Coleman

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

JASON COLEMAN,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 3:25-cv-00833

v.

Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr.

WES GOLDEN, et al., Magistrate Judge Luke A. Evans

Defendants.

To: The Honorable Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr., District Judge

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

This action has been referred to the Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A)

and (B) to dispose or recommend disposition of any pretrial motions. (Doc. No. 21.) Before the

Court are Daniel, Davis, Golden, and Poland’s (hereinafter referred to as “Defendants”) motion to

dismiss Plaintiff’s (“Coleman”) amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state claims on which relief may be granted (Doc. No. 28.) For

the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that Defendants’ motion to dismiss be

granted and Coleman’s amended complaint (Doc. No. 27) be dismissed without prejudice to

refiling.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

This civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arises out of pro se Plaintiff Jason

Coleman’s jail credit calculation for time served in Montgomery County, Tennessee, Dickson

County, Tennessee, and Williamson County, Tennessee, jails. (Doc. No. 27.) Coleman’s amended

complaint asserts false imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims against the following

Montgomery County Defendants in their official capacities: J. Daniel, a Corporal with the Sheriff’s

Department; Circuit Court Clerk Wendy J. Davis; Mayor Wes Golden; General Sessions Judge

Reid Poland, and Probation Officer Latisha M. Johnson.1 (Id.) Coleman’s factual allegations stem

from an August 30, 2020 arrest for driving under the influence (“DUI”) and driving on a revoked

license. (Doc. No. 29-1.) Pursuant to Coleman’s guilty plea, he was sentenced to serve eleven

months and twenty-nine days in the Dickson County Jail, all of which was suspended except for

two days. (Doc. No. 29-2.) Coleman was also fined $350.00, required to complete a DUI or

Mothers Against Drunk Driving (“MADD”) course, required to have an interlock device installed

in his vehicle, and he was placed under supervised probation for the remainder of his sentence.

(Id.)

On April 13, 2022, Coleman was issued his first probation violation for failing to complete

the two days of outstanding jail time ordered under his plea agreement. (Doc. No. 29-3.) In

September 2022, Coleman was arrested and charged with his second DUI, though the charge was

later amended to “DUI 1st” and he was sentenced to serve forty-five days in the Montgomery

County Jail over consecutive weekends. (Doc. Nos. 29-4, 29-5, 29-6.) On October 13, 2022,

Defendant Johnson petitioned the General Sessions Court for Montgomery County, Tennessee, for

the revocation of Coleman’s suspended sentence and ordering Coleman to serve the entirety of his

sentence as initially rendered. (Doc. No. 29-7.)

Coleman asserts that he was deprived of jail credit from his time served on “related

proceedings” when serving his Montgomery County sentence for DUI and violation of probation.

1 A summons issued for Latisha M. Johnson on January 30, 2026 (Doc. No. 30); however,

she has not been served.

(Doc. No. 27.) Coleman claims without any factual support that the prosecution against him

“terminated without a conviction.” (Id. at 4.)

B. Procedural History

Coleman filed his initial complaint on July 23, 2025. (Doc. No. 1.) Defendants answered.

(Doc. No. 12.) Several days later, they filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc No. 13.) Coleman sought

leave to amend his complaint (Doc. No. 15) and the Defendants opposed the motion (Doc. No. 16).

The Court terminated Defendants’ motion to dismiss as untimely and granted Coleman leave to

file an amended complaint. (Doc. No. 26.) On January 16, 2026, Coleman filed his amended

complaint which states as follows:

On or around February 6, 2024, Plaintiff was taken into custody by

Montgomery County law enforcement and assigned to Cell #6-10U,

Individual #70099, pursuant to Case No. 6522-CR-11143, which included

charges for DUI and PTR-DUI (probation violation).

Plaintiff was sentenced to:

45 days for DUI; and

364 days for PTR-DUI under the same case number, which were imposed

to run consecutively, resulting in a total sentence of 364 flat days, as

recorded by Corporal J. Daniel on February 7, 2024.

Despite having previously served six months of incarceration in Williamson

and Dickson Counties for related proceedings, only 22 days of jail credit

were applied to his Montgomery County sentence.

Jail policy, as outlined in the sentencing form, explicitly denies credit for

prior time served unless ordered anew by the court—effectively

disregarding constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection.

The judgment form outlined punitive conditions: any refusal, termination,

or lockdown negates credit eligibility and enforces 100% sentence service.

Plaintiff’s prior time served, legal motions, and multiple filings—including

requests for sentence adjustments and jail credit—were ignored without

hearing or merit-based review by Defendants.

Ultimately, the prosecution against Plaintiff terminated without a

conviction, satisfying the “favorable termination” standard under

Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. ___ (2022).

As a direct result of these actions, Plaintiff suffered:

Loss of liberty

• Emotional and psychological distress

• Financial harm, including burdensome fees totaling over $30,891.50; and

• Impacts to reputation and civil standing.

(Doc. No. 27 at 3–4.) Coleman did not attach any documents related to the earlier criminal

proceedings to his amended complaint. Defendants filed another motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 28)

and attached the relevant pleadings from the earlier criminal proceedings to their supporting

memorandum (Doc. No. 29–29-12). Coleman responded (Doc. No. 31), and the Defendants

replied (Doc. No. 32). Coleman also filed a sur-reply (Doc. No. 33), but he did so without leave

of the Court. Courts have the discretion to consider sur-replies filed by pro se litigants. Washington

v. Riverview Hotel, Inc., Case No. 3:19-cv-00097, 2020 WL 12990974, at *2 n.1 (M.D. Tenn. May

14, 2020). The Court will exercise that discretion, but, moving forward, Coleman is advised that,

if he seeks to file a sur-reply, he must first file a motion requesting leave to do so and explain the

basis for his request. See Dowell v. Zinke, No. 3:19-cv-105, 2019 WL 1768871, at *1 n.1 (M.D.

Tenn. Apr. 1, 2019) (considering pro se plaintiff’s sur-reply given her pro se status), report and

recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 1768161 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 22, 2019). This matter is ripe

for decision.

II. Legal Standard

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court

must “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all well-pleaded

factual allegations in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

plaintiff.” Courtright v. City of Battle Creek, 839 F.3d 513, 518 (6th Cir. 2016). Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the

claim[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However, “[t]he factual allegations in the complaint need to be

sufficient to give notice to the defendant as to what claims are alleged, and the plaintiff must plead

‘sufficient factual matter’ to render the legal claim plausible, i.e., more than merely possible.” Fritz

v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more

than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). A plaintiff must plead more than “‘labels

and conclusions[,]’” “‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action[,]’” or “‘naked

assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (third alteration in original) (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id.

Because Coleman appears pro se, the Court construes his filings “‘liberally’” and holds his

complaint “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]’” Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). “However,

this lenient treatment has limits.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976 (6th Cir. 2012).

“[C]ourts are not required to conjure up unpleaded allegations or guess at the nature of an

argument.” Brown v. Cracker Barrel Rest., 22 F. App’x 577, 578 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Wells v.

Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)). “To command otherwise would require the Court to

explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff, [and] would also transform the

district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the

strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.” Miles v. Kennington, No. 3:17-

CV-P514, 2017 WL 5988352, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 1, 2017) (internal quotations omitted)

III. Analysis

Defendants argue that Coleman has failed to plausibly plead claims of false imprisonment

and malicious prosecution and his suit should be dismissed as a matter of law. (Doc. No. 29.) In

opposing Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Coleman argues that he has met his burden at this stage

by pleading allegations that, accepted as true, plausibly state claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc.

No. 31.) The Court reiterates that, while Coleman’s amended complaint is viewed in the light most

favorable to him and his well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true, that principle has its

limits and “[t]he liberal treatment of pro se pleadings does not require lenient treatment of

substantive law.” Johnson v. Stewart, No. 08-1521, 2010 WL 8738105, at *3 (6th Cir. May 5,

2010)

As a threshold matter, the Court must determine whether Defendants’ motion is properly

considered as one to dismiss Coleman’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) or as a motion for summary

judgment under Rule 56. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d) provides that, “[i]f, on a motion

under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by

the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(d). Defendants appended to their memorandum in support of their motion to dismiss state

court records showing Coleman’s guilty plea to DUI-1st, the terms of his sentence, and probation’s

subsequent filings with state courts that Coleman violated the terms of his probation. (Doc.

Nos. 29-1–29-12.)

Coleman argues that “Defendants’ reliance on extrinsic records is procedurally improper”

because they “rely extensively on attached criminal records and invite the Court to reject Plaintiff’s

allegations in favor of Defendants’ interpretation” of the records to which he himself refers in his

amended complaint. (Doc. No. 31 at 3.) Citing no supporting authorities, Coleman further argues

that, where “the meaning accuracy, and completeness of the records Defendants rely upon” are

purportedly “central disputed issues” then dismissal would be “inconsistent with Rule 12 and this

Court’s precedent.” (Id. at 4.) Here, Coleman’s amended complaint relies heavily, even if

indirectly, on these state court documents. Although he does not attach or otherwise cite to the

documents that Defendants later appended to their memorandum, he cites to his sentence, jail

credits and jail policy related thereto, and “prior time served, legal motions, and multiple filings”

in supporting his claims. (Doc. No. 27.) Coleman’s reliance on these very same documents is

sufficient reason for the court to consider the information without converting Defendants’ motion

to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment.

As is relevant here, the Court may also consider documents from state court proceedings

in deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) without converting that motion into one for summary

judgment. See Plassman v. City of Wauseon, 85 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that review of

state-court proceedings during a motion to dismiss was permitted and noting that “any federal

court may take judicial notice of the proceedings in other courts of record”) (citation omitted). See

also Jones v. City of Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555, 562 (6th Cir. 2008) (“A court may consider public

records without converting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 motion.” (citing Jackson v. City

of Columbus, 194 F.3d 737, 745 (6th Cir. 1999))). Doing so is the more efficient path to follow in

this case, and the Court will proceed under Rule 12.

A. False Imprisonment2

As set forth in his amended complaint, Coleman alleges that Defendants violated his rights

under the Fourth Amendment because his incarceration “lacked lawful justification” and “was not

2 Although Coleman pleaded a claim of false imprisonment in his operative complaint, he

appears to argue for the first time in his response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss for a claim of

supported by valid legal process” which “caused [Coleman] to be unlawfully detained and

deprived of liberty.” (Doc. No. 27 at 5.) To successfully prosecute a claim of false imprisonment,

the plaintiff must prove “(1) the detention or restraint of one against his will and (2) the

unlawfulness of such detention or restraint.” Coffee v. Peterbilt of Nashville, Inc., 795 S.W.2d 656,

659 (Tenn. 1990). False imprisonment is the intentional restraint or detention of another without

just cause and “[l]ike the tort of malicious prosecution, false imprisonment requires that the

defendant must have acted without probable cause.” Brown v. SCOA Industries, Inc., 741 S.W.2d

916, 919–20 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (internal citations omitted).

In arguing that dismissal is warranted, Defendants raises multiple arguments. First,

Defendants state that, where Coleman seeks jail credits from time served in Williamson County

and Dickson County, he seeks to “double dip” for credits from periods of continuous confinement

for wholly separate and unrelated charges. (Doc. No. 29.) Alternatively, Defendants argue that his

false imprisonment claim is time-barred. (Id.) Defendants also argue that their motion to dismiss

should be granted because, in part, § 1983 is an inappropriate vehicle for relief where a plaintiff

seeks a reduction in the length of his actual confinement. In response, Coleman seemingly

abandons his argument for false imprisonment, instead concluding his response brief by that

stating he relies, in part, on the legal principle that “[o]ver-detention violates the Fourteenth

Amendment[.]” (Doc. No. 31 at 6.)

“unlawful over-detention” under the Fourteenth Amendment that entails different elements than

the false imprisonment and malicious prosecution claims in his amended complaint. (Doc. No. 31.)

“Generally, a plaintiff may not amend his complaint by adding factual allegations as a part of a

response in opposition to a motion to dismiss.” Becton v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. 3:16–2282, 2017

WL 1461632, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 28, 2017). See also Orea Energy Group, LLC v. E. Tenn.

Consultants, Inc., No. 3:09–CV–041, 2009 WL 3246853 at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 6, 2009) (“[T]hese

allegations are nowhere to be found in the complaint. They are present only in plaintiff’s briefing,

and it is a basic principle that the complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a

motion to dismiss.”).

The Court finds that Defendants’ latter argument carries weight and that Coleman’s false

imprisonment claim should be dismissed because the relief sought may not be granted via a § 1983

claim. Defendants cite a recent case from this Court that explained, in relevant part, that, when

applying the Supreme Court’s expansive precedent on the issue of an incarcerated individual’s

length of imprisonment, the plaintiff there was requited to

seek relief through habeas corpus, even though he seeks compensatory and punitive

damages (and not release from confinement). His claims for damages are premised

upon the assumption that Plaintiff has been incarcerated months longer than he

should have been. Success on his claims for damages based on a corrected

calculation of his “jail credits” would necessarily “imply the unlawfulness of the

State’s custody,” Wilkinson [v. Dotson], 544 U.S. [74,] 81 [2005], require a

recalculation of his release eligibility date, and shorten his total sentence by a

specific number of days. The Court therefore finds, despite Plaintiff's claims for

damages only, the relief in this case must be sought under the habeas corpus

statutes.

(Doc. No. 29 at 191) (footnotes omitted). Coleman argues that Defendants’ reliance on the Court’s

reasoning in Scott v. City of Lebanon, Tennessee, No. 3:25-CV-00234, 2025 WL 1738667 (M.D.

Tenn. June 20, 2025), is misplaced because he is not seeking an immediate release from custody,

a recalculation of his sentence, or prospective confinement relief. (Doc. No. 31.) Instead, he seeks

“retrospective damages” for “time already served[.]” (Id. at 4.)

Here, however, Coleman’s argument still fails. For example, a sister court in the Sixth

Circuit examined a similar claim where the plaintiff challenged the duration of his confinement

after he had been released from state jail and sought damages “for the ‘99 days’ he was unable to”

pursue employment as a result of his alleged “false imprisonment.” Winn v. Cuyahoga Cnty.

Sheriff, No. 1:14-cv-0249, 2014 WL 4662082, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sep. 16, 2014). There, the Court

found that, even construing the pro se plaintiff’s pleadings liberally, “[a]ny pleading filed after his

release from prison which challenges the length of his confinement, does not encompass a federal

issue over which this Court has jurisdiction.” Id. at *4. More pointedly, the Court explained that

“[w]henever a prisoner challenges the ‘legality or duration’ of his confinement, that claim must be

raised in a habeas corpus proceeding.” Id. at *3 (emphasis added).

Without deciding the merits of any of the Defendants’ alternative arguments, the Court

finds that the relief Coleman seeks cannot be decided at this stage because his false imprisonment

claim is one that must be addressed through a habeas corpus proceeding. Accordingly, the

Defendants’ motion should be granted as to this claim.

B. Malicious Prosecution

Similarly alleging a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, Coleman brings one count

of malicious prosecution and argues that “Defendants initiated and sustained criminal

prosecution . . . without probable cause and with malice[ ]” and that those proceedings “concluded

in [Coleman’s] favor and caused extensive deprivation of liberty and collateral harm.” (Doc.

No. 27 at 5.) As this Court has written,

To prove a claim of malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff

must prove four elements: (1) “a criminal prosecution was initiated against the

plaintiff and [ ] the defendant made, influenced, or participated in the decision to

prosecute;” (2) there “was a lack of probable cause for the criminal prosecution;”

(3) “as a consequence of the legal proceeding, the plaintiff suffered a deprivation

of liberty, as understood in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, apart from the

initial seizure;” and (4) “the criminal proceeding must have been resolved in the

plaintiff’s favor.”

Staten v. Dickson, Tennessee, No. 3:16–cv–00771, 2017 WL 4232677, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Sep. 25,

2017) (quoting Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 308 (6th Cir. 2010)).

Here, Defendants argue first that Coleman’s claim fails because he has not shown that any

of the charges for which he claims he was maliciously prosecuted were resolved as “favorable

termination.” (Doc. No. 29.) Alternatively, Defendants argue that such a claim is time-barred. (Id.)

Coleman opposes Defendants’ arguments and counters—without citing or directing the court to

any specific authorities in support—that this Court has previously “drawn clear distinctions

between[ ]” malicious prosecution claims that challenge the initiation of prosecution and claims

that challenge one’s continued detention without legal authority and, because Coleman is raising

a claim as to the latter, the “[f]avorable termination” element of a malicious prosecution claim “is

therefore not dispositive at the pleading stage.” (Doc. No. 31 at 5.) Coleman also asserts in his

unauthorized sur-reply that the Court must construe his pro se pleadings liberally and that, as a

result, the Court should understand through his amended complaint—wherein he argues forcefully

that the favorable termination prong was satisfied (Doc. No. 27 at 5)—that “[w]hether described

as False Imprisonment, Continued detention, [or] a Due process violation[,] the core claim remains

. . . .” (Doc. No. 33 at 4.) The Court cannot and will not do Coleman’s work for him and the only

claim properly before the Court here is one for malicious prosecution.

Despite Coleman’s insistence that favorable termination is not necessary to show in his

pleadings, this is plainly an incorrect understanding of the standard he must plausibly plead. As

this Court has stated in no uncertain terms, while a “malicious prosecution” claim can support a

claim for “‘continued detention without probable cause’”

such a claim based on the wrongfulness of Plaintiff’s prosecution and continued

detention cannot be brought unless and until criminal proceedings terminate in his

favor. Sykes, 625 F.3d at 309 (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484, 114

S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (“One element that must be alleged and proved

in a malicious prosecution action is termination of the prior criminal proceeding in

favor of the accused.”)); see King v. Harwood, 852 F.3d 568, 578–79 (6th Cir.

2017) (finding that, unlike claims for false arrest or false imprisonment, “a

malicious-prosecution claim is not available before the favorable termination of

criminal proceedings, nor does the limitations period for such a claim begin until

the favorable termination of criminal proceedings”). For these purposes, favorable

termination “does not require the plaintiff to show that the criminal prosecution

ended with some affirmative indication of innocence,” but only that it “ended

without a conviction.” Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 49, 142 S.Ct. 1332, 212

L.Ed.2d 382 (2022).

Thackston v. Mauldin, No. 3:23-cv-01161, 2024 WL 2806168, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. May 31, 2024);

see generally id. (dismissing pro se, in forma pauperis Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a

viable claim of malicious prosecution under § 1983).

Coleman’s arguments to this point are, at best, conclusory in nature (Doc. No. 27) and, at

worst, imply that no proof of favorable termination is needed at this stage of litigation. Because

Coleman has failed to even plausibly plead facts supporting a necessary element of a claim of

malicious prosecution, his claim 1s not viable and Defendants’ motion to dismiss should be granted

as to the claim.

IV. Recommendation

For the foregoing reasons, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that Defendants’ motion

to dismiss (Doc. No. 28) should be GRANTED and Coleman’s amended complaint (Doc. No. 27)

should be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Any party has fourteen days after being served with this Report and Recommendation to

file specific written objections. Failure to file specific objections within fourteen days of receipt

of this Report and Recommendation can constitute a waiver of appeal of the matters decided.

Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 155 (1985); Cowherd v. Million, 380 F.3d 909, 912 (6th Cir. 2004).

A party who opposes any objections that are filed may file a response within fourteen days after

being served with the objections. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)2). _

Entered this 8th day of April, 2026. SY _

fC

a ELA

United States Magistrate Judge

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