Roma

United States District Court

Eastern District of New York

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YVETTE ROMA,

Plaintiff,

ORDER

- against - No. 23-cv-4072 (KAM)

DAVID CARMILI, PHYSICIAN, P.C.,

DAVID CARMILI,

Defendants.

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Kiyo A. Matsumoto, United States District Judge:

Pending before the Court is a motion for attorney’s fees and

costs filed by plaintiff Yvette Roma (“Plaintiff”) following

Plaintiff’s acceptance of Defendants’ offer of judgment pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 to resolve her employment-

related claims against her previous employer, David Carmili,

Physician, P.C., and its principal David Carmili (together

“Defendants”). (See ECF No. 61.1) Plaintiff’s acceptance of

Defendants’ offer of judgment resolved all of Plaintiff’s claims

under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and New York Labor Law

(“NYLL”) for a judgment amount of $30,818, exclusive of fees and

costs.2 (ECF No. 58.) The Clerk of Court entered a final judgment

1 Pincites herein refer to the page numbers in the banner generated by CM/ECF.

2 Acceptances of offers of judgment under Rule 68(a) are not subject to judicial

review under Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, Inc., 796 F.3d 199 (2d Cir.

in the amount of $30,818 as to Plaintiff’s claims on June 30, 2025.

(ECF No. 60.)

The only remaining issue in this action is determination of

a reasonable fees and costs award to Plaintiff’s counsel.3 This

order is therefore limited to the scope of issues necessary to

resolve the instant motion, and the Court assumes familiarity with

the background of this action.4 For the reasons explained below,

the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s counsel fees in the amount of

$17,669.60 and costs in the amount of $2,356.85.

LEGAL STANDARDS

The Supreme Court has instructed that, in the interest of

judicial economy, “[t]he essential goal in shifting fees (to either

party) is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection.”

Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826 (2011). “[The] trial court has wide

discretion,” and “[t]he determination of fees should not result in

a second major litigation.” Id. (internal quotations omitted);

see also Millea v. Metro-North Railroad Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d

Cir. 2011) (noting district courts’ discretion in awarding fees).

2015). See Mei Xing Yu v. Hasaki Rest., Inc., 944 F.3d 395, 412 (2d Cir. 2019)

(“Cheeks should not be extended to apply to Rule 68(a) offers of judgment.”)

3 “Both the FLSA and [NYLL] allow for an award of reasonable attorney's fees.”

Santillan v. Henao, 822 F. Supp. 2d 284, 299 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (internal

quotations omitted). Defendants do not dispute the Court’s authority to grant

fees and costs to Plaintiff’s counsel.

4 The Court’s December 18, 2024 Memorandum and Order granting in part and denying

in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss reviews at length the background of this

action. See Roma v. David Carmili, Physician, P.C., 761 F. Supp. 3d 481

(E.D.N.Y. 2024).

Courts have historically applied two methods to analyze the

reasonableness of attorney’s fees in FLSA cases: (i) the lodestar

method, and (ii) the percentage-of-recovery method. “Both [the

Second Circuit] and the Supreme Court have held that the lodestar

— the product of a reasonable hourly rate and the reasonable number

of hours required by the case — creates a presumptively reasonable

fee.” Millea, 658 F.3d at 166 (internal quotations omitted). The

Second Circuit has instructed that the second method — a

percentage-of-recovery or proportionality analysis – “may be

relevant” only “in some cases.” Fisher v. SD Prot. Inc., 948 F.3d

593, 603 (2d Cir. 2020) (emphasis added). Furthermore, the Court

must consider the “degree of success obtained” as “the most

critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award.”

Fisher, 948 F.3d at 606 (internal quotations omitted).

I. The Lodestar Method

A. Reasonable Hourly Rate

A reasonable hourly rate is the first of two figures required

to calculate the appropriate lodestar figure. “[C]onsiderations

concerning the quality of a prevailing party's counsel's

representation normally are reflected in the reasonable hourly

rate used to calculate the lodestar initially.” Millea, 658 F.3d

at 168 (internal quotations omitted). “[T]he burden is on the fee

applicant to produce satisfactory evidence — in addition to the

attorney's own affidavits — that the requested rates are in line

with those prevailing in the community for similar services by

lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and

reputation.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984). “The

presumptively reasonable fee boils down to what a reasonable,

paying client would be willing to pay, given that such a party

wishes to spend the minimum necessary to litigate the case

effectively.” Simmons v. New York City Transit Auth., 575 F.3d

170, 174 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted).

B. Reasonable Hours

A reasonable number of hours worked is the second of two

figures required to calculate the appropriate lodestar figure.

“In determining how much attorney time should be compensated, the

court initially looks to the amount of time spent on each category

of tasks, as reflected in contemporaneous time records.” Gonzalez

v. Scalinatella, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 3d 5, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). “In

calculating reasonable hours, the essential consideration is

whether a reasonable attorney would have expended similar hours in

pursuit of the case.” Id. “If the court finds that some of the

time spent was not reasonably necessary to the outcome, it should

reduce the time for which compensation is awarded.” Id. “In

reducing a claim for time spent, the court may use a percentage

deduction as a practical means of trimming fat from a fee

application.” Id. at 30 (internal quotations omitted).

II. Limitations on Lodestar Adjustments

“A district court may adjust the lodestar when it does not

adequately take into account a factor that may properly be

considered in determining a reasonable fee.” Millea, 658 F.3d at

167 (internal quotations omitted). As discussed below, however,

the Second Circuit in Millea curtailed the discretion of judges to

make adjustments after the appropriate, presumptively reasonable

lodestar figure is calculated.

After the appropriate lodestar figure is calculated, “[a]

district court may adjust the lodestar when it does not adequately

take into account a factor that may properly be considered in

determining a reasonable fee,” but “such adjustments are

appropriate only in rare circumstances, because the lodestar

figure already includes most, if not all, of the relevant factors

constituting a reasonable attorney's fee.” Id. (citation

modified). Millea identified several impermissible lodestar

adjustments that courts must be careful to avoid. Specifically,

courts generally may not adjust the lodestar based on: (1) “the

novelty and complexity of a case ... because they are already

included in the lodestar calculation itself, being fully reflected

in the number of billable hours recorded by counsel”; (2) the

“public policy significance” of claims in a case; (3) time “spent

on claims wholly ineligible for fee-shifting”; (4) a finding that

the plaintiff’s success on a nonfrivolous claim was de minimis;

(5) “the quality of an attorney's performance” “because

considerations concerning the quality of a prevailing party's

counsel's representation normally are reflected in the reasonable

hourly rate used to calculate the lodestar initially.” Id. at

167-68 (internal quotations omitted). Instead of adjusting the

lodestar amount after it is calculated, the Second Circuit

instructs that generally “such adjustments should be made when

calculating the original lodestar figure.” Id. at 168.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff’s counsel seeks $43,385 in fees and $2,356.85 in

costs. (ECF No. 61 at 2.) Each is analyzed in turn.

I. Attorney’s Fees

The amount of fees Plaintiff’s counsel seeks significantly

exceeds Plaintiff’s recovery of $30,818 and would constitute

approximately 58.46% of the total recovery, exclusive of costs.

This disproportionality, however, is not a standalone basis to

reduce fees. Given that “the reasonableness of the fees does not

turn on any explicit percentage cap,” and “a fee may not be reduced

merely because the fee would be disproportionate to the financial

interest at stake in the litigation,”5 the Court will follow the

5 For example, in Fisher, the Second Circuit held that attorney’s fees and costs

of 92% of total recovery ($23,000 out of a total recovery of $25,000) was not

per se unreasonable. See Fisher, 948 F.3d at 606 (“While the original proposed

split of $23,000 to LLG and $2,000 to Fisher understandably gave the district

court pause, the reasonableness of the fees does not turn on any explicit

percentage cap.”)

presumptively reasonable lodestar figure. Fisher, 948 F.3d at

604, 606.

A. Reasonable Hourly Rates

“[T]he burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory

evidence — in addition to the attorney's own affidavits — that the

requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community

for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill,

experience and reputation.” Blum, 465 U.S. at 895 n.11. “Courts

in the Eastern District of New York have recently awarded hourly

rates from $70 to $100 for legal support, $100 to $200 for junior

associates, $200 to $325 for senior associates, and $300 to $450

for partners in FLSA cases.” Rodriguez v. MRC Bakery Corp., 802

F. Supp. 3d 393, 432 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (internal quotations omitted).

Given that Plaintiff’s counsel concedes that “Plaintiff recovered

approximately 15% of the damages sought,” (ECF No. 65 at 4),

Plaintiff’s limited degree of success supports an hourly rate at

the low end of the typical range for employment law attorneys in

this district.6

Accounting for the prevailing rates in this district as

described in Rodriguez and Plaintiff’s limited success in this

6 Moreover, the conduct of Plaintiff’s counsel was suboptimal and supports lower

hourly rates. For example, on June 14, 2024, the Court needed to warn

Plaintiff’s counsel of the possibility of monetary sanctions for “additional

violations of court orders.” See June 14, 2024 Docket Order (“Plaintiff's

counsel is warned that additional violations of court orders may result in

monetary sanctions.”)

action, the Court adjusts the hourly rate for Plaintiff’s counsel

as follows: The hourly rate for Roman Avshalumov, Esq., a senior

managing attorney with 15 years of experience, (see ECF No. 61-2

at 11), is reduced from $500 to $300. The hourly rate for James

O’Donnell, Esq., a managing attorney with nine years of experience,

(see ECF No. 61-2 at 2), is reduced from $400 to $300. The hourly

rate for Katelyn Schillaci, Esq., a junior associate with two years

of experience, (see ECF No. 61-2 at 5), is reduced from $250 to

$100. The hourly rate for Avraham Scher, Esq., a junior associate

no longer employed at the firm representing Plaintiff, (ECF No.

61-4), is reduced from $175 to $100. The hourly rate for Zubair

Tahir, Esq., a junior associate no longer employed at the firm

representing Plaintiff, (id.), is reduced from $175 to $100. The

hourly rate for paralegals is reduced from $100 to $70.

B. Reasonable Hours

Upon reviewing the billing entries provided by Plaintiff’s

counsel, (ECF No. 61-1), the Court identifies a number of duplicate

entries in which two attorneys participated in meetings and tasks

that likely required the services of only one attorney. For

example, Mr. Avshalumov’s June 1, 2023 billing entry is identical

to Mr. O’Donnell’s billing entry. Each billed 1.8 hours with the

following entry: “Meet w/ client, review / edit / finalize

complaint, file complaint / summons / cover sheet, NOA.” (ECF No.

61-1 at 1.) In another example, three different attorneys billed

for 30 minutes to review a two-page offer of judgment. (ECF No.

61-1 at 3.) Throughout the billing records, the Court identifies

numerous examples of identical entries for work that appears

duplicative and redundant. (See ECF No. 61-1.)

This Court joins other courts in finding that “[i]n lieu of

making minute adjustments to individual timekeeping entries, a

court may make across-the-board percentage cuts in the number of

hours claimed, as a practical means of trimming fat from a fee

application.” Lee v. Mani & Pedi Inc., No. 20-cv-10787 (JCM),

2022 WL 3645118, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2022) (collecting cases)

(internal quotations omitted). “To determine the percentage

deduction, a district court need not serve as a green-eyeshade

accountant, but may take into account its overall sense of a suit,

and may use estimates in calculating and allocating an attorney's

time.” Jianmin Jin v. Shanghai Original, Inc., No. 16-cv-5633

(ARR) (JO), 2020 WL 4783399, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2020)

(citation modified). Moreover, the affirmation of Defendants’

counsel, Terry Heidecker, Esq., identifies numerous instances of

Plaintiff’s attorneys’ conduct that prolonged the litigation.

(ECF No. 62 ¶¶ 17-25.) For example, Plaintiff’s counsel requested

repeated opportunities to file an amended and second amended

complaint but failed to delete unviable FLSA and NYLL claims. (Id.

¶¶ 12, 16, 19, 24.) The repeated issues and delays in Plaintiff’s

filings resulted in the Court warning Plaintiff’s counsel “that

additional violations of court orders may result in monetary

sanctions.” See June 14, 2024 Docket Order.

Balancing the Plaintiff’s ultimately successful recovery

against numerous examples of duplicative work by Plaintiff’s

attorneys, the Court reduces the total hours billed by 20% “as a

practical means of trimming fat.” Lee, 2022 WL 3645118, at *13.

Applying the aforementioned calculations for reasonable hourly

rates and reasonable hours expended results in a reasonable

lodestar figure of $17,669.60 for attorney’s fees:

Reasonable

Reasonable

Hours Expended

Timekeeper Hourly Total

(after 20%

Rate

reduction)

Roman Avshalumov $300 35.92 $10,776

James O’Donnell $300 6.56 $1,968

Katelyn Schillaci $100 11.12 $1,112

Avraham Scher $100 28.24 $2,824

Zubair Tahir $100 1.44 $144

Paralegals $70 12.08 $845.60

Lodestar $17,669.60

II. Costs

The costs submitted by Plaintiff’s counsel, totaling

$2,356.85, are appropriate and consist of expected costs such as

filing fees, costs of attempted service, and transcript fees.’

(ECF No. 61-1 at 3.)

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s

counsel fees in the amount of $17,669.60 and costs in the amount

of $2,356.85.

So ordered.

ba \), -~

Dated: February 10, 2026 “) 4 9 ws tee

Brooklyn, New York Kiyo A. Matsumoto

United States District Judge

Eastern District of New York

’ Defendants’ opposition brief, (ECF No. 63), advances no specific argument

against the award of requested costs.

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