The opinion
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FOR THE STATE OF DELAWARE
IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY
STATE OF DELAWARE,
V. C.A. No.: 2509000599
STEVEN WU,
Defendant.
)
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion in Limine to
determine the meaning of the phrase “beyond that relationship” as it is used in 11
Del. C. § 1335(a)(9)(b) in advance of trial.! Although cloaked as a motion in limine,
the Motion is not procedural in nature;” rather, is dispositive of a substantive legal
issue and thus should not be considered under the framework of a motion in limine.?
However, given that resolution of this issue is necessary for adjudication, the parties
consented to this Court deciding the issue in a manner akin to a declaratory
' Throughout their briefing, the parties quoted the phrase at issue as “beyond the relationship.” See Def.
Mtn. at {§ 6, 7, 8, 11; State’s Opp’n at J¥ 18, 19, 24, 25, 27, 37, 40, 42. However, that is a misstatement of
the statutory language, which describes conduct occurring “beyond that relationship,” referring to the
antecedent clause “private or confidential relationship.” 11 De/. C. § 1335(a)(9)(b)(emphasis added).
> The issue is clearly substantive as it calls for statutory interpretation which will determine whether
Defendant’s actions constitute criminal activity under the statute. Hercules, Inc. v. AIU Ins. Co., 784 A.2d
481, 500 (Del. 2001 (contrasting a motion in limine, which “typically concerns the admissibility of evidence
and is a preliminary motion,” with one that “obviates the need for trial of the matter” and thus “is not
preliminary” as “‘it is dispositive of a substantive legal issue’’).
> MSF Oakdale, LLC v. Transform Operating Stores, LLC, 2025 WL 3763966, at *4 (Del. Super. Dec. 30,
2025)(“When evaluating whether to grant or deny a motion in limine, the trial court must ensure a
substantive motion is not being disguised as a motion in limine’’).
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judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that 11 Del. C. §
1335(a)(9)(b) contemplates confidentiality as to third parties where the protected
materials were created or collected with consent limited to the context of a private
or confidential relationship, without regard to the status of that relationship at the
time the proscribed acts occur.
I BACKGROUND
The facts which follow are culled from the briefing submitted and appear to
be uncontroverted.4 Defendant Steven Wu and Complainant were engaged in a
consensual romantic relationship from 2019 to 2022 while both were married to
other individuals. During the relationship, Complainant sent Defendant intimate
photographs of herself via electronic messages, and Defendant also took
photographs of Complainant with her knowledge. Complainant contends that the
photos were solely for Defendant. The relationship ended in 2022, at which time
Complainant requested that Defendant delete the images.
On August 31, 2025, Defendant placed multiple printed photographs
depicting Complainant nude and engaged in a sexual act into the mailbox shared by
Complainant and her husband. The photographs were not enclosed in an envelope.
Complainant and her husband discovered the images that evening and contacted law
* To be clear, the Court is not reaching a finding as to any facts, but is merely providing an account of the
facts as presented by the parties in briefing.
enforcement. Defendant admitted to placing the photographs in the mailbox, stating
he did so to “return them.” Complainant asserts she did not request their return and
did not consent to the creation of physical copies.
Defendant was charged with one count of Harassment in violation of 11 Del.
C. § 1311 and one count of Violation of Privacy in violation of 11 Del. C. §
1335(a)(9).
II. PARTIES CONTENTIONS
As an initial matter, it should be noted that, while Defendant was charged with
violation of § 1335(a)(9), the phrase at issue, “beyond that relationship,” does not
appear in that section of the statute; rather, it is derived from subsection (b) of §
1335(a)(9). While not explicitly stated in their briefing, it appears the parties
construe subsection (b) as an elaboration of the conduct prohibited in § 1335(a)(9)
where the visual depictions of a person originated in the context of a private or
confidential relationship. The Court concurs with this interpretation.>
Defendant argues that the phrase “beyond that relationship” in 11 Del. C. §
1335(a)(9)(b) should be interpreted as party-based, meaning it refers to
dissemination of images to individuals who were not party to the relationship. Under
this interpretation, the statute prohibits sharing visual depictions with third parties
5 This interpretation is consistent with the statutory construction, as subsection (b) itself is not a chargeable
offense and therefore only stands to help elucidate § 1335(a)(9).
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but does not impose a temporal limitation tied to the end of the relationship.
Defendant contends that the depicted person’s reasonable expectation of privacy is
limited to preventing disclosure to outsiders, not to restricting use after the
relationship ends. Defendant further asserts that the State’s temporal interpretation
would lead to an unreasonable result by implying that no expectation of privacy
exists during the relationship itself. Accordingly, Defendant maintains that “beyond
that relationship” concerns access by third parties, and absent such third-party
dissemination, no violation occurred.
The State argues that the phrase “beyond that relationship” encompasses both
party-based and temporal meanings, and that these interpretations are not mutually
exclusive. Under the State’s view, an individual retains a reasonable expectation of
privacy both as to dissemination to third parties and as to any use of the images after
the relationship has ended. The State contends that the statutory term “retain”
supports a temporal reading, indicating that the expectation of privacy continues
beyond the termination of the relationship. Additionally, the State argues that even
under Defendant’s party-based interpretation, a violation occurred because the
images were reproduced and distributed in a manner accessible to third parties by
placement in a shared mailbox. Therefore, the State maintains, Defendant’s conduct
constitutes a violation under either or both interpretations of the statute.
Il. DISCUSSION
When interpreting a statute, the guiding tenet is legislative intent, for the goal
© Tfa statute
of statutory construction is “to give effect to the intent of the legislature.
is unambiguous, the literal meaning of its words will control; a court may look
beyond the statutory text only when the statute is genuinely ambiguous.’ However,
disagreement as to its meaning does not inherently render the statute ambiguous;
rather, ambiguity exists where the statute is “reasonably susceptible to different
interpretations, or if giving a literal interpretation to the words of the statute would
lead to an unreasonable or absurd result that could not have been intended by the
legislature.”®
At issue here is the phrase “beyond that relationship,” and, intrinsically, its
antecedent phrase “private or confidential relationship,” neither of which are defined
within the Criminal Code. When a term is not statutorily defined in the Criminal
Code, “the commonly accepted meaning and dictionary definition of that word are
to be used.”? Under that metric, it is clear there is no ambiguity in the phrase
° Coastal Barge Corp. v. Coastal Zone Industrial Control Board, 492 A. 2d 1242, 1246 (Del. 1985).
7 Arnold y. State, 49 A.3d 1180, 1183 (Del. 2012)(citing Dennis v. State, 41 A.3d 391, 393 (Del. 2012));
Hudson Farms, Inc. v. McGrellis, 620 A.2d 215, 217 (Del. 1993)(citing The Stop & Shop Companies, Inc.
v. Suzanne Quinlan Gonzales, 619 A.2d 896 (Del.1993)); In re Port of Wilmington Gantry Crane Litig., 238
A.3d 921, 927 (Del. Super. 2020) (citing Friends of H. Fletcher Brown Mansion vy. City of Wilmington, 34
A.3d 1055, 1059 (Del. 2011).
8 Arnold, 49 A.3d at 1183.
° State v. Taye, 54 A. 3d 1116, 1117 (Del. 2009); 11 Del. C. § 221(c)(“If a word used in this Criminal Code
is not defined herein, it has its commonly accepted meaning, and may be defined as appropriate to fulfill
the purposes of the provision”).
“beyond that [private or confidential] relationship.” Dictionary definitions of the
relevant words support a finding Section 1335(a)(9)(b) concerns acts occurring
outside the confines of a restricted, nonpublic association of two or more people,
without regard to the status of that relationship when the proscribed acts occur.'°
However, the dictionary definition of a word is not the sole data point available in
ascertaining the word’s commonly accepted, plain meaning.'!
“In addition to relying on dictionary definitions, a court may look to how a
term or phrase is used in a particular legal context” for “[w]ords appear in sentences,
and ‘the meaning of sentences depends critically on context’. . . although dictionary
definitions contribute significantly to the analysis, the words they contain do not
appear in their natural habitat.”'* Consider, for example, the phrase “passed the bar
exam.” The dictionary offers a wide range of definitions for the word “bar,”
including “a solid piece or block of material that is longer than it is wide”;
“something that obstructs or prevents passage, progress, or action”; ‘“‘a counter at
'0 Merriam-Webster defines both “private” and “confidential” as “intended for or restricted to the use of a
particular person, group, or class,” and it defines the term “relationship” as “the way in which two or more
things or people are connected: the state of being related or interrelated.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/private, merriam-webster.com/dictionary/confidential, merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/relationship (last visited March 26, 2026). As for the term “beyond”—when used
as a preposition, as it is in § 1335(a)(9)(b)—the definitions include “‘on or to the farther side of : at a greater
distance than” and “out of the reach or sphere of.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER, merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/beyond (last visited March 26, 2026).
"| In re Fox Corporation/Snap Inc., 312 A.3d 636, 647-648 (Del. 2024); Osgood vy. State, 310 A.3d 415,
420 (Del. 2023)(““words in a statute should be given meaning through the context in which they are used”);
G.H. Associates, Inc. v. Members of Bd. of Adjustment of Town of Millsboro, 1991 WL 53448, at *3 (Del.
Super. March 27, 1991)(“In determining what a word means in a statute, the Court examines the dictionary
definition as well as the context and setting of the word”).
'2 In re P3 Health Group Holdings, LLC, 282 A.3d 1054, 1066 (Del. Ch. Sept. 12, 2022).
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which food or especially alcoholic beverages are served”; and “the test that a person
must pass in order to become eligible to work as a lawyer.”'? In this scenario, the
common meaning of the word “bar” becomes apparent only when viewed in the
context of its encompassing sentence.
Similarly here, the word “beyond” is capable of varying definitions within and
across dictionary sources.'* However, the plain meaning of the word is crystallized
by its context. The critical descriptive verbs which precede the phrase “beyond that
relationship”—.e., "reproduction, distribution, exhibition, publication, transmission,
or other dissemination”—are most naturally understood to describe the scope of
dissemination rather than the timing of it.'° Each of these verbs contemplates the
movement of a visual depiction from one person to another. Thus, the statutory
language focuses on the sharing or exposure of such depictions to others, supporting
a reading that “beyond that relationship” refers to disclosure outside the confines of
the private relationship in which the images were originally shared.
This interpretation is reinforced by the statute’s emphasis on a “reasonable
expectation of privacy.” The expectation protected is that the images will not be
13 MERRIAM-WEBSTER, merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bar (last visited March 26, 2026).
'4 See, e.g., n. 9; Beyond, prep., WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2005)(“1. On or
onto the far side of: past. 2. Outside the scope or reach of. 3. To a degree or amount greater than. 4. In
addition to: besides.”); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY (2d ed.1984)(“‘1. on or to the far side
of; farther on than; past 2. farther on in time than; later than 3. outside the reach, possibility, or
understanding of 4. more or better than; exceeding; surpassing 5. in addition to”).
'S 11 Del. C. § 1335(a)(9).
further disseminated outside the relationship. In other words, the privacy interest at
issue is one of confidentiality as to third parties. Reading the statute to impose a
purely temporal limitation would lead to an absurd result. If the language means
dissemination is a violation of the law only after the relationship is terminated, then
a person in possession of such protected images could freely share or broadcast them
out on social media until placed on notice that the relationship is over—a scenario
which runs afoul of the chargeable section of the statute, § 1335(a)(9).'°
Accordingly, the Court concludes that 11 Del. C. § 1335(a)(9)(b)
contemplates confidentiality as to third parties where the protected materials were
created or collected with consent limited to the context of a private or confidential
relationship without regard to the status of that relationship at the time the proscribed
acts occur.!”
IT IS SO ORDERED this 27" day of March, 2026.
'6 Since the statute contains unambiguous language clearly reflective of the legislature’s intent, the plain
language of the statute controls. Hoover v. State, 958 A.2d 816, 820 (Del. 2008). However, even if the
Court needed to look beyond the plain language of the statute, the Court would reach the same conclusion,
as it clearly aligns with the legislature’s intent. The General Assembly’s synopsis explains that the statute
is intended to address “revenge porn,” explaining, “revenge porn” typically refers to the situation where
visual depictions are consensually given to an intimate partner who, after the end of the relationship, later
disseminates them without the consent of the person depicted.” H.B. 260, 147" Gen. Assemb. Reg Sess.
(De. 2014).
17 While this Court has not reached any findings of fact at this stage of the proceedings, it should be noted
that under any of the proposed interpretations of § 1335(a)(9)(b), a reasonable jury could conclude that
Defendant is guilty as charged based upon the facts presented through briefing.
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