Dalton

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

SHANCE DALTON, SR., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 3:25-cv-03368-MMM

)

DR. THOMAS BAKER, et al. )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Plaintiff proceeding pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, presently incarcerated at

Jacksonville Correctional Center, asserts claims for deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs.

I. MERIT REVIEW

The case is before the Court for a merit review of Plaintiff’s complaint. The Court

must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint, and through such process identify and dismiss any

legally insufficient claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2)

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id.

The Court accepts the factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in the

plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). Conclusory

statements and labels are insufficient—the facts alleged must “state a claim for relief

that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013)

(citation omitted).

Plaintiff names as Defendants Dr. Thomas Baker and Wexford Health Sources,

Inc.

Plaintiff complains about Dr. Baker’s medical care on two occasions.

First, on May 26, 2025, Plaintiff suffered a torn bicep during a fight with another

inmate. His bicep was deformed and he had hemorrhaging in his left forearm. He was

in pain. Dr. Baker refused to refer Plaintiff for emergency treatment and provided

inadequate pain treatment. Baker authorized emergency treatment for the other

involved inmate despite that inmate having only superficial injuries. Plaintiff

experienced these conditions for a week. Plaintiff later had emergency surgery to repair

the torn bicep muscle.

Second, on July 1, 2025, when running, Plaintiff perceived his hamstring to

“pop,” and fell down hard. He was in excruciating pain. His left leg was deformed,

swollen, and crooked in the knee area. He could not walk, stand, or be touched. Nurse

Ore called Dr. Baker at home to get authorization to sent Plaintiff to the emergency

room. Dr. Baker refused despite Nurse Ore explaining that Plaintiff was “in bad shape”

and “in pain.” Dr. Baker disregarded Nurse Ore’s description of Plaintiff’s condition

and sight unseen diagnosed Plaintiff with a sprained leg. Plaintiff’s left tibial plateau

was fractured and required emergency surgery. The surgery did not occur until July 29,

2025, due to Dr. Baker’s indifference. Plaintiff suffered unnecessary excruciating pain

because of the delay.

Plaintiff states a plausible Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to

a serious medical need against Dr. Baker. Plaintiff has plausibly alleged that this

Defendant knowingly delayed or denied Plaintiff’s needed medical care causing

significant and unnecessary pain. See Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 729-30 (7th Cir. 2016)

(en banc).

Plaintiff’s allegations do not state a claim against medical contractor Wexford

Health Sources, Inc. Plaintiff clearly alleges wrongdoing by Dr. Baker. But there is no

indication that Plaintiff’s alleged inadequate care was caused by the policies of

Wexford.

II. REQUEST FOR COUNSEL

Plaintiff has asked for court assistance in finding an attorney. Doc. 5.

The Seventh Circuit has summarized the legal standard that governs Plaintiff’s

request for counsel as follows:

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), a federal court “may request an

attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.” The

statute is “entirely permissive.” Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th

Cir. 2007) (en banc). Civil litigants have no constitutional or

statutory right to court-appointed counsel, and § 1915(e)(1) “does

not authorize the federal courts to make coercive appointments of

counsel.” Id. at 653 (quoting Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist. of

Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 310, 109 S.Ct. 1814, 104 L.Ed.2d 318 (1989)).

Rather, the statute “codifies the court’s discretionary authority to

recruit a lawyer to represent an indigent civil litigant pro bono

publico.” Id.

“Almost everyone would benefit from having a lawyer, but there

are too many indigent litigants and too few lawyers willing and

able to volunteer for these cases.” Olson v. Morgan, 750 F.3d 708, 711

(7th Cir. 2014). “District courts are thus placed in the unenviable

position of identifying, among a sea of people lacking counsel,

those who need counsel the most.” Id.

Accordingly, we have recently explained that “the decision

whether to recruit a lawyer for a particular plaintiff is made against

the twofold backdrop of a high volume of indigent, pro se litigants

(particularly incarcerated individuals) and a small pool, by

comparison, of attorneys willing and able to take those cases on pro

bono.” Watts v. Kidman, 42 F.4th 755, 763 (7th Cir. 2022). Based on

these and other practical considerations, we have held that district

judges should engage in a two-step inquiry when faced with a

request for pro bono counsel under § 1915(e)(1), asking first “(1)

has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain

counsel or been effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2)

given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear competent

to litigate it himself?” Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 654.

The first step needs no elaboration. Step two “can be complex” and

involves a pragmatic judgment about the difficulty of the case and

the plaintiff’s ability to present it to the court on his own. Watts, 42

F.4th at 760. “The inquiries are necessarily intertwined; the

difficulty of the case is considered against the plaintiff’s litigation

capabilities, and those capabilities are examined in light of the

challenges specific to the case at hand.” Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655. A

judge will normally consider “the plaintiff’s literacy,

communication skills, educational level, and litigation experience”

along with any evidence in the record “bearing on the plaintiff’s

intellectual capacity and psychological history.” Id. But these are

merely factors that are ordinarily relevant. No one factor is

“necessary or conclusive.” Id. at 655 n.9. Indeed, “[t]here are no

fixed requirements for determining a plaintiff’s competence to

litigate his own case.” Id. at 655. Ultimately, the “inquiry into the

plaintiff’s capacity to handle his own case is a practical one, made

in light of whatever relevant evidence is available on the question.”

Id.

Finally, “the decision whether to recruit pro bono counsel is left to

the district court’s discretion.” Id. at 654. Our job is to ensure that

this discretion is exercised in accordance with appropriate legal

principles. The “question on appellate review is not whether we

would have recruited a volunteer lawyer in the circumstances, but

whether the district court applied the correct legal standard and

reached a reasonable decision based on facts supported by the

record.” Id. at 658.

Jones v. Anderson, 116 F.4th 669, 675-76 (7th Cir. 2024). In determining the second step,

the Court should view the case through the lens of certain specific factors that the

Seventh Circuit has enumerated:

Though this inquiry must be case-and plaintiff-specific, we have

identified circumstances that tend to diminish a prisoner-plaintiff’s

ability to litigate pro se, such as when: (1) the case reaches later

stages of litigation, (2) the plaintiff is transferred to another facility

and loses access to relevant witnesses or evidence, (3) the claim

depends on the state of mind of the defendant, and (4) expert

testimony is necessary to prove the claim.

Owens v. Wexford Health Sources, et al., No. 22-2882, 2024 WL 5242367, at *3 (7th Cir. Dec.

30, 2024), citing James v. Eli, 889 F.3d 320, 327-28 (7th Cir. 2018).

First, Plaintiff has shown a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel on his own,

having written to several attorneys asking for assistance, without success.

Second, Plaintiff is able to represent himself. Plaintiff’s claims are not factually

difficult; he alleges Dr. Baker refused to effectively treat two obvious and significant

medical issues resulting in suffering unnecessary pain until emergency surgery was

ultimately performed as to both injuries. Plaintiff has personal knowledge of his injuries

and treatment and can testify to what he experienced. Written discovery should

produce to Plaintiff the relevant written medical and prison records related to his

claims. Plaintiff’s claims are not particularly legally difficult, though all federal

litigation is difficult to a degree. Plaintiff’s pleadings are clear, legible, and coherent.

Plaintiff’s education level is that of some college, and he appears well able to

communicate. There is no information before the Court that indicates Plaintiff is

mentally impaired to the extent that he cannot represent himself. Plaintiff’s level of legal

experience is not before the Court. And considering the circumstances the Seventh

Circuit suggested in Owens, none weigh heavily in favor of a search for counsel on the

specific facts here. The case is near its outset. Plaintiff has not been transferred to a

different prison. There is a state of mind element, which can support a search for

counsel, but is not dispositive, and in this case Plaintiff appears able to litigate this case.

Expert testimony may be implicated in this action, though at this time Defendants have

not disclosed experts, and Plaintiff’s claim as the Court understands it is a temporary

denial of treatment for obvious injuries reducing the nuance of this case.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:

1. Plaintiff's Motion to Request Counsel [5] is DENIED.

2. Pursuant to its merit review of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the

Court finds that the plaintiff states a plausible Eighth Amendment claim

for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need against Dr. Baker. Any

additional claims shall not be included in the case, except at the Court's

discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown or pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Plaintiff's claim against Wexford is

dismissed, and the Clerk is to terminate this Defendant.

3. This case is now in the process of service. The plaintiff is advised to wait

until counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to

give notice to the defendants and an opportunity to respond to those

motions. Motions filed before defendants' counsel has filed an appearance

will generally be denied as premature. The plaintiff need not submit any

evidence to the court at this time, unless otherwise directed by the court.

4. The court will attempt to serve defendants by mailing each defendant a

waiver of service. If a defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service

to the clerk within thirty days after the waiver is sent, the court will take

appropriate steps to effect formal service through the U.S. Marshals service

on that defendant and will require that defendant to pay the full costs of

formal service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).

5. With respect to a defendant who no longer works at the address provided

by the plaintiff, the entity for whom that defendant worked while at that

address shall provide to the clerk said defendant's current work address, or,

if not known, said defendant's forwarding address. This information shall

be used only for effecting service. Forwarding addresses will be retained

only by the clerk and shall not be disclosed by the clerk.

6. The defendants shall file an answer within 60 days of the date the waiver is

sent by the clerk. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer should

include all defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and

later pleadings shall be to the issues stated in this order. Generally, an

answer sets out the defendants' positions. The court does not rule on the

merits of those positions unless a motion is filed by the defendants.

Therefore, no response to the answer is necessary or will be considered.

After the defendants have been served and have answered, the court will

enter an order setting discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.

7. This district uses electronic filing, which means that, after defense counsel

has filed an appearance, defense counsel will automatically receive

electronic notice of any motion or other paper filed by the plaintiff with the

clerk. The plaintiff does not need to mail to defense counsel copies of

motions and other papers that the plaintiff has filed with the clerk.

However, this does not apply to discovery requests and responses.

Discovery requests and responses are NOT filed with the clerk. The

plaintiff must mail discovery requests and responses directly to counsel for

the appropriate defendant. Discovery requests or responses sent to the

clerk will be returned unfiled unless they are attached to and the subject of

a motion to compel. Discovery does not begin until the court has entered a

scheduling order, which will explain the discovery process in more detail.

8. Counsel for the defendants is hereby granted leave to depose the plaintiff.

Counsel for the defendants shall arrange the time for the deposition.

9. The plaintiff shall immediately notify the court, in writing, of any change

in mailing address and phone number. Plaintiff's failure to notify the court

of such changes will result in dismissal of this lawsuit.

10. The clerk is directed to enter the standard qualified protective order

pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.

Entered this 10th day of April, 2026.

s/Michael M. Mihm

MICHAEL M. MIHM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE