The opinion
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as
Disciplinary Counsel v. VanBibber, Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-1271.]
NOTICE
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 South
Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal
errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the
opinion is published.
SLIP OPINION NO. 2026-OHIO-1271
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. VANBIBBER.
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. VanBibber,
Slip Opinion No. 2026-Ohio-1271.]
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct,
including knowingly failing to respond to a demand for information by a
disciplinary authority during an investigation—Two-year suspension.
(No. 2025-1640—Submitted February 10, 2026—Decided April 10, 2026.)
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct
of the Supreme Court, No. 2024-038.
__________________
The per curiam opinion below was joined by KENNEDY, C.J., and FISCHER,
DEWINE, DETERS, HAWKINS, and SHANAHAN, JJ. BRUNNER, J., did not participate.
Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} Respondent, Jack Herchel VanBibber, of Marion, Ohio, Attorney
Registration No. 0097242, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2018. On
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
May 7, 2024, we suspended VanBibber from the practice of law for two years, with
the entire suspension stayed on conditions, after finding that he failed to comply
with multiple traffic laws, made false statements to law-enforcement officers
during traffic stops, failed to abide by multiple court orders related to his traffic
violations, mismanaged his client trust account, and failed to cooperate in the
resulting disciplinary investigation. Disciplinary Counsel v. VanBibber, 2024-
Ohio-1702.
{¶ 2} In a four-count amended complaint filed on May 15, 2025, while
VanBibber was serving the stayed suspension imposed in May 2024, relator,
disciplinary counsel, charged him with multiple violations of the Rules of
Professional Conduct arising from his neglect of a client’s legal matter, making
false statements to a tribunal, propositioning a client’s significant other for sex, and
failure to cooperate in the resulting disciplinary investigation. The parties entered
into comprehensive stipulations of fact, misconduct, and aggravating factors with
respect to three of the four counts and submitted 112 stipulated exhibits. Count
Three of the amended complaint was dismissed on relator’s motion.
{¶ 3} Thereafter, a three-member panel of the Board of Professional
Conduct held a hearing at which VanBibber was the only witness to testify.
Following the hearing, the panel issued a report in which it made findings of fact
and found that VanBibber committed the misconduct charged in the three
remaining counts. After considering that misconduct, the relevant aggravating and
mitigating factors, and our applicable precedent, the panel recommended that
VanBibber be suspended from the practice of law for two years. The board adopted
the panel’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended sanction and
further recommended that VanBibber be ordered to pay the costs of these
proceedings. No objections have been filed.
2
January Term, 2026
{¶ 4} For the reasons that follow, we adopt the board’s findings of
misconduct and recommended sanction. Accordingly, we suspend VanBibber from
the practice of law for two years and order him to pay the costs of these proceedings.
FACTS AND MISCONDUCT
Count One: The Casto Matter
{¶ 5} On July 11, 2023, VanBibber entered a notice of appearance on behalf
of Matthew Casto in a postdivorce child-custody case that was pending in the
Fairfield County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division. See Casto
v. Casto, Fairfield C.P. No. 2021 DR 00195. Approximately four months before
VanBibber entered his appearance, a settlement conference was scheduled for July
25 and a bench trial for August 31, both at 9:30 a.m. On June 30, however, in a
custody proceeding pending in the Marion County Court of Common Pleas, Family
Division, in which he was representing the plaintiff, VanBibber advised the court
that he would be available for a final hearing at 9:00 a.m. on August 31. See
Schmelzer v. Hodges, Marion C.P. Nos. 2018 PC 00077 and 00078. When he
entered his appearance in the Casto case, VanBibber knew that he was scheduled
to appear simultaneously in Casto and in Schmelzer, in two county courthouses that
are located approximately 80 miles apart.
{¶ 6} Three days later, on July 14, VanBibber’s assistant contacted the
Fairfield County court to inquire about the possibility of VanBibber’s appearing via
Zoom on July 25 and August 31 in Casto. A judicial administrative assistant
responded to the inquiry by email, stating, “You would need to file a motion to
request to appear by [Z]oom for any hearing dates.”
{¶ 7} VanBibber did not file a motion requesting to appear for the July 25
settlement conference by Zoom, nor did he advise Casto to appear at the conference.
And on July 25, both VanBibber and Casto failed—without explanation—to appear
for the conference, which Casto’s ex-wife had traveled from her residence in
Florida to attend. While Casto’s ex-wife, her counsel, and the children’s guardian
3
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
ad litem waited, the magistrate called VanBibber’s office to ascertain his
whereabouts. VanBibber’s assistant answered but offered no information, and
VanBibber did not return the magistrate’s call until after the conference had
concluded.
{¶ 8} Thereafter, Casto’s former mother-in-law was joined as a party and
filed a motion for emergency temporary custody of the children. In addition,
Casto’s ex-wife’s counsel filed a motion for attorney fees and expenses for Casto
and VanBibber’s failure to appear for the settlement conference.
{¶ 9} VanBibber did appear with Casto for an emergency custody hearing
on August 8. During that hearing, VanBibber falsely advised the magistrate that
the reason for his failure to appear for the settlement conference was that a court
staffer had told his assistant that he could appear by phone or Zoom and that the
court would send a Zoom link. VanBibber also falsely stated that at the time the
magistrate was attempting to convene the settlement conference, he was at a Marion
County hearing that was running late. In the course of this disciplinary proceeding,
however, VanBibber has stated that the reason he failed to appear for the settlement
conference was that he was either at a meeting with a prospective client that was
running late or was on his way to the Marion County courthouse for a hearing.
{¶ 10} Before concluding the August 8 hearing, the magistrate asked
whether there was anything else that the parties wanted to address. Casto’s ex-
wife’s counsel noted that his client’s motion for attorney fees and expenses was
scheduled to be heard the following day. VanBibber stated that he had intended to
file a response to the motion but had not yet done so and that he would explain his
opposition to the motion in his response. The magistrate suggested that the parties
attempt to resolve the matter, reminding VanBibber that he had failed to appear for
the settlement conference without filing a motion to continue and that Casto’s ex-
wife had incurred legal fees in connection with the scheduled conference.
4
January Term, 2026
{¶ 11} VanBibber did not file a response to the motion for legal fees and
expenses or otherwise attempt to resolve the matter. On August 18, the magistrate
granted the motion as to the legal fees and ordered Casto to pay his ex-wife $800
by 4:00 p.m. on August 28. VanBibber failed to inform Casto of the order for
several weeks but ultimately paid the fees in April 2024, after confirming with
relator that it was permissible for him to do so.
{¶ 12} Although VanBibber was aware on July 11, when he entered his
appearance in Casto, that he was double-booked for the morning of August 31, he
waited until August 9 to request a continuance of the Casto trial. The Fairfield
County court denied VanBibber’s motion the day it was filed, noting that the Casto
trial was scheduled almost four months before VanBibber entered his appearance
in the case. Although the court also called VanBibber that day to inform him that
his motion had been denied, VanBibber waited until August 24 to seek a
continuance of the Schmelzer hearing. The Marion County court denied that motion
on August 29.
{¶ 13} On August 30, VanBibber filed second motions for a continuance in
both Casto and Schmelzer. In the Casto motion, he stated, “[T]he hearing
scheduled to take place on Thursday, August 31, 2023 at 9:30 a.m. in Casto vs.
Casto is required to be continued as it was scheduled after the Schmelzer vs. Hodges
matter.” That assertion was false because the Casto trial was scheduled on March
17 and the Schmelzer final hearing was scheduled on June 30. Although counsel
for Casto’s former mother-in-law opposed the motion, noting VanBibber’s false
statement and that Casto’s ex-wife had already arranged to travel from Florida to
attend the trial, VanBibber made no effort to correct his false statement. In his
second motion to continue the Schmelzer hearing, VanBibber correctly stated that
the Casto trial was scheduled before the Schmelzer hearing was scheduled. Both
motions were denied.
5
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
{¶ 14} Shortly after VanBibber filed the second motion for a continuance
in Casto, the guardian ad litem emailed the parties, offering to conduct a phone
conference in an effort to resolve the case. Counsel for Casto’s former mother-in-
law responded, stating that her client intended to seek full custody of the children,
and Casto’s ex-wife’s counsel responded that his client was in agreement. But
VanBibber did not respond.
{¶ 15} Later on August 30, VanBibber realized that one of the tires on his
car had low pressure. He took the car to a repair shop and was advised that he
should replace all four tires but that the shop could not obtain the appropriate tires
until the following day—when he was scheduled to appear in court in both Casto
and Schmelzer. The next day, VanBibber walked to court to attend the Schmelzer
hearing and filed a motion to appear for the Casto trial by phone or Zoom,
explaining his car troubles and stating that he did not have a “backup method of
transportation.” The motion was denied, and while all other parties were present
with their counsel, neither VanBibber nor Casto appeared for the trial. The trial
was ultimately continued until January 2, 2024.
{¶ 16} VanBibber had limited communication with counsel for the other
parties between the two trial dates. After issuing initial discovery requests to
Casto’s ex-wife and former mother-in-law, VanBibber failed to respond to inquiries
from the guardian ad litem and counsel for Casto’s former mother-in-law about the
possible resolution of the case. Although the parties were unsure of Casto’s
position on the issue of custody when they arrived at the courthouse on January 2,
they were able to settle the case without a trial.
{¶ 17} The parties stipulated and the board found by clear and convincing
evidence that VanBibber’s conduct with respect to the Casto matter violated
Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence in
representing a client), 3.3(a)(1) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly making a
false statement of fact or law to a tribunal), and 8.4(d) (prohibiting a lawyer from
6
January Term, 2026
engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice). We adopt
those findings of misconduct.
Count Two: Failure to Cooperate and False Statements to Relator
{¶ 18} On September 12, 2023, after receiving various documents from the
magistrate regarding VanBibber’s conduct in the Casto matter, relator sent a letter
inquiring about that conduct to the attorney representing VanBibber in his first
disciplinary case, which was then pending before this court. In response, counsel
informed relator that VanBibber would handle the new letter of inquiry himself.
After receiving a one-week extension, VanBibber submitted a response on
October 3.
{¶ 19} On February 13, 2024, relator requested additional information from
VanBibber about his conduct in Casto by February 27. VanBibber acknowledged
receipt of the request the next day, but on the day his response was due, he asked
for and received a two-week extension. He did not, however, provide the requested
information, and he failed to respond to an email relator sent the following week to
inquire about the status of his response to relator’s February 13 request. On April
1, relator sent VanBibber a letter documenting his failure to respond to the request,
granting him an additional week to respond, and informing him that no further
extensions would be granted. Again, VanBibber failed to respond.
{¶ 20} On April 16, after the deadline, relator called VanBibber’s office,
informing his assistant of VanBibber’s failure to cooperate with the disciplinary
investigation and seeking an explanation. Later that day, VanBibber’s assistant
sent an email responding to one of relator’s inquiries and VanBibber sent a letter
responding to other inquiries. In his letter, VanBibber falsely stated that the reason
he did not prepare a motion to continue the Casto settlement conference scheduled
for July 25, 2023, was that a member of his staff had informed him that “the Court
advised [he] would be able to appear via telephone and/or [Z]oom.” But as noted
7
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
above in the discussion of Count One, VanBibber’s assistant was informed that the
court would require a motion to appear via Zoom, which VanBibber failed to file.
{¶ 21} In June 2024, relator sent VanBibber a letter informing him that
relator had subpoenaed VanBibber’s operating-account records from his bank and
that after reviewing the records, relator had questions about some of his
transactions. Relator instructed VanBibber to provide his response answering the
questions within three weeks. After the deadline passed, VanBibber’s assistant
contacted relator to request an extension and relator gave VanBibber an additional
week to respond. VanBibber ultimately submitted an incomplete response,
claiming that the client files in question were in storage and that his bank had not
yet provided the documents that he had requested. Relator twice emailed
VanBibber to request additional information but received no further response.
{¶ 22} VanBibber was deposed on August 30, 2024, but he did not provide
any of the documents that relator had requested. Once again, VanBibber claimed
that his bank had failed to provide the records he had requested, though he was
unable to specify when he had made the request. Relator therefore offered to give
VanBibber copies of the bank records and transmitted them later that day. Having
testified during his deposition that he would respond quickly to relator’s June 2024
letter once he had the records, VanBibber never adequately responded to the letter.
{¶ 23} The parties stipulated and the board found by clear and convincing
evidence that VanBibber’s conduct with respect to relator violated Prof.Cond.R.
8.1(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly making a false statement of material
fact in connection with a disciplinary matter) and 8.1(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from
knowingly failing to respond to a demand for information by a disciplinary
authority during an investigation). We adopt these findings of misconduct.
Count Four: Sexual Advances Toward J.H.
{¶ 24} In March 2024, Joshua Miller retained VanBibber to represent him
in a child-support-modification case involving Miller’s two minor children. At that
8
January Term, 2026
time, Miller was in a relationship with J.H., who knew VanBibber from a prior
matter and had recommended him to Miller. J.H. attended the meeting where
Miller retained VanBibber, and she paid a portion of the fee. A few days later, J.H.
went to VanBibber’s office to drop off paperwork and pay the remainder of his fee.
{¶ 25} On April 9, VanBibber sent J.H. a message through the Snapchat
app, asking whether she was single. J.H. replied that she was dating Miller and
asked about VanBibber’s relationship status. VanBibber responded that he was in
a relationship and that he and his partner had recently had a baby.
{¶ 26} After they exchanged a few more messages, J.H. asked, “So just
curious, but what made you ask that question lol,” apparently referring to the
question about whether she was single. VanBibber told her, “[L]ol make our snap
delete immediately and I’ll tell ya.” After J.H. informed him that she had changed
the chat setting in the app to “delete immediately,” VanBibber responded, “I want
to fucking rail you. I want to fuck you as hard and fast as I can and I’ve wanted to
since the moment I saw you.” After they exchanged several more messages,
VanBibber texted, “[L]ol I’m really just asking if you wanna fuck meeeeeeeeeee.”
J.H. replied, “Lmao aren’t u always busy at court,” to which VanBibber responded,
“That’s not what I asked.” The conversation ended when J.H. responded with “
.”
{¶ 27} J.H. told Miller about the Snapchat messages on April 10. Miller
was very upset, but neither he nor J.H. believed that they could terminate
VanBibber’s services, because the hearing in Miller’s case was just one week away.
When J.H. confronted VanBibber about the messages a couple of days later,
VanBibber stated that he was intoxicated during the conversation but that he meant
what he had said. And on April 16, VanBibber represented Miller at his child-
support hearing.
9
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
{¶ 28} VanBibber’s Snapchat conversation with J.H. came to relator’s
attention in March 2025 in the course of an investigation of a separate grievance.
On March 11, relator sent VanBibber a letter of inquiry, enclosing screenshots of
the conversation, and requested a response by March 25. On March 13, VanBibber
acknowledged receipt of the letter and requested a copy of “the report and/or any
other related documents filed and/or provided to [relator’s] office in regard to the
[matter]” “to ensure that [he would be] able to respond completely to any and all
accusations.”
{¶ 29} Later that day, relator sent VanBibber an email informing him that
there had been no grievance filed and that the office had opened its investigation as
a “matter that came to [its] attention” within the meaning of Gov.Bar R. V(9)(C)(1)
(authorizing the Office of Disciplinary Counsel to investigate “any matter filed with
it or that comes to its attention”). Relator also stated in the email that J.H. had
provided information about her contacts with VanBibber, including the screenshots
that relator had sent with the letter of inquiry. In closing the email, relator reminded
VanBibber that his response was due on or before March 25.
{¶ 30} VanBibber did not respond to the letter of inquiry, a follow-up
request relator emailed him on March 30, or a second letter of inquiry regarding the
Snapchat conversation that relator sent him on April 8.
{¶ 31} Relator later subpoenaed VanBibber for a second deposition and
directed him to provide several documents, including his response to relator’s
letters of inquiry regarding VanBibber’s Snapchat conversation with J.H. After
learning that VanBibber was representing a client in a murder trial, relator withdrew
the subpoena as to the deposition and rescheduled the deposition. VanBibber
ultimately sat for the deposition and provided some of the requested documents,
but he never responded to relator’s letters of inquiry regarding the Snapchat
conversation.
10
January Term, 2026
{¶ 32} The parties stipulated and the board found by clear and convincing
evidence that VanBibber’s Snapchat conversation with J.H. and his failures to
respond during relator’s investigation of the conversation violated Prof.Cond.R.
8.1(b) and 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely
reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law). As this court explained in
Disciplinary Counsel v. Bricker, “[i]n order to find a violation of Prof.Cond.R.
8.4(h), there must be clear and convincing evidence that the lawyer has engaged in
misconduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law, even
though that conduct is not specifically prohibited by the rules, or there must be
proof that the conduct giving rise to a specific rule violation is so egregious as to
warrant an additional finding that it adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to
practice law.” 2013-Ohio-3998, ¶ 21.
{¶ 33} Here, the board found that VanBibber’s soliciting his client’s
significant other for sexual activity—although not expressly prohibited by the
Rules of Professional Conduct—nonetheless adversely reflects on VanBibber’s
fitness to practice law. We have previously found that an attorney violated
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) by initiating a sexual act with the mother of a client’s child
after summoning her to his office, ostensibly to discuss the client’s case. See
Disciplinary Counsel v. Carter, 2023-Ohio-3992, ¶ 9-12, 28. We have also found
that an attorney violated a corresponding disciplinary rule of the former Code of
Professional Responsibility by engaging in a sexual relationship with the spouse of
a client who was being tried on capital charges. See Disciplinary Counsel v. Owen,
2014-Ohio-4597, ¶ 2, 7, 12. On these facts and this authority, we adopt the board’s
findings that VanBibber’s Snapchat conversation with J.H. and his failures to
respond during relator’s investigation of the conversation violated Prof.Cond.R.
8.1(b) and 8.4(h).
11
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
SANCTION
{¶ 34} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions
imposed in similar cases.
{¶ 35} The parties stipulated that four aggravating factors are present in this
case: VanBibber’s prior discipline, multiple offenses, lack of cooperation in the
disciplinary process, and submission of false evidence or statements during the
disciplinary process. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(1) and (4) through (6).
{¶ 36} In addition to those factors, the board found that VanBibber had
acted with a dishonest or selfish motive by engaging in misconduct for personal
advantage—namely, taking on cases with scheduling conflicts for financial gain,
submitting false information and failing to cooperate with relator in an effort to
protect his interests, and soliciting a client’s significant other for sexual activity for
his own personal gratification. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(2). The board also found
that VanBibber had harmed vulnerable victims in two respects. See Gov.Bar R.
V(13)(B)(8). First, he failed to inform Casto that a settlement conference had been
scheduled in his case, resulting in Casto’s failure to appear for that conference and
his being ordered to pay legal fees—though VanBibber ultimately paid those fees
on Casto’s behalf. And second, VanBibber caused Casto’s ex-wife to waste time
and money by twice traveling from Florida to attend hearings that were continued
due to VanBibber’s failure to appear.
{¶ 37} Much of the misconduct at issue in this case occurred during the
pendency of VanBibber’s prior disciplinary case—which arose in part from his
providing false information to law-enforcement officers in two counties. See
VanBibber, 2024-Ohio-1702, at ¶ 12, 14. Although VanBibber was not charged
with violations of Prof.Cond.R. 8.1(a) or (b) for that misconduct as he was here, we
nonetheless found in that case that his failure to cooperate in the disciplinary
12
January Term, 2026
process and his submission of false statements during the disciplinary process
constituted aggravating factors. See id. at ¶ 25-26, 37. Moreover, VanBibber’s
failure to cooperate in the disciplinary investigation giving rise to this proceeding
continued even after we imposed a conditionally stayed two-year suspension for
his prior misconduct and ordered him to serve a two-year term of monitored
probation. See id. at ¶ 58.
{¶ 38} Although the parties did not stipulate to any mitigating factors in this
case, the board found that VanBibber had exhibited a cooperative attitude at his
disciplinary hearing. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(4). The board also found that other
penalties or sanctions had been imposed on VanBibber for his misconduct in that
he eventually paid the attorney fees occasioned by his failure to attend the Casto
settlement conference. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(6). And while recognizing that
it is not a mitigating factor, the board acknowledged VanBibber’s history of
substance abuse—as evidenced by the multiple alcohol- or drug-related offenses
that gave rise to his first disciplinary case—and commended him for having
achieved sobriety by the time of the hearing.
{¶ 39} At the conclusion of the disciplinary hearing, the panel chair
informed the parties of their opportunity to file posthearing briefs. In his brief,
relator recommended that VanBibber be suspended from the practice of law for two
years with no stay. VanBibber did not file a posthearing brief, nor had he proposed
at the hearing an appropriate sanction for his misconduct.
{¶ 40} The board began its consideration of the appropriate sanction by
noting the proposition that “an actual suspension from the practice of law is the
general sanction when an attorney engages in dishonest conduct,” Medina Cty. Bar
Assn. v. Cameron, 2011-Ohio-5200, ¶ 17. Indeed, we have held, “When an attorney
engages in a course of conduct that violates [an ethical rule prohibiting dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation], the attorney will be actually suspended from
the practice of law for an appropriate period of time.” Disciplinary Counsel v.
13
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
Fowerbaugh, 1995-Ohio-261, syllabus. Although not mentioned by the board, a
second principle is also relevant here: “[W]e have consistently held that neglect of
client matters coupled with the failure to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary
investigation warrants an indefinite suspension from the practice of law.”
Disciplinary Counsel v. Ford, 2012-Ohio-3915, ¶ 24.
{¶ 41} We have also recognized, however, that “each disciplinary case is
unique, and Gov.Bar R. V(13)(A) directs that the board consider ‘all relevant
factors’ in determining what sanction to recommend.” Disciplinary Counsel v.
Daniell, 2023-Ohio-3383, ¶ 22, quoting the rule. Accordingly, when we have
found a deviation to be warranted, we have declined to impose the presumptive
sanction of an indefinite suspension for the neglect of client matters coupled with a
failure to cooperate in the resulting disciplinary investigation. Id. For example, in
Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Paulson, we imposed the lesser sanction of a two-year
suspension when the attorney had neglected just one client’s legal matter. 2006-
Ohio-5859, ¶ 12. Similarly, we have imposed a lesser sanction when the attorney’s
misconduct, while serious, did not cause irreparable harm to any clients. See
Disciplinary Counsel v. Hallquist, 2011-Ohio-1819, ¶ 15 (imposing a two-year
suspension, with six months conditionally stayed, on an attorney who neglected
two client matters and failed to cooperate in the resulting disciplinary
investigation).
{¶ 42} We have also found an attorney’s eventual cooperation in the
disciplinary process to be a factor that can justify the imposition of a sanction less
severe than the indefinite suspension that is presumptively appropriate in cases
involving the neglect of client matters coupled with a failure to cooperate in the
resulting disciplinary investigation. See, e.g., Daniell at ¶ 21-22, 34 (imposing a
two-year suspension, with 18 months conditionally stayed, on an attorney who
neglected a single client’s legal mater, failed to reasonably communicate with the
client, failed to properly manage his client trust account, and failed to cooperate in
14
January Term, 2026
the ensuing disciplinary investigation until after the complaint was certified);
Disciplinary Counsel v. Boulger, 2000-Ohio-347, ¶ 2-3, 7 (imposing a
conditionally stayed six-month suspension on an attorney who neglected a
personal-injury matter, dismissed the case without informing his client, and failed
to respond to the relator’s letters of inquiry regarding grievances filed by four
clients).
{¶ 43} Here, VanBibber neglected just one client’s legal matter and
eventually cooperated in this disciplinary proceeding by entering into
comprehensive stipulations of fact and misconduct and accepting responsibility for
his misconduct when testifying at his disciplinary hearing. Those facts are
sufficient to warrant a deviation from the presumptive sanction of an indefinite
suspension.
{¶ 44} The board recommends that we suspend VanBibber from the
practice of law for two years with no stay and that we require him to pay the costs
of these disciplinary proceedings. In support of its recommendation, the board
relies primarily on three cases in which we imposed sanctions ranging from a six-
month suspension to a two-year suspension with 18 months conditionally stayed on
attorneys who, like VanBibber, made false statements to a tribunal: Disciplinary
Counsel v. Rohrer, 2009-Ohio-5930, Toledo Bar Assn. v. DeMarco, 2015-Ohio-
4549, and Disciplinary Counsel v. Walden, 2019-Ohio-5287.
{¶ 45} In Rohrer, the attorney directed a staff member to deliver a copy of
a motion filed in a client’s case to a local newspaper, in violation of a verbal order
of the trial court prohibiting counsel from discussing the case with the media.
Rohrer at ¶ 8-10. During a subsequent hearing on the motion, Rohrer falsely told
the court that his staff had misconstrued his instructions and had leaked the
information to the media. Id. at ¶ 12-16. After firing his assistant for purportedly
divulging confidential information, Rohrer wrote a misleading letter to the
15
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
unemployment-compensation bureau, again suggesting that his assistant had been
responsible for the leak. Id. at ¶ 19, 22.
{¶ 46} We found that Rohrer’s deliberate disobedience of a court order and
his false statements to the judge and the unemployment-compensation bureau
violated three of the six ethics rules at issue in this case: Prof.Cond.R. 3.3(a)(1),
8.4(d), and 8.4(h). See id. at ¶ 3, 34. But we also found that Rohrer’s conduct
violated Prof.Cond.R. 3.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly disobeying an
obligation under the rules of a tribunal) and 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from
engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). Id.
at ¶ 3, 34. As aggravating factors, we found that like VanBibber, Rohrer had
committed multiple offenses and exhibited a selfish motive. See id. at ¶ 34, 36, 38.
Though Rohrer also failed to show remorse for his conduct, id. at ¶ 40, there was
no finding of a failure to cooperate in the disciplinary investigation, as there was in
this case. We found four mitigating factors: a clean disciplinary record, a
cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, the imposition of other
sanctions for the misconduct, and the submission of evidence of good character and
reputation, id. at ¶ 32—the second and third of which are also present in this case.
We suspended Rohrer from the practice of law for six months. Id. at ¶ 54.
{¶ 47} In DeMarco, the attorney repeatedly represented to the court that he
had never received certain discovery materials when, in fact, he had possession of
the materials at one time. 2015-Ohio-4549, ¶ 3-6. During a court proceeding, a
witness truthfully testified that he had given the materials to DeMarco and
DeMarco responded by threatening to take the witness “outside.” Id. at ¶ 5-6, 14.
We found that DeMarco’s conduct violated one of the six ethics rules at issue in
this case—Prof.Cond.R. 3.3(a)(1)—and also Prof.Cond.R. 3.3(a)(3) (prohibiting a
lawyer from offering evidence that the lawyer knows to be false) and 8.4(c). Id. at
¶ 7.
16
January Term, 2026
{¶ 48} Just one aggravating factor was present in DeMarco: a dishonest
motive. Id. at ¶ 9. As for mitigation, we found that DeMarco had exhibited a
cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings and—in contrast to
VanBibber—that DeMarco had no prior discipline and had presented evidence of
his good character and reputation. See id. Recognizing that an actual suspension
is especially appropriate when an attorney has made repeated and material false
statements to a court, we suspended DeMarco for one year with six months
conditionally stayed. Id. at ¶ 12, 15-16.
{¶ 49} And in Walden, 2019-Ohio-5287, the attorney neglected three client
matters, failed to comply with court orders in one case and made false statements
to the court in another, and failed to cooperate in the resulting disciplinary
investigations. Id. at ¶ 6-10. We found that Walden’s conduct violated four of the
six rules at issue in this case—Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 3.3(a)(1), 8.1(b), and 8.4(d)—and
that his lack of communication with his clients violated two additional rules. See
id. at ¶ 11-12.
{¶ 50} In Walden, we found the existence of three aggravating factors that
are present in this case: a history of prior discipline, multiple offenses, and a failure
to cooperate in the disciplinary process. See id. at ¶ 1, 15 (noting that Walden’s
previous sanction consisted of a one-day suspension for failing to timely register as
an attorney). Although Walden had also engaged in a pattern of misconduct, we
did not find that he had caused harm to vulnerable victims, id. at ¶ 15, as VanBibber
did here. As for mitigating factors, we found in Walden the absence of a dishonest
or selfish motive, full cooperation in the disciplinary proceeding after relator filed
a notice of intent to file a formal complaint, and the submission of evidence of good
character and reputation in the community, see id.; in contrast, VanBibber’s selfish
motive was an aggravating factor in this case. We suspended Walden from the
practice of law for two years with 18 months stayed on the condition that he commit
17
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
no further misconduct, and we placed additional conditions on his reinstatement
related to his mental health. Id. at ¶ 16, 22.
{¶ 51} In addition to the false statements to a tribunal that were at issue in
Rohrer, DeMarco, and Walden, VanBibber violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h) by making
inappropriate sexual advances toward a client’s significant other. Therefore, the
board also considered Disciplinary Counsel v. Bunstine, 2013-Ohio-3681. During
a meeting held in his office less than a week before the hearing in a client’s child-
custody matter, Bunstine solicited the client for sexual activity in lieu of payment
for his legal services, suggesting that she “get rid of her fiancé, find a babysitter for
her two children, and answer her door naked.” Id. at ¶ 10. Soon after the meeting,
Bunstine drove 35 minutes to the client’s home, but he left after he was confronted
by her fiancé and her fiancé’s father. Id. at ¶ 11-12. There is no evidence in this
case that VanBibber took any similar action in furtherance of the sexual advances
toward J.H. that he electronically communicated.
{¶ 52} We found that Bunstine violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h)—as
VanBibber did—but also Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j) (prohibiting a lawyer from soliciting
or engaging in sexual activity with a client unless a consensual sexual relationship
existed when the client-lawyer relationship commenced). See id. at ¶ 25. No
mitigating factors were present in Bunstine, id. at ¶ 29—compared to the two
mitigating factors present here. And just three of the six aggravating factors present
in this case were present in Bunstine: prior discipline, a selfish motive, and harm
caused to a vulnerable client. See id. at ¶ 28. After considering the sanctions we
had imposed on other attorneys who made sexual advances toward or engaged in a
sexual relationship with a client, we suspended Bunstine from the practice of law
for one year with six months conditionally stayed. Id. at ¶ 32-34.
{¶ 53} In contrast to Bunstine’s sexual advances, VanBibber’s were
directed not at a client but at a client’s significant other. As noted above, we have
twice disciplined attorneys who engaged in inappropriate sexual conduct with the
18
January Term, 2026
significant other or spouse of a client. In Carter, we imposed a two-year
suspension, with one year conditionally stayed, on an attorney who lured a client’s
child’s mother to the attorney’s office under the false pretense of discussing the
client’s case and then coerced the mother into engaging in a sexual act to “reward”
the attorney for representing the client. 2023-Ohio-3992 at ¶ 42. And in Owen, we
imposed the same sanction on an attorney who engaged in a sexual relationship
with the spouse of a client charged with aggravated murder with death-penalty
specifications and other criminal offenses. 2014-Ohio-4597 at ¶ 35. We find,
however, that VanBibber’s misconduct toward his client’s significant other did not
rise to the level of the misconduct at issue in Carter or Owen, because VanBibber’s
misconduct was limited to electronically communicated sexual advances and did
not include any inappropriate physical contact.
{¶ 54} In the cases discussed above, we imposed term suspensions ranging
from six months with no stay in Rohrer, to one year with six months stayed in
DeMarco and Bunstine, to two years with 18 months stayed in Walden, to two years
with one year stayed in Carter and Owen. But the combination of VanBibber’s
multiple violations—which include the neglect of a client’s legal matter, making
false statements to a tribunal and to relator, and inappropriate sexual advances
toward his client’s significant other—exceeds the misconduct at issue in each of
those cases. VanBibber’s misconduct is made worse by the facts that nearly all of
it occurred while his prior disciplinary case was pending and that his failure to
cooperate with relator continued even after we imposed a conditionally stayed two-
year suspension in that case.
{¶ 55} On these facts, we conclude that the actual two-year suspension
recommended by the board is the appropriate sanction for VanBibber’s misconduct
in this case.
19
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
CONCLUSION
{¶ 56} Accordingly, Jack Herchel VanBibber is hereby suspended from the
practice of law in Ohio for two years. Costs are taxed to VanBibber.
Judgment accordingly.
__________________
Joseph M. Caligiuri, Disciplinary Counsel, and Karen H. Osmond, Assistant
Disciplinary Counsel, and Susan M. Hard, for relator.
Jack H. VanBibber, pro se.
________________________
20