Hawks

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

OBRIAN HAWKS

by next fried D’Mica Rozetta,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:26-cv-102-KCD-NPM

GEO GROUP, INC., JOHN DOE AND

JANE DOE, JOHN DOE OR JANE DOE,

JOHN DOE OR JANE DOE, JANE DOE,

JANE DOE, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS, and MEDICAL

CONTRACTORS AND HOSPITAL

ENTITIES,

Defendants.

ORDER

On January 20, 2026, D’Mica Rozetta filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights

complaint as the purported “next friend” of Plaintiff Obrian Hawks. Hawks is

incarcerated at the Moore Haven Correctional Facility in Glades County,

Florida. (Doc. 1.) Along with the complaint, Rozetta filed a motion for

recognition of next friend status. (Doc. 2.) On February 4, 2026, she filed a

motion for emergency injunctive medical relief asking the Court to order the

defendants to provide Hawks with better medical care, “including urgent

evaluation and treatment by a qualified oral and maxillofacial surgeon[.]” (Doc.

7 at 1.) The Court now denies Rozetta’s “next friend” status and dismisses the

complaint without prejudice for lack of standing.

I. Discussion

A. Rozetta does not have standing to bring this action.

Under Article III of the United States Constitution, a federal court

cannot consider the merits of a legal claim unless the person seeking to invoke

the jurisdiction of the court establishes the requisite standing to sue. Whitmore

v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154 (1990). A litigant demonstrates standing by

showing that he or she has suffered an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to

the challenged action and is redressable by a favorable judicial decision. Steel

Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 103 (1998). Rozetta has no

standing on her own in this action.

However, “next friend” standing “has long been an accepted basis for

jurisdiction in certain circumstances.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 162. “Most

frequently, ‘next friends’ appear in court on behalf of detained prisoners who

are unable, usually because of mental incompetence or inaccessibility, to seek

relief themselves.” Id. But “‘next friend’ standing is by no means granted

automatically to whomever seeks to pursue an action on behalf of another.” Id.

To qualify for “next friend” standing, they must “provide an adequate

explanation—such as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other

disability—why the real party in interest cannot appear on his own behalf to

prosecute the action,” must be “truly dedicated to the best interests of the

person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate,” and “must have some significant

relationship with the real party in interest.” Id. at 163-64. “The burden is on

the ‘next friend’ to clearly establish the propriety of his status and thereby

justify the jurisdiction of the court.” Id. at 164.

Rosetta asserts that Hawks was struck in the face by a baseball bat

during a recreation activity at the prison on December 17, 2025 and suffered a

fractured jaw, facial lacerations, bleeding, and dental trauma. (Doc. 1 at 2.)

He was transported to a hospital on the same day and received surgery on

December 19, 2025. (Id.) Hawks’ jaw was immobilized to stabilize his fracture.

(Id.) On December 20, 2025, Hawks developed a fever, elevated blood pressure,

and severe pain. (Id.) The nurses at the hospital “repeatedly allowed IV fluids

to run dry and failed to monitor Hawks’ condition.” (Id.) He was returned to

Moore Haven on December 21, 2025, “despite clear signs of infection.” (Id.)

At the prison, Hawks continued to suffer fever, difficulty swallowing,

shortness of breath, and severe pain. (Id.) He was admitted to the facility’s

infirmary from December 26–29, 2025 where he received treatment in the form

of IV antibiotics and steroids. (Id.) On January 15, 2026, Hawks was

transported for a post-operative visit with the surgeon, but he (or Rozetta) was

unhappy with the care provided because Hawks did not receive “post-operative

instructions, a treatment plan, dietary guidance, or follow-up scheduling, and

no nutritional protocol was ordered or explained to him.” (Doc. 7 at 1.) Hawks

remains confined with his jaw immobilized. He experiences difficulty

swallowing, inadequate nutrition, pain, and an elevated risk of infection and

airway obstruction. (Doc. 7 at 2.)1

Rozetta is Hawks’ sister, so the Court assumes that she is dedicated to

his best interests. But other than stating that Hawks is a prisoner and has

suffered a mandibular fracture, Rozetta does not provide an adequate

explanation for why he cannot appear on his own behalf to prosecute this civil

rights action and has not otherwise shown she is entitled to next friend

status. Prisoners file dozens of pro se actions in the Fort Myers Division of the

Middle District of Florida every year, and the fact of their incarceration does

not entitle them to have a non-lawyer file pleadings on their behalf. And while

it is clear that Hawks suffered a serious and painful injury, he is not

incompetent and is presumably able to prosecute his own civil rights action.

He admits that he has filed medical grievances with the prison, and it is clear

that he has been able to communicate the details of his injury and treatment

to Rozetta. Rozetta does not have standing to proceed as Hawks’ “next friend,”

and the Court will dismiss the complaint and this action for lack of jurisdiction.

1 Because Rozetta alleged that Hawks was receiving inadequate nutrition and expressed

concern about the prison’s provision of medical care, the Clerk of Court sent a copy of

Rozetta’s motion for temporary restraining order (Doc. 7) to the Warden at Moore Haven

Institution to alert the facility of Rozetta’s concerns.

To the extent Hawks wishes to file a pro se complaint, he should be aware

that the facts, as alleged in Rozetta’s complaint, do not state a claim on which

relief may be granted.

B. Hendry Medical Center, Palm Beach Hospital, and their

employees are not state actors.

To prevail on a § 1983 claim, the plaintiff must show that: (1) the

defendants deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law;

and (2) the deprivation occurred under color of state law. Arrington v. Cobb

Cty., 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th cir. 1998). A person acts “under color of state law”

for purposes of § 1983 when he acts with authority possessed by reason of his

employment with the state. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988).

Rozetta names emergency room physicians, hospital charge nurses,

Hendry Regional Medical Center, and Palm Beach Hospital as defendants. She

does not allege facts suggesting that either hospital or its employees are state

actors. A private doctor’s and private hospital’s treatment of a patient who

happens to be a prisoner, without more, does not create liability under the

Eighth Amendment. See American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40,

50 (1999) (“[Section] 1983 excludes from its reach merely private conduct, no

matter how discriminatory or wrongful.”).

Moreover, Rozetta does not allege facts suggesting that the hospitals or

their employees deprived Hawks of a constitutional right. Rather, she suggests

that Hawks is being inadequately treated due to incompetence. But to the

extent she attempts to state a claim against these defendants for negligence or

medical malpractice, neither claim is actionable under § 1983. See Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (“Medical malpractice does not become a

constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.”).

Accordingly, to the extent Hawks alleges a state-law claim for medical

malpractice or negligence, it should be filed in state court.

C. Hawks has not stated a deliberate indifference claim.

The Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause

prohibits government officials from exhibiting “deliberate indifference” to the

serious medical needs of prisoners. Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1255

(11th Cir. 2024); Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–05. In 2024, the Eleventh Circuit

clarified the standard for establishing liability on an Eighth Amendment

deliberate-indifference claim. Wade, 106 F.4th at 1261–62. The plaintiff must

first show that “he suffered a deprivation that was, objectively, sufficiently

serious.” Id. at 1262.2 Next, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant

acted with “subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law.” Id. This means

that the plaintiff must establish “that the defendant was actually, subjectively

2 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations have

been omitted in this and subsequent citations.

aware that his own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to the

plaintiff.” Id.

Not every claim of inadequate medical treatment states a cognizable

claim under the federal constitution. Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262. “Medical

treatment violates the [E]ighth [A]mendment only when it is so grossly

incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be

intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505

(11th Cir. 1991). And “[w]here a prisoner has received . . . medical attention

and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are

generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize

claims that sound in tort law.” Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1575

(11th Cir. 1985). In short, a prisoner cannot establish a constitutional violation

simply because he “may have desired different modes of treatment” than that

which was provided to him. Id. Such course of treatment claims, by definition,

involve the “exercise of professional judgment” and are not actionable. Estelle,

429 U.S. at 104 n.10.

Even if the Court finds that Hawks’ facial injuries are an objectively

serious medical need, the vague and conclusory allegations in the complaint do

not articulate how any defendant was deliberately indifferent to that need. The

prison transported Hawks to the hospital on the same day he was injured, and

he received surgery. He was also taken to the prison’s infirmary and treated

for three days when he showed signs of infection. He was returned to the

hospital for follow-up care. In other words, Hawks received medical treatment

for his injury. While Rozetta wanted the hospitals, doctors, nurses, and prison

to do more, disagreement with the course of treatment is a matter for medical

judgment that does not give rise to an actionable claim of deliberate

indifference. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106-07.

II. Conclusion

Rozetta has no standing to bring this action on her brother’s behalf, and

the complaint must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Moreover, the

complaint does not state a constitutional claim. If Hawks believe that he can

file a complaint that comports with this order and states a constitutional claim,

he must file his complaint on a court-approved form in a new action,

accompanied by either the statutory filing fee or an Application to Proceed In

Forma Pauperis.

Accordingly, it is now ORDERED:

1. D’Mica Rozetta’s motion for next friend standing (Doc. 2) is

DENIED, and this action is DISMISSED without prejudice.

2. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate any pending motions

and close this case.

3. The Clerk is also directed to send a copy of the Court’s preprinted

42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint form and an application to proceed in

forma pauperis to Obrian Hawks at Moore Haven Correctional

Facility.

ENTERED in Fort Myers, Florida on February 6, 2026.

Kyle C. Dudek

United States District Judge