The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0402-24
ILVIN F. TORIBIO,
Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
and INNOVATIONS IN WALL
COVERINGS, INC.,
Respondents.
_____________________________
Submitted January 7, 2026 – Decided April 15, 2026
Before Judges Mayer and Jacobs.
On appeal from the Board of Review, Division of
Unemployment Insurance, Department of Labor and
Workforce Development, Docket No. 308301.
Northeast New Jersey Legal Services, attorneys for
appellant (Stanley G. Sheats, on the briefs).
Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent Board of Review (Janet Greenberg Cohen,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Gordon C.
Estes, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Ilvin F. Toribio appeals the August 27, 2024 final agency decision of the
Department of Labor Board of Review (Board), affirming denial of his request
for unemployment benefits and compelling payment of a refund for improperly
paid unemployment and federal Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA)
benefits as redetermined by an Appeal Tribunal (Tribunal) of the Division of
Unemployment and Temporary Disability Insurance (Division). We affirm.
I.
Toribio worked as a warehouse associate at Innovations in Wall
Coverings, Inc. (Innovations) and performed general warehouse duties,
including accounting, counting merchandise, packaging, and cleaning. In early
April 2020, Innovations temporarily closed because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Toribio applied for unemployment benefits on April 5, 2020.1
Some weeks later, Innovations reopened and Toribio returned to work for
several more unspecified months before permanently leaving the job on
February 10, 2021. Rather than opening a new unemployment claim in February
1
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 104, the Governor declared "both a Public
Health Emergency and State of Emergency" on March 17, 2020.
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2
2021, petitioner "reasserted" his initial April 2020 claim, which the Division's
computer system automatically reopened. Toribio initially received $1,017 for
a two-week period, March 20 through April 3, 2021. He received $13,689 in
benefits for his second or "transitional" claim for the weeks ending April 17,
2021 through January 8, 2022. 2
On September 6, 2022, the Division issued a "redetermination,"
concluding Toribio was disqualified from receiving benefits because he left his
job voluntarily without good cause attributable to the work, and was ineligible
for PUA benefits because his unemployment did not arise for a qualifying reason
under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act. The
Division demanded payment of refunds for both sets of benefits, totaling
$14,706. Toribio appealed.
2
A claimant "can only have one valid unemployment claim at a time." Division
of Unemployment Insurance, Glossary,
https://www.nj.gov/labor/myunemployment/ help/glossary (last visited Apr. 2,
2026) (hereinafter "Glossary"). On the date a claimant files a new claim, a new
364-day "benefit year" begins. Ibid. See also N.J.S.A. 43:21-19 (defining
"benefit year"). At the end of each benefit year, the claimant's current claim
expires, and they must file a new "transitional" claim to continue receiving
benefits. See Glossary. If a claimant stops receiving benefits for a claim, that
claim is then "closed." Ibid. To resume receiving benefits in the same benefit
year, the claimant must reassert the closed claim. Ibid. When the claimant does
so, the Division's computer system automatically reopens that claim and
resumes paying benefits. Ibid.
A-0402-24
3
Following a July 19, 2023 hearing, at which Toribio was the sole witness,
the Tribunal affirmed the Division's redeterminations. The Tribunal found
Toribio's health fears were personal, unsupported by medical advice, or evidence
of unusual danger in the workplace. It noted, "[b]ecause [Toribio] had
requalifying work after the original claim date, he was able to qualify for a valid
'transitional' claim dated [April 11, 2021] from which he continued to receive
benefits." The Tribunal concluded, however, that Toribio's voluntary separation
from work did not qualify him for unemployment or PUA benefits under the
CARES Act. Toribio appealed to the Board, which summarily affirmed both
decisions on August 27, 2024. Toribio appealed.
On appeal, Toribio argues the agency deprived him of procedural due
process by redetermining his benefit eligibility after long delay, without
identifying the legal basis for reopening his case. He concedes "he was
ineligible for regular unemployment benefits" and "may not have been eligible
for [PUA] benefits." However, he argues "[e]ven if the court agrees with the
agency that [his] unemployment was not a 'direct result' of the pandemic, the
agency must be estopped from recouping any of his benefits." In support of
equitable considerations, he contends "[i]t is difficult, if not impossible, for most
people to find unemployment regulations online. . . . Claimants are thus at an
enormous disadvantage in challenging this violation of their rights." He asserts
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the agency does not state how its redetermination met the governing standards.
See N.J.A.C. 12:17-3.3(b).
In the alternative, Toribio argues labelling the overpayment as an "agency
error" pursuant to N.J.A.C. 12:17-14.3 would be appropriate. Doing so would
not reduce the amount of the debt, but it would limit the agency's recoupment to
50% of any subsequently-claimed benefits until the full debt is repaid.
The Board contends the redetermination complied with N.J.A.C. 12:17-
3.3(b). It maintains Toribio's separation was voluntary, based on personal
reasons not attributable to work, and that his circumstances did not satisfy the
eligibility criteria for PUA under federal law. The Board argues repayment is
required by statute, and equitable estoppel is unwarranted because the Division
even-handedly applied the law. See N.J.S.A. 43:21-16.
II.
Our "review of an administrative agency's decision is limited." McClain
v. Bd. of Rev., Dep't of Lab., 451 N.J. Super. 461, 466 (App. Div. 2017), aff'd,
237 N.J. 445 (2019) (citing In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011)). We
inquire only whether the agency action violated legislative policies, lacked
support in the record, or was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Zimmerman
v. Sussex Cnty. Educ. Servs. Comm'n, 237 N.J. 465, 475 (2019); Brady v. Bd.
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5
of Rev., 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997); see N.J.A.C. 12:17-3.3. More pointedly, our
review is limited to determining:
(1) whether the agency's action violates
express or implied legislative policies, that is, did
the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record
contains substantial evidence to support the
findings on which the agency based its action; and
(3) whether in applying the legislative policies to
the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a
conclusion that could not reasonably have been
made on a showing of the relevant factors.
[Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163, 171 (2014)
(quoting Stallworth, 208 N.J. at 194).]
"[A] court owes substantial deference to the agency's expertise and
superior knowledge of a particular field." In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 28
(2007). Thus, "[g]enerally, 'we afford [an] agency great deference' in reviewing
its 'interpretation of statutes within its scope of authority' in recognition of the
agency's 'specialized expertise.'" McClain, 451 N.J. Super. at 466-67 (quoting
N.J. Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep't of Agric., 196 N.J.
366, 385 (2008)). The challenging party bears the burden of showing agency
action was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Lavezzi, 219 N.J. at 171.
New Jersey's Unemployment Compensation Law (UCL) disqualifies a
claimant who leaves work "voluntarily without good cause attributable to such
work." N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a); Brady, 152 N.J. at 213. "'[G]ood cause attributable
A-0402-24
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to such work' means a reason related directly to the individual's employment,
which was so compelling as to give the individual no choice but to leave the
employment." N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b). "The decision to leave employment must
be compelled by real, substantial and reasonable circumstances not imaginary,
trifling and whimsical ones." Domenico v. Bd. of Rev., 192 N.J. Super. 284,
288 (App. Div. 1983). "[I]t is the employee's responsibility to do what is
necessary and reasonable in order to remain employed." Ibid. (citing Condo v.
Bd. of Rev., 158 N.J. Super. 172, 175 (App. Div. 1978)). "Consistent with a
broad reading of the UCL as remedial legislation . . . 'when an employee
becomes ill and does those things reasonably calculated to protect the
employment[, then] notwithstanding that she is not reinstated, there is no
voluntary leaving of work.'" Haley v. Bd. of Rev., Dep't of Lab., 245 N.J. 511,
522 (2021) (quoting De Lorenzo v. Bd. of Review, Div. of Emp't Sec., 54 N.J.
361, 364 (1969)). However, in such a situation, the claimant must provide
medical proofs supporting a claim of "good cause attributable to the work."
Wojcik v. Bd. of Rev., 58 N.J. 341, 344 (1971).
Here, after a full hearing, the Tribunal found Toribio left work due to
unsubstantiated "personal fear of catching COVID-19," not because of a work-
related compulsion, danger, or medical direction. Toribio did not demonstrate
his employer's workplace presented an unreasonable COVID-19 risk or that
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mitigative steps were available but not implemented. The Tribunal's findings
are supported by substantial evidence in the record and align with governing
law.
Toribio asserts the Division lacked grounds for reopening a final
determination without stating its reasons, violating N.J.A.C. 12:17-3.3(b),
which provides:
(b) The Division may reconsider [or redetermine] a
final determination for the following reasons:
1. Fraud, misrepresentation or misconduct of a
party;
2. Newly discovered evidence not ascertainable
at the time of the initial benefit determination by
the exercise of reasonable diligence and the
making of proper inquiry which would probably
alter the determination;
3. Obvious material mistake or error which
requires correction;
4. To vacate a determination which is entered
without legal right and is void; or
5. The correction of inadvertent, premature, or
clearly erroneous action.
[N.J.A.C. 12:17-3.3(b).]
On review, the record demonstrates Toribio was ineligible for benefits
from the outset because he left work voluntarily without good cause.
A-0402-24
8
Additionally, he was ineligible for unemployment and PUA benefits. His receipt
of benefits was thus a clear error, entered without legal right, and subject to
correction under the regulation. The administrative record, including the
Tribunal's written decisions, provides adequate notice of the legal basis for the
redetermination. Due process requires meaningful notice and an opportunity to
be heard, which were satisfied. See Rivera v. Bd. of Rev., 127 N.J. 578, 583,
584 (1992).
N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d) requires refund of benefits received by claimants not
entitled to them. The law applies regardless of good faith or reliance by the
claimant. Bannan v. Bd. of Rev., 299 N.J. Super. 671, 674 (App. Div. 1997)
(citing Fischer v. Bd. of Rev., 123 N.J. Super. 263, 266 (App. Div. 1973)).
Federal law also requires recoupment of overpayments. Equitable estoppel
rarely applies to bar recoupment by the government. To invoke the doctrine
requires proof of a "manifest injustice" and detrimental reliance. See Sullivan
v. Bd. of Rev., Dep't of Lab., 471 N.J. Super. 147, 157 (App. Div. 2022); Vogt
v. Borough of Belmar, 14 N.J. 195, 205 (1954).
Because this equitable argument was not presented to the Division and
neither the Tribunal nor the Board made pertinent factual findings, we would
ordinarily decline to consider it. However, because both parties substantively
addressed the arguments in their briefs and to preclude further litigation, we
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briefly consider it. See Price v. Himeji, LLC, 214 N.J. 263, 294 (2013) (quoting
State v. Santos, 210 N.J. 129, 142 (2012)).
On review of the record and exercising original jurisdiction, we discern
no manifest injustice warranting estoppel. Here, after a full hearing, the
Tribunal found Toribio left work due to unsubstantiated fears of COVID-19, not
because of a work-related compulsion, incentive, or under medical advice. We
are satisfied the Tribunal's findings are supported by substantial evidence in the
record and align with governing law.
Lastly, to qualify for PUA eligibility under the CARES Act, claimants
must show unemployment "as a direct result of COVID-19." 15 U.S.C. §
9021(a)(3)(A). The Tribunal found no qualifying circumstance under federal
guidelines. Toribio's fear of possible infection did not amount to an involuntary
work cessation compelled by COVID-19. The record supports this conclusion.
In sum, the Board's affirmance of the Division's redetermination was not
arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Its findings and demand for recoupment
are supported by substantial evidence in the record, applicable statutes, and
regulations.
Affirmed.
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