Jumonville

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MARY JUMONVILLE, CIVIL ACTION

Plaintiff

VERSUS NO. 26-347

MDS SERVICES GROUP CORP., SECTION: “E” (2)

ET AL.,

Defendants

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is a motion to remand filed by Plaintiff Mary Jumonville

(“Plaintiff”).1 Defendants MDS Services Group Corporation (“MDS”) and Sosa Alvarez

Sellini (“Sellini”) (collectively “Defendants”) filed a response.2 Plaintiff filed a reply.3

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a vehicular accident that occurred in St. Charles Parish.4

Plaintiff alleges that Sellini, while driving her truck on US 90 in St. Charles Parish and in

the scope of her employment with MDS, struck Plaintiff’s car and caused Plaintiff injury.5

Plaintiff alleges Sellini was negligent in her operation of her truck.6 On December 15,

2025, Plaintiff filed a petition in the Civil District Court for the Parish of St. Charles in the

State of Louisiana.7 Plaintiff argues she effected long-arm service on Defendant, MDS

Services Group Corp. on January 5, 2026, via certified mail to its principal place of

business at 4510 SW 137th Ct, Miami, Florida 33175.8 Plaintiff argues she effected long-

1 R. Doc. 12.

2 R. Doc. 13.

3 R. Doc. 15.

4 R. Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 4.

5 Id. at ¶ ¶ 4-5.

6 Id. at ¶ 7.

7 R. Doc. 1-1.

8 R. Doc. 12-3.

arm service on Defendant, Sosa Alvarez Sellini, via certified mail to her home address on

January 8, 2026.9

On February 13, 2026, Defendants jointly filed a Notice of Removal removing this

case to this Court.10 Defendants assert this Court has federal diversity jurisdiction over

the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.11 On February 23, 2026 this Court ordered

Defendants to amend their Notice of Removal and provide “summary-judgment-type

evidence” demonstrating that the amount in controversy in this case exceeds $75,000.12

On March 5, 2026, Defendants filed a response to the Court’s order, representing that

they planned to issue discovery to Plaintiff in order to secure additional information

regarding the amount in controversy in this matter.13 On March 5, 2026, the Court issued

an order allowing Defendants to conduct discovery regarding the amount in controversy

and requiring them to file their amended notice of removal on or before April 6, 2026.14

On March 10, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand.15 Plaintiff argues this Court

should remand this matter to state court because Defendants did not file their joint Notice

of Removal until February 13, 2026—more than thirty days after the date each Defendant

received the petition via certified mail.16 Plaintiff provided a return receipt for the petition

sent to MDS executed by Enrique Morato on January 5, 2026.17 Plaintiff provided a return

receipt sent to Sellini’s residence and executed by Alberto Sellini, Sosa Alvarez Sellini’s

father, on January 8, 2026.18

9 R. Doc. 12-5.

10 R. Doc. 1. at p. 1.

11 Id. at ¶ 14

12 R. Doc. 6.

13 R. Doc. 10.

14 R. Doc. 11.

15 R. Doc. 12.

16 Id. at pp. 6-7.

17 R. Doc. 12-4.

18 R. Doc. 12-6.

Defendants argue that, while Plaintiff’s petition was delivered to MDS’s corporate

address via certified mail on January 5, 2026 and Selini’s residence via certified mail on

January 8, 2026, the petition was not “received” by MDS’s registered agent or Sellini

herself until January 16, 2026.19 Defendants argue the thirty-day window in which they

could remove this matter did not begin to run until MDS’s registered agent, Armando

Martinez, received the petition on January 16, 202620 and Sellini received a copy of the

initial pleading on January 16, 2026.21 Defendants argue they jointly removed this matter

on February 13, 2026—within thirty days of January 16, 2026—making their notice of

removal timely.22 Defendants argue, in the alternative, that because it was not facially

apparent from Plaintiff’s state court petition that the amount in controversy exceeds

$75,000 and because neither Defendant is currently in possession of other evidence

demonstrating that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold, the

thirty-day window to file their notice of removal has not yet begun to run, making

Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand premature.23

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and possess only the authority

conferred upon them by the United States Constitution or by Congress.24 Federal law

allows for state civil suits to be removed to federal courts in certain instances.25 When

removal is based on federal diversity jurisdiction, the removing party must show that (1)

19 R. Doc. 13 at pp. 3-4.

20 R. Doc. 13-1.

21 Defendants argue that Sellini did not receive the petition until she returned home on January 16, 2026

but no evidence of this fact is provided.

22 R. Doc. 13 at p. 4.

23 Id. at 3.

24 Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir. 2001).

25 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

complete diversity of citizenship exists between the parties, and (2) the amount in

controversy exceeds $75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs.26 “The removing party

bears the burden of showing that federal jurisdiction exists and that removal was

proper.”27

A district court must remand a case to state court if, at any time before final

judgment, it appears that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.28 The removal

statute is strictly construed.29 Doubts concerning removal are to be construed against

removal and in favor of remand to state court.30

I. Plaintiff’s petition affirmatively alleged that the value of her claim

exceeds “the amount necessary for federal diversity jurisdiction.”

The federal removal statute imposes mandatory time limits for filing a notice of

removal.31 When removability is apparent based on the initial pleading, a defendant must

file a notice of removal within thirty days of receipt of that pleading.32 When the initial

pleading does not indicate that the action is removable, the defendant may remove the

matter within thirty days of receiving an amended pleading, motion, order, or other paper

from which removability may be ascertained.33 The Fifth Circuit in Chapman v.

Powermatic, Inc. established a “bright line rule requiring the plaintiff, if he wishes the

thirty-day time period to run from the defendant’s receipt of the initial pleading, to place

in the initial pleading a specific allegation that damages are in excess of the federal

26 Garcia v. Koch Oil Co. of Tex., Inc., 351 F.3d 636, 638 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v.

Greenburg, 134 F.3d 1250, 1253 (5th Cir. 1998)).

27 See Manguno v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002).

28 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

29 Sea Robin Pipeline Co. v. New Medico Head Clinic Facility, No. 94–1450, 1995 WL 479719, at *2,

(E.D.La. Aug. 14, 1995) (Clement, J.) (quoting York v. Horizon Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 712 F.Supp. 85, 87

(E.D.La.1989) (Feldman, J.)).

30 Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir.2002).

31 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).

32 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1).

33 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3).

jurisdictional amount.”34 An untimely notice of removal constitutes a procedural defect

requiring remand of the action to state court.35

Importantly, the Fifth Circuit has distinguished disputes regarding the timeliness

of removal from disputes regarding the amount in controversy.36 In other words, the

question of whether an initial pleading affirmatively alleges that the amount in

controversy exceeds $75,0000, thereby triggering the thirty-day removal period, is a

separate question from whether the amount in controversy actually exceeds $75,000.37

Plaintiff points out that she affirmatively alleged in her state court complaint that

the value of her claim exceeds “the amount necessary for federal diversity jurisdiction.”38

Plaintiff argues this allegation made it facially apparent from her petition that she sought

damages in excess of the jurisdictional threshold.39 As a result, Plaintiff argues the thirty

day-removal period for MDS and Sellini began upon their receipt of Plaintiff’s initial

pleading.40

Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not allege in her state court petition that the

amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.41 Defendants further argue they have not yet

received information demonstrating that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.42

Defendants point to this Court’s order requiring them to provide summary judgment type

evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 as evidence that the amount in

34 969 F.2d 160, 163 (5th Cir. 1992).

35 See Eastus v. Blue Bell Creameries, L.P., 97 F.3d 100, 103 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Section 1447(c) allows remand

only for (1) defects in removal procedure or (2) lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”).

36 Mumfrey v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 719 F.3d 392, 398 (5th Cir. 2013).

37 See id; Quest v. Church Mut. Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 13-4872, 2013 WL 6044380, at *2 (E.D. La. Nov. 13,

2013).

38 R. Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 10.

39 R. Doc. 15 at p. 6.

40 Id.

41 R. Doc. 13 at p. 3.

42 Id.

controversy in this matter is ambiguous and indeterminate.43 Defendants argue this

establishes that it was not facially apparent from Plaintiff’s state court petition that the

amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and, because they have not received information

demonstrating that the jurisdictional amount is met, their thirty-day window to remove

this matter has not begun, meaning their joint notice of removal cannot be untimely.44

The Fifth Circuit in Chapman established that the thirty-day removal period

begins upon a defendant’s receipt of the initial pleading when the pleading affirmatively

states that the plaintiff seeks damages in excess of “the federal jurisdictional amount.”45

Chapman does not require a plaintiff to allege that she seeks damages in excess of a

specific dollar amount but only that the damages are in excess of the federal jurisdictional

amount.46 In this matter, Plaintiff clearly alleges in her state court petition that the value

of her claim “exceeds the amount necessary for diversity jurisdiction.”47 Accordingly,

MDS and Sellini’s thirty day period to remove this matter began upon their receipt

Plaintiff’s initial pleading.

II. MDS received Plaintiff’s initial pleading on January 5, 2026 and Sellini

received Plaintiff’s initial pleading on January 8, 2026.

To determine whether Defendants timely removed this matter, the Court must

determine when each Defendant received a copy of Plaintiff’s initial pleading. 28 U.S.C. §

1446(b)(1) provides that:

The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within 30 days after

the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial

43 Id. Defendants misinterpret this order. The Court ordered Defendants to provide summary judgment

type evidence demonstrating that the amount in controversy actually exceeded $75,000; the Court did not

hold that Plaintiff’s allegations were insufficient to trigger the thirty-day removal window.

44 Id. at pp. 1-3.

45 969 F.2d 160, 163 (5th Cir. 1992).

46 See id.

47 R. Doc. 1-1 at ¶ 10.

pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is

based[.]48

In addition, “[i]f defendants are served at different times, and a later served defendant

files a notice of removal, any earlier-served defendant may consent to the removal[.]”49

Accordingly, the Court must determine when each Defendant received a copy of Plaintiff’s

complaint “through service or otherwise.”

Fed. R. Civ P. 4(e)(1) allows an individual defendant to be served in any manner

consistent with the forum state’s law for serving summons; Rule 4(h)(1)(A) allows a

corporation to be served in the same manner. Louisiana’s long-arm statute provides that

“[a] court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident, who acts directly, or by

an agent,” to commit an offense in the forum state that results in injury or damage.50 A

“nonresident” defendant includes an individual not domiciled in Louisiana as well as a

corporation or limited liability company which is not organized under the laws of, and is

not licensed to do business in, Louisiana.51 The long arm-statute further provides that

service may be effectuated on such out of state defendants by sending a copy of the

petition to the defendant by registered or certified mail.52 Courts applying Louisiana’s

long arm-statute have specifically held that in order for service to be effectuated, a

plaintiff need only send a copy of the complaint to the defendant.53 The statute does not

require the defendant to sign a return receipt in order for service to be effective, nor does

the statute prohibit a defendant’s family member from accepting service.54

48 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1)(emphasis added).

49 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(c).

50 La. Rev. Stat. § 13:3201(A)(3).

51 La. Rev. Stat. § 13:3206.

52 La. Rev. Stat. § 13:3204(A).

53 See Stogner v. Neilsen & Hiebert Sys., Inc., No. CIV A 07-4058, 2008 WL 4587304, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct.

15, 2008); HTS, Inc. v. Seahawk Oil & Gas, Inc., 889 So. 2d 442, 444-45 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2004).

54 Thomas Organ Co. v. Univeral Music Co., 261 So.2d 323, 327 (La. Ct. App. 1972).

Plaintiff has provided evidence showing that she served MDS through certified

mail, which MDS received at its Florida principal address on January 5, 2026, and served

Sellini through certified mail, which she received at her residence on January 8, 2026.55

Plaintiff argues that, because Defendants did not remove this matter until February 13,

2026, more than 30 days from either service, their removal was untimely.56

Defendants point to Murphy Brothers, Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., a case

in which the Supreme Court recognized that a defendant must receive a copy of the initial

pleading, along with formal service, in order for the thirty day removal period to begin.57

Defendants state that, while Plaintiff filed a return receipt for long-arm service on MDS

on January 5, 2026, the envelope containing notice of this lawsuit was received and signed

for by Enrique Morato, who is not MDS’s registered agent for service.58 Defendants

attached a declaration by Morato in which he states that upon receipt of the mail

containing the initial pleading, he placed the mail in his mail bin, as he is not authorized

to accept service or open mail on behalf of MDS.59 Morato further states in his declaration

that he provided the mail to Armando Martinez, MDS’s registered agent for service, on

January 16, 2026.60 Defendants argue Sellini’s father received a copy of the initial

pleading on January 8, 2026, while Sellini was away from home working as an interstate

trucker, but that she was unaware of the lawsuit until she returned home on January 16,

2026. Defendants argue that, because MDS’s registered agent and Sellini herself did not

55 R. Docs. 12-3 and 12-5

56 Id.

57 526 U.S. 344, 354–55 (1999).

58 R. Doc. 13 at p. 3.

59 R. Doc. 1-5.

60 Id.

receive the complaint until January 16, 2026, their thirty-day removal window did not

begin until that day, making their February 13, 2026 joint notice of removal timely.61

Defendants’ joint notice of removal was untimely. MDS is a corporation organized

in Florida and not qualified to do business in Louisiana, and Defendant Sellini is

domiciled in Florida.62 As a result, both Defendants qualify as “non-residents” and may

be served under Louisiana’s long arm statute.63 Louisiana’s Long arm statute allows a

plaintiff to effect service on a defendant simply by sending the petition by certified mail

to the defendant.64 The statute does not require that a defendant’s registered agent for

service of process receive the petition or that the defendant sign a return receipt in order

to have received service.65 In addition, the statute does not state that the service is void if

a defendant’s family member, and not the defendant herself, receives the certified mail.66

Plaintiff sent her state court petition by certified mail to MDS at its Florida corporate

address and to Sellini at her residence.67 MDS received Plaintiff’s complaint “through

service or otherwise” on January 5, 2026, when the petition was delivered by certified

mail to its corporate office and Morato signed for it.68 Selini received the complaint

through service on January 8, 2026, when the petition was delivered by certified mail to

her residence and her father signed for it.69 Finding otherwise would create a rule ripe for

abuse—defendants could delay the start of the removal period by claiming that mail was

61 Id. at p. 5.

62 R. Doc. 1 at ¶ ¶ 9-10.

63 La. Rev. Stat. § 13:3206.

64 La. Rev. Stat. § 13:3204(A).

65 See id; Thomas Organ Co. v. Univeral Music Co., 261 So.2d 323, 327 (La. Ct. App. 1972).

66 Thomas Organ, 261 So.2d at 327.

67 R. Doc. 12-1 at p. 7.

68 R. Doc. 12-1 t p. 7.

69 Id.

misplaced and never actually received by the intended recipient or that a person

improperly withheld mail from the actual defendant.

While Defendant’s cite Murphy for the proposition that Sellini and MDS’s

registered agent must be in actual possession of the complaint in order for the removal

period to begin, that case does not support this position. Rather, the Supreme Court in

Murphy held that the thirty-day removal window is not triggered by mere receipt of the

initial complaint before formal service occurs.70 In this matter, formal service occurred

when Plaintiff sent MDS and Sellini the petition through certified mail, and both

Defendants received the complaint through this method of service. Accordingly, for

purposes of calculating the thirty-day removal period, MDS received the complaint on

January 5, 2026, and Sellini received the complaint on January 8, 2026.

III. Defendants’ joint notice of removal was untimely.

Defendants’ joint notice of removal was untimely. A defendant has thirty days from

receipt of the petition, “through service or otherwise,” to remove an action.71 “If

defendants are served at different times, and a later served defendant files a notice of

removal, any earlier-served defendant may consent to the removal[.]”72 Sellini was the

later served Defendant, as the initial pleading was delivered to her residence on January

8, 2026, three days after MDS received the initial pleading.73 Sellini had thirty days from

January 8, 2026 to file her notice of removal, which MDS could join.74 Defendants did not

file the joint notice of removal until February 13, 2026, more than 30 days later.75

70 526 U.S. 344, 347-48 (1999).

71 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1).

72 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(c).

73 R. Doc. 12-1 at p. 7.

74 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(c).

75 R. Doc. 1.

Accordingly, Defendants’ joint notice of removal was untimely, and the Court will remand

this matter to state court.

CONCLUSION

IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion to Remand is GRANTED.”

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is hereby remanded to the 29th

Judicial District Court for the Parish of St. Charles.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 2nd day of April, 2026.

SUSIE ORGAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

7° R, Doc. 12.

11