Douglas

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

QUINTEISE DOUGLAS,

MARKISHA WILSON, and

J.R., a minor by his mother

and natural guardian,

MARKISHA WILSON,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 8:24-cv-2569-VMC-AAS

SHERIFF GRADY JUDD, in his

official capacity as Sheriff

of Polk County, Florida,

JESSICA WILLIAMS, individually,

and DIAMOND HAYNES,

individually,

Defendants.

______________________________/

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court upon consideration of

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 48),

Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine (Doc. # 54), and Defendants’

Motion in Limine (Doc. # 55). For the reasons that follow,

the Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part and denied

in part. Summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendant

Diamond Haynes on Count I. The remaining counts, Counts II,

III, IV, and VI, are dismissed without prejudice. The Motions

in Limine are denied as moot.

I. Background

A. The Parties

Defendant Jessica Williams is a deputy with the Polk

County Sheriff’s Office (“PCSO”). (Doc. # 47-6 at 5:1-6). In

April 2022, Deputy Williams lived in the same neighborhood in

Bartow, Florida, as Plaintiffs, Markisha Wilson, Quinteise

Douglas, and J.R., as well as nonparty Larry McCutchen. (Doc.

# 47-1 at 6, 8, 12, 20; Doc. # 47-6 at 7:9-12). Ms. Wilson is

the mother of Ms. Douglas, J.R., and Mr. McCutchen. (Doc. #

47-11 at 29:24-30:3). At the time, Ms. Douglas and Mr.

McCutchen were adults, and J.R. was 15 years old. (Doc. # 47-

1 at 6, 8, 10). Defendant Diamond Haynes is a PCSO detective

who investigated an incident involving Deputy Williams,

Plaintiffs, and Mr. McCutchen. (Doc. # 47-5 at 5:3-4, 6:1,

10:13-11:22).

B. The Incident

On the evening of April 23, 2022, Deputy Williams drove

home at the end of her shift. (Doc. # 47-6 at 6:19-7:8). She

was having a conversation outside with her neighbor, Jose

Perez, when his dog, Chico, got loose and ran eastbound,

trailed by Mr. Perez’s 12-year-old son, Yosgar. (Doc. # 47-1

at 14-15; Doc. # 47-6 at 17:2-18:19). Deputy Williams told

Mr. Perez that she would help Yosgar get the dog and began

driving around the neighborhood. (Doc. # 47-6 at 18:19-

19:20).

In the meantime, Chico went into Ms. Wilson’s backyard

and bit Ms. Douglas’s one-year-old son as well as Ms. Wilson’s

small dog. (Doc. # 47-1 at 19; Doc. # 47-11 at 5:22-25, 13:7-

14:5). Ms. Douglas and Mr. McCutchen were able to get Chico

off the child and the other dog. (Doc. # 47-11 at 6-13).

Yosgar then called out to Chico and both ran off. (Id.). As

Deputy Williams was driving back home, she was stopped by Ms.

Wilson, who told her about the incident. (Doc. # 47-6 at

19:25-20:15); Doc. # 52-11 at 13:10-14:1). Deputy Williams

then saw Mr. McCutchen, Ms. Douglas, and J.R. chasing and

screaming at Yosgar as he was running down the street with

Chico. (Doc. # 47-6 at 20:25-21:2; Doc. # 47-8 at ¶¶ 2-3;

Doc. # 47-9 at ¶¶ 3-5).

When Deputy Williams returned home, she tried to

separate Mr. Perez, Yosgar, and Chico, who were in her front

yard, from Mr. McCutchen, Ms. Douglas, and J.R., who were in

her driveway and were upset and yelling that they wanted to

kill Chico. (Doc. # 47-6 at 25:7-23, 26:25-30:2; Doc. # 47-8

at ¶ 7; Doc. # 52-5 at 8). Ms. Wilson then came onto Deputy

Williams’s driveway and began yelling at her as well. (Doc.

# 47-1 at 7). Deputy Williams started to fear for her safety

as she was outnumbered by Plaintiffs and Mr. McCutchen. (Id.).

Ultimately, Plaintiffs and Mr. McCutchen complied with Deputy

Williams’s demands that they get off her property, and the

verbal altercation continued from the street in front of her

house. (Id.).

At some point, Deputy Williams made a “broadcast over

the Southeast Dispatch Channel information related to an in-

progress, aggressive disturbance regarding a dog bite in the

area of her private residence and was requesting Bartow Police

Department [to] respond.” (Id. at 4). “Due to the urgency

detected” in Deputy Williams’s broadcast, PCSO Deputy Kaleigh

Nicole Evans “responded in emergency mode (lights and siren)

and planned to maintain order at the scene until Bartow Police

Department could also arrive.” (Id.). Upon arrival, Deputy

Evans observed Deputy Williams attempting to get Plaintiffs

and Mr. McCutchen “to back away from her property.” (Id.).

Shortly after, as officers from Bartow Police Department

(“BPD”) and additional PCSO officers arrived, Mr. McCutchen

and Plaintiffs left and went to their nearby home. (Id. at 4-

5; Doc. # 52-8 at 1 ¶ 2). Deputy Williams told BPD officers

on the scene that she was okay and that she had not been

battered or injured. (Doc. # 52-7 at 3 ¶ 3; Doc. # 52-8 at 2

¶ 3).

PCSO, rather than BPD, investigated the incident

involving Deputy Williams. (Doc. # 47-5 at 11:16-22; Doc. #

52-7 at 4 ¶ 2). Detective Haynes began the investigation that

evening. (Doc. # 47-5 at 10:7-22, 11:8-14, 11:24-12:14).

Detective Haynes did not personally know Deputy Williams

prior to the investigation. (Id. at 19:24-20:4).

Detective Haynes first took a recorded statement from

Deputy Williams. (Id. at 13:8-14:3, 16:4-25). Detective

Haynes’s written report describes Deputy Williams’s statement

as follows. As Deputy Williams drove home after looking for

Chico, Mr. McCutchen, Ms. Douglas, and J.R. “were flailing

their arms in an aggressive manner and appeared to be angry”

as they walked westbound. (Doc. # 47-1 at 7). Deputy Williams

arrived at her home and told Mr. Perez that “something has

happened to his dog and Yosgar.” (Id.). Deputy Williams, Mr.

Perez, and Yosgar “were able to get the dog contained” in her

front yard. (Id.). Mr. McCutchen approached Detective

Haynes’s driveway “in an aggressive manner stating, ‘where is

he at because I am going to fucking kill him.’” (Id.). Mr.

McCutchen, Ms. Douglas, and J.R. then entered Deputy

Williams’s driveway “in an aggressive manner.” (Id.). Deputy

Williams told Mr. McCutchen, Ms. Douglas, and J.R. several

times to leave her property, but they did not comply. (Id.).

Ms. Wilson, who was “irate and yelling profanities,” then

entered the driveway, “placing [Deputy] Williams in fear that

she would be harmed by [Ms.] Wilson.” (Id.). The situation

escalated, with Mr. McCutchen “asking where Yosgar was so he

could ‘kill’ him” and pushing Deputy Williams, who had stepped

in front of Mr. McCutchen to prevent him from getting closer

to Yosgar. (Id.). Mr. McCutchen and Ms. Douglas told Deputy

Williams that they will kill her, and Ms. Wilson yelled at

Deputy Williams, who again told them to leave her property.

(Id.). At this point, Deputy Williams “felt in fear for her

safety since she was outnumbered by the subjects and they

were very irate.” (Id.). Two of Deputy Williams’s neighbors,

Tommy Thomas and Nicole Thomas, then came onto Deputy

Williams’s property. (Id.). Mr. Thomas told Plaintiffs and

Mr. McCutchen to leave Deputy Willliams alone, and Ms. Thomas

recorded part of the incident. (Id.). Ultimately, Plaintiffs

and Mr. McCutchen went into the roadway and then returned to

their home when several law enforcement units arrived. (Id.).

Detective Haynes interviewed other witnesses, Ms.

Thomas, Mr. Thomas, Mr. Perez, Yosgar, Sandra Young, and

Nicholas Young, who largely corroborated Deputy Williams’s

account and who stated as follows. (Id. at 7-8, 19).

Ms. Thomas saw Ms. Douglas and J.R. chasing Yosgar down

the street and heard Ms. Douglas, J.R., and Mr. McCutchen

stating that they wanted to kill Yosgar. (Id. at 7). Ms.

Thomas also saw Mr. McCutchen push Deputy Williams. (Id.).

Ms. Thomas called 911 and feared for Deputy Williams’s safety

because “she was surrounded by the subjects.” (Id.).

Mr. Thomas saw Mr. McCutchen push Deputy Williams in the

chest. (Id.). Mr. McCutchen also threatened to harm Mr.

Thomas. (Id.). Mr. Thomas saw Mr. McCutchen, Ms. Douglas, and

J.R. being aggressive toward Deputy Williams on her property.

(Id.). According to Mr. Thomas, it appeared that the group

was trying to get closer to Mr. Perez and Yosgar. (Id.).

Mr. Perez reported that after Yosgar and Chico returned,

Deputy Williams told him to “get ready” because Chico bit

someone. (Id. at 7-8). Plaintiffs and Mr. McCutchen then

approached them “aggressively.” (Id. at 8). Mr. Perez saw

someone push Deputy Williams but could not identify who did

it. (Id.).

Yosgar acknowledged that he saw Chico bite a child and

another dog at the Wilson residence. (Id.). Yosgar also saw

Mr. McCutchen push Deputy Williams. (Id.). The actions of

Plaintiffs and Mr. McCutchen were aggressive and made him

afraid. (Id.).

Ms. Young and Mr. Young saw the incident from inside

their residence. (Id. at 19). According to them, Plaintiffs

and Mr. McCutchen appeared aggressive. (Id.). Ms. Young and

Mr. Young heard Deputy Williams telling the group to leave

her property and go home but “could not make out anything

else that was said.” (Id.).

Detective Haynes also reviewed the video footage taken

by Ms. Thomas. (Id. at 9). The first video begins with Mr.

McCutchen and Plaintiffs walking toward Deputy Williams’s

driveway, with Mr. McCutchen, Ms. Wilson, and Ms. Douglas

yelling, while Deputy Williams attempts to keep them

separated from Mr. Perez. (Doc. # 47-9 at Ex. A - Video 1).

Mr. Perez then walks away from the group, and Deputy Williams

stands at the edge of driveway near Ms. Douglas and Ms.

Wilson, who are yelling at her. (Id.). It appears that Ms.

Wilson then begins yelling at Ms. Thomas while Mr. McCutchen,

who is standing to the right of Deputy Williams, yells at Mr.

Thomas. (Id.). Deputy Williams instructs the group to stay

off her property. (Id.). As Mr. McCutchen yells, seemingly at

Mr. Thomas, to “come to the street,” Ms. Wilson tells her

children to go home. (Id.). Mr. Perez again walks toward the

group in the street, exacerbating the situation. (Id.).

Deputy Williams then physically places herself between the

group and Mr. Perez, instructing Mr. Perez to back up while

the group stands in front of her and continues to yell. (Id.).

The second video shows Ms. Wilson and Deputy Williams in

the street in front of the driveway, while Ms. Douglas, J.R.,

and Mr. McCutchen are on the sidewalk across the street. (Id.

at Ex. A - Video 2). Ms. Douglas tries to calm Mr. McCutchen,

who is yelling at someone on Deputy Williams’s property.

(Id.). Ms. Wilson yells at Deputy Williams that this is the

second time one of her family members has been attacked by a

dog in the neighborhood. (Id.). Mr. McCutchen then begins

yelling and again tells someone to “come to the street,” while

Ms. Williams tries to get him to stop. (Id.). There is at

least one other law enforcement officer at the scene during

this video. (Id.).

After speaking to the witnesses, Detective Haynes went

to Ms. Wilson’s home and interviewed each Plaintiff. (Doc. #

47-1 at 8, 10, 14). J.R. and Ms. Douglas stated that, after

the dog bit Ms. Douglas’s son, they walked down the street to

find the dog’s owner. (Id. at 8, 10). J.R. denied pushing

anyone or going into Deputy Williams’s yard. (Id. at 8). Ms.

Douglas also denied pushing anyone but admitted going into

Deputy Williams’s yard because she saw the dog. (Id. at 10).

Ms. Wilson denied battering or threatening anyone. (Id. at

14).

Detective Haynes placed Plaintiffs under arrest. (Id. at

8, 10, 14). Each Plaintiff was charged with burglary with

assault in violation of Florida Statute § 810.02(2)(a). (Id.

at 6, 8, 12). Ms. Douglas additionally was charged with

assault in violation of Florida Statute § 784.011 and

corruption by threat against public servant in violation of

Florida Statute § 838.021(3)(b). (Id. at 8). All charges

against Plaintiffs were dropped. (Doc. # 47-5 at 32:10-30).

C. Procedural History

Plaintiffs initiated this action on November 4, 2024.

(Doc. # 1). The second amended complaint asserts the following

claims: false arrest and false imprisonment in violation of

42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Detective Haynes (Count I); state-

law false arrest and false imprisonment against Sheriff Judd

and Detective Haynes (Counts II and III); state-law malicious

prosecution against Deputy Williams and Detective Haynes

(Count IV); defamation against Deputy Williams (Count V); and

intentional infliction of emotional distress against Deputy

Williams (Counts VI). (Doc. # 30).

The Court granted Defendants’ unopposed motion to

dismiss Count V. (Doc. # 33). Accordingly, only Counts I, II,

III, IV, and VI remain. Defendants filed their amended answer

and affirmative defenses on October 13, 2025. (Doc. # 46).

Defendants now move for summary judgment on all

remaining claims. (Doc. # 48). Plaintiffs responded. (Doc. #

53). Plaintiffs and Defendants also have filed Motions in

Limine (Doc. ## 54, 55). Each party responded. (Doc. # 56,

57). The Motions are ripe for review.

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute alone is not enough to

defeat a properly pled motion for summary judgment; only the

existence of a genuine issue of material fact will preclude

a grant of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).

An issue is genuine if the evidence is such that a

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving

party. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742

(11th Cir. 1996) (citing Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g

Co., 9 F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir. 1993)). A fact is material if

it may affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir.

1997). The moving party bears the initial burden of showing

the court, by reference to materials on file, that there are

no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at

trial. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260

(11th Cir. 2004) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323 (1986)). “When a moving party has discharged its

burden, the non-moving party must then ‘go beyond the

pleadings,’ and by its own affidavits, or by ‘depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’

designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue

for trial.” Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590,

593-94 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at

324).

If there is a conflict between the parties’ allegations

or evidence, the non-moving party’s evidence is presumed to

be true, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the

non-moving party’s favor. Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344

F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2003). If a reasonable fact finder

evaluating the evidence could draw more than one inference

from the facts, and if that inference introduces a genuine

issue of material fact, the court should not grant summary

judgment. Samples ex rel. Samples v. City of Atlanta, 846

F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1988). But, if the non-movant’s

response consists of nothing “more than a repetition of his

conclusional allegations,” summary judgment is not only

proper, but required. Morris v. Ross, 663 F.2d 1032, 1034

(11th Cir. 1981).

III. Analysis

A. Section 1983 False Arrest and False Imprisonment

Claim against Detective Haynes

Defendants argue that Detective Haynes is entitled to

summary judgment on Count I because there was probable cause

for her arrests of Plaintiffs. (Doc. # 48 at 9-13).

Alternatively, Defendants argue that summary judgment on

Count I is warranted because Detective Haynes is entitled to

qualified immunity. (Id. at 13-14). In response, Plaintiffs

argue that there is a genuine dispute as to whether Detective

Haynes had even arguable probable cause for the arrests. (Doc.

# 53 at 10-16). The Court agrees with Defendants that

Detective Haynes had probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs.

“An arrest without a warrant and lacking probable cause

violates the Constitution and can underpin a § 1983 claim,

but the existence of probable cause at the time of arrest is

an absolute bar to a subsequent constitutional challenge to

the arrest.” Brown v. City of Huntsville, 608 F.3d 724, 734

(11th Cir. 2010). “Probable cause exists where the facts

within the collective knowledge of law enforcement officials,

derived from reasonably trustworthy information, are

sufficient to cause a person of reasonable caution to believe

that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.” Id.

“[T]he correct legal standard to evaluate whether an officer

had probable cause to seize a suspect is to ask whether a

reasonable officer could conclude . . . that there was a

substantial chance of criminal activity.” Garcia v. Casey, 75

F.4th 1176, 1186 (11th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks

omitted). “A substantial chance is all that is required, ‘not

an actual showing of such activity.’” Davis v. City of Apopka,

78 F.4th 1326, 1334–35 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting District of

Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018)). “Under the ‘any-

crime rule’ an officer is ‘insulate[d] from false-arrest

claims so long as probable cause existed to arrest the suspect

for some crime, even if it was not the crime the officer

thought or said had occurred.’” Garcia, 75 F.4th at 1187 (11th

Cir. 2023) (quoting Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147, 1158

(11th Cir. 2020)).

“An arresting officer is required to conduct a

reasonable investigation to establish probable cause.” Rankin

v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1435 (11th Cir. 1998). “An officer,

however, need not take every conceivable step . . . at

whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an

innocent person.” Id. at 1436 (internal quotation marks

omitted). “In general, reliance upon eyewitness testimony,

including that of a victim of a crime, is sufficient to

establish probable cause.” Scott v. City of Miami, 139 F.4th

1267, 1274 (11th Cir. 2025). “[E]vidence of every element of

a crime is not required for a showing of probable cause.”

Davis, 78 F.4th at 1335. “Moreover, the presence of

contradictory evidence does not bar a finding of probable

cause.” Scott, 139 F.4th at 1274. “An officer is not required

to believe [exculpatory evidence] or to weigh the evidence in

such a way as to conclude that probable cause did not exist.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Absent probable cause, an officer is still entitled to

qualified immunity if arguable probable cause existed.” Case

v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1327 (11th Cir. 2009). “Arguable

probable cause exists where reasonable officers in the same

circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the

Defendant could have believed that probable cause existed to

arrest.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “This

standard recognizes that law enforcement officers may make

reasonable but mistaken judgments regarding probable cause

but does not shield officers who unreasonably conclude that

probable cause exists.” Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d

1130, 1137 (11th Cir. 2007).

Defendants argue that there was probable cause for

Plaintiffs’ arrests because “the totality of the

circumstances known to [Detective] Haynes would lead any

reasonable officer to believe that Plaintiffs had committed

at least the criminal offense of assault (threatening

violence).” (Doc. # 48 at 12). In response, Plaintiffs argue

that there was not even arguable probable cause to arrest

them for disorderly conduct, let alone for assault. (Doc. #

53 at 11-13). Plaintiffs contend that, “at best, the

Defendants can show that these three Plaintiffs yelled and

even cursed at [Deputy] Williams while she was in her front

yard or driveway.” (Id. at 13). The Court agrees with

Defendants.

Under Florida law, an “‘assault’ is an intentional,

unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person

of another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and

doing some act which creates a well-founded fear in such other

person that such violence is imminent.” Fla. Stat. §

784.011(1). An assault conviction does not require an

explicit threat. Mantecon v. State, 373 So. 3d 929, 941 (Fla.

1st DCA 2023). A defendant’s actions can be sufficient

evidence of an unlawful threat by act to harm another person.

See Pinkney v. State, 74 So. 3d 572, 577 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)

(“It is undisputed that Mr. Pinkney’s act of backing his car

in the direction of Officer Zammitt constituted a threat of

violence.”); Martinez v. State, 561 So. 2d 1279, 1280-81 (Fla.

2d DCA 1990) (holding that “a threat need not be accompanied

by intelligible words in order to be adequately conveyed and

understood” and that, under the circumstances, the

defendant’s actions would be sufficient).

Here, Deputy Williams and all the nonparty witnesses

interviewed prior to Plaintiffs’ arrests told Detective

Haynes that there was an aggressive altercation in front of

Deputy Williams’s house on the evening in question, which is

corroborated by the video footage. (Doc. # 47-1 at 7-8, 19;

Doc. # 47-9 at Ex. A). Deputy Williams reported that Ms.

Douglas threatened to kill her. (Doc. # 47-1 at 7). Although

none of the witnesses stated that Ms. Wilson or J.R. made

explicit verbal threats to Deputy Williams, Deputy Williams

told Detective Haynes that the fact that she was outnumbered

by a group of irate people who refused, at least initially,

to leave her property placed her in fear for her safety.

(Id.). Deputy Williams’s account was corroborated by Ms.

Thomas, who stated that she called 911 when she observed the

group surrounding Deputy Williams because she was afraid for

Deputy Williams’s safety. (Id.).

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to

Plaintiffs, Defendants have demonstrated that Detective

Haynes had probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs. Although

Plaintiffs dispute that their conduct was criminal, there is

no dispute over what Deputy Williams and the nonparty

witnesses told Detective Haynes. A reasonable officer

considering the statements from Deputy Williams and the

nonparty witnesses, as well as the video, could conclude there

was a substantial chance that Plaintiffs had committed an

assault under Florida law. See Scott, 139 F.4th at 1274 (“In

general, reliance upon eyewitness testimony . . . is

sufficient to establish probable cause.”); Huebner v.

Bradshaw, 935 F.3d 1183, 1188 (11th Cir. 2019) (holding that

an arresting officer is not “required to sift through

conflicting evidence or resolve issues of credibility, so

long as the totality of the circumstances present[ed] a

sufficient basis for believing that an offense ha[d] been

committed” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Detective

Haynes was not required to believe Plaintiffs’ accounts of

the incident. See Scott, 139 F.4th at 1274 (“[A] police

officer need not resolve conflicting evidence in a manner

favorable to the suspect.” (internal quotation marks

omitted)). In any event, as reasonable officers in Detective

Haynes’s position could have believed that probable cause

existed to arrest Plaintiffs, Defendants have shown that

Detective Haynes at least had arguable probable cause and,

therefore, would be entitled to qualified immunity. Case, 555

F.3d at 1327.

In response, Plaintiffs argue that Detective Haynes did

not have even arguable probable cause to arrest Plaintiffs.

They emphasize that they were not arrested by any of the BPD

officers who responded to the scene and who “spoke directly

to [Deputy Williams] and watched the video of how the

horrified Wilson family, whose toddler had just been mauled

by a dog, was acting towards [Deputy] Williams, who they

yelled at and screamed at for, at a maximum, 10 minutes or

so.” (Doc. # 53 at 12-13). However, it is undisputed that

PCSO, not BPD, assumed responsibility for investigating the

incident. (Doc. # 47-5 at 11:16-22; Doc. # 52-7 at 4 ¶ 2).

Plaintiffs also point to the fact that Deputy Williams told

BPD officers on the scene that she was fine and had not been

battered or injured. (Doc. # 53 at 13). But Deputy Williams’s

statements to the BPD officers do not contradict her

statements to Detective Haynes that Plaintiffs’ conduct made

her fear for her safety. Plaintiffs, therefore, have not

demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact as to whether

Detective Haynes had probable cause or, at a minimum, arguable

probable cause for the arrests. See Allen, 121 F.3d at 646

(“An issue of fact is ‘material’ if it is a legal element of

the claim under the applicable substantive law which might

affect the outcome of the case.”)

Accordingly, summary judgment is granted on Count I.

B. State-Law Claims

Having found that Detective Haynes is entitled to

summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ only federal claim, Count I,

the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

the remaining state-law claims, Counts II, III, IV, and VI.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may decline

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under

subsection (a) . . . if the district court has dismissed all

claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”). Resolution

of Plaintiffs’ remaining claims “depends on determinations of

state law,” and “[s]tate courts, not federal courts, should

be the final arbiters of state law.” Baggett v. First Nat.

Bank of Gainesville, 117 F.3d 1342, 1353 (11th Cir. 1997);

Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1089 (11th Cir.

2004) (“We have encouraged district courts to dismiss any

remaining state claims when, as here, the federal claims have

been dismissed prior to trial.”). The Court finds that

principles of judicial economy, fairness, convenience, and

comity weigh in favor of having a state court decide

Plaintiffs’ state-law claims. Baggett, 117 F.3d at 1353.

Therefore, Counts II, III, IV, and VI are dismissed

without prejudice. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), the

statute of limitations is tolled for a period of 30 days after

the claims are dismissed “unless State law provides for a

longer tolling period.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d).

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED:

(1) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. # 48) is

GRANTED IN PART. Summary judgment in favor of Defendant

Diamond Haynes is granted on Count I. The Motion is

otherwise DENIED.

(2) Because the Court declines to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law claims, Counts

II, III, IV, and VI are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The

statute of limitations is tolled pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1367(d).

(3) Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine (Doc. # 54) is DENIED as

moot.

(4) Defendants’ Motion in Limine (Doc. # 55) is DENIED as

moot.

(5) The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of

Defendant Diamond Haynes and against Plaintiffs on Count

I.

(6) Thereafter, the Clerk is directed to cancel the pretrial

conference scheduled for February 27, 2026, terminate

all deadlines, and CLOSE this case.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 2nd

day of February, 2026.

VIRGINIA M. HERNANDEZ’COVINGTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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