Brock

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

DAVID BROCK , )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 25-cv-3174

)

JON HALL, CHERYL CARLSON, )

DAVID MITCHELL, EDWARD )

ESCAMILLA, AND LATOYA )

HUGHES, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.

This cause is before the Court on Defendants Jon Hall’s,

Cheryl Carlson’s, David Mitchell’s, Edward Escamilla’s, and Latoya

Hughes’ (“Defendants”) Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion

to Dismiss (d/e 9). Plaintiff David Brock’s (“Plaintiff”) Complaint

(d/e 1) does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted, so

Defendants’ Motion (d/e 9) is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint (d/e 1)

and are accepted as true at the motion to dismiss stage. Bible v.

United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 799 F.3d 633, 639 (7th Cir. 2015).

At the times relevant to the Complaint, Plaintiff was a

Correctional Lieutenant employed by the Illinois Department of

Corrections (“IDOC”) working at its Pinckneyville Correctional

Center (“Pinkneyville”). See d/e 1, p. 2, ¶ 3. At all times relevant to

this complaint, Defendants were employed by IDOC: Defendant Jon

Hall as an administrative assistant who also served as a hearing

officer, Defendant Cheryl Carlson as an administrative assistant

who also served as a management representative, Defendant David

Mitchell as the Pinkneyville Warden, Defendant Edward Escamilla

as IDOC Chief of Investigations and Intelligence, and Defendant

Latoya Hughes as Acting IDOC Director. Id. at ¶¶ 4-8.

On June 15, 2023, Plaintiff was involved in an incident in

which he ultimately deployed pepper spray on an inmate. Id. at p.

3, ¶ 10. IDOC maintains a policy outlining when security staff are

lawfully allowed to use force in their employment capacity, which is

set forth at 20 Ill. Admin. Code 501.10 et seq. Id. at p. 3, ¶ 9.

Plaintiff alleges that he complied with IDOC’s policy on resort to

force and chemical agent usage at all times during the June 15,

2023 incident and that the IDOC administration acknowledged and

understood that he had. Id. at p. 3, ¶ 11.

Plaintiff alleges that, nonetheless, Defendants all determined

that Plaintiff needed to be heavily disciplined for utilizing pepper

spray—contrary to IDOC’s written policies. Id. at p. 3, ¶ 12. Plaintiff

alleges that, because Defendants Hughes and Escamilla have

thought throughout their IDOC tenure that force should never be

used against inmates, Defendants Hughes and Escamilla “have

continually insisted that employees be seriously disciplined and

discharged for actions that fully comply with [I]DOC’s written

policies.” Id. at p. 3, ¶ 13.

On November 22, 2023, Defendant Hall oversaw an employee

review board hearing regarding Plaintiff “as a result of the directives

of” Defendants Mitchell, Escamilla, and Hughes, though Plaintiff

does not allege the contents of those directives or the location of the

hearing. Id. at p. 4, ¶ 14. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants knew

at that time that Plaintiff complied with the use of force policies and

that he reasonably relied upon those policies. Id.

At the employee review board hearing, Defendant Carlson

pushed for Plaintiff’s termination. Id. Defendant Hall recommended

that Plaintiff be terminated from his employment. Id. at p. 4, ¶ 15.

Defendant Hall’s recommendation was forwarded to Defendant

Mitchell, who concurred, and also recommended that Plaintiff be

terminated from his employment. Id. at p. 4, ¶ 16.

On January 10, 2024, Plaintiff was notified of his termination

effective that day. Id. at p. 4, ¶ 17; see also id. at p. 2, ¶ 3.

On June 13, 2025, Plaintiff filed a one-Count Complaint

against Defendants in this Court. See d/e 1. Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants did not apply IDOC’s applicable use of force rules to

him and instead applied “different unspoken and unwritten

arbitrary rules” to him, such that IDOC’s use of force rules as

applied to Plaintiff provided no notice or warning that his June 15,

2023 actions involving pepper spray were improper. Id. at p. 4,

¶ 19. Plaintiff alleges that the rules as applied to him were therefore

unconstitutionally vague under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at

p. 4, ¶¶ 19-20.

Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants played a role in

disciplining him and knew that his actions complied with IDOC’s

policies. Id. at p. 5, ¶ 21. Plaintiff sues all five Defendants in their

individual capacities, and Defendants Mitchell, Escamilla, and

Hughes additionally in their official capacities for the limited

purpose of obtaining equitable relief. Id. at p. 2, ¶¶ 4-8.

Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of Defendants violating his

Fourteenth Amendment rights, he sustained damages including lost

wages, emotional distress, and lost opportunities for promotion. Id.

at p. 5, ¶ 22. Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff seeks damages as to

all Defendants and also seeks equitable relief of IDOC expunging

his disciplinary record of any reference to his IDOC policy violations

and reinstating him to the position he would have held absent

IDOC’s violation of his rights. Id. at p. 1, ¶ 1; p. 5, ¶ 23.

On September 15, 2025, Defendants filed a Memorandum of

Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss (d/9). On October 13, 2025,

Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (d/e 13).

Notably, Plaintiff’s Response alleges that the policy IDOC

applied to him “effectively provides that any use of force

[Defendants] are personally uncomfortable with against an inmate

subjects an employee to discipline.” d/e 13, p. 1. Plaintiff alleges

that Defendants “created a new unwritten policy—a policy that was

neither promulgated nor distributed—and held him to those higher

standards,” such that the newly created policy that Defendants

“relied upon in disciplining him” was “vague.” Id. at pp. 2-3.

II. JURISDICTION

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s

claims arising under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United

States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which is a federal

statute. See 28 U.S.C. ' 1331 (“The district courts shall have

original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”).

Venue is proper because the Defendants are or were employed

by IDOC, which is headquartered in Springfield, Illinois in the

Central District of Illinois, and because Plaintiff alleges that many of

the decisions underlying Plaintiff’s claims were made in Sangamon

County, Illinois in the Central District of Illinois. See 28 U.S.C.

' 1391(b), see also d/e 1, p. 1, ¶ 2.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) challenges the complaint’s sufficiency. Christensen v. Cnty.

of Boone, 483 F.3d 454, 458 (7th Cir. 2007). A complaint must

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief” that puts the defendant on notice of the

allegations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), see also Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d

437, 439 (7th Cir. 2002). The Court accepts all well-pled facts

alleged and draws all possible inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.

Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008).

The complaint must put forth plausible grounds to

demonstrate a claim for relief—namely, the “[f]actual allegations

must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative

level[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A

plausible claim is one from which the court can draw reasonable

inferences that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Additionally, the

complaint must raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will

reveal evidence of liability. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. A complaint

merely reciting a cause of action or conclusory legal statements is

insufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

A policy “is impermissibly vague if it ‘fails to provide a person

of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited.’” Brown v.

Chicago Bd. of Educ., 824 F.3d 713, 716–17 (7th Cir. 2016)

(quoting FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253

(2012)). However, “the government acting in the role of employer

enjoys much more latitude in crafting reasonable work regulations

for its employees” compared to the standard for government

regulations for the public. Greer v. Amesqua, 212 F.3d 358, 369

(7th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted). “[A]n employee code of

conduct need not be as clear as a criminal law.” Brown, 824 F.3d at

717.

“[W]here the plaintiff alleges a pattern or a series of incidents

of unconstitutional conduct, then the courts have found an

allegation of policy sufficient to withstand a dismissal motion.”

Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 650 (7th Cir. 1981).

IV. ANALYSIS

Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to

Dismiss argues that “Plaintiff has alleged without any basis in fact

that IDOC has taken the view that force should never be used

against inmates.” d/e 9, p. 3. Defendants further argue that

“Plaintiff was in fact on notice of what standard[] his conduct was

required to conform to[,] as the phrase ‘last resort’ clearly means

that force may be used only when no other means are available or

effective,” such that “[t]he rules are not vague and IDOC’s discipline

of the Plaintiff for violating their clearly stated rules does not violate

the Plaintiff’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at pp.

3-4.

Illinois Administrative Code Section 501.20 defines “force” to

mean “physical contact used to coerce or prevent some action on

the part of a committed person, and the use of chemical agents.” 20

Ill. Admin. Code 501.20 (1984). Pursuant to Illinois Administrative

Code Section 501.30, titled “Resort to Force,” “Force shall be

employed only as a last resort or when other means are unavailable

or inadequate, and only to the degree reasonably necessary to

achieve a permitted purpose.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code 501.30 (1984).

As a threshold matter, the Court finds that Illinois

Administrative Code Sections 501.20 and 501.30 are not

unconstitutionally vague. Section 501.20 explicitly includes use of a

chemical agent, which pepper spray indisputably is, in defining

“force.” Section 501.30 authorizes force only as the last or only

available option and to the extent necessary. Therefore, Plaintiff had

“fair notice [it] is prohibited” for him to use pepper spray outside of

specific circumstances. Brown v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 824 F.3d

713, 716–17 (7th Cir. 2016).

However, Plaintiff alleges that IDOC applied, not its “applicable

use of force rules,” but instead “different unspoken and unwritten

arbitrary rules,” to Plaintiff such that the use of force rules, as

“applied to [Plaintiff], are unconstitutionally vague” because the

rules “provided no notice or warning that any of his actions on June

15, 2023, were improper.” d/e 1, p. 4, ¶ 19.

To allege that IDOC applied “a pattern or a series of incidents

of unconstitutional conduct [as] an allegation of policy,” see Powe v.

City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 650 (7th Cir. 1981), Plaintiff’s

“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above

the speculative level[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555-56 (2007).

Plaintiff’s Response alleges that the policy IDOC applied to him

“effectively provides that any use of force [Defendants] are

personally uncomfortable with against an inmate subjects an

employee to discipline.” d/e 13, p. 1. Plaintiff alleges that IDOC

“created a new unwritten policy—a policy that was neither

promulgated nor distributed—and held him to those higher

standards,” such that the newly created policy IDOC “relied upon in

disciplining him” was “vague.” Id. at pp. 2-3.

Plaintiff’s assertion resembles that in Nolan v. Wilks, No. 22-

CV-3264, 2024 WL 6861681 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2024), in which the

plaintiff, Nolan, alleged an “unspoken, unwritten arbitrary rule[]”

that “employees who use force against an inmate should be

seriously disciplined and discharged, due to [IDOC leadership’s]

view that force should never be used against inmates.” Id. at *3.

Notably, the district court found that Nolan “alleged several pieces

of evidence that supports the existence” of such a rule:

First, he alleged that the employee review board hearing

management stated that “Lt. Nolan was 100% justified for

the use of force.” But despite that statement, it was

recommended that Nolan be suspended for seven-days for

his administration of pepper spray. In support of his claim,

Nolan included information that the Illinois Fraternal

Order of Police Lodge 263 has described the rules

governing prisoner actions as being “watered down” under

the leadership of Jeffreys and Lindsay and that similar

applications of the purported unwritten policy have

occurred in at least two other instances.

Id. at *3 (emphasis added).

The Court finds that, unlike in Nolan, Plaintiff alleges no such

evidence that supports the existence of an IDOC policy “that any

use of force [Defendants] are personally uncomfortable with against

an inmate subjects an employee to discipline.” See d/e 13, p. 1.

Plaintiff alleges, without stating how, that the Defendants

“determined…that [Plaintiff] needed to be heavily disciplined for

utilizing pepper spray.” d/e 1, p. 3, ¶ 12. Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants Hughes and Escamilla, “[t]hroughout their tenure at

[I]DOC,” “have taken the view that force should never be used

against inmates” and that, “[a]s a result of their view,” Defendants

Hughes and Escamilla “have continually insisted that employees be

seriously disciplined and discharged for actions that fully comply

with [I]DOC’s written policies.” Id. at p. 3, ¶ 13.

However, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege that any

employees, including Plaintiff, were seriously disciplined or

discharged at Defendants Hughes’ and Escamilla’s insistence

stemming from their alleged view that force should never be used

against inmates or for use of force that any or all Defendants were

personally uncomfortable with against an inmate.

Plaintiff alleges that the employee review board hearing on his

use of pepper spray occurred “as a result of Defendants Mitchell’s,

Escamilla’s, and Hughes’ directives.” Id. at p. 4, ¶ 14. But Plaintiff

also alleges that Defendant Carlson pushed for Plaintiff’s

termination at the hearing, Defendant Hall oversaw the hearing and

recommended that Plaintiff be terminated, and Defendant Mitchell

concurred with Defendant Hall and recommended that Plaintiff be

terminated. Id. at p. 4, ¶¶ 14-16. Plaintiff notably does not allege

that any Defendant recommended his termination, or that he was

ultimately terminated, because of his “use of force [that Defendants

were] personally uncomfortable with against an inmate.” See d/e

13, p. 1.

In sum, Plaintiff’s factual allegations of a pattern or a series of

incidents of unconstitutional conduct constituting an IDOC policy

“that any use of force [Defendants] are personally uncomfortable

with against an inmate subjects an employee to discipline,” d/e 13,

p. 1, or “that force should never be used against inmates,” d/e 1, p.

3, ¶ 13, are not “enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-

56 (2007), see also Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 650 (7th

Cir. 1981). Therefore, Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support

of Motion to Dismiss (d/e 9) is GRANTED.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in

Support of Motion to Dismiss (d/e 9) is GRANTED. The Court notes

that while Defendants’ Motion (d/e 9) only requests dismissal by

Defendants Carlson, Hughes and Escamilla, see d/e 9 at pp. 1, 5,

Plaintiff’s Complaint (d/e 1) is DISMISSED as to all Defendants

without prejudice with leave to re-file an amended complaint within

30 days of entry of this Order.

ENTERED: April 13, 2026.

FOR THE COURT:

/s/ Sue E. Myerscough

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE