The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION
RONALD JONES,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 4:25-cv-188-AW-MAF
THE SCHOOL BOARD
OF GADSDEN COUNTY,
Defendant.
_______________________________/
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Pro se Plaintiff Ronald Jones sued the Gadsden County School Board. He
alleges he applied for teaching positions some 500 times but never got one. His
operative complaint (the fourth amended) alleges this was because of retaliation in
violation of Title VII or age discrimination in violation of the ADEA. ECF No. 15.
The School Board moved to dismiss based on Rule 12(b)(6). ECF No. 18. The
magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation concluding the court should
grant the motion and dismiss the case. ECF No. 21. Having considered the matter,
and after a de novo review of the issues Jones addressed in his objections, I now
adopt the report and recommendation and incorporate it into this order.
The issue is not complicated. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing
Twombly). Courts “hold the allegations of a pro se complaint to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd.,
760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014). Still, even with pro se litigants, a complaint
cannot survive without alleging sufficient facts to meet the Iqbal standard. Jones’s
complaint does not meet that standard.
Jones includes several conclusory allegations that he faced unlawful
discrimination or retaliation. See, e.g., ECF No. 15 at 7 (alleging that School Board’s
“real reasons for not hiring Plaintiff [] were illegal retaliation and discrimination
based on filing in the United States District Court”). But he alleges no facts plausibly
supporting his claims. He does allege that a school official modified his resume, see
id. at 8 (alleging that official “illegally removed the page from Plaintiff’s Re’ Sume’s
(sic) employment history with coaching and teaching experience to make it seem as
if the other person was more qualified than Plaintiff”), but there are no facts alleged
suggesting that alleged removal (or anything else) was based on discrimination or
retaliation.
The magistrate judge points out that Jones has alleged his own age but not the
age of the person selected for the position. ECF No. 21 at 6. That is true, but even if
Jones had alleged a younger person was selected, that alone would not be sufficient
to state a plausible claim. To state a plausible age-discrimination claim, it takes more
than an allegation that someone younger than the plaintiff got the job. The bottom
line is that Jones has not alleged sufficient facts to support either of his claims.
I agree with the magistrate judge that Jones has had sufficient opportunities to
state a claim. We are on the fourth amended complaint, and the magistrate judge has
pointed out defects in the prior complaints. In this circumstance, dismissal with
prejudice is appropriate.
It is now ORDERED:
1. The motion to dismiss (ECF No. 18) is GRANTED.
2. The objections to the report and recommendation (ECF No. 22) are
OVERRULED.
3. The clerk will enter a judgment that says, “Plaintiff’s claims are
dismissed on the merits for failure to state a claim.”
4. The “motion for judicial notice of DOAH case history” (ECF No. 23)
is DENIED because there is no need for consideration of matters beyond the
operative complaint.
5. The “motion for the court to take judicial notice” (ECF No. 26) is
DENIED for the same reason.
6. The “motion for sanctions,” which relates to an action Defendant
allegedly took “during Plaintiff’s administrative hearing,” (ECF No. 24) is DENIED.
7. Similarly, the “motion for sanctions for withholding application” (ECF
No. 30) is DENIED.
8. The motion for leave to amend (ECF No. 25) is DENIED. The motion
does not comply with the court’s local rules, which require the filer to file the
proposed amended pleading with such a motion. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 15.1.
Regardless, Plaintiff has had sufficient opportunities to amend and state a claim.
9. The “motion to compel production of personnel file” (ECF No. 28) is
DENIED. The motion is moot because the case is dismissed. In addition, the motion
did not comply with the court’s local rules.
10. The “motion to compel production of complete personnel file” (ECF
No. 31) is DENIED for the same reasons.
11. The “motion for reconsideration” (ECF No. 29) is DENIED. It seeks
reconsideration of an order that was not in existence at the time the motion was filed.
12. The other “motion for reconsideration” (ECF No. 32) is likewise
DENIED.
13. The clerk will close the file.
SO ORDERED on April 13, 2026.
s/ Allen Winsor
Chief United States District Judge