father renewed his position that the judge had authority to modify his PSL
conditions and allow unsupervised parenting time with Julia. Father requested
a hearing so he could present a September 2024 living-with-child evaluation
conducted by Zachary Yeoman, Psy.D. Father wanted to offer Dr. Yeoman's
testimony at a hearing, who would then be subject to cross-examination, in
support of unsupervised parenting time with Julia. Father expressed doubt that
his parole supervisor would promptly consider his request to modify the PSL
conditions and allow unsupervised parenting time with Julia.
The Law Guardian objected to father's request, arguing the Parole Board
needed to address the issue before the Family Part judge could consider whether
father's unsupervised parenting time with Julia was in the child's best interest.
The Division also argued any modification to father's PSL conditions must "be
addressed first and foremost through his parole."
The judge denied father's request without prejudice, finding the Parole
Board was responsible for parole modification requests. The judge suggested
father submit Dr. Yeoman's September 2024 evaluation to his parole supervisor
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5
for review. In a December 11, 2024 order, the judge denied father's request for
a plenary hearing to allow unsupervised parenting time with Julia.
On December 12, 2024, father forwarded Dr. Yeoman's evaluation to the
Parole Board, requesting it modify his PSL conditions so he could exercise
unsupervised parenting time with his daughter. Father's parole supervisors
replied that the Parole Board would not consider unsupervised contact with Julia
until father demonstrated "a period of compliance/stability" with the conditions
of his parole.
On January 29, 2025, father moved before the Family Part "[f]or an order
granting a hearing pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:71-6.12(e)(3) to determine if [he]
can be unsupervised with his daughter." Father argued the Family Part was "the
appropriate court" to hear his application because the language in N.J.A.C.
10A:71-6.12(e)(3) was "consistent with the Family Part's authority as given to
it by the [L]egislature and the decisions and court rules of the New Jersey
Supreme Court." The Division opposed father's motion.
In March 2025, the Family Part judge conducted a compliance review and
addressed the Division's request to terminate the litigation and father's motion
for unsupervised parenting time. The Division explained Julia had been
reunified with mother without issue. The Division reported father's parole
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officer advised father "would need to show a period of six months of compliance
with his conditions of parole prior to any modification or consideration of the
living with child assessment." The Division argued the judge should terminate
litigation while maintaining father's parole conditions, and any modification of
father's PSL conditions had to be implemented by the Parole Board. The Law
Guardian supported the Division's request to terminate the litigation presuming
father continued exercising supervised parenting time.
Mother supported termination of the litigation. However, she objected to
continuing father's supervised parenting time with Julia. Mother supported
father's motion because the supervision requirement prevented them from
spending quality time as a family.
Father opposed termination of the litigation. Father also asserted the
Division should want the litigation to remain open due to his continued need for
services based on his January 30, 2025 positive drug test. Relying on the New
Jersey Supreme Court's ruling in Division of Child Protection and Permanency
v. J.C., 257 N.J. 451, 465-66 (2024), father argued termination of the litigation
would contradict the holding in that case because his substance abuse issues had
not been remediated and his parole restrictions represented an impermissible
continuing restraint on his parenting time.
A-2384-24
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The Division distinguished J.C. from the facts in this case. It argued
father's parole conditions were not imposed by the Family Part and, therefore,
did not preclude termination of the litigation. Further, the Division noted the
Parole Board monitored father's substance abuse as part of his parole conditions.
The Division contended its continued involvement regarding father was
unnecessary and duplicative of the Parole Board's ongoing review of father's
activities.
After considering the parties' arguments, the judge found "that it [wa]s in
the best interests [of] . . . [Julia] that this litigation be terminated" because the
Division reported no outstanding safety concerns for Julia under mother's care.
Regarding father, the judge explained he remained subject to his PSL conditions
unless modified by the Parole Board.
In denying father's motion, the judge distinguished J.C. because father's
parole conditions were established by a criminal court judge rather than a Family
Part judge. Because the Family Part was not the court imposing conditions on
father's parenting time with Julia, the judge concluded she was not precluded
from terminating the litigation.
Additionally, the judge acknowledged the Parole Board's response to
father's informal request to modify the conditions of his parole. The judge noted
A-2384-24
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the Parole Board's unofficial rejection of unsupervised parenting time and the
Parole Board's advice that father needed to demonstrate a longer period of
compliance with the conditions of parole before it would consider unsupervised
parenting time. The judge explained she would defer to the Parole Board
regarding father's request to modify the PSL conditions because she did "not
find it appropriate . . . to address or remove th[e] condition of parole, especially
in light of the fact that there [wa]s a question as to whether [father] ha[d] been
compliant with all of his conditions for a period of time."
The judge entered a March 4, 2025 order terminating the litigation and
denying father's motion to modify his parole conditions. In the order, the judge
wrote: "[Father] continues to have [PSL] due to a prior criminal sentence and
shall continue to be supervised around [Julia] until a modification is made by
[the] Parole [Board]."
On appeal, father argues the Family Part judge erred in denying
modification of his parole conditions to allow him unsupervised parenting time
with Julia without a plenary hearing. He further claims the Family Part judge
had jurisdiction to determine whether he could have unsupervised parenting time
with Julia under the best interests of the child test. Additionally, father asserts
A-2384-24
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the judge's termination of the litigation was contrary to J.C. Mother joins in
father's arguments. We reject these arguments.
Our review of a trial judge's interpretation of a statute is de novo.
Kocanowski v. Twp. of Bridgewater, 237 N.J. 3, 9 (2019) (citing State v. Fuqua,
234 N.J. 583, 591 (2018)). "A court normally ascribes to the statute's words
their 'generally accepted meaning,' and construes them 'in context with related
provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole.'" Ibid. (quoting
Spade v. Select Comfort Corp., 232 N.J. 504, 514-15 (2018)) (citation omitted).
We also "interpret a regulation in the same manner that we would interpret a
statute." US Bank, N.A. v. Hough, 210 N.J. 187, 199 (2012) (citing Bedford v.
Riello, 195 N.J. 210, 221-22 (2008)).
We first address father's argument the judge erred in finding she lacked
jurisdiction to modify his conditions of parole and should have conducted a
plenary hearing before deciding the issue.
Article VI, Section III, Paragraph 2 of the New Jersey Constitution
assigned "original general jurisdiction throughout the State in all causes" to the
Superior Court of New Jersey. However, when "the Legislature has vested
exclusive jurisdiction with an agency, . . . a court's original jurisdiction over the
subject matter" is preempted. Smerling v. Harrah's Ent., Inc., 389 N.J. Super.
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10
181, 187 (App. Div. 2006). "[J]urisdiction of an administrative agency may be
said to be exclusive when the remedy which the agency is empowered to grant
is the only available remedy for the given situation." In re Hoboken Tchrs.'
Ass'n, 147 N.J. Super. 240, 248 (App. Div. 1977).
Because the Superior Court of New Jersey has "original general
jurisdiction throughout the State in all causes," absent the Legislature vesting
exclusive jurisdiction in the Parole Board, father argues the Family Part judge
had jurisdiction to modify his PSL conditions.
As relevant here, N.J.A.C. 10A:72-2.6(a) provides:
In the case of an offender sentenced to . . . [PSL] and
the offense committed by the offender involved a minor
child, the offender may not initiate, establish, or
maintain unsupervised contact with a minor child
unless approved by the [d]istrict [p]arole [s]upervisor
or designee or by the appropriate court.
Father asserts this regulation does not exclusively empower the Parole Board to
approve unsupervised visitation with minors because it also refers to approval
of such a request "by the appropriate court." Father argues the Family Part was
"the appropriate court" to modify his parole conditions and allow unsupervised
contact with his daughter.
Father misstates the judge's conclusion on this issue. The judge did not
state she lacked jurisdiction to address father's motion. Rather, the judge found
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it was inappropriate to address the father's PSL conditions because the Parole
Board explained father had not been compliant with his parole conditions. The
judge found the Parole Board required father to demonstrate at least six months
of compliance with the conditions of his parole before it would consider
allowing unsupervised parenting time with Julia. The judge merely deferred to
the Parole Board regarding father's future compliance with the conditions of his
parole before considering father's request for unsupervised parenting time.
Father cites the Family Part's "parens patriae responsibility to protect the
welfare of children" as evidence that the Family Part is "the appropriate court"
to hear his parole modification request. In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J.
337, 347 (1999) (citing In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 10 (1992)). Father
asserts the Family Part's obligation to protect the welfare of children implies it
is "the appropriate court" to modify his parole conditions to allow unsupervised
parenting time with Julia.
Father failed to cite a single regulation designating the Family Part as "the
appropriate court" to modify conditions of parole associated with a previous
criminal conviction. Nor did father cite any case law establishing the Family
Part as "the appropriate court" under such circumstances.
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Courts defer to the Parole Board regarding parole-related requests because
of "its expertise in the specialized area of parole supervision." J.I. v. N.J. State
Parole Bd., 228 N.J. 204, 230 (2017) (citing McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd.,
347 N.J. Super. 544, 563 (App. Div. 2002)). The Family Part's expertise
governing the welfare of a child is separate from regulations governing the
Parole Board's exercise of its authority related to the conditions of parole.
Even if we agreed the Family Part was "the appropriate court" to decide
father's request to modify the conditions of his parole, which we do not, father
argues the judge impermissibly abdicated the Family Part's obligation regarding
the best interests of the child by deferring to the Parole Board's
recommendations. Father contends the judge's deference to the Parole Board
"short-circuited the essential function of the court to consider [Julia]'s best
interest."
The judge did not abdicate her responsibilities. Rather, she deferred to the
Parole Board because there was a "question as to whether [father] ha[d] been
compliant with all of his [parole] conditions for a period of time." The judge
noted the Parole Board handled parole matters and wanted the Parole Board's
input before rendering a decision regarding Julia's best interests.
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Father and mother also argue N.J.S.A. 9:2-4.1 confers jurisdiction to
judges in the Family Part to consider modification of parole conditions. The
statute provides in part:
Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, a
person convicted of sexual contact . . . or endangering
the welfare of a child . . . shall not be awarded the
custody of or visitation rights to any minor child, except
upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence that
it is in the best interest of the child for such custody or
visitation rights to be awarded.
[N.J.S.A. 9:2-4.1(b).]
Father and mother assert father satisfied the statute's "clear and
convincing evidence" standard to warrant consideration of father's motion for
unsupervised parenting time and modification of father's PSL conditions. Father
and mother note the Parole Board does not consider the best interests of the child
and, therefore, contend the Family Part is best suited to address father's PSL
restrictions under the best interests of the child test.
Contrary to father's argument, nothing in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4.1 addresses
parole conditions and the Family Part's ability to modify such restrictions, even
where the parole conditions involve minors. If father's restrictions are modified
by the Parole Board, the Family Part would be able to address father's request
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for unsupervised parenting time under N.J.S.A. 9:2-4.1(b), focusing on Julia's
best interests.
Here, the judge merely required father to resolve his parole conditions
with the Parole Board as the agency specializing in addressing modification of
the conditions of parole. On these facts, the judge did not err in denying father's
motion and deferring to the Parole Board.
We next address father's argument that the judge erred in denying his
request for a plenary hearing. Denial of a plenary hearing "is reviewed for abuse
of discretion, with deference to the expertise of Family Part judges." Costa v.
Costa, 440 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 2015) (citing Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J.
Super. 102, 111-12 (App. Div. 2007)). When the matter involves the welfare of
a child, the movant must "show there is a genuine and substantial factual dispute
regarding the welfare of the children" warranting a plenary hearing. Hand, 391
N.J. Super. at 105 (citing Shaw v. Shaw, 138 N.J. Super. 436, 440 (App. Div.
1976)).
Father argues his September 2024 evaluation by Dr. Yeoman supported
unsupervised contact with Julia warranting a plenary hearing. He asserts the
information in Dr. Yeoman's evaluation and his PSL conditions created a factual
dispute regarding Julia's best interest. Father claims his PSL conditions should
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have been evaluated by way of a plenary hearing. If the judge had held a plenary
hearing, father argues the Division and Julia would have been able to submit
evidence as to why unsupervised parenting time was not in Julia's best interest
and cross-examine Dr. Yeoman regarding his opinions in the September 2024
evaluation.
Father does not deny he is subject to PSL conditions prohibiting contact
with minors. He also concedes the Parole Board informally considered Dr.
Yeoman's September 2024 evaluation. After reviewing the evaluation, the
Parole Board explained it would not consider modifying father's PSL conditions
until he demonstrated a longer period of parole compliance.
There are no disputed facts warranting a plenary hearing in this case.
Father's parole conditions and his compliance with those conditions are first
reviewed by the Parole Board. The Family Part may consider unsupervised
parenting time and the best interest of the child after the Parole Board modifies
father's parole conditions.
We turn to father's argument the judge erred in terminating the litigation
despite the continuing restraints imposed on his exercise of unsupervised
parenting time. We disagree.
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Father argues the termination of the litigation without addressing his
parenting time restrictions "left [him] unrepresented while the restraints on his
parenting time with his own daughter endured." Father and mother assert the
judge's order terminating the litigation was contrary to the New Jersey Supreme
Court's ruling in J.C., which prevents "the Division's continued involvement
with the family without the requisite judicial oversight." 257 N.J. at 465-66.
Father contends the judge left the case "open administratively with the Division"
as further support for his argument that the judge should not have terminated the
litigation. However, nothing in the judge's March 4, 2025 order terminating the
litigation stated the case would remain administratively open with the Division.
In J.C., the Court addressed "whether a family court judge may dismiss an
action for the care and supervision of children brought pursuant to [Title 30] but
continue restraints on a parent's conduct." Id. at 455. J.C. involved a Title 30
action against a child's mother where the trial court found "the children were not
benefiting from the Division's involvement and the court was satisfied that there
were no additional services the Division could provide to assist" the mother and,
as a result, the trial court "dismissed the litigation with restraints" imposed on
the mother. Id. at 459. The Court held "the Division's continued involvement
with the family without the requisite judicial oversight" was "inconsistent with
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the express provisions of [Title 30]." Id. at 465-66. The Court explained that
"if the court finds that the Division established by a preponderance of the
evidence that restraints on a parent's contact with her children is in their best
interests, the case should not be dismissed." Id. at 466.
Father and mother argue the facts in this case are analogous to the facts in
J.C. The parents contend the judge erred in terminating the litigation without
resolving father's PSL restrictions related to unsupervised parenting time.
However, J.C. is distinguishable because the judge in this matter did not impose
the restraints on father's parenting time. Rather, father's PSL conditions were
imposed by a criminal court judge as part of father's 2012 criminal conviction
and sentence. Therefore, the judge did not violate J.C. by terminating the
litigation.
Affirmed.
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