Plake

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

NORRIS BOSTON, S07401, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 25-cv-2190-RJD

)

C/O PLAKE, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DALY, Magistrate Judge:

Plaintiff Norris Boston, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) who

is currently incarcerated at Lawrence Correctional Center, brings this action for deprivations of

her1 constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the Complaint (Doc. 1), Boston alleges

that Defendant Plake violated her rights by groping her breasts during a pat down search on

October 30, 2025. On initial review, the Court noted that it appeared Boston had not yet received

a response to her grievance from the Administrative Review Board (ARB), so the Court directed

Boston to show cause concerning her exhaustion efforts. Boston has timely responded (Doc. 10).

Boston’s complaint concerns an incident on October 30, 2025. She filed an emergency

grievance on October 31, 2025, and the Warden expedited it for emergency processing (Doc. 1 at

18-19). On November 14, 2025, the grievance officer recommended that the grievance be deemed

resolved because a PREA investigation was ongoing, and on November 20, 2025, the Warden

concurred (Doc. 1 at 16). On November 21, 2025, Boston signed the grievance for appeal to the

ARB. (Id.). By contrast, Boston’s signed complaint included a statement on exhaustion where

1 Boston is a transgender inmate who has expressed a preference to be identified by she/her pronouns.

she indicated she had fully exhausted the grievance. The statement was signed and dated

November 16, 2025 (Doc. 1 at 10-11).

Although it is generally appropriate to wait for a defendant to raise an affirmative defense,

the Seventh Circuit has noted that “when the existence of a valid affirmative defense is so plain

from the face of the complaint that the suit can be regarded as frivolous, the district judge need not

wait for an answer before dismissing the suit.” Walker v. Thompson, 288 F.3d 1005, 1009 (7th

Cir. 2002). A plaintiff can plead himself out of court, and if he includes allegations “that show he

isn't entitled to a judgment, he's out of luck.” Early v. Bankers Life and Cas. Co., 959 F.2d 75, 79

(7th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). Although a plaintiff need not anticipate or overcome an

affirmative defense like exhaustion, if she alleges facts sufficient to establish that an affirmative

defense applies, “the district court may dismiss the complaint on that ground.” O'Gorman v. City

of Chicago, 777 F.3d 885, 889 (7th Cir. 2015).

As an inmate in the IDOC, Plaintiff was required to follow the grievance process outlined

in the Illinois Administrative Code. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.800, et seq. (2017). The Illinois

Administrative Code requires an inmate to file his grievance with his counselor within 60 days of

the discovery of an incident, occurrence, or problem that gave rise to the grievance. 20 ILL. ADMIN.

CODE § 504.810(a). If the complaint is not resolved through the counselor, the grievance may be

submitted to a grievance officer, who reports his or her findings and recommendations in writing

to the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO). 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.830(e). The CAO then

provides the inmate with a written decision on the grievance. Id. If the inmate is not satisfied with

the CAO’s response, he can file an appeal with the IDOC Director through the Administrative

Review Board (ARB). 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(a). The ARB must receive the appeal

within 30 days of the date of the CAO’s decision. Id. The inmate must attach copies of the

responses from the grievance officer and CAO to his appeal. Id. The ARB submits a written

report of its findings and recommendations to the Director, who then makes a final determination.

20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.850(d), (e).

Boston’s own evidence demonstrates that she submitted her grievance to the

Administrative Review Board on November 21, 2025 (Doc. 1 at 16). She filed this lawsuit less

than a month later with no proof that she had received a response from the ARB. In response to

the Court’s Order to Show Cause, she does not contend that she received a response from the ARB

prior to filing this lawsuit. Instead, she cites Fletcher v. Menard Corr. Ctr., 623 F.3d 1171 (7th

Cir. 2010) and argues that she faced imminent danger at Lawrence.

The implication of her citation to Fletcher is that she was not required to complete the

exhaustion process before filing this suit, but that argument does not agree with the substantive

contents of the Fletcher opinion. In Fletcher, the Seventh Circuit found that IDOC has an

emergency grievance procedure, and thus even an inmate with an arguably imminent danger must

allow the emergency grievance process an opportunity to address the issue before filing suit.

Boston’s situation is on all fours with Fletcher because IDOC still has an emergency grievance

process, and Boston’s grievance was being managed on an expedited basis pursuant to that process.

Boston simply sued before allowing the exhaustion process for imminent dangers to be conducted

at all stages of review.

Additionally, in response to the show cause order, Boston has now submitted the final

ruling from the ARB on her October 31, 2025, grievance. (Doc. 10 at 10). The final ruling was

issued on January 29, 2026, which definitively shows that Boston sued before exhausting her

claims through all levels of the grievance process. An inmate may not sue first and exhaust later,

so this shortcoming may make immediate dismissal of this pleading without prejudice appropriate.

Chambers v. Sood, 956 F.3d 979, 984 (7th Cir. 2020) (a sue first, exhaust later approach is not

acceptable, and cannot be cured by an amended complaint). Based on the foregoing analysis, the

Court finds that Boston filed this suit before exhausting her administrative remedies, so the suit

must be dismissed without prejudice.

Disposition

Boston’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to exhaust her

administrative remedies prior to filing this suit. This dismissal does not bar Boston from

presenting her claims in any future lawsuit once the claims are fully exhausted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 31, 2026

s/ Reona J. Daly

REONA J. DALY

U.S. Magistrate District Judge