Riley-Cornutt

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

SOUTHERN DIVISION

ERIKA RILEY-CORNUTT, }

}

Plaintiff, }

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v. } Case No.: 2:23-cv-00454-MHH

}

THE BOARD OF THE TRUSTEES }

OF THE UNIVERSITY OF }

ALABAMA, }

}

Defendant. }

ERIKA RILEY-CORNUTT, }

}

Plaintiff, }

} Case No.: 2:24-cv-01164-MHH

v. }

}

THE BOARD OF THE TRUSTEES }

OF THE UNIVERSITY OF }

ALABAMA, UAB HOSPITAL, }

}

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Ms. Riley-Cornutt has requested permission to file a second amended

complaint against the Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama. (Doc. 72).1

1 In her pro se pleadings in this case, Ms. Riley-Cornett has named as defendants the Board of

Trustees of the University of Alabama and UAB Hospital. (See, e.g., Doc. 60. The Board “‘owns

University of Alabama Hospital in Birmingham, Alabama, an operating division of the University

of Alabama at Birmingham, and various other entities and assets engaged in the delivery of

healthcare services.’” See Health Care Auth. for Baptist Health v. Davis, 158 So. 3d 397, 401

Ms. Riley-Cornutt seeks to assert Title VII claims against the Board for race

discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment; discrimination claims

under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983; and a failure to accommodate claim under the

Americans with Disabilities Act. (Doc. 72-1, pp. 33–43, ¶¶ 236–317). Because the

disposition of Ms. Riley-Cornutt’s motion to amend will help resolve other pending

motions in this case, the Court begins this order with an analysis of the motion to

amend and then addresses the orders impacted by the Court’s ruling.2

“A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course no later than: (A)

21 days after serving it, or (B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading

is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of

a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1).

“In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s

written consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when justice

so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). “[T]he grant or denial of an opportunity to

(Ala. 2013). Therefore, the Board is the proper defendant in this action. Mr. Riley-Cornutt seems

to recognize this in her proposed second amended complaint. (Doc. 72-1).

On August 29, 2024, the Court issued an order consolidating Ms. Riley-Cornutt’s two lawsuits,

Case No.: 2:23-cv-00454-MHH and Case No.: 2:24-cv-01164-MHH. In this order, unless

otherwise noted, the Court cites the documents in the lead case, Case No.: 2:23-cv-00454-MHH.

2 The Board has filed a motion to strike and a partial motion to dismiss Ms. Riley-Cornutt’s first

amended complaint, (Doc. 61). The Board also has filed a motion to vacate the scheduling order

in case no. 2:23-cv-00454, to stay rulings on pending motions, and to amend the scheduling order

in case: 2:24-cv-01164. (Doc. 76). Ms. Riley-Cornutt had filed an amended motion to reopen

discovery. (Doc. 64).

amend is within the discretion of the [d]istrict [c]ourt.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.

178, 182 (1962).

A district court may deny leave to amend if “(1) there has been undue delay

or bad faith; (2) allowing an amendment would cause undue prejudice to the

opposing party; or (3) an amendment would be futile.” Ray v. Equifax Info. Servs.,

LLC, 327 Fed. Appx. 819, 822 (11th Cir. 2009). “[D]enial of leave to amend is

justified by futility when the ‘complaint as amended is still subject to dismissal.’”

Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999). To determine

whether the claims Ms. Riley-Cornutt asserts in her proposed second amended

complaint are futile, the Court views the factual allegations in the proposed amended

complaint in the light most favorable to Ms. Riley-Cornutt. See Tims v. LGE Cmty.

Credit Union, 935 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir. 2019) (“We accept factual allegations

in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.”).

Because Ms. Riley-Cornutt is proceeding pro se, her “pleadings are held to a

less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be

liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir.

1998). “This leniency, however, does not require or allow courts to rewrite an

otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Thomas v. Pentagon Fed.

Credit Union, 393 Fed. Appx. 635, 637 (11th Cir. 2010).

***

Ms. Riley-Cornutt first sued the Board on April 10, 2023. (Doc. 1). In her

initial complaint, she asserted Title VII claims for disparate treatment and retaliation.

On August 24, 2024, after exhausting additional employment claims with the EEOC,

Ms. Riley-Cornutt filed a new complaint against the Board asserting Title VII claims

for failure to promote, unequal terms and conditions of employment, and retaliation.

(Case No. 2:24-cv-01164-MHH, Doc. 1). This Court consolidated Ms. Riley-

Cornutt’s lawsuits. (Doc. 49).

On January 21, 2025, Ms. Riley-Cornutt filed her first amended complaint.

(Doc. 60). In the amended complaint, Ms. Riley-Cornutt asserted claims under the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. 1981. (Doc. 60, p. 2).

On February 4, 2025, the Board moved to dismiss some of the claims in Ms. Riley-

Cornutt’s first amended complaint. (Doc. 61). A few months later, Ms. Riley-

Cornutt asked for permission to file a second amended complaint to address the

Board’s arguments in its motion to dismiss. (Doc. 65). Ms. Riley-Cornutt did not

attach her proposed amended complaint to her motion to amend. (Doc. 65). Before

the Court ruled on the motion for leave to amend, Ms. Riley-Cornutt filed a second

amended complaint. (Doc. 68). Because Ms. Riley-Cornutt filed the amended

complaint without the Court’s permission, the Court struck the second amended

complaint from the record, (Doc. 70), and the Court gave Ms. Riley-Cornutt the

opportunity to renew her motion to amend her complaint and attach to her motion

her proposed amended complaint. (Doc. 70). Ms. Riley-Cornutt then filed her

pending motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. (Doc. 72).

***

In her proposed second amended complaint, Ms. Riley-Cornutt, a Black

woman, alleges that she began working for the University of Alabama at

Birmingham, in July 2003. (Doc. 72-1, pp. 4–5, ¶¶ 11–12). Over approximately 20

years, she advanced from a technician to a Registered Nurse in 2006 and later to

Ambulatory Services Manager for Neurology in 2018. (Doc. 72-1, p. 5, ¶¶ 13–14).

Ms. Riley-Cornutt contends that over her years of employment, she received positive

performance appraisals, and she had no disciplinary issues. (Doc. 72-1, p. 5, ¶ 16).

Ms. Riley-Cornutt asserts that the Board terminated her as Ambulatory Services

Manager in July 2021 shortly after she raised concerns about discriminatory

practices by her direct leader. (Doc. 72-1, p. 5, ¶ 15).

Ms. Riley-Cornutt alleges that the hospital rehired her in July 2021 as an RN

Quality Improvement Coordinator in the Heart and Vascular Center, where she was

assigned to a team with a white colleague, Dawn Ousley. (Doc. 72-1, p. 6, ¶¶ 19–

20). Ms. Riley-Cornutt asserts that her manager, Melesia Goolsby, recognized her

ability to maintain a significant workload, but Ms. Goolsby and others favored Ms.

Ousley. (Doc. 72-1, p. 6, ¶ 24). For example, Director Sherri Wall, white, refused

to shake Ms. Riley-Cornutt’s hand, citing COVID-19 protocols, but Ms. Wall

hugged Ms. Ousley a short time later. (Doc. 72-1, pp. 6–7, ¶¶ 25–26).

Ms. Riley-Cornutt alleges that UAB manipulated salaries to favor white

employees. (Doc. 72-1, p. 8, ¶¶ 37, 41). In October 2022, UAB raised the maximum

salary for the RN QI Coordinator position from $92,206 to $98,855 to allow a white

employee, Brandy George, to transfer into the role without a reduction in pay. (Doc.

72-1, pp. 8–9, ¶¶ 36–42). A white STEMI Coordinator, Emily Pentecost, earned

approximately $95,000, a salary that exceeded the position’s maximum and her own

pay, even though Ms. Pentecost had less nursing experience and no prior quality

experience. (Doc. 72-1, p. 10, ¶¶ 56–57).

In April 2023, Ms. Riley-Cornutt requested a meeting with Ms. Wall and

Human Resources to address pay parity. (Doc. 72-1, p. 13, ¶¶ 77, 79). After the

meeting, Ms. Riley-Cornutt was placed on a performance improvement plan. Ms.

Riley-Cornutt advised HR that she disagreed with the PIP. (Doc. 72-1, p. 13, ¶¶ 84,

86). A co-worker told Ms. Riley-Cornutt that Ms. Wall discussed Ms. Riley-

Cornett’s complaint about pay parity with others and remarked: “She’s going

down.” (Doc. 72-1, p. 14, ¶ 91). Ms. Riley-Cornutt felt that Ms. Wall was

threatening her. (Doc. 72-1, p. 14, ¶ 92). Ms. Riley-Cornutt contends that her

supervisors scrutinized her work more closely than they scrutinized the work of

white employees. (Doc. 72-1, p. 16, ¶ 101).

In May and June of 2023, Ms. Riley-Cornutt interviewed for a new position

at the hospital. (Doc. 72-1, p. 17, ¶ 112). In June of 2023, the hospital placed Ms.

Riley-Cornutt on a PIP. (Doc. 72-1, p. 17, ¶ 113). As a result, Ms. Riley-Cornutt

did not receive an interview for the new position even though she was highly

qualified. (Doc. 72-1, pp. 17-18, ¶¶ 114, 116).

Ms. Riley-Cornutt alleges that the stress associated with the discrimination

and retaliation caused her to take FMLA leave for anxiety and depression in July

and August 2023. (Doc. 72-1, pp. 19–20, ¶¶ 129–30). When she returned from

leave, Ms. Riley-Cornutt’s work was subject to heightened scrutiny and

micromanagement. (Doc. 72-1, pp. 20, 23–24, ¶¶ 132, 153, 165). In October 2024,

Ms. Riley-Cornutt transferred to the radiology department. (Doc. 72-1, p. 27, ¶¶

184–85). Still, personnel from her former department interfered by passing the chain

of command to report overdue assignments to her new department’s executive

leadership. (Doc. 72-1, pp. 28–30, ¶¶194–95, 202–07). Ms. Riley-Cornutt was

denied a merit increase in 2024, even though she received one the previous year with

comparable performance ratings. (Doc. 72-1, pp. 30–31, ¶¶ 214, 216, 218).

Ms. Riley-Cornutt contends that her race was a motivating factor in UAB’s

decisions regarding her pay, disciplinary status, and the denial of promotional

opportunities. (Doc. 72-1, pp. 31–32, ¶¶223, 227). Ms. Riley-Cornutt seeks back

pay, front pay, compensatory damages, costs, and injunctive and declaratory relief.

Ms. Riley-Cornutt asks the Court to declare that the Board’s employment

practices violated federal anti-discrimination laws, (Doc. 72-1, p. 44, ¶ A), and to

enjoin the Board from continuing these unlawful actions, (Doc. 72-1, p. 44, ¶ B).

Ms. Riley-Cornutt asks for additional relief, including promotion to a director-level

position or higher and an award of damages for mental anguish, lost wages, and an

award of legal fees and costs. (Doc. 72-1, p. 44, ¶ C).

***

The Board contends that several of the claims Ms. Riley-Cornutt would like

to pursue in her proposed second amended complaint are futile. (Doc. 75, pp. 4–5).

The Court agrees.

The Board is immune from many of the claims that Ms. Riley-Cornutt would

like to pursue. “[T]he Constitution does not provide for federal jurisdiction over

suits against nonconsenting States.” Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73

(2000). Alabama has not consented to be sued in federal court. ALA. CONST., art. I,

§ 14 (“[T]he State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law

or equity.”). Under the Eleventh Amendment, suits against an “arm of the State” are

also barred in federal court. Versiglio v. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 686 F.3d 1290, 1291

(11th Cir. 2011). An “‘arm of the State’ . . . includes agents and instrumentalities of

the State.” Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003). Consistent with

this precedent, the Eleventh Circuit has held that state agencies are immune from

suits brought without their consent, and the Board is a state agency. Eubank v.

Leslie, 210 Fed. Appx. 837, 844 (11th Cir. 2006). “The Alabama Supreme Court

has also determined that the [University of Alabama Board of Trustees] is entitled

to sovereign immunity as an instrumentality of the state.” Harden v. Adams, 760

F.2d 1158, 1164 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing Hutchinson v. Board of Trustees of

University of Alabama, 256 So.2d 279 (Ala. Civ. App. 1971)). Per Ex parte Young,

209 U.S. 123 (1909), plaintiffs may maintain lawsuits against state officials for

prospective injunctive relief to halt ongoing violations of federal law, but the Ex

parte Young exception does not apply “in suits against the States and their agencies,

which are barred regardless of the relief sought.” P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v.

Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993). Ms. Riley-Cornutt has not asserted

claims against a state official.

Because the Board is an arm of the State of Alabama, the Board is immune

from suit in federal court absent a valid abrogation of that immunity by Congress or

an express waiver by the State. With respect to her proposed ADA claim, Ms. Riley-

Cornutt seeks a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction against the Board

under Title II. (Doc. 72-1, p. 44, ¶ A-B). Title II of the ADA abrogates Eleventh

Amendment immunity only when the alleged conduct amounts to disability

discrimination in violation of Title II and the Fourteenth Amendment. Black v.

Wiginton, 811 F.3d 1259, 1269 (11th Cir. 2016). In her proposed second amended

complaint, Ms. Riley-Cornutt’s does not cite the Fourteenth Amendment. For this

reason alone, Ms. Riley-Cornutt has not pleaded an ADA claim that survives a

challenge under the Eleventh Amendment.

To assert a constitutional violation, a plaintiff must bring a claim under §

1983, but that statute does not abrogate a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity,

and a state and its agencies are not “persons” subject to suit under that statute. See

Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989) (“Section 1983

provides a federal forum to remedy many deprivations of civil liberties, but it does

not provide a federal forum for litigants who seek a remedy against a State for

alleged deprivations of civil liberties”). These immunity principles also apply to

claims against a state or its agencies under § 1981. See Sessions v. Rusk State Hosp.,

648 F.2d 1066, 1069 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment

immunity applies in § 1981 litigation).3

Therefore, Ms. Riley-Cornutt’s proposed claims against the Board under the

ADA and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 are futile.4

3 The Eleventh Circuit has adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit

Court of Appeals issued before the close of business on September 30, 1981. Bonner v. City of

Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981). The Fifth Circuit issued the Sessions

decision in June 1981, so the Sessions decision is binding authority for this district court.

4 The Board challenged these claims in its motion to dismiss Ms. Riley-Cornutt’s first amended

complaint. (Docs. 60, 61). The Board’s arguments are well-taken.

The Board does not have an immunity defense to Ms. Riley-Cornutt’s Title

VII claims because Congress has abrogated state immunity under Title VII. Title

VII prohibits employers from discriminating “against any individual with respect to

h[er] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such

individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–

2(a)(1). Ms. Riley-Cornutt has adequately alleged facts to proceed with her Title

VII claims for race discrimination and retaliation. Under binding precedent, Ms.

Riley-Cornutt has not alleged sufficient facts to support a hostile work environment

claim.

A hostile work environment claim requires evidence that “the workplace is

permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently

severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an

abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21

(1993). To prove a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate

that she is a member of a protected class, she was subjected to unwelcome

harassment, the harassment was based on a protected characteristic, the conduct was

sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of her employment

and create an abusive working environment, and the employer is liable for the

harassment under either a theory of direct or vicarious liability. Miller v. Kenworth

of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002). In evaluating the objective

severity of the alleged harassment, a district court must consider “(1) the frequency

of the conduct; (2) the severity of the conduct; (3) whether the conduct is physically

threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and (4) whether the

conduct unreasonably interferes with the employee’s job performance.” Brathwaite

v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., Fla., 763 Fed. Appx. 856, 859 (11th Cir. 2019).

Ms. Riley-Cornutt alleges that Ms. Goolsby, her white supervisor, and others

subjected her to a hostile work environment through a pattern of adverse treatment.

(Doc. 72-1, pp. 34–37, ¶¶ 242–62). Ms. Riley-Cornutt alleges that during meetings,

Ms. Goolsby would repeatedly interrupt her, cut her off, and disregard her

contributions. (Doc. 72-1, p. 35, ¶ 248). Ms. Riley-Cornutt contends that when she

did not immediately assist a white colleague as directed, Ms. Goolsby subjected her

work to heightened scrutiny to ensure that Ms. Riley-Cornutt would receive low

performance evaluations. (Doc. 72-1, pp. 35–36, ¶¶ 250–52).

Ms. Riley-Cornutt alleges that this pattern of conduct led her to believe that

Ms. Goolsby and Ms. Wall intended to terminate her employment. (Doc. 72-1, p.

36, ¶ 257). Ms. Riley-Cornutt asserts that the resulting stress and anxiety became so

severe that she took medical leave. (Doc. 72-1, p. 36, ¶ 258). When she later

attempted to return to work, Ms. Riley-Cornutt alleges that the work environment

was intolerable, forcing her to transfer or resign. (Doc. 72-1, p. 37, ¶ 26).

Although Ms. Riley Cornutt’s proposed allegations indicate that her

experience with her supervisors caused her significant distress, the “severe or

pervasive” prong of a harassment claim has an objective component, and Ms. Riley-

Cornutt has not alleged facts that meet the objective standard. See Yelling v. St.

Vincent's Health Sys., 82 F.4th 1329, 1335 (11th Cir. 2023) (“Showing that

harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive requires” that the employee

“subjectively perceive the harassment as sufficiently severe and pervasive,” and that

perception must “be objectively reasonable”). With respect to frequency and

severity, Ms. Riley-Cornutt’s allegations concerning increased scrutiny and limited

communication do not rise to the level of repeated discriminatory comments, slurs,

ridicule, or abusive conduct required to meet the objective standard. See, e.g.,

Fortson v. Carlson, 618 Fed. Appx. 601, 607 (11th Cir. 2015) (multiple racially

explicit remarks over two-year period not severe or pervasive). The Eleventh Circuit

has held that criticism, micromanagement, ostracism, and unfair treatment, without

more, do not constitute the type of extreme conduct necessary to alter the terms and

conditions of employment. See Harris v. Pub. Health Tr. of Miami-Dade Cnty., 82

F.4th 1296, 1305 (11th Cir. 2023) (supervisors’ micromanagement, excessive

monitoring, solicitation of peers to report plaintiff’s violations, requirement that the

plaintiff perform clerical duties, and dismissal or disregard of the plaintiff’s

complaints of race discrimination were not sufficiently severe or pervasive); Yelling,

82 F.4th at 1335–37 (racially “heated” work environment where coworkers regularly

discussed racially insensitive topics including name-calling not severe or pervasive).

Because Ms. Riley-Cornutt has not alleged discriminatory intimidation,

ridicule, or insult that is, objectively, “sufficiently severe or pervasive,” Ms. Riley-

Cornutt’s proposed Title VII hostile work environment claim is futile.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed, many of the claims that Ms. Riley-Cornutt asserts

in her proposed second amended complaint are futile. Because Ms. Riley-Cornutt

has added detailed factual allegations in her proposed second amended complaint,

the Court will allow Ms. Riley-Cornutt to file the second amended complaint. By

April 15, 2026, Ms. Riley-Cornutt shall file her proposed second amended

complaint, (Doc. 72-1), as a new pleading so that the Clerk may docket a second

amended complaint. The Court strikes from Ms. Riley-Cornutt’s second amended

complaint all claims but Ms. Riley-Cornutt’s Title VII claims for race discrimination

and retaliation.5 The parties shall litigate the Title VII race discrimination and

retaliation claims.

This order renders the Board’s motion to dismiss Ms. Riley-Cornutt’s first

amended complaint moot. (Doc. 61). The parties shall submit a proposed

5 The Court strikes from Ms. Riley-Cornutt’s second amended complaint her Title VII hostile work

environment claim and her claims against the Board under the ADA and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and

1983.

scheduling order, and discovery shall proceed with respect to the second amended

complaint. The Court denies Ms. Riley-Cornutt’s amended motion to reopen

discovery, (Doc. 64), and finds that Docs. 72, 76, and 80 are moot. The Clerk of

Court shall please TERM Docs. 61, 64, 72, 76, and 80.

DONE and ORDERED this April 9, 2026.

Madeli Sh asa

MADELINE HUGHES HAIKALA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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