Gil

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

WESTERN DIVISION

VIANNY L. PEDROZA GIL, ]

By Candace Pimentel, Next Friend ]

]

Petitioner, ]

]

v. ] 7:26-cv-498-EGL-GMB

]

SHERIFF OF PICKENS COUNTY ]

et al., ]

]

Respondents. ]

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On March 26, 2026, Petitioner Vianny Pedroza Gil filed a petition for writ of

habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 through Candace Pimentel, Next Friend. Doc.

1. With the permission of the Court, she amended her petition on April 6, 2026. See

Docs. 10, 12. Because it plainly appears from the petition that Gil is not entitled to

relief, the Court DENIES her habeas petition (Doc. 10).

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Gil is a Colombian national who entered the United States in October 2022.

Docs. 13 at 2, 13-1 at 2. After presenting herself at the border and being briefly

detained, Gil was paroled into the United States. Doc. 13 at 2-3. On December 3,

2025, Gil was issued a Notice to Appear charging her as being an alien present in

the United States who has not been admitted or paroled under Section

212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the INA and an immigrant not in possession of a valid unexpired

passport, or other suitable travel document or document of identity and nationality

under Section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the INA. See generally Doc. 13-2.

On March 23, 2026, Gil was arrested and taken to the Pickens County

Detention Center. See Doc. 1 at 1-2. She filed her habeas petition on March 26, 2026.

Id. On March 27, 2026, she was transferred to the South Louisiana Processing Center

where she remains detained. See Docs. 13 at 3, 13-3 at 2.

II. JURISDICTION

The habeas statute permits district courts to grant relief only “within their

respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). Jurisdiction depends on the

petitioner’s location at the time of filing. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434-

35, 443 (2004). A subsequent transfer after the petition is filed does not divest a

court of jurisdiction. See id. at 440-41 (discussing Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 304-

06 (1944)).

Gil was in custody at the Pickens County Detention Center in Carrollton,

Alabama, when she filed her petition. See generally Doc. 1. Because that facility lies

within this district, the Court has jurisdiction over the petition.

III. STATUTORY BACKGROUND

Though Gil does not expressly challenge her classification under the

Immigration and Nationality Act, that classification is nonetheless central to her

claims.

Section 1225(a)(1) of the INA provides that all aliens “present in the United

States who ha[ve] not been admitted or who arrive[] in the United States” are deemed

“applicant[s] for admission.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). The INA defines “admission,”

as the “lawful entry … into the United States after inspection and authorization by

an immigration officer.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). That requires formal, lawful

entry. Morales v. Noem, No. 25-62598, 2026 WL 236307, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 29,

2026). An alien who enters without inspection therefore remains an “applicant for

admission,” regardless of how long he has remained in the country or how far he has

traveled from the border. See Mejia Olalde v. Noem, 2025 WL 3131942, at *2-3

(E.D. Mo. Nov. 10, 2025); Rojas v. Olson, 2025 WL 3033967, at *6, *8 (E.D. Wis.

Oct. 30, 2025).

Section 1225(b)(2)(A) directs that an immigration officer “shall” detain “an

alien who is an applicant for admission,” if the officer determines that the alien “is

not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

Like subsection (a), subsection (b)(2) contains no exception based on the duration

of the alien’s presence in the United States or the depth of the alien’s incursion into

the country. That lack of exceptions is particularly noticeable given that other parts

of § 1225 do categorize certain aliens based on whether they are “arriving” or

whether they have “been physically present in the United States” for a period of

time. See id. §§ 1225(a)(2), (b)(1)(A)(iii)(II). But under § 1225(b)(2)(A), subject

only to limited statutory exceptions, Congress required DHS to detain all

“applicant[s] for admission” who are not “clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be

admitted.”

Upon termination of her parole, Gil fell under § 1225(b)’s mandatory

detention provision. She is present in the United States, has not been lawfully

admitted, and does not fall within any of the exceptions to

§ 1225(b)(2)(A). See Docs. 13-1, 13-2. Nor has she established that he is “clearly

and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). The statute

therefore treats her as an applicant for admission subject to mandatory detention. See

Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 502 (5th Cir. 2026) (“Presence without

admission deems [petitioners] to be applicants for admission.”) (citing 8 U.S.C. §

1225(a)(1)).

DISCUSSION

Gil’s petition presents four counts. See generally Doc. 10. She asserts that

each justifies her immediate and unconditional release, yet she ultimately bears the

burden of proving that her custody violates federal law. Whitfield v. U.S. Sec’y of

State, 853 F. App’x 327, 329 (11th Cir. 2021); Martin v. Beto, 397 F.2d 741, 749

(5th Cir. 1968). Though enumerated separately, each count within Gil’s petition

presents fundamentally the same claim: that her detention violates her due-process

rights. The Court therefore addresses those claims together.

I. Counts 1-4: Violation of Due Process

Gil argues that her detention violates her Fifth Amendment Due Process

rights, amounts to unlawful and prolonged detention, causes irreparable harm to

herself and her children, and violates principles of fundamental fairness. See Doc.

10 at 7-8; see also Doc. 11.

The Fifth Amendment requires the Government to provide due process before

depriving a person of life, liberty, or property. Dep’t of State v. Munoz, 602 U.S.

899, 909-10 (2024). Due process protects not only fair procedure but also certain

“fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this

Nation’s history and tradition.” Id. at 910 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521

U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997)). As such, Gil’s claim regarding “fundamental fairness” is

interchangeable with her Due Process claim. Doc. 10 at 7-8.

“Aliens unlawfully present in the United States have no fundamental right to

move freely about the country.” Palma v. Powell, No. 7:26-CV-299, 2026 WL

701778, at *12 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 12, 2026); see also, e.g., League of United Latin Am.

Citizens (LULAC) v. Bredesen, No. 3:04-0613, 2004 WL 3048724, at *4 (M.D.

Tenn. Sept. 28, 2004). Rather, the Supreme Court has “long recognized the power

to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the

Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control.” Fiallo

v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977). The Supreme Court thus “has firmly and

repeatedly endorsed the proposition that Congress may make rules as to aliens that

would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.” Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522

(2003). Though individuals unlawfully present in the United States possess due-

process rights, those rights exist within the bounds set by rule and statute, as “the

through line of history is recognition of the Government’s sovereign authority to set

the terms governing the admission and exclusion of noncitizens.” Munoz, 602 U.S.

at 911-12. And the Supreme Court has “recognized detention during deportation

proceedings as a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process.” Demore,

538 U.S. at 523. “The Government may, therefore, restrain aliens unlawfully present

from enjoying the privileges and liberties associated with lawful presence and

citizenship pending deportation, such as the right to be free from detention.” Palma,

2026 WL 701778, at *12; see also Fernandez-Fajardo v. I.N.S., 193 F. Supp. 2d

877, 880 (M.D. La. 2001).

Gil argues that she has been subjected to unreasonably prolonged detention

without sufficient justification. Doc. 10 at 7. She argues that because she poses no

danger to the community and does not pose a flight risk, that the Government must

justify its continued detention of her pending deportation. Id.

This Court has repeatedly rejected such claims. See, e.g., Palma, 2026 WL

701778, at *12-13; Ayala v. Harper, No. 1:26-CV-204, 2026 WL 501113, at *9-11

(N.D. Ala. Feb. 23, 2026); Martinez v. Powell, No. 7:26-CV-145, Doc. 23 at 9-10

(N.D. Ala. Feb. 25, 2026). Forcing the Government to determine individually

whether each detained alien constitutes a danger to the community or a flight risk

would be to, in effect, require the Government to employ the least-restrictive means

to accomplish the removal of such aliens. But the Supreme Court has rejected such

arguments, holding that “when the Government deals with deportable aliens, the Due

Process Clause does not require it to employ the least burdensome means to

accomplish its goal.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 528. And that mandatory detention does

not violate due process “for the limited period” of the aliens’ “removal proceedings.”

Id. at 531.

Gil “is due no process beyond the process Congress gave [her],” and

“Congress chose to withhold bond hearings from applicants for admission, so the

Fifth Amendment does too.” Ayala, 2026 WL 501113, at *11. The Supreme Court

has repeatedly confirmed the constitutionality of such mandatory detention pending

removal. See Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 138-40

(2020); see also Demore, 538 U.S. at 523, 531. As the Court explained in

Thuraissigiam, an alien who has never been lawfully admitted “has only those rights

regarding admission that Congress has provided by statute,” and the Due Process

Clause requires nothing further. 591 U.S. at 138-140. Indeed, aliens who enter the

country illegally, “even those paroled elsewhere in the country for years pending

removal,” are treated for due-process purposes “as if stopped at the border.” Id. at

139.

Because Gil was never lawfully admitted to the United States, even though

temporarily permitted to remain on parole, her due-process rights are limited to those

provided by statute. Cf. Jandres-Ordonez v. Bondi, No. 6:25-CV-084, 2026 WL

274493, at *12 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2026). And by statute, § 1225(b) mandates her

detention until “certain proceedings have concluded” and says nothing “whatsoever

about bond hearings.” Id.; see also Kameron v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 7:19-

CV-16, 2020 WL 9460465, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2020).

Gil further argues that the rescheduling of her immigration hearing from May

9, 2028, to April 7, 2026, following her habeas petition “raises serious constitutional

concerns.” Doc. 11 at 1. Invoking Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), Gil

contends that due process requires a “meaningful opportunity to be heard at a

meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Doc. 11 at 1. And her reply contends

that the “abrupt change significantly undermines [her] ability to prepare her case,

secure evidence, and meaningfully present her claims for relief.” Doc. 16 at 5. But

Gil’s procedural due process claim is both premature and presented to the wrong

tribunal. Gil can raise her due process arguments about timing and the ability to be

heard before the immigration judge, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and

ultimately the Eleventh Circuit by a petition for review of a final order. 8 C.F.R. §§

1003.1(b)-(d), 1003.38. She cannot raise them here now, for it is only the “failure to

provide adequate procedures to remedy the otherwise procedurally flawed

deprivation of a protected interest that gives rise to a federal procedural due process

claim.” Cotton v. Jackson, 216 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2000). And there is no

argument that the whole administrative process, with its appeals, will not provide

due process.

Relatedly, an “allegation of a due process violation”—like a denial of “a full

and fair hearing before a neutral factfinder—is precisely the kind of procedural error

which requires exhaustion” before the BIA, before being raised in a petition for

review with the Eleventh Circuit. Amaya-Artunduaga v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 463 F.3d

1247, 1251 (11th Cir. 2006). Gil cannot raise in this Court a claim of a future

procedural error that she has not tried to present through the channels Congress has

prescribed. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).

Finally, Gil’s argument that her detention causes severe hardship for her

family, Doc. 10 at 7, does not warrant habeas relief. The Constitution “does not

ordinarily prevent the government from taking actions that indirectly or incidentally

burden a citizen’s legal rights.” Munoz, 602 U.S. at 917 (internal quotation omitted).

While Gil has presented evidence of the costs her detention is imposing on her and

her family, that evidence does not create an independent ground for habeas relief.

Gil’s detention does not violate federal law and thus her petition must be denied.

CONCLUSION

Gil fails to demonstrate that she is entitled to habeas relief. Accordingly, the

Court DENIES her habeas petition (Doc. 10) on the merits.

DONE and ORDERED this 14th day of April, 2026.

EDMUND G.LACOURJR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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