Scarborough

a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

DESMOND DEONDRE CIVIL DOCKET NO. 1:23-CV-01695

SCARBOROUGH #512711, SEC P

Plaintiff

VERSUS JUDGE DRELL

RAPIDES PARISH DETENTION MAGISTRATE JUDGE PEREZ-MONTES

CENTER I ET AL,

Defendants

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the Court is a civil rights Complaint and several Amended Complaints

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 filed by pro se Plaintiff Desmond Deondre Scarborough

(“Scarborough”). At the time of filing, Scarborough was a pretrial detainee at the

Rapides Parish Detention Center I (“RPDC-I”). He alleges the violation of his

constitutional rights by numerous Defendants.

Because Scarborough only states a viable constitutional claim against Officers

Phipps and Fuller, all other claims should be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

I. Background

Scarborough presents numerous, unrelated allegations of constitutional

violations over the course of one year against several Defendants at RPDC-I.

First, Scarborough alleges that, on November 28, 2022, he slipped on water

that leaked from under the sink in his cell. ECF No. 1 at 4, 6. He asserts that Warden

Carmouche and Assistant Warden Sasser knew about the leak because they have

access to video surveillance. He also alleges that Mr. Mark, the maintenance

supervisor, was aware of the leak based on video surveillance and multiple work

orders.

Scarborough claims that the fall caused pain in his head, neck, back, and right

hip. at 6. X-rays revealed no fractures, but he was diagnosed with swelling and

a contusion. ECF No. 48.

Next, Scarborough alleges that Officers Phipps and Fuller went to his cell on

December 24, 2022, and told him to pack up his property. at 6. When Scarborough

questioned the officers’ reasons, they “pulled” him from his top bunk and “slammed”

him to the floor. Officer Phipps allegedly twisted Scarborough’s arm behind his back.

Scarborough also asserts that he was choked from behind and punched in his

mouth and side. At Officer Phipps’s direction, Officer Fuller deployed a Taser to

Scarborough’s leg and punched him in the side.

Following the incident, Lt. Taylor instructed Officer Phipps to transport

Scarborough to the hospital. Officers Phipps and T. Holt brought Scarborough to

the garage for transport and “slammed” him around in the wheelchair.

After returning from the hospital, Scarborough was placed in lockdown. at

7. Scarborough asserts that he was rarely let out of his cell, was subjected to inmates

throwing feces and urine at him, and he was not allowed to shower for “nearly two

weeks.” at 7.

On January 3, 2023, Scarborough was “knocked out” by his cellmate. ECF No.

1 at 7. When Officer Phipps responded, he put his foot on Scarborough’s back and

“pressed down hard.” Although Nurse Bowie responded to the incident, she

provided no medical care.

The following week, Scarborough and Inmate Tremaine Veal (“Veal”) were

allowed out of their cells at the same time. at 8. Veal approached Scarborough

stating that he would take Scarborough’s shoes. Veal then punched Scarborough in

the face and held a sharp object to his neck. Scarborough’s chest was cut while

removing his shoes.

Scarborough reported the incident the following day, informing Guards Holt,

Cox, and an unknown guard, that Scarborough had been “set up” by other guards.

Scarborough was provided an ice pack and moved to another dorm.

Scarborough began to receive threats in his new dorm because Veal allegedly

“put a hit” on him. Scarborough reported the threats to Officers Gordon and

Phipps, who informed him that he was being returned to the dorm. Scarborough

objected, so Officer Phipps twisted Scarborough’s arm behind his back, and Lt.

Gordon threatened Scarborough with his taser. ECF No. 1 at 10

The officers escorted Scarborough back to his dorm and placed him alone in a

cell. at 10. He was subjected to threats from inmates, and an inmate threw urine

at him. On January 9, 2023, Scarborough was moved to another dorm.

Next, Scarborough alleges that he was subjected to “sexual assault” by Ms.

Morran, Vicky Messar, Ms. Lattrell, and Guard Brisbon, when they touched his

buttocks between August and October, 2023. ECF No. 1 at 14, 16. He also asserts

that he was subjected to verbal abuse by Officer Jones.

Scarborough alleges that Nurse Bowie and Debbie Green have denied him

medical treatment for a hernia, blood in his urine, and mental health care. ECF No.

1 at 11.

Scarborough alleges that, on September 16, 2023, Officer Latrell and Ms.

Smith opened his legal mail and made copies ( at 22); on November 11, 2023, his

legal mail was opened by an unknown person ( ); and on May 5, 2024, Ms. Brown

handed him mail that had been opened (ECF No. 23 at 2).

Scarborough also complains of various incidents and conditions at RPDC-I. He

alleges that inmates are required to purchase soap in the commissary; dorms are

unsanitary; inmates are allowed to smoke indoors; he has been provided food trays

with overcooked chicken or food that has been touched by Defendant Brisbon; he is

subjected to extreme cold and hot temperatures; he has been deprived of outdoor

exercise and subjected to prolonged isolation; and he was not protected from catching

COVID-19. ECF No. 1 at 15-20.

Finally, Scarborough alleges that Detective Shelby Anderson and Detective

John Skrobareck illegally “put a hold” on him for arrest and slandered his name at

his preliminary examination. at 21. He complains that District Attorney Kelvin

Sanders and Judge Mary Doggett have deprived him of his right to a speedy trial; his

detention is unlawful; and he is receiving ineffective assistance of counsel from Eric

Talley.

Scarborough was ordered to amend his Complaint to allege: (1) the dates on

which he was deprived of outdoor exercise, by whom, and what injury he suffered; (2)

the dates on which he was subjected to extreme cold and hot temperatures, by whom,

and the injury he suffered; and (3) the dates on which he was held in isolation, by

whom, and the injury suffered. ECF No. 32. Scarborough’s amendment, however,

fails to provide this information.

II. Law and Analysis

A. Scarborough’s Complaint is subject to preliminary screening.

As a pretrial detainee seeking redress from an officer or employee of a

governmental entity, Scarborough’s Complaint is subject to preliminary screening

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. t, 156 F.3d 578, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1998)

(per curiam). Because Scarborough is proceeding , his Complaint

is also subject to screening under § 1915(e)(2). Both § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)

provide for dismissal of a complaint, or any portion thereof, if the Court

finds it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

relief.1

1 A complaint is frivolous when it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”

, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is

“based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” . at 327. Courts are also afforded the

unusual power to pierce the veil of the factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose

factual contentions are clearly baseless.

B. Scarborough fails to state a viable constitutional claim for his slip and

fall.

A jail official’s treatment of a pretrial detainee is governed by the substantive

protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Upon

conviction, such treatment is evaluated under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition

against cruel and unusual punishment. The Due Process Clause protects a detainee’s

right to be free from punishment prior to an adjudication of guilt. ,

441 U.S. 520, 535–36.

The appropriate standard to apply in analyzing a constitutional challenge by

a pretrial detainee depends upon whether the challenge is an attack on a condition of

confinement or a complaint about one or more episodic acts or omissions.

, 74 F.3d 633, 643 (5th Cir. 1996). For an episodic act case, a plaintiff

must allege that the defendants had actual, subjective knowledge of a substantial

risk of serious harm but responded with deliberate indifference to the known or

perceived risk. The deliberate indifference standard is also the standard

applicable in the Eighth Amendment context. at 643–44.

A complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted when it fails to plead

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A

claim is facially plausible when it contains sufficient factual content for the court “to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” , 556

U.S. at 678 (citing , 550 U.S. at 570). Plausibility does not equate to possibility or

probability; it lies somewhere in between. . Plausibility simply calls for enough factual

allegations to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence to support

the elements of the claim. , 550 U.S. at 556.

Scarborough’s allegations regarding his slip and fall presents a claim of an

episodic act or omission. Therefore, Scarborough must allege deliberate indifference.

Scarborough asserts that Defendants Carmouche and Sasser knew about the leaking

sink based on their access to video surveillance, and that the maintenance supervisor

was aware of the leak from prior work orders. Nonetheless, he does not allege that

Defendants had a subjective intent to cause him harm.

Additionally, the Fifth Circuit has held that a slippery floor, “although a

potential hazard, is a daily risk faced by members of the public at large.”

, 745 F.3d 756, 764 (5th Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks

omitted); , 5:24-CV-009, 2025 WL 1287923, at *3

(N.D. Tex. 2025), , 2025 WL 1287913 (N.D. Tex.

2025). “Thus, even if prison officials are aware of a slippery floor, that condition does

not satisfy the objective prong of the deliberate indifference standard because a

slippery floor does not establish that [a detainee] was exposed to a substantial risk of

serious harm.” (citing , 745 F.3d at 764–65); ,

, 278 F. App’x 438, 439 (5th Cir. 2008) (officials’ failure to

repair leaks that caused puddles and led to inmate’s fall amounted only to

“unreasonableness or negligence, neither of which establishes” a constitutional

violation); , 350 F. App’x 892, 893 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)

(complaint for injuries sustained from slip and fall in standing water in prison shower

area amounted to negligence at most and was insufficient to raise claim of deliberate

indifference, even though defendants were aware of the standing water and failed to

take preventive action); , 122 F. App’x 692, 693 (5th Cir. 2004)

(per curiam) (plaintiff failed to state claim for deliberate indifference after “he slipped

on water that had accumulated on the floor of his cell due to a leaky air conditioning

unit,” despite his allegation that defendants were aware of the leak and did not clean

up the water). At most, Scarborough’s claim amounts to negligence, which is not

actionable under § 1983. , 350 F. App’x. 892, 893 (5th Cir. 2009)

(affirming dismissal as frivolous of prisoner’s § 1983 claim that defendant was

deliberately indifferent by failing to correct slippery shower floor);

, 67 F. App’x. 242, 242 (5th Cir. 2003) (same); , 48 F. App’x.

105, 105 (5th Cir. 2002) (same).

C. Scarborough fails to state a viable constitutional claim against Sheriff

Woods.

Scarborough alleges that Sheriff Woods is liable based on his position as Sheriff

and his appointment of Warden Carmouche to RPDC-I. The United States Court of

Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently reiterated:

Liability under the doctrine of is not cognizable in

actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

, 279 F.3d 273, 286 (5th Cir. 2002). “Rather, a

plaintiff must show either [that] the supervisor personally was involved

in the constitutional violation or that there is a ‘sufficient causal

connection’ between the supervisor's conduct and the constitutional

violation.” , 911 F.3d 235, 245 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting

, 330 F.3d 681, 689 (5th Cir. 2003)). Liability may be

found where “supervisory officials implement a policy so deficient that

the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of constitutional rights’ and is ‘the

moving force of the constitutional violation.’” , 828

F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1987) (quoting , 767

F.2d 161, 169, 170 (5th Cir. 1985)). Furthermore, “[i]n order to establish

supervisor liability for constitutional violations committed by

subordinate employees, plaintiffs must show that the supervisor act[ed],

or fail[ed] to act, with deliberate indifference to violations of others'

constitutional rights committed by their subordinates.” ,

659 F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting

, 537 F.3d 404, 435 (5th Cir. 2008)).

, 102 F.4th 292, 321 (5th Cir. 2024). Scarborough

identifies no unconstitutional policy implemented by Sheriff Woods, nor does he

allege personal involvement by the Sheriff. There are no allegations that Sheriff

Woods acted with deliberate indifference. According, Scarborough fails to state a

viable constitutional claim.

D. Scarborough fails to allege deliberate indifference and a physical injury

as to certain claims.

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e): “No Federal civil action may be brought by a

prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or

emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury

or the commission of a sexual act (as defined in section 2246 of Title 18).” “Section

1997e(e) applies to all federal civil actions in which a prisoner alleges a constitutional

violation, making compensatory damages for mental or emotional injuries non-

recoverable, absent physical injury.” , 404 F.3d 371, 375 (5th Cir.

2005). “The ‘physical injury’ required by § 1997e(e) ‘must be more than

[sic], but need not be significant.’” , 174 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir.

1999) (quoting , 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997)).

Scarborough does not allege that he suffered a physical injury because of

Officer T. Holt “slamming” him around in a wheelchair; Nurse Bowie’s alleged failure

to provide medical care on January 3, 2023; Officer Phipps pressing down on

Scarborough’s back or twisting his arm on January 3, 2023; Officer Mark Thomas

speaking in a threatening manner; denial of care by Nurse Bowie and Debbie Green;

the opening of his mail by Officer Latrell, Ms. Smith, M. Holt, or Ms. Brown; his food

being touched by Officer Brisbon; Ms. Rodriguez failing to provide him food on

December 2, 2023; Officer Christophe providing dry chicken with peanuts on

November 7, 2023; or any actions by Guard Bennett or Lt. Taylor.

Likewise, Scarborough fails to identify a Defendant that allegedly required

him to purchase soap in the commissary; allowed inmates to smoke indoors;

subjected him to extreme cold and hot temperatures; deprived him of outdoor

exercise; subjected him to prolonged isolation; and failed to protect him from catching

COVID-19. ECF No. 1 at 15-20. Nor does he provide the dates on which these

incidents allegedly occurred. Scarborough fails to allege that any of these allegations

involved deliberate indifference or resulted in a physical injury that was more than

.

E. Scarborough fails to state a viable claim for lack of protection.

To state a constitutional claim for a defendant’s failure to protect a pretrial

detainee, the detainee must allege: (1) he was subjected to conditions posing a

substantial risk of serious harm; and (2) prison officials were deliberately indifferent

to his need for protection. , 74 F.39 at 648 (citing , 511 U.S.

825, 834 (1994)); , 59 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1995). A

finding of deliberate indifference requires that a jail official “be aware of the facts

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm

exists, and he must also draw the inference.” , 511 U.S. at 837. It is neither

expected nor required that jail officials “prevent all inmate-on-inmate violence.”

, 331 F.3d 508, 512 (5th Cir. 2003).

Scarborough does not allege that prison officials were aware that Inmate Veal

posed a threat to him on January 7, 2023, when Inmate Veal stole his shoes and

injured him. Scarborough’s allegation that he was “set up by the guards” is

conclusory and insufficient to state a viable claim.

, 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).

F. Scarborough fails to state a viable constitutional claim for alleged

“sexual assault” and verbal abuse.

Scarborough alleges that he was subjected to “sexual assault” when Ms.

Morran touched his buttocks during shift change on July 3 and August 3, 3023; when

Vicky Messar touched his buttocks on August 25 and November 21, 2023; when

Guard Brisbon touched his buttocks on October 18, 2023; and when Officer Latrell

touched his buttocks on August 29, 2023. ECF No. 1 at 14, 16.

Courts have recognized that not every allegation of sexual abuse is “objectively,

sufficiently serious” for purposes of the Eighth Amendment. ,

559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (not every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a

federal cause of action). To state a constitutional claim of sexual harassment, an

inmate must allege that, “as an objective matter, the alleged abuse or harassment

caused ‘pain’ and, as a subjective matter, that the officer in question acted with a

sufficiently culpable state of mind.” , 6:24-

CV-236, 2024 WL 4729492, at *2 (E.D. Tex. 2024),

, 2024 WL 4372675 (E.D. Tex. 2024), , 24-40840, 2025 WL

1577821 (5th Cir. 2025) (citations omitted). That is, the harassment must be

“objectively sufficiently serious.” , 20-CV-2572, 2021 WL 5494783, at

*2 (S.D. Tex. 2021) (citing , 105 F.3d 857, 860-61 (2d Cir. 1997)).

Many courts have found no constitutional violation where an officer touched

an inmate’s buttocks. , 158 F. App’x 656, 661–62 (6th Cir.

2005) (allegation of rubbing and grabbing of prisoner’s buttocks in a degrading

manner did not amount to a constitutional violation); , No. 3:15-

CV-2245, 2019 WL 127112, at *6 (M.D. Pa. 2019) (no constitutional violation where

officer “touched Plaintiff's buttocks through his pants and made a suggestive

comment”); , 03-CV-3254, 2004 WL 2282927, at *1, *4 (D. Kan.

2004) (no constitutional violation where prison guard grabbed plaintiff’s buttocks,

exposed his penis to plaintiff, and made crude sexual remarks); ,

1996 WL 428357, at * 1 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (finding no violation where guard stood

unnecessarily close to plaintiff and grabbed his buttocks). And although Scarborough

alleges the touching of his buttocks happened several times, his claim is not

sufficiently serious to state a constitutional violation. 153

F.Supp.2d 368, 375 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“several” instances of squeezing of an inmate’s

penis, with no allegation of injury, is not sufficiently serious);

, 232 F.3d 901, at *1–2 (10th Cir. 2000) (table opinion) (no

constitutional violation where inmate alleged that a guard “touched him several

times in a suggestive manner and exposed her breasts to him”). In this Court, a claim

that a guard rubbed an inmate’s “knee and thigh in a sexual manner” and offered to

have the inmate brought to his office later that night—an incident alleged to make

the inmate feel “degraded, humiliated, and mentally distressed” despite lasting only

“for a fleeting moment in time”—was considered frivolous. , 09-CV-

1960, 2010 WL 2710395, at *5 (W.D. La. 2010), ,

2010 WL 2710392 (W.D. La. 2010). Accordingly, Scarborough fails to state a viable

constitutional claim against Defendants Morran, Messar, Brisbon, and Latrell.

G. Scarborough fails to state a viable claim against Detectives Shelby

Anderson and John Skrobareck, District Attorney Kelvin Sanders,

Judge Mary Doggett, and attorney, Eric Talley.

Scarborough alleges that Detectives Shelby Anderson and John Skrobareck

illegally “put a hold” on him and slandered his name at his preliminary examination.

at 21. Scarborough provides no facts to support his conclusion that Defendants

wrongfully detained him. Legal conclusions are not entitled the assumption of truth

under , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Furthermore, allegations of “slander” fail to state a viable claim under § 1983.

, 616 F.2d 791, 794 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that slander and

libel are not rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States).

Scarborough also complains that District Attorney Sanders and Judge Doggett

deprived him of the right to a speedy trial and improperly detained him. To the extent

that Scarborough seeks enforcement of his right to a speedy trial, such relief is not

available in a civil rights action. Scarborough may seek the enforcement of his right

to a speedy trial through a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 after exhausting the claim

in state court. , 816 F.2d 200, 224 (5th Cir. 1987).

Additionally, criminal prosecutors have absolute immunity from claims for

money damages under § 1983 based upon actions taken in the presentation of a

criminal case. , 410 U.S. 484,

488–89 (1973) (“Prosecutorial immunity applies to the prosecutor’s actions in

initiating the prosecution and in carrying the case through the judicial process.”);

, 1 F.3d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 1993); , 1:24-CV-356,

2024 WL 5066080, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 2024), ,

2024 WL 5063661 (E.D. Tex. 2024). Likewise, judges have absolute judicial immunity

to claims for money damages based upon judicial acts performed in judicial

proceedings. 2024 WL 5066080, at *2 (citing , 502 U.S. 9,

9-10 (1991); , 97 F.3d 107, 110-11 (5th Cir. 1996)).

Scarborough’s claim against his own attorney also fails. Neither private

defense counsel nor court-appointed counsel qualify as state actors under § 1983.

, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (public defender does not act under color of

state law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions); , 795

F. App’x 319 (5th Cir. 2020) (public defender cannot be sued for performing

traditional legal functions); , 786 F. App’x 481 (5th Cir. 2019)

(affirming dismissal of § 1983 claim against state-appointed attorney):

, 289 F. App’x 684, 687 (5th Cir. 2008) (neither private attorneys nor court-

appointed attorneys are official state actors); , 837

F.2d 677, 679 (5th Cir. 1988) (same).

Finally, although Scarborough names Clerk of Court Robin Hooter as a

Defendant, he provides no allegations that she committed any unconstitutional

actions.

H. Scarborough’s claims for verbal threats should be dismissed.

Scarborough alleges that Officer M. Holt and Lt. Gordon each threatened him

(ECF No. 1 at 10), and he was subjected to verbal abuse by Officer Jones (ECF No. 1

at 14, 16). ECF Nos. 1 at 10; 14 at 1. He also alleges that Defendants Latrell and

Messer were each “picking on [him].” ECF No. 1 at 17.

Verbal abuse or harassment, even when it is threatening, does not, without

more, violate an inmate’s constitutional rights. , 312 F.3d

730, 734 (5th Cir. 2002); , 1 F.3d 271, 274 n.4 (5th Cir. 1993);

, 713 F.2d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 1983) (“Mere threatening language

and gestures of a custodial officer do not, even if true, amount to constitutional

violations.”). Scarborough fails to present allegations to support a constitutional

violation.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that all claims against the

following Defendants be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE under §§

1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A: Detective Shelby Anderson, Detective John Skrobareck,

District Attorney Kelvin Sanders, Judge Doggett, Eric Talley, Officer Morran, Vicky

Messar, Officer Brisbon, Officer Latrell, Officer Jones, Gerald Carmouche, Julie

Sasser, Mark Woods, Officer M. Holt, Officer T. Holt, Nurse Bowie, Officer Phipps,

Officer Thomas, Debbie Green, Officer Latrell, Ms. Smith, Mark Thomas, M. Bennett,

Lt. Taylor, Robin Hooter, Lt. Gordon, Ms. Brown, Ms. Rodriguez, and K. Christophe.

The excessive force claim against Officers Phipps and Fuller regarding the incident

of December 24, 2022, will be SERVED pursuant to a separate Order.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), a party may file

written objections to this Report and Recommendation within 14 days of service,

unless the Court grants an extension of time to file objections under Fed. R. Civ. P.

6(b). A party may also respond to another party’s objections to this Report and

Recommendation within 14 days of service of those objections, again unless the Court

grants an extension of time to file a response to objections.

No other briefs may be filed without leave of court, which will only be granted

for good cause. A party’s failure to timely file written objections to this Report and

Recommendation will bar a party from later challenging factual or legal conclusions

adopted by the District Judge, except if the challenge asserts “plain error.”

SIGNED on Monday, February 23, 2026.

JOSEPH H.L. PEREZ-MONTES

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE