Tuggle

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

EASTERN DIVISION

TEMPESTT TUGGLE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. ) No. 4:23-cv-00533-SEP

)

ESSENTIAL INFORMATION INC., et al, )

)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Defendants. )

Before the Court are Defendants’ motions to dismiss. Docs. [20], [29]. Plaintiff has

not filed a response to either motion, and the deadline for doing so has passed. For the

reasons set forth below, the motionFsA CaTrSe AgNraDn BteAdCK. GROUND

In April 2023, Plaintiff Tempestt Tuggle filed this employment discrimination action

against her employer, Defendant Essential Information Inc., and her supervisor, Defendant

Jasmine Banks. Doc. [1]. Plaintiff, a Missouri resident who worked from her home in St.

Louis, alleges that Banks, “a resident of Arkansas who [also] worked remotely from home,”

sexually harassed her after learning in August 2020 that Plaintiff was bisexual. Doc. [1]

¶¶ 1, 3, 10, 12. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that Banks would criticize Plaintiff’s

Id.

relationship with her partner and make sexual comments about Plaintiff’s appearance

during meetings. ¶¶ 12-18. Plaintiff further alleged that in October 2021, Plaintiff

Id.

visited Banks in Arkansas, at which time Banks requested that Plaintiff have sex with her

and her partner. Plaintiff declined. ¶¶ 24-25. Banks also made comments about

Id.

Plaintiff’s race, that Plaintiff is a “darker skinned black woman,” and that she was “putting

her neck on the line by going to bat for Plaintiff Tuggle at work.” ¶ 30. In March 2022,

Id.

Plaintiff and Banks attended a work conference in Miami, where Plaintiff alleges that Banks

continued to make sexual comments directed to Plaintiff and sexually battered her.

¶¶ 34-38. Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that board members from Essential Information

Id.

requested that she attend a Zoom teleconference in Banks’s hotel room, where she was

questioned about the incident with Banks present. ¶¶ 44-47. Other than the incidents

which Banks communicated with her, or her specific location when those communications

took place.

The Complaint alleges sexual harassment, hostile work environment, retaliation,

and race discrimination claims under Title VII against Essential Information (Counts I & II)

and common law assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims

against Banks (Count III, IV, & V), arising from Banks’s unwanted sexual propositions and

Id.

sexual assault. Doc. [1] ¶¶ 48-74. Plaintiff requests actual damages “in excess of

[$25,000],” unspecified punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees. at 12-13. Plaintiff states

Id.

that the Court has jurisdiction “because Title VII is a federal law, and thus it involves a

federal question,” but does not make any additional jurisdictional claim. ¶ 4.

Defendants each move to dismiss. Docs. [20], [29]. Essential Information argues

that the case should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Doc. [21]. Banks argues that

1

Plaintiff failed to properly establish subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction.

Doc. [29-1]. Plaintiff did not respond tLoE GeAitLh SeTr AmNoDtAiRoDn .

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a claim

Huggins v.

for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” When ruling on a motion to

FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc.

dismiss, a court “must liberally construe a complaint in favor of the plaintiff,”

Lustgraaf v. Behrens

, 592 F.3d 853, 862 (8th Cir. 2010), and “grant all reasonable

Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,” , 619 F.3d 867, 872-73

(8th Cir. 2010) (citing , 588 F.3d 585, 591) (8th Cir. 2009)).

But if a claim fails to allege one of the elements necessary to recovery on a legal theory, the

1

Defendants also request dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), as Plaintiff failed to

serve defendants within 90 days of filing. Rule 4(m) states “[i]f a defendant is not served within 90

days after the complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—

must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made

within a specified time.” Plaintiff filed the Complaint on April 25, 2023. Doc. [1]. On May 6, 2024,

the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause as to why the action should not be dismissed for failure to

serve the defendants. Doc. [8]. On May 20th, Plaintiff responded, indicating that there were

difficulties in contacting the defendants, but that attempts at service had been made. Doc. [10]. On

June 20, 2025, the Court ordered that unless proof of service was filed no later than July 21st, the

case would be dismissed without prejudice. Doc. [13]. Plaintiff filed proof of service against both

See Crest Contr. II, Inc. v. Doe

Court must dismiss that claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

, 660 F.3d 346, 355 (8th Cir. 2011).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) permits a party to move to dismiss a claim

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. “In order to properly dismiss for lack of subject

Titus v. Sullivan

matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the complaint must be successfully challenged on

Osborn v. United States

its face or on the factual truthfulness of its averments.” , 4 F.3d 590, 593

(8th Cir. 1993) (citing , 918 F.2d 724, 729 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990)). In a

Osborn

factual challenge, the defendant challenges the factual truthfulness of the assertions, and

the Court may consider matters outside the pleadings. , 918 F.2d at 729. “In a facial

challenge to jurisdiction, all of the factual allegations concerning jurisdiction are presumed

Titus

to be true and the motion is successful if the plaintiff fails to allege an element necessary

for subject matter jurisdiction.” , 4 F.3d at 593.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) permits a party to move to dismiss a claim

Fastpath, Inc. v. Arbela

for lack of personal jurisdiction. When a defendant challenges personal jurisdiction, the

Techs. Corp. K-V Pharm. Co. v. J. Uriach & CIA, S.A.

plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that jurisdiction exists.

, 760 F.3d 816, 820 (8th Cir. 2014) (citing ,

648 F.3d 588, 592 (8th Cir. 2011)). That showing is made “by pleading sufficient facts ‘to

K-V Pharm. Dever v. Hentzen Coatings, Inc.

support a reasonable inference that the defendant[] can be subjected to jurisdiction within

K-V Pharm.

the [forum].’” , 648 F.3d at 591-92 (quoting , 380

F.3d 1070, 1072 (8th Cir. 2004)) (alteration in ). A plaintiff’s prima facie

Id.

showing is tested, “not by the pleadings alone, but by the affidavits and exhibits supporting

or opposing the motion.” (quotation marks omitted). While the party seeking to

Fastpath

establish jurisdiction carries the burden, the Court views the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party and resolves factual conflicts in its favor. , 760

F.3d at 820. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief can be granted against Essential

Information and has not shown that the Court has personal jurisdiction over Banks.

Accordingly, the claims against both Defendants are dismissed.

I. Plaintiff fails to state a claim under Title VII against Essential Information.

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it “an unlawful employment practice

for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,

terms, conditions, or privileges of employm§ent, because of such individual’s race, color,

religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1). Title VII defines an employer as

“a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees

for each working day in e§ach of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding

SeeArbaugh v. Y&H

calendar year.” 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b). Title VII’s numerical threshold is not a jurisdictional

Corp.

bar but is instead a required element of a plaintiff’s Title VII claim.

, 546 U.S. 500, 515-16 (2006).

Essential Information moves to dismiss on the basis that Plaintiff failed to allege

facts sufficient to show that Essential Information was an employer as defined under Title

VII. The Court agrees. The Complaint does not contain sufficient factual allegations to

show that Essential Information was an employer under Title VII. And Essential

Information’s federal tax records (IRS Form 990) indicate that Essential Information had

2

eight or fewer employees during the time periods relevant to Plaintiff’s claims. Because

the Complaint contains no facts indicating that Essential Information was an employer for

tIhI.e purTphosee Cs oouf rTti tdleo eVsI In loiatb hilaitvye, Pplearinstoinffa’sl Tjuitrleis VdIiIc ctilaoinm osv fearil .B anks.

As an initial matter, the Court is not persuaded that it lacks subject matter

jurisdiction. Because the Title VII claims against Essential Information fail, Banks argues,

there is no legitimate basis for the§ Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related

state claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367. Doc. [§29-1] at 5-7. But even if that is so, it does

not affect diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332(a). Although the Complaint does not

explicitly invoke diversity jurisdiction, its allegations and prayer for relief support it.

2

On a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider not just the allegations in the complaint, but also

“matters incorporated by refereZnecaen ovr. Finatiervgireawl tHoe tahleth c lSaeirmvs[s.], items subject to judicial notice,

matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits . . . whose

authenticity is unquestioned.” , 858 F.3d 520, 526 (8th Cir. 2017)

(quoting 5B Wright & Miller, FedeIrda.l Practice & Procedure § 1357 (3d ed. 2004)). Defendant’s IRS

Under Section 1332(a), district courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions

Ryan ex rel. Ryan v. Schneider Nat. Carriers, Inc.

when the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000 and the dispute is between citizens of

different states. , 263 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir.

2001). The Complaint alleges, and Banks does not dispute, that Plaintiff “is, and was at all

times relevant herein, a resident of [Missouri],” and that Banks “was a resident of

Arkansas.” Doc. [1] ¶¶ 1 , 4. While determining an amount in controversy is g B e e n l e l r v a . l H ly e r a s hey

“Csot.raightforward task .. .because the plaintiff is the master of the complaint,”

, 557 F.3d 953, 956 (8th Cir. 2009), when a plaintiff does “not allege a specific amount in

Clark v. Matthews Int’l Corp.

controversy in his complaint, the amount in controversy depends upon the value of the

relief [the plaintiff] seeks,” , 639 F.3d 391, 397 (8th Cir. 2011).

“Generally, a complaint that alleges the jurisdictional amount in good faith will suffice to

Larkin v. Brown

confer jurisdiction, but the complaint will be dismissed if it ‘appear[s] to a legal certainty

St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co.

that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount.’” , 41 F.3d

387, 388 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting , 303 U.S.

283, 289 (1938)). Here, Plaintiff requests actual damages in excess of $25,000, unspecified

see Essex Contracting, Inc. v.

punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees. Doc. [1] at 12-13. While Plaintiff likely would not be

Jefferson Cnty.

entitled to attorneys’ fees for her common law tort claims,

SeeScottsdale Ins. Co.

, 277 S.W.3d 647, 657 (Mo. 2009), it does not appear to a legal certainty that

her claim is for less than the jurisdictional amount. , 620 F.3d at 931.

Viasystems, Inc. v. EBM-Papst St.

Accordingly, the Court turns to Banks’s argument that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction.

Georgen GMBH & Co.

“Personal jurisdiction can be specific or general.”

, 646 F.3d 589, 593 (8th Cir. 2011). General jurisdiction “refers to the

power of a state to adjudicate any cause of action involving a particular defendant,

regardless of where the cause of action arose,” while “[s]pecific jurisdiction refers to

Id. Miller v. Nippon Carbon Co.

jurisdiction over causes of action arising from or related to a defendant’s actions within the

forum state . . .” (quoting , 528 F.3d 1087, 1091 (8th Cir.

2008). Plaintiff has alleged no facts suggesting that general jurisdiction can be exercised

over Banks, an “Arkansas resident.” The Court thus considers whether specific personal

jurisdiction exists. A federal court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a

nonresident defendant in a diversity case if: (1) the facts presented satisfy the

Digi-Tel Holdings, Inc. v. Proteq Telecomms. (PTE), Ltd.

does not violate due process. § , 89

F.3d 519, 522 (8th Cir. 1996). The Missouri long-arm statute, Mo. Rev. Stat. 506.500,

provides for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant t§hat transacts business,

makes a contract, or commits a tort within the state. Mo. Rev. Stat. 506.500.1. “These

individual categories are construed broadly, such that if a defendant commits one of the

acts specified in the long-arm statute, the statute will be interpreted ‘to provide for

Viasystems, Inc.

jurisdiction, within the specific categories enumerated in the statute[], to the full extent

permitted by the due process clause.’” , 646 F.3d at 593.

While Plaintiff states that she worked remotely from her home in Missouri, the

Complaint lacks any other clear allegation establishing the method by which any alleged

conversations took place, the frequency of the conversations, or that the conversations

took place while Plaintiff was physically in Missouri. To the extent Plaintiff did make

specific allegations concerning the locations and methods of tortious activity, Plaintiff

alleged that those acts occurred in Arkansas and Miami. Even if the Court inferred from the

Complaint that Banks communicated with Plaintiff through telephone and video calls—

See Fastpath, Inc.

although the Complaint does not specifically allege as much—the existence of such calls

Viasystems

alone would likely still be insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. ,

760 F.3d at 823-24; , 646 F.3d at 594 (no personal jurisdiction where non-

Digi-Tel Holdings, Inc.

resident defendant’s contacts consisted of scattered emails, phone calls, and a wire-transfer

to forum state); , 89 F.3d at 523 (no personal jurisdiction where non-

resident defendant’s contacts with forum state consisted of numerous faxes and letters,

several phone calls in connection with the contract in dispute, and choice-of-law

provision). Plaintiff did not respond to Banks’s motion to dismiss, and accordingly did not

See K-V Pharm.

provide any additional evidence, in the form of affidavits or other exhibits, for the Court to

consider. , 648 F.3d at 591-92. Thus, Plaintiff failed to meet her burden to

show that the Court can exercise personal jurisdiction over Banks.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, Docs. [20] and [29],

are GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED without

prejudice.

A separate order of dismissal will be entered herewith.

Dated this 23™4 day of March, 2026.

SARAH E. PITLYK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE