McDonnal-Phipps

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF OREGON

IRA M.-P., Ca se No. 6:25-cv-00046-AR

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER

v.

COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

_____________________________________

ARMISTEAD, United States Magistrate Judge

Plaintiff Ira M.-P. seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision denying

Social Security disability benefits. Plaintiff (1) challenges the ALJ’s finding as unpersuasive

opinions about his limitations from Lauren Bell, a physician’s assistant; and (2) contends that the

ALJ’s discounting of his subjective symptom testimony lacked clear and convincing reasons.

(Pl.’s Br. at 2-10, ECF 11.) The district court must affirm the Commissioner’s decision if the

Commissioner applied proper legal standards and the findings are supported by substantial

evidence in the record. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2020).

With that standard of review applied, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED.

(1) Lauren Bell. Lauren Bell, a physician’s assistant, provided an opinion about plaintiff’s

physical impairments. In her 2021 opinion, Bell opined that plaintiff’s lumbar disc disorder and

foraminal stenosis of the lumbar region caused limitations severe enough to “often” interfere

with the attention and concentration required to perform simple, work-related tasks; plaintiff

could sit for two hours, stand or walk for three hours, and would need to recline or lie down

more than the typical breaks offered during a full eight-hour workday; and plaintiff would be

absent four or more days per month and would need to take daily unscheduled one-hour breaks.

(Tr. 596-97.)

The ALJ was not persuaded, finding that Bell’s opinion lacked citations to the record or

explanation and was inconsistent with other medical opinions, including those revealing

significant childcare and other activities of daily living. (Tr. 23.) Plaintiff challenges that finding,

contending that it fails on supportability or consistency with the record. (Pl.’s Br. at 4-6); 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520c (the regulations require ALJs to evaluate the supportability and consistency

of a medical opinion when assessing its persuasiveness); Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 792

(9th Cir. 2022) (ALJs must “articulate . . . how persuasive [they] find all of the medical

opinions” and “explain how [they] considered the supportability and consistency factors”)

(quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2)). The court disagrees with plaintiff.

To start, the ALJ determined that Bell’s opinion did not cite to the record to support her

conclusions or explain how plaintiff’s impairments would limit his ability to sit, walk, and stand.

(Tr. 23.) Although plaintiff argues that Bell’s opinion was consistent with the entirety of the

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record (Pl.’s Br. at 4), “[a] physician’s opinion can be discredited based on contradictions

between the opinion and the physician’s own notes.” Buck v. Berryhill, 869 F.3d 1040, 1050 (9th

Cir. 2017). The ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence here. (Tr. 23; see also Tr.

499, 415, 501, 506, (treatment notes showing that plaintiff reported his pain as a one out of ten to

Bell, that on examination plaintiff’s gait was “steady[,]” as well as other providers noting that

“[h]e does not have any red flag symptoms or exam findings today that would require any further

emergent evaluation or treatment). Thus, the ALJ’s conclusion that Bell’s opinion was

unsupported by her own notes that document normal gait and strength, low pain levels, improved

pain levels with medication, and failed to include Bell’s own objective evaluations regarding

plaintiff’s limitations is a reasonable interpretation of the record and an appropriate basis on

which to find it unpersuasive. See Stiffler v. O’Malley, 102 F.4th 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2024)

(quoting Ford, 950 F.3d at 1154) (“‘The ALJ need not accept the opinion of any physician,

including a treating physician, if that opinion is brief, conclusory, and inadequately supported by

clinical findings.’”).

The ALJ also found Bell’s opinion unpersuasive because it was inconsistent with the

medical opinion from Nurse Practitioner Kooienga. The ALJ observed that “[t]here is also no

explanation for the lack of manipulative limitations in light of [plaintiff]’s carpel tunnel

syndrome and the exam findings of NP Kooienga.” (Tr. 23.) Plaintiff argues that Bell was not

opining on carpal tunnel and instead was focused on plaintiff’s lumbar disc disorder and

foraminal stenosis. (Pl.’s Br. at 5.) Even so, the ALJ’s finding is supported by substantial

evidence in the record—NP Kooienga listed carpal tunnel as an impairment that causes a tremor

in both of plaintiff’s hands, which was not mentioned or observed by Bell. (Tr. 791, 794.) And

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the ALJ determined that Bell’s severe limitations were inconsistent with NP Kooienga’s opinion,

which remarked on plaintiff’s ability to perform many daily activities, such as laundry, cooking,

sweeping, vacuuming, driving, shopping, and grooming without issue. (Tr. 23, citing Tr. 790.)

Even if the record could support plaintiff’s view of the evidence, the ALJ was entitled to rely on

those inconsistencies in the decision; the ALJ’s interpretation is reasonable and backed by

substantial evidence. Stiffler, 102 F.4th at 1107 (holding ALJ reasonably determined physician’s

opinion was inconsistent with other opinions and significant daily activities described in

treatment records). The ALJ did not err.

(2) Subjective Symptom Testimony. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to give specific, clear

and convincing reasons for discounting his subjective symptom testimony. (Pl.’s Br. at 6-10);

Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 488-89 (9th Cir. 2015) (if a claimant provides objective

medical evidence of an underlying impairment and there is no affirmative evidence of

malingering, the ALJ must provide specific, clear and convincing reasons for discounting the

claimant’s testimony); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. According to plaintiff, the ALJ’s grounds for

discounting his symptom testimony—inconsistencies with the medical evidence and activities of

daily living—were unsupported or failed to consider the entire record. (Pl.’s Br. at 6-10.) The

court disagrees.

Regarding the medical evidence, plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to identify the

testimony she found not credible and link that testimony to particular parts of the record. Brown-

Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 494 (9th Cir. 2015). According to plaintiff, the “ALJ summarized

the medical record to justify her residual functional capacity finding.” (Pl.’s Br. at 9.) Not so. As

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argued by the Commissioner, the ALJ identified specific evidence in the record and linked it to

specific portions of plaintiffs’ testimony.

For example, the ALJ observed that, despite plaintiff’s testimony regarding his symptoms

caused by carpal tunnel, namely some “numbness in his left small [and] ring finger[,]” he failed

to attend his follow up appointments and the “treatment record show[ed] functional improvement

following bilateral release surgery.” (Tr. 21-22, citing Tr. 653.) The ALJ also acknowledged

plaintiff’s testimony that his back locks up, is painful, and that sitting or standing too long strains

his back. (Tr. 20, citing Tr. 275-82, 308-19.) Even so, it was noted by the ALJ that plaintiff’s

main course of treatment for that impairment was physical therapy and medication, that he had

been denied spinal surgery by two different providers because there was “no need” based on

MRI results, and that physical therapy notes showed that his issues are “mostly muscular[,]” but

that disc involvement could not be ruled out. (Tr. 21, citing Tr. 491, 836, 950.) Based on those

inconsistencies, the ALJ reasonably discounted his subjective symptom testimony. See Smartt v.

Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 498 (9th Cir. 2022) (“When objective medical evidence in the record is

inconsistent with the claimant’s subjective testimony, the ALJ may indeed weigh it as

undercutting such testimony.”).

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in relying on his activities of daily living, contending

that his hearing testimony described what he can do only on a good day, and that ALJ failed to

identify specific evidence undermining it. (Pl.’s Br. at 9-10.) The court disagrees. In the decision,

the ALJ discussed specific testimony and identified record evidence undermining that testimony.

For example, the ALJ described that plaintiff is homeschooling his children, that “involves

teaching his youngest to read and teaching math and history lessons to the older children” and

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that he is solely “responsible for the household including meal preparation and cleaning.” (Tr.

22.) Although plaintiff testified that the older children help with tasks, the ALJ found his reports

to “providers demonstrate greater functioning capacity” than he alleged, detailing several

inconsistencies. (Tr. 22 citing Tr. 449 (plaintiff reported he was “still fishing most days”), 875-76

(plaintiffs back pain was due to “pushing himself too hard” and working in the yard); 44

(plaintiff describing how he homeschools his children for four hours in a typical day), 277-78

(plaintiff prepares several course meals daily and is responsible for many in-home chores).) The

ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence and the ALJ reasonably could conclude that

his ADLs suggest a greater physical capacity than alleged by plaintiff. See Molina v. Astrue, 674

F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Even where [a claimant’s] activities suggest some difficulty

functioning, they may be grounds for discrediting the claimant to the extent that they contradict

claims of a totally debilitating impairment.”); see also Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789,

792 (9th Cir. 1997) (inconsistencies between testimony and conduct may be considered in

weighing a claimant’s credibility). The ALJ did not err in discounting plaintiff’s subjective

symptom testimony.

CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s final decision and this

action is DISMISSED.

ORDERED: March 31, 2026.

United States Magist\ate Judge

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