Lora

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

HAROLD GLENN LORA, ) Case No. 1:25-cv-2576

)

Plaintiff, ) Judge J. Philip Calabrese

)

v. ) Magistrate Judge

) Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong

MEDINA COUNTY JAIL )

PHYSICIAN, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Harold G. Lora filed civil rights lawsuit without a lawyer under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. He named as Defendants the “Medina Couty Jail—Physician,”

“Medical Staff,” “Corrections Officers,” and the Medina County Sheriff. (ECF No. 1,

PageID #2–3.) In his complaint, Plaintiff indicates that he is a pretrial detainee, and

the events about which he complains occurred while he was detained at the Medina

County Jail. Though it has no bearing on this suit, it does not appear that Mr. Lora

remains detained in the jail. The docket of the Medina County Court of Common

Pleas indicates that he is awaiting trial on a charge of violating a protection order

and that he has been released on bond. See State v. Lora, No. 2024 CR 0060 (Medina

Cnty. Ct. Com. Pls.).

In his statement of claim, Plaintiff states that his “rights to medical privacy-

records have been violated by nursing staff and correctional officers” at the Medina

County Jail, who openly discussed his medical information and listened to his

appointments. (ECF No. 1, PageID #4.) He states that he believes a member of the

nursing staff, Jenny Blankenship, who is a friend of his ex-wife’s, shared his medical

information with his ex-wife by text message. (Id., PageID #5.) In attachments to

his complaint, he contends that he was not given or not properly given “life

sustaining” medication prescribed for him before he “entered the jail system.” (Id.,

PageID #17.) Specifically, he complains that the jail physician and nursing staff

changed his blood thinner medication to a less expensive medication; he was not given

his oral medication three times a day (because, nursing staff allegedly told him, the

jail only gives medications two times a day); and he was not given pain medication.

(Id., PageID #17–18.) Also, he complains that the jail physician and nursing staff

denied his request for “extra mat, pillow, blanket to sleep on to help with [his] spinal

stress and back pain” from spinal stenosis. (Id., PageID #19.)

Asserting violations of his right to medical privacy under the Health Insurance

Portability and Accountability Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the

Constitution, he seeks $2.5 million in damages. (Id., PageID #5.) The Court

GRANTS Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2; ECF

No. 5.)

ANALYSIS

Federal law expressly requires district courts to review all in forma pauperis

complaints filed in federal court and to dismiss before service any such complaint the

court determines is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470 (6th Cir. 2010). Although

a complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff is “liberally construed” and “held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus,

551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), even a pro se complaint must set forth “sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”

to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim. Hill, 630 F.3d at 470–71 (internal

quotation omitted) (holding that the dismissal standard articulated in Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),

governs dismissals for failure to state a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)). The

factual allegations in the complaint must be sufficient “to raise a right to relief above

the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A complaint may be dismissed for

failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . .

claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint warrants dismissal for

failure to state a claim in accordance with Section 1915(e)(2)(B). His allegations are

insufficient to demonstrate that he suffered a deprivation of a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)

(“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured

by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged

deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.”).

First, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for the disclosure of his medical information

under HIPAA because the statute provides no private right of action. See Johnson v.

Departments of Army & Air Force, 465 F. App'x 644, 645 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming

dismissal of HIPAA claim on the grounds that HIPAA provides no private right of

action); Carpenter v. Phillips, 419 F. App’x 658, 659 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he district

court correctly concluded that such a claim was not cognizable because HIPAA does

not furnish a private right of action.”). HIPAA does provide redress for an alleged

violation, but it does not authorize a private plaintiff to file suit. Instead, a person

may lodge a written complaint with the Secretary of Health and Human Services,

through the Office for Civil Rights, which has the discretion to investigate the

complaint and impose sanctions. See Johnson v. Kuehne & Nagel Inc., No. 11–cv–

02317, 2012 WL 1022939, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 26, 2012) (citing 45 C.F.R.

§ 160.306).

Second, Plaintiff’s allegations regarding Defendants’ disclosures of his medical

information fail to state a constitutional claim. The Sixth Circuit has expressly held

that that there is no “general right to nondisclosure of private information” by

government officials under the Constitution. Doe v. Wiggington, 21 F.3d 733, 740

(6th Cir. 1994). Rather, the Sixth Circuit restricts a constitutional right to

informational privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment only to “those personal

rights that can be deemed fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”

Summe v. Kenton Cnty. Clerk's Office, 604 F.3d 257, 270 (6th Cir. 2010). The Sixth

Circuit and other courts in this Circuit have repeatedly rejected due process privacy

claims based on the disclosure of a person’s medical information. See, e.g., Summe,

604 F.3d at 270–71) (county’s release of medical record of deputy county clerk to

citizen pursuant to open records request did not implicate a right fundamental or

implicit in the concept of ordered liberty so as to violate a constitutional right to

privacy); Coleman v. Martin, 63 F. App’x 791, 793 (6th Cir.2003) (dissemination of

prisoner’s mental health records to parole board was not a constitutional violation);

Holden v. Michigan Dep’t of Corrs., No. 1:12–cv–284, 2012 WL 2317538, at *1 (W.D.

Mich. June 18, 2012) (prison staff’s disclosure of plaintiff’s health and/or HIV status

to prison officials and other inmates does not implicate a fundamental interest

protected by the right to privacy under the Fourteenth Amendment). Plaintiff has

not alleged circumstances involving disclosure of medical information in which courts

in this Circuit have recognized an interest protected by the right to privacy under the

Fourteenth Amendment. See Holden, 2012 WL 2317538, at *3 (citing cases).

Third, Plaintiff has not stated a claim under the ADA. The ADA provides that

no qualified individual with a disability shall, because of that disability, “be excluded

from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities

of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 12132. To make out a prima facie case, a plaintiff must establish that he has a

disability; he otherwise qualified; and “is being excluded from participation in, being

denied the benefits of, or being subjected to discrimination under the program

because of [his] disability.” Anderson v. City of Blue Ash, 798 F.3d 338, 357 (6th Cir.

2015). Plaintiff has not alleged facts demonstrating, or plausibly suggesting, these

elements. He does not allege that he has a disability within the meaning of the ADA

or facts suggesting that he was excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of,

or subjected to discrimination because of a disability.

Finally, Plaintiff’s allegations with respect to his medical care while detained

in the jail fail to rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation. The Eighth

Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment generally provides the

basis to assert a Section 1983 claim of deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious

medical needs. Where a claim is asserted on behalf of a pretrial detainee, the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the proper constitutional provision.

Winkler v. Madison Cnty., 893 F.3d 877, 890 (6th Cir. 2018). There are two parts to

a claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs, one objective and one subjective.

For the objective component, the detainee must demonstrate the existence of a

“sufficiently serious” medical need. Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890 (6th

Cir. 2004).

For the subjective component, the detainee must demonstrate that the

defendant possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind in denying medical care.

Spears v. Ruth, 589 F.3d 249, 254 (6th Cir. 2009). A defendant has a sufficiently

culpable state of mind if he “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate

health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). The subjective

component requires more than mere negligence, medical malpractice, or

“misdiagnosis of an ailment.” Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir.2001).

To satisfy the subjective component, the plaintiff must “show that the official being

sued subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner,

that he did in fact draw the inference, and that he then disregarded that risk.” Id. at

703. “When a prison doctor provides treatment, albeit carelessly or inefficaciously, to

a prisoner, he has not displayed a deliberate indifference to the prisoner's needs, but

merely a degree of incompetence which does not rise to the level of a constitutional

violation.” Id. And where a prisoner has received some medical care and the dispute

is over the adequacy of the treatment, “federal courts are generally reluctant to

second guess medical judgments” unless the medical treatment provided was “so

woefully inadequate as to amount to no treatment at all.” Alspaugh v. McConnell,

643 F.3d 162, 169 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5

(6th Cir. 1976)).

On its face, Plaintiff’s complaint indicates that he received some medical care

while temporarily detained in the Medina County Jail. Although Plaintiff disagrees

with the adequacy of this treatment and wanted more done for him, it cannot be said

that Plaintiff’s treatment was so woefully inadequate as to amount to no treatment

at all. A prisoner’s disagreement with the level of testing or treatment he receives

does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Dodson v. Wilkinson, 304

F. App’x 434, 440 (6th Cir. 2008); Ward v. Smith, 100 F.3d 958 (Table), 1996 WL

627724, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 29, 1996) (“[D]ifferences in judgment between an inmate

and prison medical personnel regarding the appropriate medical diagnosis or

treatment are not enough to state a deliberate indifference claim.”). Even assuming

Plaintiff had serious medical needs while detained in the jail, he has not alleged facts

sufficient to state a claim that the care he was provided rose to the level of

constitutional deliberate indifference.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs application to

proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2; ECF No.5) and DIMISSES Plaintiffs

complaint pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(8), the Court certifies that an appeal from this decision could not be taken

in good faith.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: March 18, 2026

J.PhilipCalabrese

United States District Judge

Northern District of Ohio