Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states in federal court for money damages
How later courts described this case
- Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states in federal court for money damages
- individual capacity claims are not available; the proper defendant is the agency or its director in his/her official capacity
- holding warden is proper defendant for injunctive relief claim as he would be responsible for ensuring that any injunctive relief would be carried out
- an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MATTHEW JAMES GRIFFIN, #Y53580, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. 25-cv-01219-SMY
)
LATOYA HUGHES, ANDREW WALTERS, )
DEE DEE BROOKHART, )
JEREMIAH BROWN, )
LORI CUNNINGHAM, PERCY MYERS, )
GENTRY, GLEN BABICH, )
CARISSA LUKING, WISE, )
LAWRENCE CORRECTIONAL CENTER, )
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF )
CORRECTIONS, WEXFORD, )
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, and )
JOHN DOES # 1-12 (C/O’s Lawrence), )
)
Defendants. )
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
YANDLE, Chief Judge:
Plaintiff Matthew James Griffin, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections
(“IDOC”) currently incarcerated at Lawrence Correctional Center, filed the instant lawsuit
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He asserts violations of the Eighth Amendment, the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), 29 U.S.C.
§ 701, et seq., and seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief (Doc. 1).
This case is now before the Court for preliminary review of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A, which requires the Court to screen prisoner Complaints to filter out nonmeritorious
claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Any portion of the Complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious,
fails to state a claim for relief, or requests money damages from an immune defendant must be
dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
The Complaint
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in the Complaint (Doc. 1): Plaintiff is seriously
visually impaired1 and has a shoulder dysfunction which qualify him for accommodations under
the ADA and RA (Doc. 1, p. 6). Since August 25, 2022, he has been incarcerated in IDOC facilities
under an interstate corrections compact with the New Mexico prison system. Upon Plaintiff’s
initial arrival at Stateville Northern Reception Center, employees of Defendant Wexford Health
Sources (“Wexford”) confirmed his handicapped status and placed him in an ADA cell. On August
26, 2022, Wexford granted Plaintiff’s request for the accommodations listed in Exhibit 1 (Doc. 1,
pp. 32-33). He received a permit for low bunk, low gallery, left eye patch, magnification card,
digital talking book player in his cell, and front handcuffs due to his shoulder injury (Doc. 1, pp.
7, 32).
Wexford was the contracted health provider for the New Mexico corrections system as well
as the IDOC. Before Plaintiff’s arrival in Illinois, Wexford officials in New Mexico gave Plaintiff
all the accommodations listed in Exhibit 4: handicapped cell housing; ground floor cell; bottom
bunk; orderly assistance; fall prevention; no climbing, stairs, or heights over two feet; no hot or
sharp objects; no operating hazardous machinery; no driving; no uneven terrain; a talking digital
wrist watch; talking books; eye patch; eye glasses; raised line paper and bold pens; night light; and
wrist restraints in front with waist chains (Doc. 1, pp. 11, 41-42).
Plaintiff was transferred from Stateville to Lawrence Correctional Center on September
16, 2022. Lawrence officials told him the permit issued at Stateville was no longer valid and
1 Plaintiff has large angle alternating exotropia, which causes double vision, nystagmus, uncontrolled eye movement,
and loss of depth perception, as diagnosed by doctors in North Carolina, New Mexico, and Illinois (Doc. 1, pp. 8, 33-
36) (Exhibit 2).
placed him in a non-ADA-compliant cell (Doc. 1, p. 11). When Plaintiff complained, he was
moved to a handicapped cell (R8-CL-22), but its night light did not work.
Plaintiff provided documentation of his vision diagnoses to Defendants Dr. Gentry (doctor
of optometry) and Dr. Percy Myers in August and September 2022. At Plaintiff’s visit on
September 23, 2022, Dr. Gentry agreed with Plaintiff’s previous diagnoses but did not provide the
accommodations he requested (listed in Exhibit 4, Doc. 1, p. 42). (Doc. 1, p. 12). On September
24, 2022, Dr. Myers granted Plaintiff’s requests for an eye patch, magnification card, low bunk,
low gallery, and digital audiobook player in his cell, but denied the other ADA accommodations.
Plaintiff made numerous requests for the remaining ADA accommodations for his vison
impairment and fall prevention to Defendants Brookhart (Warden), Brown (Deputy Warden),
Cunningham (Health Service Administrator), Hughes (IDOC Director), Dr. Myers, Dr. Gentry,
Luking (FNP-C), Wise (FNP), Babich (Regional Medical Director), and Walters (ADA
Coordinator) between September 2022 and February 2024, but each refused to allow them (Doc.
1, pp. 13-15).
Plaintiff bought his own night light so he would not fall in the dark. On August 2, 2023,
Defendant Officers John Doe #1 and John Doe #2 confiscated the light because the other
defendants had not issued Plaintiff a permit for it (Doc. 1, p. 16).
On the night of August 17, 2023, Plaintiff fell, dislocating his left shoulder. His calls for
help were not answered and he did not see a medical provider until August 24, 2023, when the
nurse told Plaintiff he must see a nurse on three separate dates before he could see a nurse
practitioner or doctor (Doc. 1, p. 17). Dr. Gentry issued Plaintiff a night light medical permit on
October 27, 2023 (Doc. 1, p. 18).
In addition to the denial of ADA accommodations, Defendants Myers, Gentry, Luking,
Wise, Babich, and the John Does #3-12 failed to provide Plaintiff with necessary medical care,
including referral to an ophthalmologist and safety measures from September 28, 2022 through
the present (Doc. 1, pp. 18-20). Wexford had a custom or policy of contracting to provide adequate
medical care and reasonable disability accommodations to prisoners but failing to meet those
obligations in order to maximize their profits (Doc. 1, p. 19).
Based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Court designates the following claims in
this pro se action:
Count 1: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs
claim against Myers, Gentry, Babich, Wise, Luking, Hughes,
Brookhart, Brown, Walters, Cunningham, and John Does #1-12, for
denying Plaintiff medical care and accommodations related to his
visual and physical disabilities.
Count 2: ADA and/or RA claim against the IDOC, Lawrence Correctional
Center, Wexford, Wexford Health Sources, Hughes, Brookhart,
Brown, Walters, Cunningham, Myers, Gentry, Wise, Luking,
Babich, and John Does #1 and #2 for denying Plaintiff reasonable
accommodations for his disabilities.
Count 3: Eighth Amendment claim against Wexford and Wexford Health
Sources for maintaining a custom, usage, policy, or practice of
failing to provide adequate medical care and reasonable ADA
accommodations to prisoners, causing Plaintiff to be deprived of
medical care and ADA accommodations.
Count 4: Breach of contract claim against Wexford and Wexford Health
Sources for failing to provide adequate medical care and ADA
accommodations to Plaintiff as a third-party beneficiary.
Any other claim that is mentioned in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be
considered dismissed without prejudice as inadequately pled under the Twombly pleading
standard. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is
plausible on its face.”).
Preliminary Dismissals
Plaintiff cannot maintain an action for damages against the Illinois Department of
Corrections because it is a state government agency. That is because “neither a State nor its
officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). See also Wynn v. Southward, 251 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 2001)
(Eleventh Amendment bars suits against states in federal court for money damages). Likewise,
Lawrence Correctional Center, a division of the Illinois Department of Corrections, is not a
“person” within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act and is not subject to a § 1983 lawsuit. See
Will, 491 U.S. at 71. Accordingly, Lawrence Correctional Center will be dismissed from the case.
IDOC will remain as a defendant only for the ADA/RA claims, as explained below.
Discussion
Count 1
Prison officials and medical staff violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment when they act with deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical
needs. Rasho v. Elyea, 856 F.3d 469, 475 (7th Cir. 2017). To state such a claim, a prisoner must
plead facts suggesting (1) he suffered from an objectively serious medical condition, and (2) the
defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Id. An objectively serious
condition includes a condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities or which
involves chronic and substantial pain. Gutierrez v. Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state a claim for deliberate indifference in Count 1
against Myers, Gentry, Babich, Wise, Luking, Hughes, Brookhart, Brown, Walters, Cunningham,
and John Does #1 and #2. However, John Does #3-12 will be dismissed. A plaintiff may use the
“John/Jane Doe” designation to refer to specific individuals whose names are unknown, but a
vague assertion that an undefined group of officials violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights
runs afoul of the pleading standards in Iqbal and Twombly. See Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580
(7th Cir. 2009). Here, without identifying any specific incidents, Plaintiff claims these unknown
persons denied medical care/accommodations September 28, 2022 through August 26, 2023 (Doc.
1, p. 20). This is insufficient to state a viable claim against individuals. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Count 2
Plaintiff's allegations state a cognizable ADA and/or RA claim. However, the individual
employees of IDOC cannot be sued under the ADA or the RA. Jaros v. Illinois Dep't of Corrs,
684 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2012). Instead, the proper defendant is the relevant state department
or agency. See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(b); Jaros, 684 F.3d at 670, n. 2 (individual capacity claims
are not available; the proper defendant is the agency or its director in his/her official capacity). As
Plaintiff has correctly named IDOC as a defendant for this claim, Count 2 will proceed only against
the agency; the remaining defendants will be dismissed from this claim.
Count 3
Defendant Wexford Health Sources is a corporation that provided medical care at the
prison at the relevant times. But a corporation can be held liable for deliberate indifference only
if it had a policy or practice that caused the alleged violation of a constitutional right. See
Woodward v. Corr. Med. Serv. of Ill., Inc., 368 F.3d 917, 927 (7th Cir. 2004); Jackson v. Ill. Medi-
Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 766 n.6 (7th Cir. 2002) (private corporation is treated as though it were a
municipal entity in a § 1983 action). See also Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York,
436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
Plaintiff alleges that Wexford maintained a custom, policy, or practice of denying ADA
accommodations and providing inadequate medical care to maximize its profits, as carried out by
Babich and other Wexford providers at Lawrence. These allegations state a viable claim in Count
3 against Wexford Health Sources. The separately named Defendant Wexford will be dismissed
without prejudice as duplicative.
Count 4
Plaintiff asserts he is a third-party beneficiary of the contract between IDOC and Wexford,
and Wexford’s alleged breach of that contract damaged him. However, a contractual claim does
not amount to a constitutional violation. See Taake v. Cnty. of Monroe, 530 F.3d 538, 542-43 (7th
Cir. 2008) (citing Garcia v. Kankakee County Hous. Auth., 279 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 2002)).
Therefore, Count 4 will be dismissed.
Injunctive Relief
Because the Complaint includes a request for injunctive relief, the Warden of Lawrence
Correctional Center (currently Jeremiah Brown), will remain as an official-capacity defendant
regarding the request for injunctive relief. See Gonzales v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir.
2011) (holding warden is proper defendant for injunctive relief claim as he would be responsible
for ensuring that any injunctive relief would be carried out).
Unknown/John/Jane Doe Defendants
Plaintiff is responsible for securing information aimed at identifying the Unknown/John
Doe Defendants #1 and #2, in accordance with the John/Jane Doe Identification Order that will be
entered separately. Once the names of the unknown defendants are obtained, Plaintiff must file a
motion to substitute the newly identified defendants in place of the generic designations in the case
caption and throughout the Complaint. The Warden of Lawrence Correctional Center, in his
official capacity only, is designated to respond to Plaintiff’s requests for information regarding the
identity of the John Doe Defendants.
Pending Motion
Plaintiff’s motion to deem the Complaint filed on June 5, 2025 (Doc. 9) is GRANTED
pursuant to the prison mailbox rule. (See Doc. 1, p. 30). See Edwards v. United States, 266 F.3d
756, 758 (7th Cir. 2001).
Disposition
The Complaint states colorable claims in Count 1 against Myers, Gentry, Babich, Wise,
Luking, Hughes, Brookhart, Brown, Walters, Cunningham, and John Does #1 and #2; in Count 2
against the IDOC; and in Count 3 against Wexford Health Sources. Count 4, Lawrence
Correctional Center, Wexford (duplicate), and John Does #3-12 are DISMISSED without
prejudice.
The Clerk shall prepare for Latoya Hughes, Andrew Walters, Dee Dee Brookhart, Jeremiah
Brown (individual and official capacity), Lori Cunningham, Percy Myers, Gentry, Glen Babich,
Carissa Luking, Wise, the Illinois Department of Corrections, and Wexford Health Sources: (1)
Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6
(Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the
Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to each Defendant’s place of employment as
identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons
(Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take
appropriate steps to effect formal service on the Defendant, and the Court will require the
Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the employer
shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, the
Defendant’s last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as
directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be
retained only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.
Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the
Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g). Pursuant to
Administrative Order No. 244 and Local Rule 8.2, Defendants need only respond to the issues
stated in this Merit Review Order.
Plaintiff is ADVISED that if judgment is rendered against him and the judgment includes
the payment of costs under 28 U.S.C. §1915, he will be required to pay the full amount of the
costs, even though his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(f)(2)(A).
Plaintiff is further ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of
Court and the opposing parties informed of any change in his address; the Court will not
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 14 days
after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a
delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of
prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).
Finally, based on the allegations in the Complaint, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to
ENTER the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 30, 2026
s/ Staci M. Yandle_____
STACI M. YANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge
Notice to Plaintiff
The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the Defendants of your lawsuit and serve
them with a copy of your Complaint. After service has been achieved, Defendants will enter an
appearance and file an Answer to your Complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days from the date
of this Order to receive the Defendants’ Answer, but it is entirely possible that it will take 90 days
or more. When Defendants have filed their Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling Order
containing important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is advised to
wait until counsel has appeared for Defendants before filing any motions, to give the Defendants
notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before Defendants’ counsel
has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any
evidence to the Court at this time, unless specifically directed to do so.