McFarland

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MONROE DIVISION

RODNEY MCFARLAND ET AL CASE NO. 3:25-CV-01667

VERSUS JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY

JEFF LANDRY ET AL MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D.

MCCLUSKY

MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the Court are three Motions to Dismiss [Doc. Nos. 6, 8, and 25]. The

first Motion [Doc. No. 6] is filed by Defendant, Friday Ellis, in his official capacity as

the Mayor of the City of Monroe (“Mayor Ellis”). Plaintiffs, Bishop Rodney

McFarland, Verbon Muhammad, Jr., and Juanita Woods (collectively, “Plaintiffs”),

filed an opposition [Doc. No. 15]. No reply was filed. The second Motion [Doc. No. 8]

is filed by Defendant, Jeff Landry, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of

Louisiana (“Governor Landry”). Plaintiffs filed an opposition [Doc. No. 18] and

Governor Landry filed a reply [Doc. No. 20]. Defendant, City of Monroe Fire Chief

appointee, Timothy Williams (“Chief Williams”), adopted the two Motions to Dismiss

mentioned above [Doc. No. 25].1

After carefully considering the parties’ filings and applicable law, the Motions

are GRANTED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Motions are otherwise

DENIED AS MOOT.

1 Governor Landry, Mayor Ellis, and Chief Williams are collectively referred to as “Defendants”.

I. Background

This suit challenges the lawfulness of a recently enacted Louisiana law known

as Act 452. See 2025 La. Acts 452. On October 31, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the instant

suit against Governor Landry, Mayor Ellis, and Chief Williams. The Complaint

challenges Act 452 “on the grounds that [it] violates Section 2 of the Voting Rights

Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C Section 10301, the Constitution of the United States, and the

Louisiana Constitution” by “unlawfully dilute the voting strength of Black Voters in

Monroe, Louisiana.”2 Further, Plaintiffs claim that “Act 452’s amendment to the

Lawrason Act R.S. 33:381(F) is in direct conflict with the Louisiana Constitution and

Monroe’s Home Rule Charter.”3 The Monroe City Council (“City Council”) is made up

of five members.4 Three members—who are the Plaintiffs in this case—are Black and

make up a 60% majority of the City Council.5

Act 452 amended Louisiana Revised Statute Section 33:381 to add subsection

(F), which states:

(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the

contrary, if a vacancy in the office of chief of police or fire

chief in a municipality covered by the provisions of the

municipal fire and police civil service law continues for a

period exceeding twelve consecutive months and the

municipal governing authority has failed or declined to

confirm an appointment submitted by the mayor or other

appointing authority to the governing authority under the

requirements of a municipal home rule charter, the

governor shall have the authority to make an

appointment to the position.

2 [Doc. No. 1, p. 2].

3 [Id.].

4 [Id. at ¶ 14].

5 [Id.].

(2) The governor’s appointment shall be selected from

among the candidates on the certified competitive

employment list for the position and recommended by the

mayor or the local governing authority, notwithstanding

any prior rejection or denial of confirmation of a candidate

by the local governing authority

(3) The mayor or appointing authority shall notify the

board of the filling of the vacancy as provided in R.S.

33:2503.

(4) The person appointed to the position shall begin his

working test as provided by R.S. 33:2495, and nothing

herein shall be construed to prohibit the mayor, board,

or appointing authority from removing the probational

employee for the reasons and under the circumstances set

forth pursuant to that Section.

(5) Nothing in this Section shall be construed to limit the

authority of a mayor or local appointing authority to

submit appointees to a local governing authority for

confirmation under the requirements of a home rule

charter.

(6) Any person appointed under this Section must meet all

applicable statutory, regulatory, or civil service

qualifications for the position of chief of police or fire chief.

(7) This Section shall apply only to municipalities with a

population greater than forty-five thousand but no more

than forty-eight thousand, as determined by the most

recent federal decennial census.

(8) The provisions of this Section shall be retroactive to

June 1, 2023.

La. Stat. Ann § 33:381(F) (2025).

The City of Monroe’s population is 47,702 and the City is governed by a Home

Rule Charter (“the Charter”).6 Section 4-05 of the Charter states, in part, that “the

head of the Fire Department shall be the fire chief who shall be appointed in

accordance with applicable state law.”7 Louisiana Revised Statute section 33:2494

states:

6 [Doc. No. 9, p. 5].

7 [Id.].

Except for the positions of entrance firefighter, entrance

police officer, entrance jailer, secretary to the chief,

departmental records clerk, and for the entrance classes for

which the operation and maintenance of radio, alarm, or

signal systems for the respective fire or police service is the

primary duty, whenever the appointing authority proposes

to fill a vacancy in the classified service, except by

demotion, transfer, emergency appointment, or by

substitute employment not to exceed thirty days, the

appointing authority shall request the board to certify

names of persons eligible for appointment to the vacant

position. The board shall thereupon certify in writing the

names of eligible persons from the appropriate

employment list, and the appointing authority shall, if the

appointing authority fills the vacancy, make the

appointment as provided by this Section.

Id. § 33:2494(A)(1).

Section 3-09 of the Charter covers appointment of officers and states that the

mayor, “as chief executive officer of the City,” has the power to “[a]ppoint and suspend

or remove all City administrative officers and employees provided for under this

charter, except as otherwise provided by law, this charter or civil service or other

personnel rules adopted pursuant to this charter.”8

Section 7.1 and Section 4-01 of the Charter outline the process for filling

vacancies. When a vacancy occurs in the head of a department, the mayor selects a

replacement. The City Council must approve this appointment, and the individual

serves at the mayor’s discretion.9 On June 10, 2025, Plaintiffs voted against the

confirmation of Mayor Ellis’s appointee for Fire Chief Williams.10 Due to the City

Council’s votes in opposition, Chief Williams was never confirmed.

8 [Id. at p. 6].

9 [Id. at p. 7].

10 [Id.].

Regarding Mayor Ellis, Plaintiffs assert that “[he] failed to adequately

communicate with Chairman McFarland, Vice Chairman Muhammed, and counsel

member Woods, causing a delay in the appointment of a fire chief.”11 Because Mayor

Ellis and City Council were at an impasse, Plaintiffs allege that Mayor Ellis

“circumvented” their authority by instead engaging in discussion with State Senator

Stewart Cathy, Jr.—the sponsor of Act 452—which they claim was intended to dilute

the voting power of Black voters in Monroe.12 On August 14, 2025, Governor Landry

called for a 30-day temporary suspension of Act 452 to allow Mayor Ellis and the City

Council time to discuss and confirm a Fire Chief.13 On September 15, 2025—more

than a year after the Fire Chief position became vacant—Governor Jeff Landry

appointed Chief Williams as Fire Chief in accordance with § 33:381(F).14

The three Motions ensued. Mayor Ellis argues that “as chief executive officer

for the City of Monroe, Ellis had no authority to sponsor, vote in favor of, or enact any

legislation,” so the claims should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state

a redressable claim.15 Governor Landry also makes this argument, but he also asserts

in his Motion that dismissal is warranted under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction.16

Chief Williams adopts all arguments in both Motions.17 Plaintiffs oppose all Motions.

The parties briefed all relevant issues, and the matter is ripe.

11 [Id. at p. 5].

12 [Id.].

13 [Id. at p. 8].

14 [Id.].

15 [Doc. No. 6-1, p. 4].

16 [Doc. No. 8, p. 2].

17 [Doc. No. 25].

II. 12(b)(1) Motions for Lack of Jurisdiction

A. Standard of Review

Federal courts are courts of “limited jurisdiction, and their proceedings are

erroneous, if the jurisdiction be not shown upon them.” Hain Celestial Grp., Inc. v.

Palmquist, 146 S. Ct. 724, 730 (2026) (quoting Kempe’s Lessee v. Kennedy, 9 U.S. (5

Cranch) 173, 185, 173, 70 (1809)). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges

a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “Under Rule

12(b)(1), a case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the

court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” Huff v. Neal,

555 F. App’x 289, 296 (5th Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (citing Home Builders Ass’n of

Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir.1998)).

“There are two types of attacks against a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction:

‘facial’ and ‘factual’.” Reardon v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 167 F.4th 294, 299 (5th Cir. 2026)

(quoting Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1981)). “The former

challenges subject-matter jurisdiction on the pleadings alone, and the court must

presume the factual allegations in the complaint are true.” Id.

In factual attacks, the court may also look at parties’ “affidavits, testimony, or

other evidentiary materials” to ensure it has subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 300.

“Because at issue in a factual 12(b)(1) motion is the trial court’s jurisdiction, there is

substantial authority that the court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as

to the existence of its power to hear the case.” Id. (citation modified). Finally—and

importantly—a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not an adjudication on the merits

and, therefore, the plaintiff may pursue the claim elsewhere. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

B. Analysis

The court analyzes the Motions in descending order of precedence. That is, the

Court starts with Governor Landry’s Motion and works its way down to Chief

Williams’ Motion.

1. Plaintiffs do not have Standing Against Governor

Landry

Governor Landry argues that Plaintiffs’ complaint should be dismissed both

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction18 and for failure to state a claim upon which the

Court can grant relief.19 He also raises an Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity

defense.20 But in this Court, jurisdiction is tackled first.

The Constitution extends federal “judicial Power” only to “Cases” and

“Controversies.” U.S. Const. Art. III, § 2, Cl. 1. The Supreme Court, time and again,

has held this clause requires that a plaintiff “have standing to sue.” Food & Drug

Admin. v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 378 (2024). Article III standing

“requires a plaintiff to first answer a basic question: ‘What’s it to you?’” Id. at 379

(quoting A. Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation

of Powers, 17 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881, 882 (1983)). Put differently, a plaintiff must have

a “personal stake” in the dispute. Id. This ensures courts “decide litigants’ legal rights

in specific cases, as Article III requires,” and “do not opine on legal issues in response

to citizens who might ‘roam the country in search of governmental wrongdoing.’” Id.

18 [Doc. No. 8, ¶ 2].

19 [Id. at ¶ 4].

20 [Id. at ¶ 3].

To establish standing, “a plaintiff must demonstrate (i) that she has suffered

or likely will suffer an injury in fact, (ii) that the injury likely was caused or will be

caused by the defendant, and (iii) that the injury likely would be redressed by the

requested judicial relief.” Id. at 380 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). These

requirements are “essential and unchanging.” Id.

Relevant here is the third prong: redressability. “[R]edressability requires that

the court be able to afford relief through the exercise of its power, not through the

persuasive or even awe-inspiring effect of the opinion explaining the exercise of its

power.” Haaland v. Brackeen, 599 U.S. 255, 294 (2023) (quoting Franklin v.

Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 825 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring

in judgment)). “It is a federal court’s judgment, not its opinion, that remedies an

injury; thus it is the judgment, not the opinion, that demonstrates redressability.” Id.

While “causation and redressability are often ‘flip sides of the same coin,’” All.

for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 380 (citation omitted), “[r]edressability can still pose

an independent bar in some cases.” Id. at 381 n.1 (emphasis added). This is one of

those cases.

The Court assumes without deciding that Plaintiffs (1) suffered an injury in

fact, (2) which is fairly traceable to Governor Landry. Plaintiffs cannot, however,

prove redressability. To show why, the Court first frames Plaintiffs’ alleged injury.

Plaintiffs’ alleged injury in fact is straightforward: Act 452 strips the majority-

minority City Council of its ability to select appointed city officials, which in-turn

dilutes minority voters’ votes as they cannot influence the appointment of city

officials despite voting for candidates who would—but for Act 425—represent the

minority voters’ interests.21 This injury, Plaintiffs argue, is traceable to Governor

Landry since he enforces Act 452 by appointing an official when Mayor Ellis and the

City Council cannot agree. Again, the Court accepts both as a given.

To remedy said injury, Plaintiffs ask the Court to declare Act 452 unlawful22

and issue an injunction that bars Defendants from enforcing Act 452.23 These

measures, however, would not redress Plaintiffs’ harm. The Court relies on Haaland

v. Brackeen, which has analogically identical facts, to illustrate why.

There, the petitioners sought an injunction, “preventing the federal parties

from enforcing” the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”) and “a declaratory judgment

that the challenged provisions are unconstitutional.” Haaland, 599 U.S. at 292. The

Supreme Court held that neither request would redress the petitioners’ injury. Id.

The injunction, the Court held, would not alter the ultimate determination—child

custody—because ICWA’s constitutionality was only “an incidental legal

determination” of the petitioners’ suit. Id. at 293. The Court, likewise, held the

petitioners’ “request for a declaratory judgment suffers from the same flaw.” Id.

(citation omitted). Even if the Court set aside ICWA, its effect would only be a

“possible, indirect benefit in a future lawsuit.” Id. at 294 (quoting United States v.

Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. 932, 937 (2011) (per curiam)). And such a future, indirect

benefit, “does not preserve standing.” Id.

21 [Doc. No. 18-1, p. 7].

22 [Doc. No. 1, ¶ 48].

23 [Id. at ¶ 52].

Likewise, here. Even if the Court (1) enjoins Governor Landry from enforcing

Act 452 or (2) rules that Act 452 is unlawful, Plaintiffs’ injury, appointment of a fire

chief they prefer, will not be remedied. The Charter explicitly states that the fire chief

“shall be appointed by the mayor, subject to confirmation by the [City Council].”24 In

other words, even without Act 452, Plaintiffs cannot select the fire chief they prefer

without Mayor Ellis signing off. Suppose Act 452 does not exist, and Plaintiffs and

Mayor Ellis are at an impasse. Same result as now. In this instance, therefore, the

Court enjoining enforcement of Act 452 or declaring Act 452 unconstitutional is

nothing more than an advisory opinion. And this Court follows a long and

distinguished line of federal courts—starting in 1793—that have refused to issue an

advisory opinion. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 378 (citing 13 Papers of

George Washington: Presidential Series 392 (C. Patrick ed. 2007)).

The Court’s above conclusion might suggest that if Plaintiffs do not have

standing, no one may have standing. Two points. First, the Supreme Court has

emphatically rejected “that kind of ‘if not us, who?’ argument as a basis for standing.”

Id. at 396 (collecting cases). Second, “some issues may be left to the political and

democratic processes.” Id. “Vindicating the public interest (including the public

interest in Government observance of the Constitution and laws) is” equally the

responsibility of the other branches of government. Id. at 382 (quoting Lujan v.

Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

24 [Doc. No. 9, p. 7].

Since Plaintiffs cannot show that a judgment by this Court will remedy their

injury, they have not met the redressability prong for standing. Consequently, they

have not established Article III standing. As such, the Court does not have subject

matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims against Governor Landry, meaning it lacks

the “constitutional power to adjudicate” those claims. Huff, 555 F. App’x at 296.

Accordingly, Governor Landry’s Motion is GRANTED as to lack of jurisdiction.

2. Plaintiffs do not have Standing Against Mayor Ellis

Although Mayor Ellis’s Motion is a 12(b)(6) Motion for failure of Plaintiffs to

state a claim—and not a 12(b)(1) Motion for lack of jurisdiction25—federal courts have

an “obligation to consider the basis of their jurisdiction sua sponte before addressing

the merits of a dispute.” Matter of S. Cent. Houston Action Council, 38 F.4th 471, 472

(5th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). So, the Court first asks whether Plaintiffs have

standing to sue Mayor Ellis. They do not.

The Court does not regurgitate Article III standing law. Rather, as it does

earlier, the Court assumes, without deciding, that Plaintiffs (1) suffered an injury in

fact, (2) which is fairly traceable to Mayor Ellis. But again, Plaintiffs cannot meet the

redressability requirement.

The analysis is similar to Governor Landry’s. Even if the Court (1) enjoins

Mayor Ellis from enforcing Act 452 or (2) rules that Act 452 is unlawful, Plaintiffs’

injury, appointment of a fire chief they prefer, will not be remedied. The Charter

explicitly states that the fire chief “shall be appointed by the mayor, subject to

25 [Doc. No. 6-1, p. 1].

confirmation by the” City Council.26 This means even without Act 452, Plaintiffs

cannot select the fire chief they prefer without Mayor Ellis signing off. Thus,

Plaintiffs and the Mayor remain at an impasse, even without Act 452. In this

instance, therefore, the Court enjoining enforcement of Act 452 or declaring Act 452

unconstitutional is nothing more than an advisory opinion since Plaintiffs still would

not be able to pick their preferred fire chief candidate.

Since Plaintiffs cannot show that a judgment by this Court will remedy their

alleged injury against Mayor Ellis, they have not met Article III standing’s

redressability prong. Consequently, they have not established Article III standing.

So, the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims against

Mayor Ellis, and, therefore, it lacks the “constitutional power to adjudicate” them.

Huff, 555 F. App’x at 296.

3. Plaintiffs do not have Standing Against Chief Williams

Finally, there is Chief Williams. Chief Williams adopts all arguments made by

Governor Landry and Mayor Ellis.27 That is, he too makes a lack of subject matter

jurisdiction argument and a failure to state a claim argument. As always, jurisdiction

comes first.

Once again, Plaintiffs do not have standing to sue. This time, however, there

is a more obvious reason. Plaintiffs cannot prove the second requirement—causation.

Again, to see why, the Court must first re-state Plaintiffs’ injury.

26 [Doc. No. 9, p. 7].

27 [Doc. No. 25].

Plaintiffs' alleged injury in fact is that Act 452 strips the majority-minority

City Council of its ability to select appointed city officials, which in-turn diminishes

the effectiveness of minority voters’ votes as they cannot influence the appointment

of city officials despite voting for candidates who would—but for Act 425—represent

the minority voters’ interests.28

Plaintiffs do not point out, however, how their injury is traceable to Chief

Williams’ conduct. This is because they cannot. “Plaintiffs attempting to show

causation generally cannot rely on speculation about the unfettered choices made by

independent actors not before the courts.” All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 383

(citation modified) (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 415 n.5

(2013)). Here, the only conduct Chief Williams could have engaged in—that would

injure Plaintiffs—was applying to be the fire chief. Governor Landry, an independent

actor, who, for reasons stated above, is no longer before the Court had “unfettered

choice” in appointing Chief Williams. Thus, Plaintiffs cannot show an independent

act by Chief Williams caused their alleged harm.

Since Plaintiffs cannot show Chief Williams substantially caused their alleged

harm, they do not have standing to sue Chief Williams. Consequently, the Court does

not have subject matter jurisdiction over those claims, and, accordingly, Chief

Williams’s Motion is GRANTED as to lack of jurisdiction.

28 [Doc. No. 18-1, p. 7].

To sum, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that they have Article III standing

to sue any of the listed Defendants. Therefore, the Court concludes it does not have

subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims against Defendants.

III. 12(b)(6) Motions for Failure to State a Claim

Since the Court has concluded that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction

over Plaintiffs claims, it does not—because it cannot—address Defendants Motions,

arguing that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for which relief can be sought.

Accordingly, those Motions are DENIED AS MOOT.

IV. Conclusion

For the above-stated reasons,

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Motions to

Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction filed by Defendants, Governor Landry

and Chief Williams [Doc. Nos. 8, 25] are GRANTED, and the claims asserted by

Plaintiffs against Governor Landry and Chief Williams are DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the

Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 6] filed by Defendant Friday Ellis is GRANTED, and

Plaintiffs’ claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the

Motions to Dismiss for failure to state a claim filed by Defendants, Governor Landry,

Mayor Ellis, and Chief Williams [Doc. Nos. 6, 8, 25] are DENIED AS MOOT.

MONROE, LOUISIANA, this 23rd day of March 2026.

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TERRY A. DOUGHTY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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