Brinson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

CARLOS TERRELL BRINSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No.: 3:25-CV-266-KAC-JEM

)

THOMAS SPANGLER, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Carlos Terrell Brinson, a prisoner formerly in the custody of the Tennessee

Department of Correction (“TDOC”), filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 1] and a

complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [Doc. 2]. For the reasons below, the Court GRANTS the

motion to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 1] and allows a use-of-force claim against Defendant

David Isaacs in his individual capacity to PROCEED but DISMISSES all remaining claims and

Defendants.

I. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS [Doc. 1]

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), a prisoner who brings a civil action

may apply for permission to file suit without prepaying the filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). A

review of Plaintiff’s Motion demonstrates that he lacks sufficient financial resources to pay the

filing fee in a lump sum [See Doc. 1]. So, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court GRANTS the

Motion [Doc. 1].

Plaintiff is ASSESSED the civil filing fee of $350.00. The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate

trust account SHALL submit to the Clerk, U.S. District Court, 800 Market Street, Suite 130,

Knoxville, Tennessee, 37902 as an initial partial payment, whichever is the greater of: (a) twenty

percent (20%) of the average monthly deposits to Plaintiff’s inmate trust account; or (b) twenty

percent (20%) of the average monthly balance in his inmate trust account for the six-month period

preceding the filing of the Complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (1)(A), (B). Thereafter, the custodian

of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account MUST submit twenty percent (20%) of Plaintiff’s preceding

monthly income (or income credited to Plaintiff’s trust account for the preceding month), but only

when such monthly income exceeds ten dollars ($10.00), until the full filing fee of three hundred

fifty dollars ($350.00) as authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) has been paid to the Clerk. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order to

the Court’s financial deputy and the custodian of inmate trust accounts at Plaintiff’s current facility

to ensure compliance with the PLRA’s requirements for payment of the filing fee.

II. SCREENING OF COMPLAINT

Under the PLRA, the Court must screen the Complaint and sua sponte dismiss any claims

that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or are against a defendant who is

immune. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. The dismissal standard the Supreme

Court articulated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544 (2007) “governs dismissals for failure state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)

and 1915A] because the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6)” of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to

survive an initial review, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 570).

A claim is “facial[ly] plausib[le]” if the Complaint “pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” See

Teamsters Local 237 Welfare Fund v. ServiceMaster Glob. Holdings, Inc., 83 F.4th 514, 524 (6th

Cir. 2023) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S.at 678). Allegations that give rise to a mere possibility that a

plaintiff might later establish undisclosed facts supporting recovery are not well-pled and do not

state a plausible claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. Further, formulaic and conclusory

recitations of the elements of a claim that are not supported by specific facts are insufficient to

state a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681. However, the Supreme Court has

instructed that courts should liberally construe pro se pleadings filed in civil rights cases and hold

them to a less stringent standard than “formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner,

404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

On March 26, 2025, Plaintiff was housed at the “Rodger1 D. Wilson Detention Facility”

(“RDWDF”) [Doc. 2 at 2, 3-4]. While Plaintiff was trying to use the kiosk, Defendant Correctional

Officer (“CO”) David Isaacs “sent [Plaintiff] outside” because a medical technician came in to

pass out medication [Id. at 4]. Plaintiff attempted to explain to CO Isaacs that he needed to

complete his kiosk request and grievance due to his limited time outside of his cell, but CO Isaacs

told Plaintiff to go outside [Id.]. As Plaintiff was walking to the door, CO Isaacs became “upset”

and told Plaintiff “to go lock down” [Id.]. Plaintiff went to his cell and closed the door, and CO

Isaacs began removing Plaintiff’s handcuffs [Id.]. In doing so, CO Isaacs “became overly

aggressive and started jerking [Plaintiff] thr[ough] the pie flap” [Id.]. Plaintiff’s left pinkie finger

got caught in the pie flap and was broken when CO Isaacs pulled on Plaintiff [Id.]. Plaintiff said,

“[s]top you just broke my finger” [Id.]. CO Isaacs replied, “[i]t hurt[]s don’t [sic] it” [Id.].

CO Isaacs called the shift supervisor, Lieutenant Randall Kidd, and Plaintiff informed

Lieutenant Kidd that he was in pain and needed medical attention [Id. at 4]. Lieutenant Kidd told

Plaintiff, “I’ll get you medical attention if you stop acting gay” [Id.]. A “nurse tec” came to see

1 The facility is titled the “Roger D. Wilson Detention Facility,” and the Court uses that title here.

Plaintiff and asked him to hold his hand up [Id.]. She looked (through the door) and walked away

stating something about an x-ray, which Plaintiff finally received two days later at 6:05 a.m. [Id.

at 5]. The x-ray revealed that Plaintiff’s finger was broken, and that the bone was chipped [Id.].

Plaintiff “put [in] sick call after sick call” but did not receive pain medication or an answer to his

sick calls until five days later, March 31, 2025 [Id.].

Plaintiff asked the pod officer if he could go to medical, but the officer called medical and

was told there were not enough nurses on shift “to d[eal] with [Plaintiff’s] broken finger” [Id.].

So, to test the system, Plaintiff asked his cellmate to say his chest was hurting to see if he received

any medical attention [Id.]. The cellmate was given the choice to go to medical at that time or to

wait until after “chow” [Id.].

On April 9, 2025, Plaintiff was called to medical, and a splint was put on his finger because

he was going to court on April 11, 2025 [Id.]. Plaintiff told the judge he was not receiving adequate

medical care at the RDWDF, and she stated that Plaintiff’s “finger better be fix[ed] the next time

[Plaintiff] come[s] to her court[]room” [Id. at 6]. Plaintiff “went back” on April 16, 2025, and as

of April 20, 2025, “they still . . . have no d[one] anything to fix [his] finger” [Id. at 6, 7]. The only

thing Plaintiff has been told is that “they referred [him] to a specialist [] orth[o]pedic” [Id. at 6].

“And everyone knows that these supervisor[]s and correctional officer[]s and administration are

r[u]n by Sheriff Thomas Spangler and all authority is under his ruling” [Id. at 6].

Plaintiff sued Defendants Sheriff Thomas Spangler, CO David Isaacs, and the “Rodger D.

Wilson Administration” [Id. at 1, 3]. It is unclear whether he seeks to sue the individual defendants

in their individual or official capacity, or both. As relief, the Complaint asks the Court to “[s]tart

my [his] civil procedures or have the lawyer representing these officer[]s and make some

deal” [Id. at 7]. The Court liberally construed this to request a “deal” for some monetary relief.

To state a claim against any Defendant for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must

establish that a “person” acting “under color of” state law deprived him of “any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

A. Defendant Sheriff Spangler

Starting with Defendant Sheriff Spangler, to Plaintiff’s benefit, the Court liberally

construes the Complaint to raise claims against Sheriff Spangler in his individual and official

capacities. To state a claim against Sheriff Spangler in his individual capacity, Plaintiff must

adequately plead that Sheriff Spangler, through his own actions, violated a federal right. See Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 676; see also Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (providing

that “a complaint must allege that the defendants were personally involved in the alleged

deprivation of federal rights” to state a claim upon which relief may be granted). Constitutional

liability cannot attach to a defendant solely based on his or her position of authority. Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (finding that liability under Section 1983 may not

be imposed merely because a defendant “employs a tortfeasor”). The Complaint contains no

factual allegations against Sheriff Spangler personally [See Doc. 2]. Instead, Plaintiff sues him

because of his position of authority [Id. at 6]. That is not enough. So, the Court DISMISSES any

individual capacity claims against Defendant Sheriff Spangler.

Any official capacity claim fails too. Suit against Sheriff Spangler in his official capacity

is a suit against Knox County, which employs him. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166

(1985) (holding “an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit

against the entity”). For the Complaint to state a claim against Knox County, it must plausibly

allege that a custom or policy of Knox County caused a violation of Plaintiff’s federal rights. See

Monell, 436 U.S. at 708 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (explaining a municipality can only be

held liable for a constitutional violation when the violation resulted from “implementation of [the

municipality’s] official policies or established customs”). But the Complaint does not plausibly

allege that any custom or policy of Knox County caused any violation of Plaintiff’s rights.

Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES any official capacity claim against Defendant Sheriff

Spangler too.

B. Defendant RDWDF Administration

The Complaint does not specify which discrete acts the RDWDF “Administration” took

that allegedly violated Plaintiff’s federal rights. And “[i]t is a basic pleading essential that a

plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular defendants.” Brown v. v. Montgomery Cnty.

Mgmt., No. 3:22-cv-00580, 2022 WL 5213004, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 4, 2022) (citations omitted).

Furthermore, to the extent the “Administration” means the county jail administration, it is not a

“person” subject to suit within the meaning of Section 1983. Id. Accordingly, the Court

DISMISSES any claim against the “Administration.”

C. Defendant CO David Isaacs

Moving to Defendant CO Isaacs, the Court again liberally construes the Complaint to raise

claims against Defendant CO Isaacs in his individual and official capacities. The Complaint does

not plainly identify Plaintiff’s custodial status at the relevant time [See Doc. 2]. But the Court can

take judicial notice of publicly-available inmate information at the TDOC. See Oak Ridge Env’t

Peace All. v. Perry, 412 F. Supp. 3d 786, 810 n.6 (E.D. Tenn. 2019) (“Information taken from

government websites is self-authenticating under Fed. R. Evid. 902, and courts may accordingly

take judicial notice of the information found on these websites.” (citations omitted)). TDOC

Felony Offender Information records show that Plaintiff was convicted and began serving his

current custodial sentence in July 2020. See https://www.tn.gov/correction/agency-

services/foil.html. So, the Eighth Amendment applies to his use of force claim against Defendant

CO Isaacs. See Lawler as next friend of Lawler v. Hardeman Cnty., 93 F.4th 919, 926 (6th Cir.

2024) (noting that the Eighth Amendment “kicks in only after a conviction”).

The Eighth Amendment, incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment,

provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and

unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII.; Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,

666–67 (1962). The Eighth Amendment’s “ban on cruel and unusual punishment prohibits the

‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ on prisoners.” Johnson v. Sootsman, 79 F.4th 608,

615 (6th Cir. 2023) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5 (1992)). As applied to the use of

force by a correctional officer, as here, the law requires a subjective and objective component. See

id. “As a subjective matter,” the “core judicial inquiry” is to distinguish “between force used in a

‘good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline’ and force used ‘maliciously and sadistically to

cause harm.’” Id. at 616 (quoting Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010) (per curiam)). Only

“force exerted maliciously and sadistically to inflict pain” violates the Eighth Amendment. Id.

(citation omitted). “As an objective matter, the Court has held that prisoners who challenge a

correctional officer’s use of force need not prove ‘extreme’ or ‘serious’ harms.” Id. (citation

omitted). “And the malicious and sadistic infliction of pain violates” applicable contemporary

standards of decency “whether or not the pain leads to any significant injury.” See id. (citation

omitted).

Here, liberally construed, there are enough facts in the Complaint to infer that Defendant

CO Isaacs used force “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm” to Plaintiff. See Johnson, 79

F.4th at 616. And the Complaint alleges that pain was inflicted on Plaintiff as a result [See Doc.

2]. At this preliminary screening phase, that is enough to allow Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment use

of force claim against Defendant CO Isaacs in his individual capacity to PROCEED.

But any official capacity claim fails for the same reasons any official capacity claim against

Defendant Sheriff Spangler fails. The Complaint does not plausibly allege that any custom or

policy of Knox County caused any violation of Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. Accordingly,

the Court DISMISSES any official capacity use of force claim against Defendant CO Isaacs.

D. Medical Care Allegations

The Complaint could also liberally be construed to raise an inadequate medical care claim.

This claim too would arise under the Eighth Amendment because Plaintiff was an inmate at the

relevant time. As relevant here, an Eighth Amendment inadequate medical care claim has both an

objective and a subjective component. See Helphenstine v. Lewis Cnty., 60 F.4th 305, 315 (6th

Cir. 2023). The objective component requires that the alleged deprivation “was serious enough to

violate the Constitution.” See id. (quoting Griffith v. Franklin Cnty., 975 F.3d 554, 567 (6th Cir.

2020)). And the subjective component “requires a plaintiff to show that a defendant ‘kn[ew] of

and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must be aware of facts

from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must

also draw the inference.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,

837 (1994)).

Here, there are no facts in the Complaint that would allow the Court to infer than any named

Defendant, including CO Isaacs or Sheriff Spangler, committed acts that satisfied both the

objective and subjective component of the law. Generally, a broken finger does not raise to the

level of an objectively serious medical need. See Thomas v. Nassau County Corr. Ctr., 288

F.Supp.2d 333, 338 (E.D.N.Y.2003) (collecting cases); Small v. Clements, No. 3:18-cv-1731

(KAD), 2018 WL 5634942, at *3 (D. Conn. Oct. 31, 2018) (noting “courts generally hold that a

broken finger is not serious”); Williams v. Alana, No. 2:23-cv-142, 2023 WL 6427231, at *6 (W.D.

Mich. Oct. 3, 2023) (finding it “not at all clear” that Plaintiff’s broken ring finger, which caused

“extreme pain” satisfied “the objective component of the relevant two-prong test”). But even if

the objective component were satisfied, the subjective component is lacking for each named

Defendant. So, the Court DISMISSES any inadequate medical care claim against any named

Defendant.

III. CONCLUSION

As set forth above,

1. The Court GRANTED Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. 1];

2. The Court ASSESSED Plaintiff the civil filing fee of $350.00;

3. The Court DIRECTED the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account to submit

the filing fee to the Clerk in the manner set for above;

4. The Court DIRECTED the Clerk to provide a copy of this Memorandum and Order

to the custodian of inmate accounts at the institution where Plaintiff is now confined

and to the Court’s financial deputy; and

5. The Court allowed a use-of-force claim against Defendant David Isaacs in his

individual capacity to PROCEED but DISMISSED all remaining claims and

Defendants.

As a result,

1. The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to send Plaintiff a service packet (a blank summons

and USM 285 form) for Defendant Isaacs;

2. Plaintiff MUST complete the service packet and return it to the Clerk’s Office

within twenty-one (21) days of entry of this Order. At that time, the summons

will be signed and sealed by the Clerk and forwarded to the U.S. Marshal for

service, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4;

3. If Plaintiff fails to return the completed service packet timely, the Court will dismiss

this action;

4. Defendant Isaacs MUST answer or otherwise respond to the complaint within

twenty-one (21) days from the date of service. If Defendant fails to timely respond

to the complaint, it may result in entry of judgment by default against him;

5. Plaintiff MUST immediately inform the Court and Defendant or his counsel of

record of any address changes in writing. Pursuant to Local Rule 83.13, it is the

duty of a pro se party to promptly notify the Clerk and the other parties to the

proceedings of any change in his address, to monitor the progress of the case, and

to prosecute or defend the action diligently. E.D. Tenn. L.R. 83.13. Failure to

provide a correct address to this Court within fourteen (14) days of any change in

address may result in the dismissal of this action.

SO ORDERED.

ENTER:

/s/ Katherine A. Crytzer

KATHERINE A. CRYTZER

United States District Judge