The opinion
Case: 25-30016 Document: 52-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/13/2026
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
____________ FILED
April 13, 2026
No. 25-30016 Lyle W. Cayce
____________ Clerk
Albert K. Alexander,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Dwayne Arceneaux; Jeff Hebert; Calvin Parker; Kyle P.
Manceaux; Greg Cormier; Jarvis Mayfield; James Craft;
Kristina Bernard Strong,
Defendants—Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 6:11-CV-1749
______________________________
Before Clement, Douglas, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges.
Edith Brown Clement, Circuit Judge:
Police had a warrant to search Albert Alexander’s residence for
firearms, but when they executed the warrant, they found pellet rifles instead.
While they were searching the house, the officers noticed electronics and
appliances that were either brand new in unopened boxes, wrapped in plastic,
covered in pillowcases, or sitting on blankets. The officers had previously
received tips that Alexander kept stolen electronics at his house, and the
Case: 25-30016 Document: 52-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/13/2026
No. 25-30016
officers’ observations on the scene corroborated these reports. So, the
officers seized the goods, suspecting that they were stolen contraband.
Alexander brought a § 1983 suit against the officers, alleging that they
violated the Fourth Amendment by seizing items that were not listed in the
search warrant. The district court granted summary judgment to the officers,
concluding that they are entitled to qualified immunity because the seizure
was justified under the “plain view” doctrine. We AFFIRM: Based on the
tips the officers received, their observations on the scene, and their prior
experience, the officers had probable cause to believe that the items were
stolen, so they constitutionally seized them under the plain view doctrine.
I
On December 29, 2010, officers with the Lafayette Police Department
responded to a call from Sharlette Alexander (“Sharlette”) and her
girlfriend, Dashawna Morrison (“Morrison”), about a disturbance that had
taken place the day before. The women reported that they had been living
with Sharlette’s grandfather, Albert Alexander (“Alexander”), at 212 I-B
Street in Lafayette, Louisiana, for several months. Then, after an argument
on December 28, Alexander told them to leave, and he attacked them when
they exited the house.
Five days after the women gave their initial report, Officer Kristina
Strong conducted a follow-up interview. During this interview, Sharlette and
Morrison both told Officer Strong that Alexander—who had previously been
convicted of a felony—owned a firearm and kept it at 212 I-B Street.
Morrison reported that the firearm was a brown shotgun and that Alexander
kept it behind a china cabinet near the back door.
During this follow-up interview, Sharlette and Morrison also told
Officer Strong that Alexander kept stolen items in his house. According to
the women, these items included electronics and furniture, and Alexander
2
Case: 25-30016 Document: 52-1 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/13/2026
No. 25-30016
had bragged about stealing things without getting caught. Sharlette and
Morrison both provided (undated) written lists of these purportedly stolen
items.
After interviewing Sharlette and Morrison, Officer Strong learned
that Officer Calvin Parker was independently investigating Alexander for
threatening his son, granddaughter, and ex-girlfriend. Officer Parker
informed Officer Strong that some of Alexander’s family members
reportedly feared he would “make good” on his threats because he had a
history of violence and kept firearms at his residence. Armed with this
information, along with Sharlette and Morrison’s reports, Officer Strong
sought a warrant for Alexander’s arrest and a warrant to search his residence
for firearms. On January 4, 2011, Officer Strong obtained an arrest warrant
and a warrant to search 212 I-B Street for “[a]ny and all firearms,
ammunition, ammunition clips, ammunition boxes, firearm storage boxes,
spent projectiles, spent cartridges, firearms or ammunition paperwork.”
Officers executed the search warrant that day. Alexander was not
present. When the officers entered the residence, they observed that the
house “was in disarray” and “looked like it was being gutted.” Electronics
and household appliances—including three flatscreen televisions, three
DVD players, and four stereo systems—were scattered throughout the
house and in plain view. Many of the items were new, unopened in their
original packaging, and stacked up next to each other. Other items were
wrapped in plastic, covered with pillowcases, or placed on top of blankets. In
addition, the officers saw new furniture sets that were stacked against the
walls and not in use. Officer Strong later testified that, based on her
experience, the number of items in the house and the manner in which they
were stored were “indicative of . . . how people house stolen property.”
3
Case: 25-30016 Document: 52-1 Page: 4 Date Filed: 04/13/2026
No. 25-30016
Shortly after the officers entered the residence, they found two large
pellet rifles behind an armoire near the back door. Officer Strong called
Morrison to ask whether these pellet rifles were the “firearms” she had
reported seeing in Alexander’s residence. Morrison confirmed that they
were, and she explained that she did not have experience with firearms and
believed the pellet rifles were “real.” Officer Strong then asked Morrison
about the electronics and appliances that officers observed in the residence.
Morrison reaffirmed what she had told Officer Strong during their interview:
“Alexander had confided in her that the items in the residence were stolen.”
Having confirmed Sharlette and Morrison’s earlier report that Alexander
kept stolen goods in the residence, the officers seized many of the electronics
and appliances. 1 Although the officers also believed the furniture sets were
stolen, they did not seize them. Instead, they photographed the furniture and
wrote down descriptions.
The next day, officers discovered that the furniture they
photographed matched the descriptions of furniture that had recently been
stolen from Clayton Homes, a local mobile home dealership. Officer Strong
sought and obtained a second warrant to search Alexander’s residence, this
time for the furniture. While executing the warrant, officers noticed a hot tub,
several pallets of shingles, and a hot water heater that also matched
descriptions of stolen items. The officers recorded these items’ serial
numbers and later confirmed that they had been reported stolen.
Thus, the following day, Officer Strong applied for and obtained a
third warrant to search 212 I-B Street. While officers were executing the
_____________________
1
These items included electronics such as a portable DVD player, a computer with
accessories, three flatscreen televisions, three DVD players, four stereo systems, a printer,
and a laptop computer. Officers also seized household appliances—including a crock pot,
a fryer, a rice cooker, and a vacuum cleaner—as well as a scooter.
4
Case: 25-30016 Document: 52-1 Page: 5 Date Filed: 04/13/2026
No. 25-30016
warrant, representatives from Van Allen Homes, Home Depot, and
Lowe’s—the entities that had reported the items as stolen—arrived on the
scene, and officers distributed the property to them.
The day after officers executed the third search warrant, they located
and arrested Alexander. He was charged with six counts of possession of
stolen property. Alexander was detained for over two years pending trial,
which commenced in January 2014. By the time trial began, only two of the
six counts remained, and the jury found Alexander not guilty on both counts.
Two years after he was acquitted, the items that the officers seized during the
first search were still in police evidence, so the Lafayette City-Parish
Consolidated Government sold them at auction.
In September 2011, while Alexander was detained awaiting trial, he
filed a pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After a six-year stay pending the
resolution of his criminal trial and a number of dismissed claims and amended
complaints, Alexander obtained counsel and filed a third amended complaint
in October 2021. He raised claims under the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments against James Craft, the former Chief of Police for
the City of Lafayette, and seven police officers in their individual capacities.
In relevant part, Alexander alleged that the officers violated the Fourth
Amendment when executing the first search warrant because they conducted
a general exploratory search of his residence and seized property that was not
listed in the search warrant. The defendants moved for summary judgment,
asserting qualified immunity as to Alexander’s Fourth Amendment claim.
The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants and
dismissed all of Alexander’s claims with prejudice. The court determined
that the officers had not violated the Fourth Amendment because the
electronics and appliances they seized were in plain view and their
incriminating nature was immediately apparent. Considering the tips from
5
Case: 25-30016 Document: 52-1 Page: 6 Date Filed: 04/13/2026
No. 25-30016
Sharlette and Morrison and the fact that many of the items were brand new
and stored in their original packaging, the court concluded that the officers
had probable cause to seize the items under the plain view doctrine. Because
Alexander did not show a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the court held
that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity and dismissed
Alexander’s claim. Alexander timely appealed.
II
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Thompson v. Mercer,
762 F.3d 433, 435 (5th Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is proper “if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
“The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable
inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
III
Although the district court dismissed all of Alexander’s claims, he
appeals only the dismissal of his Fourth Amendment claim. Alexander
contends that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment during the first
search of his residence by seizing items that were not listed in the search
warrant, and he argues that the district court erred by concluding otherwise. 2
_____________________
2
Alexander also argues that the district court erred by declining to address whether
he has Fourth Amendment standing before determining that the search was constitutional
under the plain view doctrine. But Fourth Amendment standing is distinct from Article III
standing, “which is jurisdictional and must be assessed before reaching the merits.” Byrd
v. United States, 584 U.S. 395, 410–11 (2018). In contrast, “Fourth Amendment standing
is subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine,” so it “need not be addressed
before addressing other aspects of the merits of a Fourth Amendment claim.” Id. at 411.
6
Case: 25-30016 Document: 52-1 Page: 7 Date Filed: 04/13/2026
No. 25-30016
To overcome the officers’ assertion of qualified immunity, Alexander
must show (1) that they “violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2)
that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged
conduct.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Because we hold that Alexander has
not shown a constitutional violation, we do not reach the second prong.
The Fourth Amendment safeguards “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. It further provides that
“no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.” Id. It is undisputed that the first search
warrant did not describe any of the items seized during the first search. But
the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement is subject “to a few
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
One such exception is the plain view doctrine, which “provides
grounds for seizure of an item when an officer’s access to an object has some
prior justification under the Fourth Amendment.” Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S.
730, 738 (1983) (plurality opinion); see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (plurality opinion) (“It is well established that under
certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in plain view without a
warrant.”). Under this doctrine, officers can seize items without a warrant if
“(1) the officers lawfully entered the area where the items were located; (2)
the items were in plain view; (3) the incriminating nature of the items was
‘immediately apparent’; and (4) the officers had a lawful right of access to
the items.” United States v. Buchanan, 70 F.3d 818, 825 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136–37 (1990)).
7
Case: 25-30016 Document: 52-1 Page: 8 Date Filed: 04/13/2026
No. 25-30016
Alexander focuses on the third element, arguing that it was not
immediately apparent that any of the items officers seized were stolen.
According to Alexander, he was renovating his house after it was damaged by
a hurricane, and that is why the electronics and appliances were stored the
way they were.
“The incriminating nature of an item is ‘immediately apparent’ if the
officers have ‘probable cause’ to believe that the item is either evidence of a
crime or contraband.” Id. at 826 (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326–
27 (1987)). “Probable cause does not require certainty.” Id. Rather, it “is a
flexible, common-sense standard” that “merely requires that the facts
available to the officer would ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief’ that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as
evidence of a crime.” Brown, 460 U.S. at 742 (quoting Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). “[I]t is not necessary that the officer know
that the discovered res is contraband or evidence of a crime, but only that
there be ‘a “practical, nontechnical” probability that incriminating evidence
is involved.’” United States v. Espinoza, 826 F.2d 317, 319 (5th Cir. 1987)
(quoting Brown, 460 U.S. at 742–43). When “reviewing probable cause
determinations, we must consider the totality of the circumstances—
including the officers’ training and experience as well as their knowledge of
the situation at hand.” Buchanan, 70 F.3d at 826; see also United States v.
Turner, 839 F.3d 429, 433 (5th Cir. 2016) (reciting these standards).
Looking to the totality of the circumstances, it is undisputed that,
before the search, Officer Strong received tips from Sharlette and Morrison
that Alexander kept stolen items at his residence. They reported that these
items included electronics such as televisions and DVD players, and they
said that Alexander had bragged about stealing things without getting caught.
Alexander explains that he had evicted Sharlette and Morrison, and they
fabricated their reports to get back at him. But while Alexander challenges
8
Case: 25-30016 Document: 52-1 Page: 9 Date Filed: 04/13/2026
No. 25-30016
the veracity of Sharlette and Morrison’s reports, he does not dispute that
officers had received these tips about stolen goods before they commenced
the first search of 212 I-B Street. 3
Moreover, it is undisputed that when the officers entered the
residence, they saw a considerable number of electronics and appliances
stored in the house. These items were either stored in their original,
unopened packaging, wrapped in plastic, covered with pillowcases, or placed
on top of blankets. Officer Strong testified that the number of items in the
house and the fact that many of the items were in their original packaging
reminded her of cases she had worked in which people stored and resold
stolen goods. Alexander offers an alternative explanation for why the items
were stored in this manner, but he does not dispute the officers’ testimony
about what they observed in the residence.
In sum, officers had received tips from Morrison and Sharlette that
Alexander kept various stolen items, including electronics and appliances, in
his residence. When the officers entered the residence, they saw many such
items sitting in plain view. The items were packaged and stored in such a way
that indicated to the officers, based on their experience and their knowledge
of the situation at hand, that they were stolen. Officer Strong then called
Morrison, who confirmed that Alexander had told her he kept stolen items in
the residence. Based on these facts, a reasonable officer could have believed
that there was a “‘practical, nontechnical’ probability” that the items in the
residence were stolen property. See Brown, 460 U.S. at 742 (quoting Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)); see also 2 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth
_____________________
3
Alexander does not contend that the officers relied on a false statement to obtain
the search warrant. Alexander raised a claim under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978),
relying on similar allegations, but he abandoned this claim in the district court.
9
Case: 25-30016 Document: 52-1 Page: 10 Date Filed: 04/13/2026
No. 25-30016
Amendment § 4.11(c) (6th ed. 2021) (explaining that the plain view
doctrine has justified warrantless seizures when “the quantity and placement
of the articles were such that they obviously were not on the scene for
ordinary use” and when officers, “after observing suspicious items . . ., while
still within the premises, contact the police station and learn that items of
that description were earlier reported stolen”). In other words, the
incriminating character of the items was immediately apparent, so the
officers were justified in seizing them under the plain view doctrine.
Alexander’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. He argues
that the officers violated Arizona v. Hicks by taking additional investigative
steps to establish probable cause. Specifically, he argues that Officer Strong
had to call Morrison to establish probable cause to believe that the items were
stolen. 4 Alexander ignores the fact that Sharlette and Morrison had reported
that there were stolen items in the house before the search began. Given the
earlier reports and the officers’ observations on the scene, the officers already
had probable cause to believe the items were stolen before Officer Strong
called Morrison. Officer Strong’s call merely confirmed what Morrison had
already told her: that Alexander had bragged about keeping stolen items at
212 I-B Street.
Moreover, Alexander argues that the officers conducted an
impermissible “general exploratory search” of his home that should have
stopped after they confirmed the reported firearms were actually pellet rifles.
Alexander relies on Creamer v. Porter, 754 F.2d 1311 (5th Cir. 1985), for
support. In that case, officers obtained a warrant to search a used
merchandise store for two stolen television sets. Id. at 1314. “The warrant
_____________________
4
Alexander also argues that the officers violated Hicks by checking items’ serial
numbers and searching databases. But the officers checked serial numbers and databases in
the later searches, and Alexander challenges only the first search.
10
Case: 25-30016 Document: 52-1 Page: 11 Date Filed: 04/13/2026
No. 25-30016
described the sets by size, color and serial number,” and it listed “[n]o other
property.” Id. Although officers located and seized both television sets
within fifteen minutes of entering the store, they continued to search the
property for over three hours. Id. at 1315. The officers searched everywhere
from the locked office in the back of the store to the store owner’s apartment
on the back of the lot, seizing a total of twenty-nine items. Id. at 1314–15. We
held that the plain view doctrine did not justify the officers’ “extended
search and seizure of objects at random” because none of the items they
seized (other than the televisions) bore any indicia of criminality. Id. at 1318.
“There was no conceivable justification for the officers to continue the
search after the items described in the warrant had been seized,” so we
concluded that they violated the Fourth Amendment by continuing the
search and seizing additional items after they seized the two televisions. Id.
at 1319.
Creamer is distinguishable for two reasons. First, the warrant in
Creamer listed two specific items, and when police seized them, their search
should have ended. See id. Here, the search warrant authorized a broader
search for “[a]ny and all firearms, ammunition, ammunition clips,
ammunition boxes, firearm storage boxes, spent projectiles, spent cartridges,
firearms or ammunition paperwork.” When the officers found the two pellet
rifles, they did not satisfy the warrant’s objective. Family members other
than Sharlette and Morrison had reported that Alexander kept firearms in the
house. Thus, after the officers seized the pellet rifles, they still had reason to
believe they might find other firearms or ammunition on the property, and
the warrant authorized them to search for such items.
Second, in Creamer, the officers’ only justification for believing the
items they seized were stolen was that they found them in the same used
merchandise store where they recovered the stolen televisions. See id. at 1318.
In contrast, here, the officers had received tips that Alexander possessed
11
Case: 25-30016 Document: 52-1 Page: 12 Date Filed: 04/13/2026
No. 25-30016
stolen electronics and appliances, and when they entered the residence, they
saw items that corroborated those tips. The quantity of the items and the
manner in which they were stored further supported the officers’ reasonable
belief that the items were stolen. Given this additional context, the officers
here had a stronger indication that the items were stolen than did the officers
in Creamer, who only knew that the televisions were found in the store and
their owner had reported other items as stolen. See id. at 1315.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, the officers had probable
cause to believe that the items they seized during the first search of
Alexander’s residence were stolen. Because the officers were lawfully in the
residence pursuant to the search warrant, the items were in plain view, the
incriminating nature of the items was immediately apparent, and the officers
had a lawful right to access them, their seizure was justified under the plain
view doctrine. See Buchanan, 70 F.3d at 825.
IV
The officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment, so they are
entitled to qualified immunity on Alexander’s Fourth Amendment claim.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
12