CHRISTOPHER PETERMAN v. RANDY IRWIN, Superintendent at SCI-Forest, and PENNSYLVANIA PAROLE BOARD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

CHRISTOPHER PETERMAN, )

Case No. 1:24-cv-191

)

Petitioner )

SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER

)

United States District Judge

v. )

)

RICHARD A. LANZILLO

RANDY IRWIN, Superintendent at )

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

SCI-Forest, and PENNSYLVANIA )

PAROLE BOARD, )

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

)

ON AMENDED PETITION FOR

Respondents )

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (ECF

)

NO. 24)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. Recommendation

It is respectfully recommended that the Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas

Corpus filed by Petitioner Christopher Peterman pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, ECF

No. 24, be denied. It is further recommended that no certificate of appealability issue.

II. Report

A. Procedural History

Petitioner commenced this litigation on July 2, 2024, when he mailed his

original petition.1 ECF No. 1 at 16. Petitioner is serving a sentence of nine to 18 years’

incarceration imposed on March 19, 2015, by the Court of Common Pleas of

Westmoreland County at Docket Number CP-65-CR-0000600-2013, following his

convictions for aggravated assault, conspiracy, and endangering the welfare of

1 At that time, Petitioner was incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Forest; he is currently incarcerated

at the State Correctional Institution at Fayette.

children. His minimum sentence date was January 28, 2022. The Parole Board denied

Petitioner parole on October 4, 2021, January 20, 2023, May 14, 2024, and May 22,

2025.

The pending Amended Petition was filed on October 29, 2025. ECF No. 24.

Therein, Petitioner asserts that the Parole Board’s May 22, 2025, decision to deny

him parole violated his constitutional right to due process. Respondents filed an

Answer on the same day. ECF No. 25.

The petition is ripe for review.

B. Jurisdiction

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a federal court may grant a state prisoner a writ of

habeas corpus “on the ground that he or she is in custody in violation of the

Constitution…of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). It is Petitioner’s burden to

prove that he is entitled to the writ. See, e.g., Vickers v. Superintendent Graterford

SCI, 858 F.3d 841, 848-49 (3d Cir. 2017).

C. Analysis

1. Exhaustion

Respondents argues that Petitioner’s claim must be dismissed for failure to

exhaust his state court remedies. ECF No. 25 at 4-8. State prisoners typically must

“exhaust their claims in state court before seeking relief in federal courts.” Slutzker

v. Johnson, 393 F.3d 373, 379 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing 28 U.S.C § 2254(b)(1)(A)). In

2005, in Defoy v. McCullough, 393 F.3d 439 (3d Cir. 2005), the United States Court

of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that, aside from litigating an ex post facto claim,

Pennsylvania law does not provide a mechanism by which a prisoner can challenge a

parole denial. Id. at 445. Therefore, it held, a Pennsylvania prisoner who is

challenging the denial of parole is exempt from the exhaustion requirement that

applies to other constitutional claims. Id. Apparently relying on Defoy, Petitioner

asserts that exhaustion is not required for a substantive due process challenge to the

denial of parole because no state remedies are available. ECF No. 24 at 3, 4.

The continuing validity of Defoy has been called into question. See, e.g.,

Begandy v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 2021 WL 1986415, at *4 (W.D. Pa.

May 18, 2021); Bradley v. Wingard, 2017 WL 11476608, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2017),

report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 10150909 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 2018).

But the Court need not consider in this case whether Defoy is still good law because

Petitioner’s claim has no merit and because it is more efficient for the Court to deny

it on that basis. See Roman v. DiGuglielmo, 675 F.3d 204, 209 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding

that a federal court “may bypass the exhaustion issue altogether should [it] decide

that the petitioner’s habeas claim fails on the merits”); Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416,

427 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Here, because we will deny all of [petitioner’s] claims on the

merits, we need not address exhaustion.”); Lee v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole,

2019 WL 5191968, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2019); see also 28 U.S.C § 2254(b)(2).

2. Merits

Petitioner argues that his substantive due process rights were violated by the

Parole Board’s most recent denial of parole.2 The Fourteenth Amendment provides

2 Petitioner correctly advances his substantive due process rights rather than his procedural due process rights. There

is “no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid

that the State may not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. While a convicted person has “no

constitutional or inherent right . . . to be conditionally released before the expiration

of a valid sentence,” see Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442

U.S. 1, 7 (1979), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has acknowledged that

prisoners have a liberty interest flowing directly from the due process clause “in not

being denied parole for arbitrary or constitutionally impermissible reasons.” Block v.

Potter, 631 F.2d 233, 236 (3d Cir. 1980). See also Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 775, 782

(3d Cir. 2010). In other words, while there is no constitutional right to parole, a state,

once it does enact a parole statute, cannot exercise its authority under that statute

“in an arbitrary or capricious, or constitutionally impermissible manner.” Block, 631

F.2d at 236.

The scope of judicial review of a parole denial is “necessarily quite limited.”

Diehl-Armstrong v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 2014 WL 1871509, at *5 (M.D. Pa. May

7, 2014). See also Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 487 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[F]ederal courts

are not authorized to second-guess parole boards and the requirements of substantive

due process are met if there is some basis for the challenged decision.”) (emphasis

added); Shoop v. Pennsylvania Board of Parole, 2025 WL 2178422, at *6 (M.D. Pa.

July 31, 2025) (“The Parole Board has vast discretion to refuse or deny parole.”)

(citing 61 Pa.C.S. § 6137(a)(1)). Under substantive due process, as the term has been

sentence.” Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Thus, absent a liberty

interest in parole, a state’s decision to deny parole does not implicate procedural due process protections. See, e.g.,

Burkett v. Love, 89 F.3d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1996) (recognizing general principle that Pennsylvania's parole statute does

not create a liberty interest in the right to be paroled)

construed by the courts, a state may not deny parole on constitutionally

impermissible grounds or base a parole decision on factors bearing no rational

relationship to the interests of the Commonwealth. Block, 631 F.2d at 237. This

generally requires a habeas petitioner to demonstrate that: “(1) they were arbitrarily

denied parole due to impermissible reasons such as race, religion, or political beliefs,

and/or (2) the Parole Board failed to apply appropriate, rational criteria in reaching

its determination to deny parole.” Shoop, 2025 WL 2178422, at *6 (citing Block, 631

F.2d at 236).

The Third Circuit has stressed that a substantive due process claim based upon

alleged arbitrary and capricious action is not easily mounted. Hunterson v. DiSabato,

308 F.3d 236, 246-47 (3d Cir. 2002). This is because the relevant level of arbitrariness

required to establish a substantive due process violation “involves not merely action

that is unreasonable.” Id. at 247. Rather, our Court of Appeals has made clear that

“only the most egregious conduct” – such as conduct that is “conscience shocking” or

“deliberately indifferent” – will be considered arbitrary in the constitutional sense.

Id. at 247-48. See also Newman, 617 F.3d at 782 (“Conduct can violate substantive

due process if it shocks the conscience, which encompasses only the most egregious

official conduct.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Applying these principles to the instant case, the Parole Board informed

Petitioner that his parole was denied for the following reasons:

Your institutional behavior, including reported misconducts.

Your minimization/denial of the nature and circumstances of the

offense(s) committed.

Your lack of remorse for the offense(s) committed.

The negative recommendation made by the prosecuting attorney.

The nature of your crime.

Your prior criminal history.

ECF No. 25-6 at 1. These factors largely mirror those that the Parole Board is

statutorily required to consider under Pa.C.S. § 6135 including:

(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense committed.

(2) Any recommendations made by the trial judge and prosecuting attorney.

(3) The general character and background of the inmate.

(4) Participation by an inmate sentenced after February 19, 1999, and who is

serving a sentence for a crime of violence as defined in 42 Pa. C.S. § 9714(g)

(relating to sentences for second and subsequent offenses) in a victim

impact education program offered by the Department of Corrections.

(5) The written or personal statement of the testimony of the victim or the

victim's family submitted under section 6140 (relating to victim statements,

testimony and participation in hearing).

(6) The notes of testimony of the sentencing hearing, if any, together with such

additional information regarding the nature and circumstances of the

offense committed for which sentence was imposed as may be available.

(7) The conduct of the person while in prison and his physical, mental and

behavioral condition and history, his history of family violence and his

complete criminal record.

See 61 Pa.C.S. §6135(a)(1)-(7). In reaching its decision, the Board relied on an

interview that it conducted with Petitioner, a review of his file, and consideration of

all matters required under the parole statute. Id.

Petitioner does not dispute the relevancy and legitimacy of these factors or

argue that they bear no rational relationship to the interests of the Commonwealth.

Nor does he direct the Court to any factor relied upon by the Board that was

constitutionally impermissible or “conscience shocking.” Instead, he asks the Court

to second-guess the Board in its analysis, claiming that he is “a model prisoner and a

prime candidate for parole.” ECF No. 19 at 3. As set forth above, “federal courts, on

habeas review, are not to ‘second-guess parole boards,’ and ‘the requirements of

substantive due process are met if there is some basis for the challenged decision.”

Hunterson, 308 F.3d at 246 (quoting Coady, 251 F.3d at 487). Because the Parole

Board advanced multiple legitimate bases for its denial, and because Petitioner has

not pointed to any impermissible factor the Parole Board relied upon, his

disagreement with that decision does not offend substantive due process or entitle

him to habeas relief. Shoop, 2025 WL 2178422, at *9 (denying habeas relief where

Parole Board provided “‘some basis’ for its decision insofar as it provided eight (8)

minimally detailed reasons for denying parole, none of which were based on

impermissible factors”). His petition should be denied.

D. Certificate of Appealability

AEDPA codified standards governing the issuance of a certificate of

appealability for appellate review of a district court’s disposition of a habeas petition.

It provides that “[a] certificate of appealability may issue…only if the applicant has

made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2253(c)(2). When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds

without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim, a [certificate of

appealability] should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason

would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a

constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the

district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,

484 (2000). Applying that standard here, jurists of reason would not find it debatable

whether Petitioner’s claim should be denied. Thus, a certificate of appealability

should be denied with respect to his claim.

III. Notice

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, the parties may

seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and

Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and

Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days

from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).

Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See

Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d

187 (3d Cir. 2007).

Dated this 3rd day of March, 2026.

SUBMITTED BY:

___________________________

RICHARD A. LANZILLO

Chief United States Magistrate Judge