Garcia

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

)

GARCIA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) No. 2:25-cv-02599-BCL-cgc

v. )

)

CITY OF MUNFORD, )

TENNESSEE et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART BRIGHTON DEFENDANTS’

JOINT MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

This case was transferred to the undersigned on March 5, 2026.1 Doc. 44. Before the Court

is the Brighton Defendants’2 Joint Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Doc. 26.

In the portions of their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings that remain relevant, the

Brighton Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(Count III, Doc. 53 at 13-15) and the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”) (Count IV, Doc.

53 at 15). Doc. 26. For the reasons below, the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED

as to Count III and DENIED as to Count IV.

BACKGROUND

This matter arises from a complaint filed by Plaintiff Kenneth Garcia, a former Patrol

Officer of Puerto Rican descent, against the City of Munford, the Town of Brighton, and several

of their respective officials. Doc. 1. In the Operative Amended Verified Complaint, Mr. Garcia

1 The case was earlier assigned to Judge Mark Norris.

2 Town of Brighton, Jonathan Max, and Stephanie Chapman-Washam.

alleges that during his tenure with the Munford Police Department, he was subjected to

discrimination on the basis of race. Doc. 53 at 2. Mr. Garcia claims he was unfairly disciplined for

resting in his vehicle and for using his patrol car for transporting his children, which he alleges

were activities permitted for white officers. Id. at 5-6. Furthermore, he asserts he was denied

opportunities for advancement within the Department’s SWAT team. Id. at 7.

The conflict escalated in June 2024 when Mr. Garcia informed his supervisors that he filed

a discrimination complaint with the EEOC. Id. at 8. He was terminated from the Munford Police

Department the following day. Id. Subsequently, Mr. Garcia applied for a position with the

Brighton Police Department. Id. He alleges that despite initial indications he would be hired, the

Town of Brighton rescinded the opportunity. Id. at 9. He contends this was a retaliatory act directed

by the Mayor of Brighton due to his legal actions against Munford. Id.

On June 12, 2025, Mr. Garcia filed suit asserting six counts of racial discrimination and

retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the THRA. Doc. 1. In his operative

complaint, Mr. Garcia has voluntarily dropped the following claims in response to the Brighton

Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings: Plaintiff’s claims under the Tennessee Human

Rights Act (“THRA”) against Jonathan Max and Stephanie Chapman-Washam, and Plaintiff’s

claims for punitive damages under Section 1983 and the Tennessee Human Rights Act. See Docs.

33, 53. As a result, the remaining claims against the Brighton Defendants are:

 Count III - Unlawful Retaliation in Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against All

Defendants. Doc. 53 at 13.

 Count IV - Unlawful Retaliation in Violation of the THRA against Town of

Brighton, Tennessee. Id. at 15.

On October 9, 2025, the Brighton Defendants filed a Joint Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings. Doc. 26. As is relevant here, this Motion first seeks to dismiss Count III, for unlawful

retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, based on an argument that Title VII provides the sole

remedy where a plaintiff claims that he was retaliated against for conduct protected by Title VII.

Id. at 5-6; Doc. 35 at 2-5. The Brighton Defendants then seek to dismiss Count IV, arguing that

because only a state law claim remains, the Court lacks jurisdiction. Doc. 26-1 at 8.

ANALYSIS

As noted above, Brighton Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for retaliation under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count III, Doc. 53 at 13-15) and the Tennessee Human Rights Act (“THRA”)

(Count IV, Doc. 53 at 15). Doc. 26. The Brighton Defendants assert that dismissal of the Section

1983 claim is required based on an argument that Title VII provides the sole remedy where a

plaintiff claims that he was retaliated against for conduct protected by Title VII. Id. at 5. They

further argue that because the federal claim must be dismissed, the Court should not exercise

jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim. Id. at 8.

1. Legal Standard

A Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is governed by the same standards as

a Rule12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Brown v. Louisville-Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t, 135 F.4th

1022, 1030 (6th Cir. 2025). Under that standard, the “complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A

claim has facial plausibility “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Plausibility

requires more than factual allegations that demonstrate “a sheer possibility” of unlawful conduct

or are “‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability.” Id. If the factual allegations “do not permit

the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint . . . has not show[n]

that the pleader is entitled to relief” and cannot survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 679. In

determining whether the complaint states a plausible claim, the district court must accept the well-

pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true. Id. at 678-79. When there are well-pleaded

factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly

give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id. at 679.

2. Plaintiff has not stated a claim for relief under Section 1983 for retaliation.

The Brighton Defendants argue that the plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed because they

are based on his filing of an EEOC charge, which they contend makes Title VII his sole federal

remedy. Doc. 26-1 at 5. They assert that Section 1983 cannot be used to bypass the specific

administrative requirements and remedial framework of Title VII when the underlying conduct

involves protected activity covered by that statute. Doc. 35 at 5.

The Brighton Defendants’ argument has grounding in binding Sixth Circuit precedent.

That Court has held that, “[w]hatever the scope or source of a constitutional claim of improper

retaliation in other circumstances, where the plaintiff asserts that she has been retaliated against

for filing a complaint under Title VII, her sole federal remedy is the cause of action provided for

under Title VII.” Morris v. Oldham Cnty. Fiscal Ct., 201 F.3d 784, 794-95 (6th Cir. 2000); see also

Day v. Wayne Cnty. Bd. Of Auditors, 749 F.2d 1199, 1204-05 (6th Cir. 1984) (“Here the … only

wrongful act was [defendants’] retaliation for the plaintiff's actions, a violation of Title VII. We

conclude that Congress did not intend this violation to be the basis of a Section 1983 claim.”).

In response, Plaintiff makes both a legal and a factual argument. His legal argument is that

he can still bring a Section 1983 claim premised on retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981,

because Section 1983 is “the exclusive federal remedy for violation of the rights guaranteed in §

1981 by state governmental units.” Doc. 33 at 4 (quoting Arendale v. City of Memphis, 519 F.3d

587, 599-600 (6th. Cir. 2008)). And, while Plaintiff does not cite it, there is binding Sixth Circuit

precedent supporting the position that constitutional claims may be asserted under Section 1983

even if Section 1983 does not provide a vehicle for a parallel statutory claim. See Bullington v.

Bedford Cnty., Tenn., 905 F.3d 467, 472 (6th Cir. 2017) (in analogous context of a claim parallel

to the Americans with Disabilities Act, holding that while Section 1983 does not provide a basis

for a claim under a more specific statute (like Title VII), it does provide a basis for a constitutional

claim, “even where the plaintiff’s constitutional claim runs parallel to claims brought under

analogous statutes”). The parties have cited no precedent extending that principle to claims based

on Section 1981, but the same logic would seem to apply, and the Court has found no precedent

treating claims based on Section 1981 differently from constitutional claims for purposes of

displacement by Title VII.

That leads to Plaintiff’s factual argument—i.e., that “nowhere in the Complaint does

Plaintiff claim to have filed a complaint specifically under Title VII prior to his termination,” so

that it remains possible he is claiming his activity was protected by some source of law other than

Title VII. Doc. 33 at 3. That argument is inconsistent with the pleading standard, which requires

“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Plaintiff’s retaliation claim nowhere mentions Section

1981 or any other sort of law—rather, it alleges only (as relevant here) that he was “engaged in

protected activity when … he decided to file a complaint with the EEOC” and that his termination

and rejection in hiring was “solely because of his EEOC Charge of Discrimination.” Doc. 53 at

14-15. And that is fatal to Plaintiff’s claim here, because the Sixth Circuit has made clear that a

plaintiff seeking to assert a Section 1983, non-Title VII claim that is “parallel” to a claim under

Title VII “must allege that the conduct forming the basis of her Section 1983 claim violates a …

right apart from the rights protected under Title VII.” Ogbonna-McGruder v. Austin Peay State

University, 91 F.4th 833, 844 (6th Cir. 2024), abrogated on other grounds as recognized in Kellar

v. Yunion, 157 F.4th 855 (6th Cir. 2025). Vague references to other laws, “without providing a

specific provision, do[ ] not adequately put defendants on notice of [plaintiff’s] claims for purposes

of a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 844. Plaintiff’s complaint falls even further short, as it does not

even gesture broadly at other provisions of law.

The Court therefore GRANTS the Brighton Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings as to Count III. Moreover, Count III of the operative complaint is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE. The case has been pending since June 12, 2025 (Doc. 1), and Plaintiff has already

amended his complaint once in an effort to respond to arguments raised by the Brighton

Defendants. Doc. 53. Despite making those changes, Plaintiff declined to amend his claim of

retaliation to account for the deficiencies identified by the Brighton Defendants. Nor did Plaintiff

seek leave to amend in the event the Brighton Defendants’ Motion was granted (as it now is in

part). Under these circumstances, there is no basis for granting leave to amend.

3. The Court maintains supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining THRA claim

against the Town of Brighton.

The Brighton Defendants further argue that because Garcia’s federal claims should be

dismissed, the Court should decline jurisdiction over the remaining state law claim under the

THRA (Count IV, Doc. 53 at 15). Doc. 26-1 at 8-10. Plaintiff has asserted that the Court has

supplemental jurisdiction based on the interrelatedness of his federal and state law claims. Doc. 53

at 4.

District courts have supplemental jurisdiction over “all other claims that are so related to

claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or

controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). “In other

words, if there is some basis for original jurisdiction, the default assumption is that the court will

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all related claims.” Blakely v. United States, 276 F.3d 853,

861 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted). Claims form part of the same case or controversy

when they ‘derive from a common nucleus of operative facts.’” Carmichael v. City of Cleveland,

571 F. App’x 426, 434 (6th Cir. 2014). District courts have “broad discretion to decide whether to

exercise jurisdiction over state-law claims that are so related to claims in the action” within their

original jurisdiction. Gamel v. City of Cincinnati, 625 F.3d 949, 951 (6th Cir. 2010). “In

determining whether to retain jurisdiction over state-law claims, a district court should consider

and weigh several factors, including the ‘values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and

comity.’” Id.

As this Court stated in response to the Brighton Defendant’s earlier Motion to Bifurcate

(Doc. 25), the Complaint alleges a continuous narrative – the discrimination led to the protected

activity which then (as alleged by Plaintiff) was the reason for the retaliation. Doc. 52 at 4.

Evidence regarding Plaintiff’s protected activity, its causes, and any relevant, related

communications between these neighboring municipalities is likely to overlap, making jurisdiction

proper. Id.; see also Blakely, 276 F.3d at 861 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that a district court may

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over an additional defendant where the state law claims arise

from the same narrative and concerted scheme as the claims within the court’s original

jurisdiction). To decline jurisdiction would require the same Plaintiff and many of the same

witnesses to provide repetitive testimony in separate forums, which would undermine judicial

economy, convenience, and fairness to the Plaintiff. Doc. 52. Therefore, because the state law

claim against the Town of Brighton is inextricably linked to the federal claims against the Munford

Defendants, the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is proper.

The Court therefore DENIES the Motion as to Count IV of the operative complaint.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Brighton Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the

Pleadings is GRANTED as to Count III and DENIED as to Count IV. Plaintiff’s Section 1983

claim for retaliation is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Because no further claims remain

pending against Defendants Jonathan Max and Stephanie Chapman-Washam, they are hereby

DISMISSED from this action. As this matter pertains to the remaining Brighton Defendant, Town

of Brighton, the following claim remains:

Count IV – Unlawful Retaliation in Violation of the THRA against Town of

Brighton.

Doc. 53 at 15.

SO ORDERED, this 13th day of April 2026.

s/Brian C. Lea

BRIAN C. LEA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE