Ricardo McClinton v. Warden, Baldwin State Prison

USCA11 Case: 25-10654 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 04/14/2026 Page: 1 of 20

FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 25-10654

____________________

RICARDO MCCLINTON,

Surviving Parents and Co-Administrators of the Estate of

deceased Jamari McClinton,

DORIS JONES,

Surviving Parents and Co-Administrators of the Estate of

deceased Jamari McClinton,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

WARDEN, BALDWIN STATE PRISON,

COUNSELOR JARVIS PRIMUS,

Baldwin State Prison,

WARDEN, PHILLIPS STATE PRISON,

ELADIO ABREU,

NOLITA MOSS,

Defendants-Appellees.

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2 Opinion of the Court 25-10654

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 5:22-cv-00109-MTT

____________________

Before BRANCH, LUCK, Circuit Judges, and SCHLESINGER,∗ District

Judge.

BRANCH, Circuit Judge:

While Jamari McClinton was incarcerated in Phillips State

Prison in Georgia (“Phillips”), he stabbed a high-ranking member

of the Bloods criminal gang during an altercation. Thereafter, the

warden of Phillips placed McClinton in protective custody and

requested McClinton’s transfer to another prison for his protection.

The transfer was approved, and McClinton was sent to Baldwin

State Prison (“Baldwin”). After arriving at Baldwin, McClinton was

placed in the general prison population where another prisoner, a

Bloods member, later stabbed him to death.

McClinton’s parents and estate (the “plaintiffs”) sued five

officials in the Georgia Department of Corrections (“GDOC”)

alleging that each violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of

cruel and unusual punishments. They alleged each official was

deliberately indifferent to the risk that McClinton faced at Baldwin

by failing to ensure that McClinton was properly protected upon

his transfer.

∗ Honorable Harvey E. Schlesinger, United States District Judge for the Middle

District of Florida, sitting by designation.

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The district court granted the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment and dismissed each claim. The district court

found that each defendant was entitled to qualified immunity

because the defendants did not violate any clearly established law.

On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the district court

misconstrued this Court’s en banc precedent in Wade v. McDade, 106

F.4th 1251 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc). Per the plaintiffs, the district

court applied a higher standard for determining whether the

defendants were deliberately indifferent than that required by

Wade and by the Supreme Court in Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825

(1994). By applying the proper standard, they argue, material

disputes of fact remain as to each defendant, and this Court should

therefore reverse the district court in full. Some defendants argue,

however, that they did not know of the risk to McClinton at

Baldwin; and the rest argue that, although generally aware that

McClinton faced danger, they were not subjectively aware that

their conduct caused him a substantial risk of harm.

After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument,

we affirm, because none of the defendants possessed the requisite

subjective knowledge of the risk of harm to McClinton.1

1 The parents also challenge the district court’s dismissal of their claims against

three defendants—Perry, Abreu, and Moss—as time-barred by the relevant

statute of limitations. We need not reach these arguments because our

conclusion on the merits that each of the defendants is protected by qualified

immunity as to the timely claims is equally applicable to the parents’ time-

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I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background2

On April 19, 2021, McClinton, an inmate in Phillips, stabbed

Michael Johnson, another inmate. At the time of the stabbing,

Johnson was a high-ranking member of the Bloods, a notorious

prison gang. After the stabbing, Warden James Perry placed

McClinton in protective custody to protect him from retaliation by

Johnson or another Bloods gang member. Warden Perry also

began the process to have McClinton transferred to another prison

to more permanently separate him from Johnson. The transfer

request stated, “[P]lease transfer inmate McClinton to a facility

with [mental health] level 3 services. He cannot come out on the

compound because of a known enemy. The enemy is identified as

Johnson, Michael GDC#1000386449, a high-ranking Blood

member whom inmate McClinton assaulted with a weapon.”

McClinton remained in protective custody until his transfer.

Classification analyst Eladio Abreu—who worked for

GDOC’s central office rather than any specific prison—reviewed

the transfer request and approved McClinton’s transfer to Baldwin.

Baldwin possessed a mental health level III facility capable of

accommodating McClinton’s needs, and Abreu also believed that

barred claims. As such, the parents’ motion for certification of the statute of

limitations issue to the Supreme Court of Georgia is denied as moot.

2 The facts recited below are either undisputed or construed in the light most

favorable to plaintiffs as the non-moving party. See Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334,

1335 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam).

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transferring McClinton to Baldwin would allow McClinton to no

longer be housed in protective custody. According to Abreu, he

had no knowledge that transferring McClinton to Baldwin would

cause any risk of harm to McClinton.3 Abreu’s approval of

McClinton’s transfer was the extent of his involvement in the

relevant events.

McClinton was transferred to Baldwin on August 6, 2021,

where he was housed in a general population dorm rather than in

protective custody. After the transfer, Baldwin counselor Jarvis

Primus conducted an intake interview with McClinton. During the

interview, McClinton did not tell Primus about any safety concerns

he had and provided no information about his altercation with

Johnson at Phillips. Primus was not informed that McClinton had

been in protective custody at Phillips nor of any threat of harm

McClinton might have faced from any of the prisoners housed at

Baldwin.4 Primus had no further interactions with McClinton after

the interview. There is no evidence that Primus saw Warden

Perry’s transfer request for McClinton.

3 The plaintiffs conceded Abreu’s lack of knowledge, although they asserted

that he had a “duty to address” the issues regarding McClinton’s conflict with

the Bloods gang.

4 The plaintiffs did not dispute that Primus lacked actual knowledge, although

they asserted that “this information was []available in the transfer

documentation, plus a proper intake and review of history would have

produced such knowledge.”

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On August 9 or 10, 2021, McClinton knocked on the door of

his housing unit and pushed past Krystle Milner, a corrections

officer at Baldwin, telling her that he needed to leave his assigned

dormitory. Milner testified that McClinton said, “I got to get out

of the dorm. I did something to an offender at another institution,

and we’re in the same dorm together.” Milner contacted her

supervisor, Lieutenant Nolita Moss, who told Milner to send

McClinton to security. Milner did not tell Moss why McClinton

wanted to leave his dorm.

Moss met with McClinton after Milner sent him to security.

During the meeting, McClinton told Moss that he wanted to be

placed in protective custody, but at no point did he tell Moss why

he wanted to be placed there. Later the same day, McClinton

withdrew his request for protective custody and said that he

wanted to return to his assigned dorm. Based on McClinton’s

decision to withdraw his request, Moss believed that McClinton

would not be in danger in his dorm, so she allowed him to return

there. 5 There is no evidence that Moss saw McClinton’s transfer

request.

On August 11, 2021, McClinton was stabbed to death by

another Baldwin inmate. According to an incident report,

McClinton’s alleged killer was a member of the Bloods gang.

5 The plaintiffs do not dispute Moss’s account of her interactions with

McClinton, although they assert they might have been able to prove otherwise

if Moss had “take[n] the required written statement or otherwise

document[ed] the request.”

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The warden of Baldwin while McClinton was housed there

was Walter Berry. Berry had no interactions with McClinton while

he was at Baldwin, nor is there any evidence that he was aware of

any of the events involving McClinton at Phillips or at Baldwin

before McClinton’s death.

B. Procedural History

On March 14, 2022, McClinton’s parents, Ricardo

McClinton and Doris Jones, filed a wrongful death suit against

Berry and Primus on their own behalf. They alleged that Berry and

Primus each failed to protect McClinton, in violation of the Eighth

Amendment, by being deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk

of harm against McClinton—namely, the danger of lethal

retaliation. All proceedings in this suit were stayed while criminal

proceedings against McClinton’s alleged killer were ongoing.

On April 8, 2024, the parents amended their complaint.

First, the amended complaint added three new defendants—Perry,

Abreu, and Moss—and brought similar wrongful death claims on

the parents’ behalf alleging that the new defendants also failed to

protect McClinton in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Second,

the amended complaint added Eighth Amendment failure to

protect claims on behalf of McClinton’s estate against all five

defendants.

The three new defendants moved to dismiss the claims

against them, which the district court granted in part and denied in

part. The district court found that the wrongful death claims

brought by the parents on their own behalf were time-barred by

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the applicable statute of limitations, and that no tolling provisions

applied to the parents’ own claims. However, the district court

allowed the estate’s claims against the three new defendants to

proceed (along with the original claims against Berry and Primus).

The district court later granted the defendants summary

judgment on the plaintiffs’ remaining claims, finding that each of

the defendants was protected by qualified immunity. The plaintiffs

could not prevail on the deliberate indifference claim because the

plaintiffs presented no evidence tending to show that any

defendant was actually aware that his or her own conduct caused

a substantial risk of serious harm to McClinton. And the plaintiffs

presented no clearly established law that the defendants’ actions

had violated.

This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss

and its grant of summary judgment de novo. Hill v. White, 321 F.3d

1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). For purposes of the motion

to dismiss, we “accept[] the allegations in the complaint as true and

constru[e] them in the light most favorable to” the non-moving

party. Id. In the summary judgment context, we also draw all

factual inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party. Smith v. Owens, 848 F.3d 975, 978 (11th Cir. 2017). Summary

judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue of material

fact. Id.

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III. DISCUSSION

The defendants argue that qualified immunity defeats the

plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claims. Qualified immunity protects

government officials from personal liability for their official

conduct so long as “their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346

(11th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). “To receive qualified

immunity, the public official must first prove that he was acting

within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly

wrongful acts occurred.” Id. at 1346 (quotation omitted).

Once the official makes that showing, then the burden shifts

to the plaintiff to prove that qualified immunity does not apply. Id.

Specifically, a plaintiff must prove two things: “that the defendant

violated a constitutional right” and that the right was “clearly

established.” Corbitt v. Vickers, 929 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 2019)

(quotations omitted). For a right to be clearly established, “[t]he

contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable

official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). The “‘salient

question’ . . . is whether the state of the law gave the defendants

‘fair warning’ that their alleged conduct was unconstitutional.”

Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hope

v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).

Here, the parties do not dispute that the defendants acted

within the scope of their discretionary authority. Their dispute

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turns on whether the defendants’ actions (and failures to act)

violated clearly established Eighth Amendment law governing

failure to protect claims.

The Eighth Amendment provides, “Excessive bail shall not

be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual

punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII. As we explained

in Wade, to establish liability on an Eighth Amendment “deliberate

indifference” claim, a plaintiff must satisfy both an objective and a

subjective element. First, he must “demonstrate, as a threshold

matter, that he suffered a deprivation that was, objectively,

sufficiently serious”; and second,

the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant

acted with subjective recklessness as used in the

criminal law, and to do that he must show that the

defendant was actually, subjectively aware that his

own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm

to the plaintiff—with the caveat, again, that even if

the defendant actually knew of a substantial risk to

inmate health or safety, he cannot be found liable

under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause if

he responded reasonably to the risk.

Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262 (quotations omitted). 6

6 Plaintiffs argue that “Wade is best understood as a judicial housekeeping

decision intended to resolve a semantic split in authority,” and that it is

consistent with a “two-part standard for deliberate indifference—one part

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Beginning with the objective element, there is no dispute

that housing McClinton—who had recently stabbed a high-ranking

Bloods gang member—in a general population cell block with

Bloods members was an objectively serious deprivation because it

was a condition posing a substantial risk that McClinton would

suffer serious harm—being severely wounded or killed. The heart

of this challenge is therefore situated in the subjective element of

the plaintiffs’ cruel and unusual punishment claim, to which we

now turn. Specifically, we must determine whether each

defendant was subjectively aware that his or her actions (or

subjective . . . and one part objective.” Both arguments are incorrect. First,

Wade resolved a substantive, not semantic, intra-circuit split concerning the

requisite standard of negligence—more than gross negligence versus more

than mere negligence—by expressly “repudiat[ing] our dueling ‘more than’

formulations’” and returning to the Supreme Court’s standard in Farmer.

Wade, 106 F.4th at 1255.

Second, the plaintiffs’ argument misstates what “deliberate indifference” refers

to. While an Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim has

two elements, a subjective and an objective element, deliberate indifference

refers only to the subjective element. As the Supreme Court explained in

Farmer, “[t]he second requirement [of a cruel and unusual punishment claim

is that] a prison official must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind. In

prison-conditions cases that state of mind is one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to

inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quotation omitted); see also

id. at 846 (describing “deliberate indifference” as “the subjective factor”).

Given this language in Farmer, we did not endorse in Wade a mixed objective-

subjective analysis for deliberate indifference. Instead, as in Farmer, we

articulated a purely subjective deliberate indifference standard of “subjective

recklessness as used in the criminal law.” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1255 (quoting

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839).

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inaction) caused a substantial risk of serious harm to McClinton—

and, if so, whether he or she responded reasonably.

This Court in Wade explained that plaintiffs making

deliberate indifference claims—like those at issue here—“must

show that the defendant acted with ‘subjective recklessness as used

in the criminal law.’” 106 F.4th at 1253 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 839). To make such a showing, “the plaintiff must demonstrate

that the defendant actually knew that his conduct—his own acts or

omissions—put the plaintiff at substantial risk of serious harm.” Id.

And this showing of subjective recklessness must be based on more

than a generalized or abstract knowledge of a danger to the

prisoner; the official must be aware of a specific risk. That an

official must know of a specific risk is clear from Farmer, where the

Supreme Court’s focus “was on whether the official knew

that . . . his own acts or omissions . . . put the inmate at risk, not

just whether the inmate confronted a risk in the abstract.” Id. at

1259; see also Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir.

2019) (“In general, a plaintiff must show more than a generalized

awareness of risk to make out a deliberate-indifference claim.”

(quotation omitted)).

Put simply, a constitutional violation occurs only when

prison officials act “consciously” such that their acts or omissions

knowingly have the effect of inflicting a punishment upon

prisoners. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839; see also id. at 837 (“The Eighth

Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual ‘conditions’; it

outlaws cruel and unusual ‘punishments.’”) This focus on the

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prison official’s actual “mental attitude” “isolates those who inflict

punishment” from those who do not, ensuring that “only

inflictions of punishment carry liability.” Id. at 839, 841. Put

differently, without “a particularized focus on a prison official’s

subjective awareness of the risk created by his own conduct, there

is a danger that he could be held liable for conduct that does not

remotely resemble the infliction of punishment.” Wade, 106 F.4th

at 1259 (alteration adopted) (quotation omitted). Thus, “an

official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have

perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot

under our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment.”

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838.

We now turn to applying this law to each of the individual

defendants.

1. Warden Perry (Phillips)

The plaintiffs argue that Perry’s “fail[ure] to communicate

[to Warden Berry] that [McClinton] had been in protective custody

for four months when transferring him to Baldwin” constitutes

deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to

McClinton.

Perry admits that he knew of the risk of harm to McClinton

from gang retaliation, an admission supported by his decision to

promptly place McClinton in protective custody and to transfer

McClinton out of Phillips “to a facility with [mental health] level 3

services.” But he responded reasonably to that known risk by

placing McClinton in protective custody and seeking a transfer, and

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thus Perry “cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual

Punishments Clause” for his knowledge of the risk to McClinton at

Phillips. Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262 (quotation omitted). As to

McClinton’s experiences at Baldwin after his transfer, the plaintiffs

have pointed to no evidence that Perry was subjectively aware that

his decision to transfer McClinton to another facility would place

McClinton at risk of serious harm.

Nevertheless, the plaintiffs argue that Perry’s duty was to

“reach out to the warden at the receiving facility” when “he [was]

aware of a threat” like the one against McClinton. But they cite no

caselaw establishing that this duty exists; and even if the plaintiffs

were to show that Perry had such a duty and that he failed to meet

it, such a showing of negligence is not enough. Instead, the

plaintiffs must show that Perry knew that not reaching out would

endanger McClinton. As we explained in Goodman v. Kimbrough,

“[p]roof of deliberate indifference requires a great deal more than

does proof of negligence” as “the official must both be aware of

facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial

risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”

718 F.3d 1325, 1332 (11th Cir. 2013) (emphasis omitted) (quotation

omitted); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838 (“[A]n official’s failure to

alleviate a significant risk that he should have perceived but did not,

while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be

condemned as the infliction of punishment.”). As the plaintiffs

present no evidence connecting Perry’s general understanding of

the risk to McClinton at Phillips to any subjective knowledge that

failure to reach out to the prison administration at Baldwin would

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endanger McClinton there, we cannot conclude that Perry was

deliberately indifferent to a risk of harm to McClinton.

A defendant-official is entitled to qualified immunity if a

plaintiff cannot establish that the defendant committed a

constitutional violation. Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370

F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004). As Perry was not deliberately

indifferent, he did not violate McClinton’s Eighth Amendment

right. Thus, Perry is protected by qualified immunity.

2. GDOC Analyst Abreu

The plaintiffs argue that Abreu was deliberately indifferent

because “he failed to take steps to continue protective custody or

otherwise ensure the safety of the decedent upon arrival at

Baldwin.” Instead, they claim that Abreu should have

“coordinate[d] with the security staff at Baldwin.”

As with Perry, Abreu had some knowledge of the risk

McClinton faced. In approving McClinton’s transfer, Abreu

reviewed the transfer request from Phillips, which included the

information that McClinton was in danger from “a known enemy”

who was “Johnson, Michael . . . , a high-ranking Blood member.”

The transfer order was silent as to any known risks beyond the

walls of Phillips, otherwise stating only that McClinton needed to

be transferred “to a facility with [mental health] level 3 services.”

The plaintiffs have conceded that Abreu had no knowledge

that transferring McClinton to Baldwin would cause any risk of

harm to McClinton. The transfer request Abreu reviewed makes

clear that McClinton faced a risk at Phillips, without any mention

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that he may face a risk once he was transferred elsewhere. Nor do

the plaintiffs provide facts showing that Abreu somehow learned

that McClinton would be at risk if he approved a transfer to

Baldwin. Without actual knowledge that sending McClinton to

Baldwin could endanger him, Abreu cannot be found to have been

deliberately indifferent. Wade, 106 F.4th at 1253.

As Abreu was not deliberately indifferent, he did not violate

McClinton’s Eighth Amendment right. Therefore, Abreu is

protected by qualified immunity.

3. Warden Berry (Baldwin)

The plaintiffs argue that Berry was deliberately indifferent

because he “fail[ed] to make arrangements to continue the

protective custody that [McClinton] had been on at Phillips.” In

other words, they claim that Berry had a duty to inform himself of

the security risks McClinton faced upon his transfer to Baldwin but

failed to do so.

It is undisputed that Berry had no knowledge of McClinton

at all, let alone of any substantial risk he faced of retaliation. Berry’s

lack of knowledge is fatal to the plaintiffs’ claim, because deliberate

indifference requires that the defendant be subjectively aware that

his conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff.

Id. As with their argument regarding Perry, the plaintiffs’ theory

incorrectly applies a negligence standard, when we have adopted

the higher standard of “subjective recklessness as used in the

criminal law.” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262 (quotation omitted). As the

Supreme Court noted in Farmer, “we cannot accept petitioner’s

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argument . . . that a prison official who was unaware of a

substantial risk of harm to an inmate may nevertheless be held

liable under the Eighth Amendment if the risk was obvious and a

reasonable prison official would have noticed it.” 511 U.S. at 841–

42.

Therefore, as Berry was not deliberately indifferent, he did

not violate McClinton’s Eighth Amendment right and is protected

by qualified immunity.

4. Counselor Primus

The plaintiffs argue that Primus failed to properly conduct

his intake interview with McClinton, which, if done properly,

would have uncovered information about the risks McClinton

faced. Primus is entitled to qualified immunity for the same reason

as Berry: the parties do not dispute that he had no knowledge of

any risk to McClinton. As with Perry and Berry, the plaintiffs’

argument instead invokes a negligence standard, premised on a

violation of a duty owed to McClinton, that is out of place in the

deliberate indifference context. Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262. Without

actual knowledge, Primus was not deliberately indifferent, he did

not violate McClinton’s constitutional right, and he is protected by

qualified immunity.

5. Lieutenant Moss

Finally, we turn to Moss. The plaintiffs argue that Moss was

deliberately indifferent because “she was aware of requests by

[McClinton] to be placed in protective custody but failed to take

appropriate action on those requests.” Put simply, they claim that

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“she failed to act reasonably on [her] knowledge” of threats to

McClinton’s safety.

Moss similarly lacked knowledge that McClinton was facing

a threat of substantial harm. Although McClinton had told Officer

Milner that he needed to be removed from his assigned dorm

because “[he] did something to an offender at another institution,

and we’re in the same dorm together,” we have no evidence that

Milner communicated information about the source of the threat

to Moss. When Moss met with McClinton, he told her only that

he wanted protective custody, not why he wanted it. Once he

ultimately requested to be returned to his bunk, Moss agreed to

send him back because she did not believe, based on the

information before her, that he would be in danger. These facts

fall far short of subjective knowledge that her decision to send

McClinton back into the general population dorm would place him

at substantial risk of serious harm. Id. at 1253.

The plaintiffs nevertheless argue that Moss violated

McClinton’s rights because she failed to respond reasonably: that

she had knowledge of a threat to McClinton’s safety and did not

investigate the threat or act to protect him in any way. This

argument stretches the evidence beyond what it will support. To

be sure, Moss knew that McClinton was requesting protective

custody. But without any evidence that she had specific knowledge

of a particular risk to McClinton—rather than a mere “generalized

awareness of risk” to him, Marbury, 936 F.3d at 1234—we cannot

infer from a withdrawn request for protective custody that Moss

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knew that returning McClinton to his dorm placed him in harm’s

way. Any awareness of “risk in the abstract” to McClinton based

solely on his vague request for protective custody is insufficient for

Eighth Amendment liability. Wade, 106 F.4th at 1259.

Nor did Moss’s failure to investigate lead to a violation of

McClinton’s rights. As we noted earlier, even “if the risk was

obvious and a reasonable prison official would have noticed it,”

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842, the mere obviousness of the risk is not

enough to find an official liable because “the official must both be

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a

substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the

inference.” Goodman, 718 F.3d at 1332 (emphasis omitted)

(quotation omitted). Further, the evidence plainly shows that she

did not subjectively believe that he was in serious danger, and thus

her mental state did not constitute deliberate indifference. See

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838.

Thus, without evidence that she actually knew that sending

McClinton back into general population endangered him, we

cannot find that Moss was deliberately indifferent to the abstract

risk she was alerted to, and thus she did not violate McClinton’s

constitutional right. Moss is therefore protected from liability by

qualified immunity.

IV. CONCLUSION

In accordance with our analysis above, the plaintiffs have

not presented any evidence from which a jury could conclude that

any of the defendants were deliberately indifferent to the risk of

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significant harm faced by McClinton. The judgment of the district

court is therefore

AFFIRMED.