Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

BRANDON JACKSON )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 23-cv-2856-SMY

)

RICHARD ARNOLD, DAVID )

MITCHELL, and ROB JEFFREYS )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YANDLE, District Judge:

Plaintiff Brandon Jackson, currently incarcerated at the Cook County jail, filed this lawsuit

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Chaplain Richard Arnold, Warden David Mitchell, and Assistant

Wardan Rob Jeffreys, alleging constitutional violations of his religious freedom. Now pending

before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. 37). Plaintiff did not file a

response.1 For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED in part.

Factual Background

The following facts, derived from Plaintiff’s deposition and Chaplain Arnold’s affidavit,

are undisputed unless otherwise indicated: Plaintiff Brandon Jackson, a practicing Muslim, was

incarcerated at Pinckneyville Correctional Center during the events at issue (Doc. 37-1, pp. 9–10).

From 2019 through 2021, he participated in Ramadan, Jumu’ah, and Taleem services without

incident (Id. at 9, ¶¶ 7–10). Under 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 425.70, inmates must submit written

1 When a party fails to respond, the Court may accept the movant’s statement of facts as true. FED. R. CIV. P.

56(e)(2). Accordingly, the Court accepts Defendant’s statement of facts as true in considering the instant motion for

summary judgment.

requests for religious-diet accommodations 45 days before the observance begins (Doc. 37-2,

pp. 1–2, ¶ 3). In prior years, Pinckneyville posted Ramadan sign-up information on housing-unit

bulletin boards, and Jackson routinely complied through that process (Doc. 37-1, pp. 14–15).

In 2022, Ramadan lasted from April 1 to April 30 (Doc. 37-2, p. 2, ¶ 7). During Ramadan,

practicing Muslims fast from sunrise to sunset and break the fast after sunset (Doc. 37-1, p. 11).

After the observance began, Jackson learned from Chaplain Arnold that he was not on the

participation list because he had missed the sign-up deadline (Doc. 37-2, pp. 2, ¶¶ 8–9). Unlike in

previous years, the 2022 notice was not posted on bulletin boards but appeared only on the

institutional television channel (Doc. 37-1, p. 15). Jackson was not informed the sign-up notice

would be distributed through the institutional television system, nor did he receive notice from any

other source (Id., p. 16). As a result, Jackson was excluded from evening meals and congregational

prayers.

Jackson filed grievance, observed Ramadan on his own, and broke his fast with food

purchased from commissary (Doc. 37, pp. 3–4, ¶¶ 12–13, 16). In 2023, Pinckneyville

automatically enrolled him for Ramadan (Doc. 37-1, p. 29, ¶¶ 8–12). Jackson seeks policy change,

not financial compensation (Id. at pp. 38–40, 44).

Discussion

Summary judgment is proper only if the moving party can demonstrate that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Alabama v. North Carolina, 560 U.S.

330, 344 (2010). The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the non-moving party “has

failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [his] case with respect to which [he]

has the burden of proof.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the evidence is

merely colorable or not sufficiently probative, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1986). Any doubt as to the existence of a genuine

issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Lawrence v. Kenosha Cnty.,

391 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2004).

First Amendment

To establish a free exercise claim, Jackson “had to submit evidence from which a jury

could reasonably find that the defendants personally and unjustifiably placed a substantial burden

on his religious practices.” Thompson v. Holm, 809 F.3d 376, 379 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing

Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989)). A substantial burden is one that “put[s] substantial

pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Thomas v. Review Bd.,

450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981). In the prison context, such a burden is justified if it is “reasonably

related to a legitimate penological interest.” Thompson, 809 F.3d at 380 (citing Turner v. Safley,

482 U.S. 78, 89–91 (1987)).

Wardens David Mitchell and Rob Jeffreys

Despite never meeting or speaking with Defendants David Mitchell and Rob Jeffreys,

Jackson named them based on his belief that as wardens, they were notified of the Ramadan sign-

up issue through his grievance process and were therefore “responsible in that capacity” (Doc. 37-

1, pp. 22–23). Citing Exhibit 3, bates 1, Defendants contend that Jackson’s grievance “did not

come before the warden[s] until after Ramadan [] to put them on notice”, and that respondeat

superior does not apply to Jackson’s claims (Doc. 37, p. 9).

Exhibit 1, Jackson’s deposition transcript, and Exhibit 2, Chaplain Arnold’s declaration are

attached to Defendants’ motion; Exhibit 3 was not attached and will not be considered. That said,

an attachment to Jackson’s Complaint, specifically Defendants grievance response (Doc. 2, pp.

25–27), establishes these defendants did not become aware of the incident until after the

completion of the 2022 Ramadan. As such, they are entitled to summary judgment. Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (“Government officials may not be held liable for the

unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”); Minix v.

Canarecci, 597 F.3d 824, 833 (7th Cir. 2010) (“individual liability under § 1983 requires ‘personal

involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation’”).

Chaplain Richard Arnold

Chaplain Arnold argues he did not violate Jackson’s First Amendment Rights by requiring

him to sign up for Ramadan in accordance with the Illinois Administrative Code, which serves

legitimate penological interests. The issue, however, is whether providing the sign-up notice

solely through the institutional television channel was constitutionally sufficient.

Here, the record shows that Ramadan diet sign-up information had been posted on housing-

unit bulletin boards in years prior to 2022, and Jackson successfully enrolled through that method.

However, in 2022, the sign-up notice was distributed only through the institutional television

channel, which Jackson did not see and asserts he was unaware of (Doc. 37-1, pp. 13–15). This

creates a material issue of fact as to whether notice distributed only via the institutional television

channel, which displays information momentarily rather than continuously like a posted bulletin,

comported with the First Amendment’s free-exercise protection in the prison context. See Conyers

v. Abitz, 416 F.3d 580, 586 (7th Cir. 2005) (denying summary judgment where the record did not

show the inmate was aware of the religious sign-up deadline).

Chaplain Arnold also argues that because Jackson had observed Ramadan in previous

years, he should have known a deadline was approaching and inquired about the date. This

argument is unpersuasive. The record does not establish that Jackson was aware Ramadan was

approaching in 2022. Moreover, Ramadan follows a lunar calendar and its dates vary each year.

Esterling v. Pollard, 528 Fed.Appx. 653, 655 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Because Ramadan is based on a

lunar month, each year its starting and ending dates shift in relation to the Gregorian calendar (the

predominant calendar in the United States)”).

Next, Chaplain Arnold argues that Jackson observed Ramadan independently and

expressed no interest in financial remuneration during his deposition, thus Jackson has no case

absent real damages (Doc. 37, p. 10). The Court disagrees, as Jackson’s request for a policy change

is construed as a request for declaratory relief. Clayton-El v. Fisher, 96 F.3d 236, 241 (7th Cir.

1996) (“When a state official violates the Constitution in his treatment of a state prisoner, his

illegal conduct can, at least in theory, give rise to claims for monetary or declaratory relief under

§ 1983 . . . .”).

Qualified Immunity

Finally, Defendants argue qualified immunity shields them from liability in this case.

“Public officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 763

(7th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has established a two-part

test to determine whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. First, “[t]aken in the light

most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct

violated a constitutional right?” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). If so, was the law

clearly established when the defendant’s alleged unlawful conduct occurred? (Id.). The two

questions may be addressed in either order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).

As to the first prong, the Court has found that the evidence creates material issues of facts

regarding Jackson’s First Amendment free exercise of religion claim. To establish the violated

right was clearly established, “a plaintiff must show either a reasonably analogous case that has

both articulated the right at issue and applied it to a factual circumstance similar to the one at hand

or that the violation was so obvious that a reasonable person necessarily would have recognized it

as a violation of the law.” Howell v. Smith, 853 F.3d 892, 897 (7th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation

marks omitted). The factual circumstances and constitutional violations alleged by Plaintiff do

not invoke new constitutional principles; similar cases have been litigated in district courts across

the nation. See Thomas v. Holm, 809 F.3d 376, 380-381 (7th Cir. 2016) (A prisoner has a clearly

established right not to have officials substantially burden religious exercise without justification);

Conyers, 416 F.3d, at 586 (finding no qualified immunity where the evidence showed the

defendant did not know a sign-up deadline). As such, Defendants are not entitled to qualified

immunity.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to

Defendants David Mitchell and Rob Jeffreys and DENIED as to Defendant Chaplain Richard

Arnold. Because Jackson seeks no monetary damages and requests only policy change, the matter

will proceed to a bench trial, which will be scheduled by a separate order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(1);

Simon v. Cooperative Educ. Serv. Agency #5, 46 F.4th 602, 609 (7th Cir. 2022) (“The Supreme

Court has repeatedly found that declaratory judgments ‘closely resemble’ injunctive relief, the

quintessential equitable remedy.”); Kramer v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 355 F.3d 961, 966 (2004)

(“There is no right to a jury where the only remedies sought (or available) are equitable.”).

IT IS SO ORDERED. Ak Gola

DATED: March 30, 2026

STACI M. YANDLE

Chief U.S. District Judge

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