Sizemore

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

EMILY SIZEMORE,

)

)

Plaintiff,

) CIVIL ACTION NO.

v.

) 2:23-cv-00198-MHT

) (WO)

CITY OF MONTGOMERY,

)

ALABAMA, et al.,

)

)

Defendant.

)

ORDER ON PRETRIAL HEARING

A pretrial hearing was held in this case on March 19, 2026, wherein the

following proceedings were held and actions taken:

1. Parties and Trial Counsel:

Sidney M. Jackson

Plaintiff:

Samuel Fisher

Emily Sizemore

Nicki Lawsen

Wiggins, Childs, Pantazis,

Fisher & Goldfarb, LLC

Henry Lewis Gillis

Kristen Jordana Gillis

Gillis Law Group, P.C.

Defendants:

City of Montgomery Rand Neeley

Juraldine Battle-Hodge

City of Montgomery

Richard Dorman Rand Neeley

Juraldine Battle-Hodge

City of Montgomery

Ernest Finley Wallace D. Mills

Wallace D. Mills, P.C.

Counsel Appearing at Pretrial Hearing:

Plaintiff:

Emily Sizemore Sidney M. Jackson

Nicki Lawsen

Wiggins, Childs, Pantazis,

Fisher & Goldfarb, LLC

Defendant:

City of Montgomery Rand Neeley

Juraldine Battle-Hodge

City of Montgomery

Richard Dorman Rand Neeley

Juraldine Battle-Hodge

City of Montgomery

Ernest Finley Wallace D. Mills

Wallace D. Mills, P.C.

2. Jurisdiction and Venue: Jurisdiction in this Court is proper under 28

U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(3) and (4), and 1367. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

3. Pleadings: The following pleadings and amendments were allowed:

Amended Complaint (Doc. 26)

Answer to Amended Complaint (Doc. 30)

4. Contentions of the Parties:

(a) Plaintiff

Plaintiff alleges the following:

This is a case brought against the City of Montgomery and former

Montgomery Police Chief Ernest Finley for Excessive Force, Failure to Train and

Supervise, and Failure to Discipline pursuant to the Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendments through 42 U.S.C. §1983. Additionally, this case includes a claim for

Excessive Force pursuant to the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments through 42

U.S.C. §1983, against former Montgomery Police Department Officer, Richard

Dorman. Dorman is also sued for Alabama state law claims of Assault and Battery;

Invasion of Privacy; Outrage; and Negligence. A jury trial has been demanded.

The above claims have been asserted in this lawsuit based on the events that

occurred in the late hours of April 9, 2021. At that time, Emily Sizemore, a 25-year-

old widow was driving home alone and was pulled over, under false pretense, by

Officer Dorman. Soon thereafter, Sizemore became the target of excessive and

unconstitutional force by Officer Dorman. Within moments of stopping in front of

her own home, Ms. Sizemore was yelled at, threatened, straddled, yanked out of her

car, and tased repeatedly while under the full control of Dorman with at least one of

her wrists handcuffed—despite posing no physical threat, flight risk, no active

resistance, and attempting to comply.

Dorman failed to identify himself, failed to tell Sizemore why she was pulled

over, failed to warn Sizemore before using force, and violated his own department’s

policies in the process. Dorman then told a demonstrably false account of events to

the magistrate in order to have a warrant issued. City of Montgomery and Finley

failed to properly train and supervise Dorman and defended his conduct—just as

they had done in excessive force claims in the past—despite knowing better. The

City repeatedly demonstrated, through action and inaction, that it condoned force

even when such action violated written policy, training, and constitutional

boundaries. Officer Dorman’s use of force was excessive and it flowed from a

municipal custom or policy of deliberate indifference. Defendants’ actions violated

clearly established law. Sizemore relies on the law asserted in her oppositions to

Defendants’ summary judgment motions. Qualified and/or State Agent immunity is

inapplicable to the Defendants.

Factual Summary

Emily Sizemore adopts and incorporates the facts as stated in the Statement

of Facts sections of her oppositions to Defendants’ summary judgment motions.

(Docs. 99 and 100).

Damages

Emily Sizemore is entitled to compensatory damages, nominal damages, pre-

judgment interest, attorneys fees, expenses, and other equitable relief awarded by

the Court against the City of Montgomery. Sizemore is entitled to compensatory

damages, punitive damages, nominal damages, pre-judgment interest, attorneys fees,

expenses, and other equitable relief awarded by the Court against Richard Dorman

and Ernest Finley.

*All defenses not previously asserted have been waived by Defendants.*

(b) Defendants City of Montgomery and Richard Dorman

Defendants allege the following:

Federal Law Claims

The City of Montgomery contends that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a long-

standing and widespread practice regarding the use of tasers or other lethal and or

non-lethal devices or practices not authorized by written law or express municipal

policy, that has become 'so permanent and well settled as to constitute a ‘custom

or usage’ with the force of law.

Similarly, the City of Montgomery contends that Plaintiff cannot present

sufficient evidence demonstrating the City knew of a need to train and/or supervise

in relevant area(s) and / or that the City made a deliberate or conscious choice to

not take action. Plaintiff cannot show a pattern of similar constitutional

violations by untrained employees to demonstrate deliberate indifference for

purposes of failure to train.

Finally, the City of Montgomery contends Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a

persistent failure to take disciplinary actions against officers in matters alleging

excessive force and or use of tasers. Thus, Plaintiff cannot establish the City has

ratified unconstitutional conduct, thereby establishing an unconstitutional custom

that can subject the City to liability.

Defendant Richard Dorman contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity

as his actions did not violate any of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. It is undisputed

that Officer Dorman was acting within his discretionary authority and Plaintiff

cannot demonstrate that Defendants violated clearly established law that at the time

of the events in question was sufficiently clear that every reasonable officer would

understand that what he is doing' is unlawful.

State Law Claims

Plaintiff makes four potential state claims against the City of Montgomery

and Richard Dorman: 1) assault and battery, 2) invasion of privacy, 3) outrage and

4) negligence. Defendants City of Montgomery and Defendant Richard Dorman

contend that they are entitled to state agent immunity as to each and every claim.

Plaintiff cannot demonstrate Defendant Richard Dorman’s conduct was

committed in violation of the Constitution and the laws of the United Staes, the

Constitution and laws of the State of Alabama and/or the laws, ordinances, rules,

policies and/or regulations of Defendant City of Montgomery, which were enacted

and/or promulgated for the purpose of regulating the boundaries of permissible

activities of law enforcement personnel.

Defendant Richard Dorman contends that he was acting within his

discretionary authority and with regard for his own safety given the totality of the

circumstances. Because his actions did not amount to excessive force, he did not

use more force than necessary to effectuate the arrest.

Defendant Richard Dorman contends his entry into Plaintiff’s arguable

“physical and emotion sanctum,” was lawful and a necessary measure to safely and

expeditiously gain control and effect the arrest. Additionally, Defendant Richard

Dorman contends that utilizing a taser, a non-lethal device, to gain control of a non-

compliant, resisting Plaintiff who failed to yield to lawful commands was not

outrageous or beyond the bounds of decency.

Moreover, Defendant Richard Dorman contends the force he applied was not

excessive, and within his discretion to utilize, therefore, he breached no duty to

Plaintiff by exercising his discretion in applying enough force to gain control and

effect the arrest.

Defendant City of Montgomery contends that because its employee,

Defendant Richard Dorman, is entitled the state-agent immunity, said immunity

passes to the City, making it immune due to state-agent immunity.

(c) Defendant Ernest Finley

Plaintiff makes two potential claims against Chief Finley: 1) a custom and

policy violation made generally and 2) a claim for failure to train, supervise, and

discipline. A custom and policy claim against a supervisor who was not directly

involved in the alleged deprivation of rights requires, among other things, that the

supervisor had notice of “a history of widespread abuse” sufficient to put him on

notice of a need to correct the alleged deprivation. Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d

667,670 (11th Cir. 1990). Finley asserts that he had no such notice and that he did

act, through the written policy, to prevent any such abuse.

As to the failure to train, supervise, or discipline claim, Finley similarly asserts

that he did not have knowledge, either actual or presumed, that his employees were

incompetent or in need of more or different training and/or supervision. Finley

further asserts that there is no evidence of the requisite deliberate indifference; that

he “made a deliberate choice not to take any action.” Gold v. City of Miami, 151

F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998).

Finley further asserts that Plaintiff cannot establish an unofficial custom or

policy against him; that there is insufficient evidence to infer that he committed

“repeated acts” as a final policymaker to support such an unofficial custom or policy.

Grech v. Clayton Cnty., Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1329–30 (11th Cir. 2003). Finley’s

position is that the two written policies on the use of force at issue in this case pass

constitutional muster.

Finally, Finley asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity; that there is

either no constitutional violation with regard to his actions as supervisor or his

training and supervision or that any such violation was not clearly established at the

time or both.

5. Stipulations By and Between the Parties:

N/A

***

It is ORDERED that:

(1) The jury selection and trial of this cause, which

is to last three days, are set for May 11, 2026, at 10:00

a.m., at the United States Courthouse in Montgomery,

Alabama;

(2) Motions for summary judgment (Doc. 68 and Doc.

73) and motions to exclude expert testimony (Doc. 76 and

Doc. 77) remain pending and will be resolved before

trial.

(2) A trial docket will be mailed to counsel for

each party approximately two weeks prior to the start of

the trial term;

(3) Each party shall have available at the time of

trial, for use by the court (the judge, the courtroom

deputy clerk, and the law clerk), three copies of the

exhibit list and a sufficient number of copies of each

photostatically reproducible exhibit for opposing

counsel, the courtroom deputy clerk, the law clerk, the

jurors, and the judge to each have a set of the exhibits;

(4) Trial briefs ((a) summarizing the evidence to be

presented at trial, (b) setting forth the elements of

each and every claim and defense at issue and how the

evidence does or does not satisfy those elements, and (c)

addressing any evidentiary issues that may arise at

trial) are required to be filed by May 1, 2026;

(5) All deadlines not otherwise affected by this

order will remain as set forth in the uniform scheduling

order (Doc. 35, as modified) entered by the court on

November 28, 2023; and

(6) All understandings, agreements, deadlines, and

stipulations contained in this pretrial order shall be

binding on all parties unless this order be hereafter

modified by order of the court.

DONE, this the 23rd day of March, 2026.

/s/ Myron H. Thompson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE